EN BANC
[G.R. No. 213545. August 7, 2018.]
THELMA SL. SALGADO, petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REP. BY CHAIRPERSON GRACE PULIDO-TAN, AND COTABATO REGIONAL AND MEDICAL CENTER, COTABATO CITY REP. BY. DRA. HELEN YAMBAO, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedAUGUST 7, 2018, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 213545 (Thelma SL. Salgado vs. Commission on Audit, rep. by Chairperson Grace Pulido-Tan, and Cotabato Regional and Medical Center, Cotabato City rep by. Dra. Helen Yambao). — This resolves the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Thelma SL. Salgado (Salgado) under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court, which seeks to annul the Decision No. 2012-203 1 dated November 12, 2012 and the Resolution 2 dated April 4, 2014 of the Commission on Audit (COA) Commission Proper, which denied Salgado's request for relief from property accountability over medical supplies amounting to P560,100.00.
The Antecedents
Salgado was Administrative Officer V who functioned as the Supply Officer of the Cotabato Regional and Medical Center (CRMC), a government hospital situated in Cotabato City. On November 7, 2006, a delivery of three boxes containing various medical supplies valued at P948,900.00 3 were made by SLL Medi Trade and General Merchant to CRMC. The supplies were inspected and inventoried by Josephine Pascasio (Pascasio) and Crizaldo Dampil (Dampil), who were CRMC's Administrative Aide I (Storekeeper) and Administrative Aide I, respectively. 4
The delivery was found to be complete in quantity and accurate in description, and thus was received by Salgado. She instructed Pascasio and Dampil to deliver the items to the hospital's pharmacy, but they failed to immediately do so and instead left the boxes at the alley by the main door of the hospital's Supply Building. The boxes were not delivered to the pharmacy even until November 14, 2006, when Dampil was preparing to transfer the items but discovered that medical supplies valued at P560,100.00 were missing. 5
The loss was reported by Dampil to Salgado, who in turn relayed the incident to the Supervising Administrative Officer, Ester Mato (Mato). The incident was later reported to the Cotabato City Police Station. 6
The investigations that were later conducted revealed that Gil Serrano (Serrano), Administrative Aide, was seen leaving the hospital premises on November 9, 2006 on board a motorcycle with a box fastened to it. Serrano thereafter admitted that he obtained the box from the supply office, but claimed that it was empty when he got it. Despite his explanation, Serrano was included in an investigation report as one of the primary suspects for the loss. 7 aScITE
On December 14, 2006, Salgado filed with State Auditor Joy B. Rondael of COA Regional Office XII, Cotabato City, being the Audit Team Leader (ATL) and Resident Auditor of CRMC, a formal request for relief from accountability for the loss. 8 She explained in her letter-request:
The said supplies were discovered to have been lost sometime on November 16, 2006 while in the custody of the Storekeeper of [CRMC] Mrs. Josephine Pascasio.
The undersigned was the person who received the same from the supplier but immediately after their receipt, the aforementioned supplies were turned over to the Storekeeper for proper safekeeping and issuance to its end user.
xxx xxx xxx 9
An Auditor's Investigation Report 10 was later issued by the ATL, who recommended the denial of the request for relief. The report reads in part:
We witnessed a physical inventory taking of supplies at the storeroom of the supply office and at the various ancillary units of the [CRMC].
As gleaned from [evidence] submitted and interrogations made to the accountable officers and witnesses, it appears that due care and diligence of a good father of the family in the housekeeping of government property was not observed.
Based on the foregoing, it is highly recommended that the request for relief from accountability be denied due to negligence of the accountable officers. 11
The report was concurred in by the COA Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City's Regional Cluster Directors of Cluster V, Social and Scientific, National Government Sector, and Regional Legal and Adjudication Office. 12
Ruling of the ASB
On October 13, 2009, the COA Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) issued ASB Decision No. 2009-119 13 that denied Salgado's request for relief from property accountability. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant request of Ms. Thelma SL. Salgado for relief from property accountability is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, Ms. Salgado shall pay the value of the lost property amounting to P560,100.00[.] 14
The ASB emphasized that the standard of care required of government employees with respect to government property entrusted to their care was the diligence of a good father of a family. It also mattered that Salgado was Chief of Section in the hospital's Supply Office, and thus had the over-all command thereof. The ASB explained:
x x x [A]s storekeeping is one of the specific responsibilities of her Office, prudence dictates that it was incumbent upon her to observe that items procured, delivered and accepted were properly stored in a secure place such as in this case inside the storeroom. x x x [A]s the Section Chief, she is obliged to enforce proper security measures considering that medical supplies in government hospitals are scarce and costly. Taking into account the above circumstances, Ms. Salgado failed to meet the responsibility imposed on her by virtue of the position she holds. Section 101 of Presidential Decree 1445 is explicit when it states that:
"Every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of government funds or property shall be accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law."
Finding negligence in the safekeeping of government property, Ms. Salgado has to answer for the loss of the subject medical supplies on the basis of Section 105 (1) of the aforementioned law which provides, thus:
"Every officer accountable for government property shall be liable for its money value in case of improper or unauthorized use or misapplication thereof, by himself or any person for whose acts he may be responsible. He shall likewise be liable for all losses, damages, or deterioration occasioned by negligence in the keeping or use of the property whether or not it be at the time in his actual custody." 15 HEITAD
Dissatisfied by the ASB's ruling, Salgado elevated the matter to the COA Commission Proper by way of an appeal 16 founded on two main grounds. First, she denied having been negligent in the performance of her functions as supply officer and second, she insisted that the COA should have awaited the outcome of the criminal case that was filed against the suspected perpetrator of the offense before deciding on the request for relief. 17
Before the Commission Proper could have ruled on the appeal, Salgado filed several motions 18 that cited an ensuing Decision 19 of the Office of the Ombudsman in Case No. OMB-M-A-07-126-F, an administrative case for Dishonesty and Gross Neglect of Duty instituted in 2007 by CRMC against Salgado, Pascasio, Dampil and Serrano. The charge of neglect of duty against Salgado was dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of sufficient evidence that she was remiss in the performance of her duties as supply officer and head of the supply unit. 20 Salgado likewise appeared to have acted in good faith when she reported the loss to her superiors and the police. 21 The Office of the Ombudsman also dismissed 22 the complaint for malversation of public property and violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, docketed as Case No. OMB-M-C-07-0209-F, that was filed against Salgado simultaneously with the institution of the administrative cases.
The Ruling of the Commission Proper
On November 12, 2012, the Commission Proper rendered Decision No. 2012-203 23 denying the appeal, and with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal of Ms. Thelma SL. Salgado is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and COA ASB Decision No. 2009-119 dated October 13, 2009 is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, Ms. Salgado shall be liable for the amount of P560,100.00. 24
For the Commission Proper, it was insufficient that Salgado instructed her subordinates to immediately transport the medical supplies to the hospital's pharmacy; it was necessary for her to likewise ensure that her directive was complied with. Furthermore, Salgado's negligence was evident from the apparent lack of internal control measures to ensure proper safekeeping of government property within her section. All personnel assigned at the Supply Office had their own keys to the room, and other personnel were allowed to stay inside the office even as they had no official business. 25
As regards the pendency of the criminal case against the purported taker of the missing supplies, the Commission Proper ruled that it could not have affected or suspended the COA action because the obligations or liabilities that were involved in the two proceedings were different. 26
Salgado's motion for reconsideration was denied via a Resolution dated April 4, 2014. 27 Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The Present Petition
Salgado submits the following issues for the Court's determination:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION PROPER OF THE [COA] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN:
1. RESOLVING THAT [SALGADO] IS LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY;
2. NOT APPRECIATING THE FINDINGS OF THE POLICE AND THE OMBUDSMAN THAT [SALGADO] WAS NOT AT ALL NEGLIGENT. 28
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to dismiss the petition. Salgado failed to establish that public respondent COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed the COA ASB's denial of the plea for relief from property accountability.
At the outset, the Court emphasizes that law and jurisprudence provide strict parameters by which the issuance of a writ of certiorari is justified. It is allowed only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or in cases of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In Tagle vs. Equitable PCI Bank, 29 the Court reiterated:
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to concur are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. ATICcS
The phrase "without jurisdiction" means that the [public respondent] acted with absolute lack of authority or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority. "Excess of jurisdiction" occurs when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority; or results when an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer (to do) is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. While that of "grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 30 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Upon review, the Court finds that none of these indicators that should qualify the public respondent's acts for a certiorari petition to prosper attend the instant case. The COA sufficiently explained its factual and legal bases in denying Salgado's request for relief. It took note of the position that Salgado held in CRMC, along with the resulting duties and obligations that she was expected to satisfy as a Supply Officer and Chief of Section of the Supply Office of CRMC. She was required to oversee the procurement, delivery, acceptance and storage in a secure place of the supplies for the government hospital. Her failure to ensure the safekeeping of the medical items and the security in the hospital's storeroom constituted a breach of her obligations under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as the "Government Auditing Code of the Philippines," the pertinent portions of which are herein reproduced:
CHAPTER 5
ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR
Section 101. Accountable officers; bond requirement. —
1. Every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of government funds or property shall be accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 105. Measure of liability of accountable officers. —
1. Every officer accountable for government property shall be liable for its money value in case of improper or unauthorized use or misapplication thereof, by himself or any person for whose acts he may be responsible. He shall likewise be liable for all losses, damages, or deterioration occasioned by negligence in the keeping or use of the property whether or not it be at the time in his actual custody.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
The COA's findings were supported by records, and its conclusions were reasonable. By her own statements, Salgado had recognized the need to store the medical supplies in a secure location. While she argued that she repeatedly directed some personnel from her section to transfer the delivered items to a stockroom, she failed to ensure that her orders were actually complied with. For days, the items, which cost almost One Million Pesos, all remained at an alley by the Supply Building's main door, yet she did not perform any further act to exact performance. Such failure on her part signified negligence and allowed the eventual loss of the medical supplies. In Rosemarie B. Bintudan vs. The Commission on Audit, 31 the Court explained:
Negligence is the omission to do something that a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent man and reasonable man could not do. Stated otherwise, negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. x x x. 32
Prudence on Salgado's part could have shielded the government from the exorbitant losses. The delivered medical supplies were costly at nearly 1 Million Pesos. More importantly, the worth of the supplies was high not only for their volume and cost but for their value to a government hospital, where resources are usually limited compared to the number of patients who need aid. Although Salgado had already observed the continued failure to transfer the valuable items to the storeroom or the pharmacy, she took no sufficient action to enforce compliance. Evidently, she still failed to perform all that was within her power to safekeep government property, properly supervise her subordinates and correct their inaction. TIADCc
It was immaterial that another person, Serrano in particular, was charged in a separate criminal case after the investigations that were conducted by the hospital and police indicated that he was the taker of the medical supplies. Salgado's liability under this case was not premised on an allegation that she appropriated or applied the items for personal benefit. Regardless of the person who actually stole the items, the purpose of the taking and the means by which it was accomplished, the liability of Salgado would attach because under Section 105 of PD No. 1445, it was sufficient that her negligence and failure to safekeep government property occasioned the loss.
Even as the Court considers the findings of the police and the dismissal by the Ombudsman of both the administrative and criminal complaints that were filed against Salgado in relation to the loss, the issuance in this case of a writ of certiorari is unwarranted. The COA Commission Proper sufficiently explained in its Decision:
This Commission rules that the pendency of a criminal case does not suspend or affect the proceeding before it even if based upon the same facts or incidents. The proceeding before this Commission is separate and distinct from the criminal proceeding in court. The former's ruling or decision is predicated on the civil obligation or administrative liability of the persons accountable for government property, while the latter is determinative of the criminal liability of the offender as prescribed under the penal laws.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he contention of Ms. Salgado that she should be granted relief from property accountability for the loss of medical supplies amounting to P560,100.00 after she has been found innocent of any wrongdoing and cleared by the police authorities of any criminal, civil or administrative liability, is not necessarily binding on this Commission in the determination of this case. Further, the assertion that there were other persons who could be held liable or determined responsible for the lost medical supplies/items does not necessarily exempt her from the liability. In determining the officers' liability, Section 105 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1445 x x x is instructive[.]
xxx xxx xxx 33 (Emphasis supplied)
There is no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from the foregoing pronouncements of the COA. While Salgado cites in her petition the Police Investigation Report indicating that "there is no sufficient basis to find any other persons criminally, civilly or administratively liable except the said suspect [Serrano]," 34 it bears stressing that it was not for the police, but for the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, to determine the administrative or criminal liability that arose from the loss of the government property.
Insofar as the dismissal of the administrative and criminal complaints against Salgado was concerned, it was likewise erroneous to argue that the Ombudsman's rulings were controlling upon Salgado's property accountability. Salgado's invocation of the principle of res judicata is misplaced. The case before the COA was distinct and independent from those before the Ombudsman. Unlike in administrative cases and criminal proceedings where the end purpose is discipline and imposition of sanctions or sentence, a case before the COA focuses on the safeguard of government resources and property accountability. The COA cannot be precluded from making its own determination of the factual issues and deriving conclusions therefrom, as it determines the accountable officer's responsibility and accompanying liability that proceeds from a distinct legal provision. To rule otherwise would be to defeat the purpose of an audit and the demands from an independent constitutional commission, which has a clear and vital mandate, to wit:
The Constitution has made the COA "the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain and grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions. 35
Moreover, it is settled that res judicata requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of causes of action. 36 Specifically on the fourth requisite, the subject matters and causes of action in the COA and Ombudsman cases were not alike. As the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel of respondents COA and CRMC, correctly argued:
[T]he subsequent decisions by the Ombudsman (both administrative and criminal) do not involve the same subject matter as that resolved by respondent COA. The Ombudsman's findings are limited to evaluating the evidence in relation to the administrative charges of the dishonesty and gross neglect of duty, and the criminal charges of malversation of public property and the violation of Section 3E of R.A. No. 3019. These are diametrically opposed to the subject matter of the case at bar, which is [Salgado's] request for relief from property accountability. 37
Furthermore, a dismissal by the Ombudsman of a criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and final judgment. Its determination was limited to an investigation and, if warranted, the filing of the appropriate cases before the Sandiganbayan.
All told, given the COA Commission Proper's considerations in arriving at its ruling to deny the request for relief, the Court finds no cogent reason to annul the assailed Decision No. 2012-203 dated November 12, 2012 and Resolution dated April 4, 2014.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED." Caguioa, J., on official leave. (adv23)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETAClerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Issued by Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido Tan, Commissioner Juanito G. Espino, Jr. and Commissioner Heidi L. Mendoza; rollo, pp. 29-33.
2.Id. at 34.
3.Id. at 76-77.
4.Id. at 29.
5.Id. at 35.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 36.
8.Id. at 67.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 68-69.
11.Id. at 69.
12.Id. at 30.
13.Id. at 35-38.
14.Id. at 37-38.
15.Id. at 37.
16.Id. at 54-66.
17.Id. at 56-57.
18.Id. at 113-116, 117-118, 119-120.
19.Id. at 123-140.
20.Id. at 114.
21.Id. at 117.
22.Id. at 141-159-A.
23.Id. at 29-33.
24. Id. at 32.
25. Id. at 31.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 34.
28. Id. at 12.
29. 575 Phil. 384 (2008).
30. Id. at 396.
31. G.R. No. 211937, March 21, 2017.
32. Id.
33. Rollo, pp. 31-32.
34. Id. at 13.
35. Bintudan v. The Commission of Audit, G.R. No. 211937, March 21, 2017.
36. Riviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings, B.V., 760 Phil. 655, 665 (2015).
37. Rollo, p. 196.