Santamaria v. Equitable PCI-Bank, Inc.
This is a civil case where the petitioners, Vivian and Nina Santamaria, filed a complaint for damages against respondents Equitable PCI-Bank, Inc. (now BDO Unibank, Inc.) and Mary Rose Tabing. The petitioners claimed that the respondents were negligent in handling Vivian's current account which resulted in checks being issued without her knowledge or consent, causing her serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding that the petitioners failed to establish that an unauthorized person had managed Vivian's account and that the respondents were not negligent in handling the account. The Supreme Court also noted that the petitioners failed to prove that they sustained any injury or damage from the acts of the respondents.
ADVERTISEMENT
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 229540. September 6, 2017.]
VIVIAN M. SANTAMARIA AND NINA RICA M. SANTAMARIA, petitioners,vs. EQUITABLE PCI-BANK, INC. (NOW BDO UNIBANK, INC.) AND MARY ROSE TABING, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 6, 2017, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 229540 (Vivian M. Santamaria and Nina Rica M. Santamaria vs. Equitable PCI-Bank, Inc. (now BDO Unibank, Inc.) and Mary Rose Tabing). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision 1 dated January 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 106502. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the Decision dated July 1, 2014 and the Order dated March 4, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 74 in Civil Case No. 057687, which ordered respondents to jointly and severally pay petitioners moral, exemplary, actual, and compensatory damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. ETHIDa
The Facts
Sometime in 1999, petitioner Vivian M. Santamaria ("Vivian") was hired as operations manager of a Select Convenience Store in a Shell Gasoline Station at Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City which was owned and operated by Lourdes Casimero ("Casimero"), Vivian's professor at the University of the Philippines. Vivian served as such until January 29, 2004 when she left for the United States to attend to her ailing sister-in-law. As operations manager of the store, Vivian had the responsibility of ordering supplies, paying its suppliers, and had supervisory functions over the store's employees.
Casimero also owns two (2) other entities, namely, Tensorex Industrial Corporation (Tensorex) and Extra Mile Tire (EMT). Both are clients of respondent Equitable PCI-Bank, Inc., now called BDO Unibank, Inc. ("BDO"). Respondent Mary Rose Tabing is an officer at BDO's West Avenue Branch. 2
On the other hand, petitioner Nina Rica M. Santamaria ("Nina") is the daughter of petitioner Vivian who had no connection whatsoever with Casimero or any of Casimero's stores or businesses. 3 However, she had joined her mother in filing the present case against respondents since her name had been signed on several checks issued from a current account which was opened by Casimero in the name of petitioner Vivian.
It appears that a few months after Vivian was hired, Casimero suggested that they open a current account in the name of Vivian to facilitate the payment of suppliers which did not extend credit to Select Store. Vivian agreed to this suggestion and a current account was opened at respondent BDO's West Avenue branch, without the presence of Vivian but with the aid of Tabing. 4 Current Account No. 000237-00087-0 (the "Account") was opened in the name of Vivian and Lorelei Ibasco ("Ibasco"), the daughter of Casimero. 5 The required initial deposit was financed by Casimero, who thereafter gave Vivian blank signature cards which she filled up and returned to Casimero for submission to the bank. 6
Upon Casimero's instructions, Vivian proceeded to issue checks from the Account until the latter left for an authorized leave of absence on January 29, 2004.
When she returned from the United States on June 9, 2004, Vivian was shocked to receive a letter from BDO notifying her that she, who was addressed in the letter as "Proprietress of a certain Santamaria Tires," was a debtor of Tensorex and that the latter had assigned Vivian's debt to BDO. She thereafter learned that several checks were issued from the Account in favor of several entities after she left for the United States (US) on January 30, 2004.
Vivian then called Casimero and asked about the matter. However, Casimero told her to disregard the same as she will settle it with the bank and will contact Vivian thereafter. However, Casimero never got in touch with Vivian and the former's whereabouts could no longer be found.
Meantime, Vivian left again for the US in November 2004 and came back in March 2005 due to the failing health and eventual death of her sister-in-law. Upon her return, she was surprised to receive a letter from Rykom Leasing and Finance Corporation demanding that she pay Tensorex's receivables from her. 7
In view of this, Vivian became more worried and she was forced to go from one office to another to verify if she incurred loans from the checks she allegedly issued on behalf of Santamaria Tires which ghost firm apparently was just Casimero's creation. In the process, Vivian discovered that some checks issued from the Account were negotiated while others were dishonored as they bore the forged signatures of petitioner Nina, who was neither the owner nor an authorized signatory of the Account. 8
Because of her discovery, Vivian felt so worried that there were numerous occasions that she had a hard time sleeping. She had to search for all other possible creditors of Casimero to confirm whether petitioners' names were used by Casimero without their knowledge. Vivian also sought help from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for relief for what she claims as an unsound banking practice and BDO's negligence in handling the subject account by allowing a non-signatory to operate the same. 9
Thus, on September 23, 2005, petitioners filed a Complaint for damages seeking redress against respondents' actions. 10
In their defense, respondents BDO and Tabing sought for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action, claiming that they exercised good faith in accordance with ordinary banking procedures while handling Vivian's account. They also assert that inasmuch as petitioners have no cause of action against them, then petitioners are not entitled to damages. 11
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners in a Decision 12 dated July 1, 2014, the dispositive portion of which reads: cSEDTC
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) ORDERING defendants EQUITABLE-PCI BANK (now BDO-UNIBANK, INC.) and MARY ROSE TABING, jointly and severally, TO PAY plaintiff VIVIAN M. SANTAMARIA, the following:
a) Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages;
b) Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
c) Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as actual and compensatory damages.
2) ORDERING EQUITABLE-PCI BANK (now BDO-UNIBANK, INC.) and MARY ROSE TABING, jointly and severally, TO PAY plaintiffs VIVIAN M. SANTAMARIA and NINA RICA M. SANTAMARIA, the following:
a) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as attorney's fees; and
b) Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P17,000.00) as litigation expenses.
3) The defendants EQUITABLE-PCI BANK (now BDO UNIBAN[K], INC[.], and MARY ROSE TABING's counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED. 13
The trial court ruled that the non-participation of Casimero and Ibasco did not affect the court's resolution of the case since the issue of whether respondents were liable for damages could still be determined in their absence. The trial court found that respondents failed to comply with their obligation as a bank and bank officer to treat Vivian's account meticulously and with the highest degree of care when they allowed a person who was not a signatory to operate her current account. Because of respondents' negligence, several financing companies went after petitioner Vivian, despite the latter's not having any hand in the issuance of the subject checks. The trial court further ruled that while respondents' negligence was not attended by malice and bad faith, their failure to verify the genuineness of Vivian's signatures on the checks, which led to eventual claims against Vivian, caused her serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation, for which she is entitled to reasonable moral damages.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision, but this was denied in an Order dated March 4, 2015. Thus, respondents appealed the case to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In the assailed Decision dated January 20, 2017, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the APPEAL is GRANTED. The RTC's Decision dated 1 July 2014 and its Order dated 4 March 2015 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING appellees' Complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 14
The CA agreed with the RTC that the non-inclusion of Casimero and Ibasco as parties to the suit is not fatal. However, it disagreed with the trial court's ruling on the substantive issues raised by petitioners. First, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that an unauthorized person had managed Vivian's account. Since the account was not solely owned by Vivian, the CA found that it needed more than Vivian's bare allegations and hearsay evidence to prove that the account was accessed and operated without the consent of its owners.
As for respondent bank's acceptance or processing of falsified checks, the CA ruled that it cannot discount the possibility that the checks were made by Ibasco as co-owner of the account, absent any proof to the contrary. Moreover, petitioners allegedly never claimed injury or damage from the deposits of the falsified checks, nor did they demonstrate that they complained to respondent bank after they received the bank statement reflecting the deposits. The CA concluded that petitioners were not able to show how they were inconvenienced by the deposits or if they were made to answer for these checks. Thus, it found that petitioners cannot recover damages from the acceptance of checks by respondent bank.
The CA also ruled that respondents did not breach their duty to treat the subject account with the highest degree of diligence since the checks were merely presented to respondent bank to determine the credit ceiling for the credit line granted to Tensorex. As for the checks issued to the other financing companies, these were dishonored by respondent bank. Thus, respondents cannot be made liable for damages for the dishonored checks, especially since petitioners never had to pay for these checks. In conclusion, the CA held that petitioners failed to prove that respondents acted negligently in treating the former's account; thus, their claim for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, must be denied.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present petition praying for the reversal of the assailed Decision and the reinstatement of the RTC Decision.
The Petition
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in holding that they failed to substantiate sufficient evidence in support of their claim that an unauthorized person managed petitioner Vivian's account during her absence from the Philippines. They point out that both the RTC and the CA found that the signatures appearing on the subject checks were forged signatures of petitioner Nina, and not of petitioner Vivian nor of Ibasco who co-owned the account. Thus, petitioners argue that the CA's conclusion that it could have been Ibasco who accessed the account in petitioner Vivian's absence was erroneous since it would have been unnecessary to forge petitioner Nina's name on the checks if it was truly Ibasco who accessed the account.
Pursuant to this Court's Resolution dated March 15, 2017, respondents filed their Comment on the petition on April 26, 2017 wherein they refuted the allegations in the petition. They first argue that the petition should be dismissed because it raises a question of fact when only questions of law may be brought before this Court. They further assert that petitioners failed to prove the negligence of respondent bank which allegedly caused the injury which they claim to have suffered.
The Issue
Petitioners raised the sole issue of whether or not the CA committed reversible error when it granted respondents' appeal and dismissed the complaint for utter lack of merit. SDAaTC
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Respondents are correct in arguing that only questions of law may be brought before this Court since it is not a trier of facts. However, considering the conflicting findings of the trial court and the CA, We are constrained to review the factual circumstances of the case. After an exhaustive examination of the records, We rule that the CA committed no reversible error in reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision. We agree with the CA that the RTC erred in finding that herein respondents are liable to petitioners.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner Vivian's account was not solely owned by her. Petitioners conveniently omitted this fact in the petition. However, records reveal that the subject account, Current Account No. 000237-00087-0, was indeed under the name of petitioner Vivian and Ibasco. 15 Petitioners also seemingly neglected to state that Ibasco had signed an authorization in favor of Casimero and a certain Rosalia Agustin to "inquire balances" and for "confirmation of checks," among others. 16 This was never refuted by petitioners.
In fact, petitioner Vivian herself testified that Casimero had access to the subject account, thus:
ATTY. MALICDEM
Q: Ms. [W]itness, who has access of [sic] the subject checking account?
A: Well, it's me and since Loreli Casimero is not in the Philippines [as] she is residing in the States, Mrs. Casimero had access in the sense that she request the check books from me. 17
Thus, the CA properly concluded that petitioners failed to establish any negligence on the part of respondents in having another person aside from petitioner Vivian to access the subject account.
In response to the CA's findings, petitioners now argue that respondents should be liable for tolerating the negotiation of the forged checks. They assert that respondents failed to exercise the high standards of integrity and performance required of them when they accepted the negotiated checks bearing the forged signatures of petitioner Nina.
This issue was succinctly addressed by the CA in the Assailed Decision, to wit:
Now to the remaining issue of BDO's acceptance or processing of falsified checks. Before embarking on its resolution, We stress that the signing of the checks bearing what appears to be appellee Nina Santamaria's name is a separate matter. While We hold that the access of Vivian's account is presumed to have been made in good faith by her co-depositor, the issuance of those checks in Nina's name bears an indicia of bad faith. However, the liability attending the execution of such checks and its issuance to the collection entities are beyond the scope of this appeal. Appellants cannot be held liable for something over which they have no control over, i.e., the possessor of such checks deciding to breach the trust reposed in him by issuing the checks under the signature of one who does not own the account.
What lies within the province of this appeal, instead, is whether there is liability attending appellants' acceptance of deposits for the alleged falsified checks and appellants' acceptance/receiving of checks issued by Casimero in the course of her application for a discounting/credit line for Tensorex, as well as its processing of the checks in the process of dishonouring the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellees, however, never claimed injury or damage from the deposits of these falsified checks. As We have held above, the funding of such checks was never shown to have been made by an unauthorized person. Without contrary proof, We cannot discount that these were made by Ibasco, as co-owner of the subject account. Appellees, furthermore, never demonstrated that they complained to BDO after they received the Bank Statement reflecting the deposits.
Anent the irregularity of funding those checks, We reach the similar conclusion that the appellees have not shown how they were inconvenienced or worried by the deposits. Appellee Vivian's anxieties only came about from her assumption that Casimero was operating her account; however, as We have discussed, such assumption has not been proved and she has failed to eliminate the plausible explanation that her co-depositor Ibasco was the one operating their account while she (Vivian) was abroad.
In fact, the funding of the checks saved appellee Vivian from liability. As a result of credit infusions for the Nina Rica Santamaria checks, appellees never had to shell out any money for those instruments, notwithstanding that these were drawn from Vivian's account.
Yet it cannot be denied that BDO committed questionable practices in accepting late payments for these Nina Rica Santamaria checks. However, BDO ought to be answerable to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, for possibly violating its duties and responsibilities as a banking institution, and not to the appellees, who failed to prove that they were made to answer for those checks, and hence, consequently failed to prove any injury from the transactions. 18
Article 1173 of the Civil Code defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." This definition is reflected in jurisprudence where negligence is described as the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose. 19 In the case of banking institutions, the diligence required is more than that of the Roman bonos pater familias or a good father of a family. The observance of the highest degree of diligence is expected of banks 20 under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 8791, also known as the General Banking Law of 2000, to wit:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the vital role of banks in providing an environment conducive to the sustained development of the national economy and the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance. In furtherance thereof, the State shall promote and maintain a stable and efficient banking and financial system that is globally competitive, dynamic and responsive to the demands of a developing economy. (n)
We find that respondents were not negligent and in fact exercised utmost diligence to verify the authenticity of the checks or, at least, confirm if the checks were validly issued by the owners of the subject account. Respondent bank referred the questionable checks to its Branch's Technical Overdraft Screen/Report and tried contacting Ibasco or petitioner Vivian for confirmation of the checks. However, when neither could be reached, respondent bank resorted to the depositors' authorized representatives — Casimero and Agustin — who confirmed the issuance of the checks. This act of confirming checks was within the explicit scope of the powers given to these authorized representatives by Ibasco as a co-depositor of the account. Thus, We do not agree that respondents were negligent. acEHCD
Respondents even sent a Statement of Account to petitioner Vivian which required the depositor to contact the bank immediately should there be any discrepancies in the transactions made. Yet, petitioner Vivian never contacted respondent bank about any discrepancies despite receiving the Statement of Account.
It is also worthy to note that petitioners themselves admitted in the petition that as early as June 9, 2004, petitioner Vivian had already received the notice of assignment of debts from BDO, and yet, she did not even bother to confront BDO on the matter. Instead, she merely contacted Casimero who told her to disregard the same as the latter had already settled the matter. After five months, petitioner Vivian had to go back to the States to attend to her ailing sister-in-law. Despite the lapse of five months since she received the notice from BDO, petitioner Vivian still failed to contact respondent Bank after not having heard back from Casimero. It was only upon receiving a demand letter from Rykom Financing and other financing companies and after speaking with other possible creditors that petitioner Vivian decided to contact respondent Bank to settle the matter. 21
We also agree with the findings of the CA that petitioners were unable to prove that they sustained any injury or damage from the acts of respondent bank. The CA explained:
The RTC, however, ignored that appellant BDO dishonored the checks. This was precisely why these creditors sent demand letters to appellant Vivian, believing her to be the issuer of those checks. But the issue of genuineness of the signatures on these instruments had been mooted by the closure of the account against which they were drawn. In this case, the closure terminated the contractual relationship between the bank and the former account holders.
To reiterate, appellees failed to prove that Casimero, and not Ibasco, operated Vivian's account while she was absent; that appellees suffered damage and injury from the mere acceptance by appellees for cash deposits for the Nina Rica Santamaria checks; and that appellants' negligence exposed Vivian to liability for checks issued by the Casimero spouses. Neither were appellees able to show that appellants acted negligently in dishonouring the checks drawn from her closed account to other creditors.
We also cannot discount that appellees never had to pay for any of the checks issued from her and Ibasco's account.
The failure of appellees to prove appellants' negligence and the injury they suffered consequently justifies a denial of their claim for damages, and ultimately, a dismissal of their case. 22
Even assuming, however, that We can consider petitioners' claim that she is entitled to damages due to the "physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and embarrassment" which they allegedly suffered after receiving demand letters and threats of suits, We still cannot ascribe any liability on the part of respondents.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. 23 Petitioners assert that the proximate cause of their supposed injuries is respondent bank's alleged negligence. However, as had been discussed earlier, We find that respondent bank did not commit any negligence on its part.
Instead, it can be seen in the present case that the proximate cause of the supposed injury which petitioners had suffered resulted from the issuance of the allegedly forged checks by a yet unidentified person. Even then, petitioners failed to establish that the issuance of the allegedly forged checks were caused by either respondent bank or respondent Tabing.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, finding no reversible error in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 106502, the Court resolves to DENY the petition and, thus, AFFIRM said Decision.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 28-51. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon A. Cruz and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting.
2.Id. at 5.
3.Id.
4.Id.
5. Records, pp. 420-421.
6.Rollo, p. 6.
7.Id.
8.Rollo, pp. 6-7.
9.Id. at 7.
10.Id.
11.Id. at 57.
12.Id. at 56-61. Rendered by Presiding Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro.
13.Id. at 60-61.
14.Id. at 50.
15. Records, pp. 420-421.
16.Id. at 422.
17. Records, pp. 224-225. TSN, January 8, 2009, pp. 10-11.
18.Rollo, pp. 40-41.
19.Equitable PCI Bank v. Tan, G.R. No. 165339, August 23, 2010, 628 SCRA 520.
20.Philippine National Bank v. Cheah Chee Chong, G.R. Nos. 170865 and 170892, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 49.
21. Records, pp. 226-238. TSN, January 8, 2009, pp. 12-24.
22.Rollo, pp. 47-48.
23.Id.
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