Salazar v. Spouses Lustre

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 217284. June 23, 2021.]

CIPRIANO B. SALAZAR and SIMEON B. SALAZAR, petitioners,vs. SPS. LEONOR RUIZ-LUSTRE AND ARMAND LUSTRE, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 23, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 217284 (CIPRIANO B. SALAZAR and SIMEON B. SALAZAR, petitioners, v. SPS. LEONOR RUIZ-LUSTRE AND ARMAND LUSTRE, respondents). — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari dated January 15, 2015 filed by Cipriano B. Salazar and Simeon B. Salazar (petitioners) seeking a reversal of the Decision 1 dated April 2, 2014 and the Resolution 2 dated November 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 128637.

Facts

Petitioners are the tenants of spouses Leonor Ruiz-Lustre and Armando Lustre (respondents) on a portion of agricultural land totaling 43,311 square meters in San Isidro, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija (the Subject Property). 3 Under the Leasehold Agreement between petitioners and respondents, the former was obligated to pay 20 cavans of palay annually to the latter. 4

From the records, it would appear that petitioners, and their predecessors-in-interest, have had a history of failing to pay lease rentals to the respondents:

1. In Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Case No. 1219 NE91, Felix Salazar, the predecessor-in-interest and kin of the petitioners, was found liable to the respondents for failing to pay lease rentals for 25 years or between 1975 and 1990. 5

2. In DARAB Case No. 00723 SNE' 95, petitioners were, for a second time, found liable to the respondents for their failure to pay lease rentals. The Decision in the aforementioned case was sustained on appeal by the DARAB Central Office in a Decision dated January 3, 2001. 6

The foregoing notwithstanding, respondents, for the third time, initiated DARAB Case No. 09341 SNE' 07 against petitioners for the familiar reason that the latter have failed to pay their lease rentals. This time, however, the respondents prayed that petitioners be dispossessed of the land they till (in addition to the prayer for payment of accrued lease rentals, attorney's fees, and costs of litigation). 7 After trial, the DARAB, in a Decision 8 dated July 20, 2007 (the DARAB Decision), ruled in favor of respondents and held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the respondents to vacate the subject landholding and ordering further their dispossession thereto. Their lease agreement with the petitioners is hereby declared terminated;

2. Ordering the respondents to pay the petitioners the amount of 510 cavans of palay at 45 kilos per cavan representing their unpaid lease rentals from 1989 to 1999;

3. Directing the respondents to pay the petitioners the amount of 90 cavans per year starting the year 2000 up to the present; and

4. Ordering the respondents to pay the petitioners the amount of P20,000 representing attorney's fee and litigation expenses with cost against the respondents. 9

Petitioners sought an appeal of the above-mentioned Decision before the DARAB Central Office but was, after due consideration, denied in a Decision dated April 5, 2010 and a Resolution dated December 13, 2010. 10 Thus, on October 26, 2011, upon a Motion filed by respondents, a Writ of Execution of even date was issued directing the execution of the Decision dated July 20, 2007. 11

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution arguing that they are holders of Emancipation Patents over the land they till which has supposedly "change[d] the complexion of the case on hand." 12 This notwithstanding, the Provincial Adjudicator Vicente Aselo S. Sicat, in an Order 13 dated October 2, 2012, denied the Motion to Quash, holding plainly that "[t]he arguments raised [by petitioners] should have been brought at the time [the] case [was] under litigation and they can no longer be raised anew this time that the decision had already attained its finality." 14 Unperturbed, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied in an Order 15 dated January 9, 2013; thus:

This Office, is not a little bit impressed on the cited scenario that the issuance of the Emancipation Patents is a material change that can be veered away from implementing the decision of the case at bar. Let it be stressed that the cancellation of emancipation patents is a different issue from the issue that was settled in the case at bar. Be that as it may, it would appear that the emancipation patents of the [petitioners] were already cancelled in the decision of the DARAB under Case No. 09583 SNE' 07 rendered by the former PARAD Atty. Eulogio M. Mariano on July 28, 2008. Thus, the material change as invoked by the respondent is no longer available. 16

In view of the adverse Orders dated October 2, 2012 and January 9, 2013, petitioners sought a review of the same with the CA arguing, in the main, that the issuance of the Emancipation Patent in their favor in 2004 constituted a material change in the situation of the parties that would render inequitable the execution of the DARAB Decision. Notably, the DARAB Decision was affirmed in toto by the DARAB Central Office 17 and has forthwith attained finality. 18 Notwithstanding the spirited arguments of the petitioners, the CA issued the April 2, 2014 Decision which rejected petitioners' plea.

In rejecting the petitioners' plea, the CA harped on two key factors: first, petitioners' failure to present the purported Emancipation Patent (issued in 2004) during trial, which were then available prior to the promulgation of the DARAB Decision; and second, case law supposedly does not support the proposition that the issuance of Emancipation Patents "can x x x be considered a supervening event which can bar execution of the judgement[.]" 19 Thus, the CA held:

From a scrutiny of the Petition itself, petitioners' emancipation patents were issued in their favor as early as 2004 and We are in a quandary as to why these papers were not presented below notwithstanding occasion therefor as recognized by petitioners themselves. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

And the conclusion was inescapable that petitioners did not effectively discharge their onus probandi.

xxx xxx xxx

Prescinding from the issuance of the emancipation patents of petitioners in 2004, and even on the assumption that petitioners' patents were issued after the Decision in 2007 from the Adjudication Board, recent case law presented a dreary scenario for petitioners inasmuch as the matter of subsequent issuance of emancipation patents would more appropriately be ventilated in a full-blown proceeding, rather than in a motion to stay execution of the judgment rendered in the instant summary Ejectment proceeding. Subsequent acquisition of ownership of the subject property can hardly be considered a supervening event which can bar execution of the judgment, since it is normally understood that possession de facto is the thrust of an Unlawful Detainer.

WHEREFORE, following the foregoing discussion, the Petitioner is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 20 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citations omitted)

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied in a Resolution dated November 27, 2014. 21

Petitioners then filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari and Motion to Litigate as Indigent Party dated December 23, 2014. In a Resolution 22 dated March 16, 2015, this Court granted petitioners an additional period of 30 days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, as well as granted petitioners' prayer to litigate as an indigent party. On January 22, 2015, and within the reglementary period, petitioners filed the instant Petition. For their part, respondents filed a Comment 23 dated February 25, 2016, against which petitioners filed a Reply 24 dated October 14, 2016.

Issue

The sole issue for our consideration is whether the subsequent acquisition of the Subject Property by the petitioners constitutes a material change sufficient to bar execution of the DARAB Decision.

Ruling

In the Petition, petitioners primarily argue that (1) the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. EP7407 in favor of Cipriano Salazar and TCT No. EP7406 in favor of Simeon B. Salazar (the Emancipation Patents); (2) the full payment of the value of the Subject Property to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LP); and (3) the payment of real property taxes over the Subject Property, all show that ownership of the Subject Property has already passed to them. 25 Petitioners assert that this amounts to a "radical material change in the situation of the parties" which makes the execution of the DARAB Decision "grossly inequitable" since, as land owners, they are entitled to peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Subject Property. 26 Petitioners likewise invoke principles of equity in an attempt to convince this Court to look beyond questions of possession in this simple ejectment case. 27 These arguments were echoed by the petitioners in its Reply. 28

On the other hand, the respondents offer the case of Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation v. Abacan29 as the applicable case. 30 In particular, respondents argue that it is settled jurisprudence that subsequent acquisition of ownership of a property subject of an unlawful detainer case does not operate as a material event that could prevent execution. 31

The Petition is partly meritorious.

To begin, it is a basic precept that, as a general rule, Decisions, Judgments, Resolutions, and/or Orders which have attained finality can no longer be amended or corrected. 32 This is called the principle of immutability of a final judgment. In Tabalno v. Dingal, Sr., 33 this Court explained:

The principle of immutability of a final judgment stands as one of the pillars supporting a strong, credible, and effective court. The principle prohibits any alteration, modification, or correction of final and executory judgments as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.

On this point, the Court has repeatedly declared:

It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.

The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of adjudicating bodies must become final and executory on some definite date fixed by law. x x x, the Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of immutability of judgment is adhered to by necessity notwithstanding occasional errors that may result thereby, since litigations must somehow come to an end for otherwise, it would be even more intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is designed to protect. x x x

Once a judgment is issued by the court in a case, and that judgment becomes final and executory, the principle of immutability of judgments automatically operates to bar any modification of the judgment. The modification of a judgment requires the exercise of the court's discretion. At that stage — when the judgment has become final and executory — the court is barred from exercising discretion on the case; the bar exists even if the modification is only meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law as these are discretionary acts that rest outside of the court's purely ministerial jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Of course, as with every general rule, the principle of immutability of a final judgment admits of narrow exceptions: "(1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable." 35 The fourth exception is specifically invoked by the petitioners.

To properly invoke the fourth exception to the rule of immutability, the following requisites must concur: "(1) the supervening event must have 'transpire[d] after [the] judgment has become final and executory'; and (2) the supervening event must affect or change the judgment's substance that its execution is rendered inequitable." 36

Measured against the foregoing standard, the plea of petitioners fail. A reading of the Petition would show that petitioners' acquisition of ownership over the Subject Property (by virtue of the issuance of TCT No. EP7407 and TCT No. EP7406) transpired in 2004, or three years before the issuance of the DARAB Decision. Thus, the issuance of petitioners' Emancipation Patents cannot be considered a supervening event insofar as it transpired before the DARAB Decision became final and executory.

Additionally, it bears emphasizing that in an action for Unlawful Detainer, basic is the rule that "[t]he subsequent acquisition of ownership x x x is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment." 37 Thus, in Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation v. Abacan, 38 and correctly cited by herein respondents, this Court held:

The MTCC correctly denied their motion, citing our ruling in Oblea v. Court of Appeals and Chua v. Court of Appeals to the effect that the subsequent acquisition of ownership is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. According to the MTCC:

This court gives due weight to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the cases of Oblea vs. Court of Appeals (244 SCRA 101) and Chua vs. Court of Appeals (271 SCRA 564), wherein it made a categorical pronouncement that the subsequent acquisition of ownership by any person is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case. True it is that the sole issue in an action for unlawful detainer x x x is physical or material possession. Such issue of physical or material possession was already pass[ed] upon by this court during trial. As held in the case of Dizon vs. Concina (30 SCRA 897), the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the parties respecting title to the land or building. (Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)

It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. The argument of respondent-spouses that they subsequently acquired ownership of the subject property cannot be considered as a supervening event that will bar the execution of the questioned judgment, as unlawful detainer does not deal with the issue of ownership. 39 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court, in its duty to settle in its entirety all the controversies between competing litigants "leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation[,]" 40 cannot turn a blind eye to the issuance of the Emancipation Patents in favor of petitioners — a fact which respondents do not dispute. Indeed, the issuance of the Emancipation Patents is replete with consequences inasmuch as it substantially affects the authority of respondents to demand the ejectment of petitioners from the subject property.

Relevantly, the only claim to possession by the respondents to the Subject Property is by virtue of their previous Torrens Title thereto, 41 which title was evidently cancelled upon the issuance of the Emancipation Patents. As such, upon issuance of the Emancipation Patents, the petitioners were deemed the owners of the Subject Property entitled to full possession thereof. 42 The right to retain possession of the Subject Property is unaffected by the fact that petitioners failed to remit payment of lease rentals to the respondents. This is because upon transfer of ownership of the Subject Property to the respondents by virtue of Republic Act No. 6657 or the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988," 43 the LBP shall have already compensated the petitioners the value of the Subject Property. 44 At which point, therefore, any and all obligations of the petitioners over the Subject Property pertained to the LBP; likewise, any claim of just compensation of the Subject Property by the respondents pertained to LBP.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision dated April 2, 2014 and the Resolution dated November 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 128637. Petitioners CIPRIANO B. SALAZAR and SIMEON B. SALAZAR are ORDERED to PAY respondents SPOUSES LEONOR RUIZ-LUSTRE and ARMANDO LUSTRE:

1. The amount of 510 cavans of palay at 45 kilos per cavan representing their unpaid lease rentals from 1989 to 1999;

2. The amount of 90 cavans per year starting the year 2000 up to September, 2004; and

3. The amount of P20,000.00 representing attorney's fees and litigation expenses with costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 30-35; penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., with Associate Justices Magdangal M. de Leon and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring.

2.Id. at 34-35.

3.Id. at 36. Note: The land titled by petitioners is only a part of the 96,295 square meter property of the respondents. This is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29338.

4.Id.

5.Id.

6.Id.

7.Id. at 37.

8.Id. at 36-39; penned by Walter R. Carantes, the Presiding Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. 09341 SNE' 07 entitled "Leonor Lustre and Armando Lustre vs. Felix Salazar, et al."

9.Id. at 39.

10.Id. at 53. The appeal of the Decision dated 20 July 20, 2007 in DARAB Case No. 09341 SNE' 07 was docketed as DARAB Case No. 16206.

11.Id. at 52-53.

12.Id. at 55.

13.Id. at 54-56.

14.Id. at 55.

15.Id. at 57-58

16.Id. at 57.

17.Id. at 53. The appeal of the Decision dated 20 July 2007 in DARAB Case No. 09341 SNE' 07 was docketed as DARAB Case No. 16206.

18.Id. at 52-53.

19.Id. at 32-33.

20.Id.

21.Id. at 34-35.

22.Id. at 61-62.

23.Id. at 68-77.

24.Id. at 79-81 .

25.Id. at 20.

26.Id.

27.Id. at 21-24.

28.Id. at 79-81.

29. 709 Phil. 653 (2013).

30.Rollo, p. 68.

31.Id. at 68-70.

32.Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank v. Court of Appeals, 279 Phil. 597, 601 (1991).

33. 770 Phil. 556 (2015).

34.Id. at 563-564.

35.Republic v. Heirs of Cirilo Gotengco, 824 Phil. 568, 578 (2018).

36.Gelito v. Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol, G.R. No. 196367, February 5, 2020.

37.Oblea v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 804, 808 (1995).

38.Supra note 30.

39.Id. at 660-661.

40.Chua v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 262, 270 (1997).

41.Rollo, p. 36.

42.Del Castillo v. Orciga, 532 Phil. 204, 214 (2006).

43.See also Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972), Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor; Executive Order No. 228 (1987), Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified Farmer Beneficiaries Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27; Determining the Value of Remaining Unvalued Rice and Corn Lands Subject of Presidential Decree No. 27; And Providing for the Manner of Payment by the Farmer Beneficiary and Mode of Compensation to the Landowner.

44. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, § 18. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.