San Pedro y Tanyag v. People

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 228409. March 1, 2017.]

LOURDES SAN PEDRO Y TANYAG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, LRC MANPOWER SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, INC., REPRESENTED BY MA. LOURDES P. CAPUA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 1, 2017,which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 228409 (Lourdes San Pedro y Tanyag vs. People of the Philippines, LRC Manpower Services International, Inc., represented by Ma. Lourdes P. Capua). — This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the March 1, 2016 Decision 1 and November 18, 2016 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 103998 entitled "People of the Philippines, LRC Manpower Services International, Inc., represented by Ma. Lourdes P. Capua v. Lourdes San Pedro y Tanyag," finding petitioner Lourdes San Pedro y Tanyag (San Pedro) civilly liable to private respondent LRC Manpower Services International, Inc. (LRC) for the amount of P1,296,540.90.

Factual Antecedents

San Pedro served as the Vice President (VP) for Finance of LRC. As VP for Finance, part of her duties was to oversee the accounting procedures, incoming remittances, and disbursements of the company. She was also allowed to receive money or remittances from the counterpart agencies of LRC, and after receiving the remittances, to deposit the same to the account of LRC.

LRC averred that during San Pedro's tenure as VP for Finance, LRC's counterpart agencies abroad complained about delays in the deployment of hired workers, while the employees of LRC complained about their delayed salaries. LRC's President and General Manager, Ma. Lourdes P. Capua (Capua), conducted an investigation, which led to the discovery of discrepancies in the company's accounting. Owing to her responsibilities for the company's finances, Capua asked San Pedro to explain what happened to the funds or remittances she received. Instead of providing an explanation, San Pedro resigned. Upon further investigation, Capua found that there were some remittances that were not entered in the account of the company. Capua also discovered that San Pedro deposited some of the remittances to the personal account of her daughter, Rona Lou San Pedro, who served as the Marketing Officer of LRC from 2009 until her resignation in October 2010. HTcADC

Consequently, LRC filed a criminal complaint for 34 counts of qualified theft against San Pedro, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 12-1555 to 1588. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision acquitting San Pedro of the crime charged without, however, making a finding as to her civil liability. The fallo of the RTC's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the prosecution was not able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in committing the crime of Qualified Theft defined and penalized under Article 308 and Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, hence, the accused LOURDES TANYAG SAN PEDRO is hereby ACQUITTED of all the charges on reasonable ground.

LRC appealed to the CA, questioning the RTC's failure 1) to declare that the facts from which the civil liability of San Pedro might arise exist, and 2) to adjudge San Pedro civilly liable since her acquittal was merely due to reasonable doubt. CAIHTE

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In the assailed Decision, the CA granted LRC's appeal and declared San Pedro civilly liable to LRC for the unaccounted remittances in the total amount of P1,296,540.90. The dispositive portion of the said decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 147 dated 10 November 2014 acquitting accused-appellee Lourdes Tanyag San Pedro of thirty-four (34) counts of Qualified Theft is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to include the civil liability of the latter based on delict. Lourdes Tanyag San Pedro is ordered to refund the value of the remittances amounting to P1,296,540.90 in favor of LRC Manpower Services International, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

In ruling thus, the CA noted that San Pedro's acquittal was predicated on the prosecution's failure to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The CA found that the trial court's decision shows the facts from which San Pedro's civil liability might arise exist.

San Pedro moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA. Aggrieved, San Pedro filed the instant petition.

The primordial issue for the resolution of this Court is whether San Pedro is civilly liable to LRC despite her acquittal from the criminal charge of qualified theft.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied.

At the outset, the Court notes that San Pedro failed to attach a certified true copy of the assailed CA Decision. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement is sufficient ground for dismissal, in accordance with Section 4 3 of the same rule. On this score alone, the outright dismissal of the petition is warranted. aScITE

In any event, the petition is still denied for lack of merit.

San Pedro's acquittal in the qualified theft case does not automatically absolve her from any civil liability to LRC. The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his or her civil liability. 5 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."

In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court had the occasion to explain the two kinds of acquittal recognized in our jurisdiction, including the different effects thereof on the civil liability of the accused, thus:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. (emphasis supplied)

In connection thereto, Dayap v. Sendiong7 enumerated the instances where the acquittal of an accused in a criminal case does not ipso facto result in his or her release from civil liability to the other party:

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. (emphasis supplied)

In the case at bench, the RTC acquitted San Pedro for the prosecution's failure to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt without ruling on her civil liability, or lack thereof, to LRC. Thus, the question is begged: has San Pedro's civil liability been established by preponderant evidence?

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 8 In this regard, Section 1, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court indicates how preponderance of evidence shall be determined:

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

Based on the foregoing, the Court is inclined to uphold the CA's finding that the superior weight of evidence tilts in favor of the civil liability of San Pedro. We quote the CA's disquisition hereunder: DETACa

The contention of [San Pedro] that there was no taking or stealing since she was authorized to receive the remittances as Vice President for Finance is misplaced. While it is true that she was authorized to receive the remittances, she did not have the authority to expend the same according to her own discretion, nor deposit it to the personal account of her daughter without proper authorization from [LRC]. It was her obligation to make a report and/or take account of the remittances she received, which she failed to do. Her bare defences and denials cannot and should not suffice. The purported payments of LRC's obligations and expenses from the remittances obtained by [San Pedro] could have been substantiated by presenting the corresponding receipts or any other proof of payment, but no such evidence was proffered at all. San Pedro could have presented Atty. Lopez to support the prior internal arrangement with the latter for the payment of the company's loan to him, but she did not do so. Failure to present the required evidence strongly indicates that the remittances received by [San Pedro] from LRC's counterpart agencies were misappropriated by her.

Accordingly, in the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, the [RTC] ruled that "the prosecution was not able to prove the guilt of [San Pedro] beyond reasonable doubt in committing the crime of Qualified Theft" and [San Pedro] is acquitted of said charges on "reasonable ground" — which implies that the facts from which [San Pedro's] civil liability might arise do exist. If such facts do not exist, the [RTC] could have ruled that [San Pedro] is acquitted on the ground that she is not guilty of the crime charged, not merely because the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No such declaration was made in the assailed decision.

It bears to note that the facts from which the CA drew its conclusion of the existence of civil liability of San Pedro are the very same facts on which the RTC based her acquittal for qualified theft. The Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, should now accord the highest respect to the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, in the absence of a clear showing by San Pedro that such findings were tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.

Suffice to state that despite the prosecution's failure to prove San Pedro's criminal liability with moral certainty, it was clearly established that San Pedro received amounts owing to LRC in her capacity as its VP for Finance, for which she failed to account. Accordingly, San Pedro should be held civilly liable for the unaccounted remittances in the total amount of P1,296,540.90 as determined by the CA. HEITAD

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed Decision dated March 1, 2016 and Resolution dated November 18, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 103998, the Court resolves to DENY the petition and, thus, AFFIRM said Decision and Resolution. (Reyes, J.,on leave;Caguioa, J.,designated as Fifth Member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 2417 dated January 4, 2017)

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 25-33. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Florito S. Macalino and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles.

2.Id. at 47-48.

3. Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.

4.Lumantas v. Calapiz, G.R. No. 163753, January 15, 2014.

5. Section 2. Contents of the judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

6. G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 387.

7. G.R. No. 177960, January 29, 2009, 577 SCRA 134.

8.Eulogio v. Spouses Apeles, G.R. No. 167884, January 20, 2009, citing Go v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 883, 890-891 (2001).