EN BANC
[G.R. No. 257381. November 23, 2021.]
SAGIP BAYAN, KALINGANG PINOY ['SABAKPINOY'], petitioner, vs.SOCORRO INTING, PRESIDING COMMISSIONER, AND ANTONIO T. KHO, COMMISSIONER OF COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated NOVEMBER 23, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 257381 (Sagip Bayan, Kalingang Pinoy ['SABAKPINOY'] vs. Socorro Inting, Presiding Commissioner, and Antonio T. Kho, Commissioner of Commission on Elections). — Assailed in this petition for certiorari, 1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, is the June 25, 2021 Order, 2 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, in SPP No. 21-040 (PL), dismissing the Petition 3 for registration filed by petitioner Sagip Bayan, Kalingang Pinoy (SABAKPINOY).
SABAKPINOY alleges to be a multi-sectoral organization composed of the urban poor, working class, businessmen and professionals who are qualified voters and bound together by similar physical attributes or characteristics, or by employment, interests or concerns. 4 On March 24, 2021, SABAKPINOY filed a verified Petition, 5 seeking its registration as a duly accredited party-list organization for the purpose of participating in the May 9, 2022 elections.
On June 25, 2021, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued the now assailed order, dismissing the petition on the ground that the Manifestation of Intent to Participate 6(MIP) attached to SABAKPINOY's petition does not contain the required information and was not in the form prescribed by the COMELEC. Pertinent portions of the assailed order states:
Specifically, the Petitioner has submitted a Manifestation of Intent to Participate (MIP) not in the form prescribed by the Commission. Upon scrutiny of the MIP, the following were not stated therein:
a. place of organization;
b. its founders;
c. its officers;
d. principal and post headquarters;
e. its constituents; and
f. its period of existence.
It bears emphasis that the first sentence of Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 used the word 'shall.' The term 'shall' is a word of command and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning and it is generally imperative or mandatory. It therefore underscores the mandatory character of Sections 6 and 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366. Settled is the rule that failure to comply with mandatory requirements warrants the dismissal of the Petition.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission (Second Division) hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED. 7
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, SABAKPINOY filed the instant petition under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court on July 27, 2021 alleging that respondent COMELEC (Second Division) committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its petition for registration.
To begin with, We note the following defects in the petition, warranting its outright dismissal:
1) failure to submit soft copies of the petition and their annexes either by email to the Court's e-mail address or by compact disc (CD), 8 as required by the Efficient Use of Paper Rule (A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC dated November 13, 2012); 9
2) failure to provide complete details on the evidence of identity of the affiant on the affidavit of service and verification/certification on non-forum shopping, 10 as required by Section 2 (b) (1) and (2), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules;
3) failure to file the required number of plain copies of the petition 11 as required by Section 5 (1st paragraph), Rule 64 of the Rules of Court; 12 and
4) failure to accompany the petition with a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the COMELEC's June 25, 2021 Order 13 as required by Section 5 (2nd paragraph), Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. 14
As explicitly stated in Section 5 (last paragraph) of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, petitioner's failure to comply with the required forms and contents of the petition shall be sufficient ground for its dismissal. 15
The petition is also premature as no motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC En Banc, and there are no sufficient allegations to bring the case within the recognized exceptions. As a rule, a decision, order, or resolution of a COMELEC Division must first be reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc via a motion for reconsideration before it may be elevated to the Supreme Court through the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. 16
The 1987 Constitution provides the rule on the filing of motions for reconsiderations of decisions or final orders in election cases decided by COMELEC Divisions, thus:
Article IX-C, SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the other hand, Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC, as follows:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Explaining these provisions of the Constitution and the importance of filing a motion for reconsideration from decisions or orders of a division of the COMELEC vis à vis the power of this Court to review said decisions and orders, We have, in Cayetano v. Commission on Elections17andSoriano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 18 exhaustively reviewed well-settled jurisprudence on the matter, thus:
In the 2004 case of Repol v. Commission on Elections, the Court cited Ambil and held that this Court has no power to review viacertiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. However, the Court held that an exception to this rule applies where the commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. In Repol, what was assailed was a status quoante Order without any time limit, and more than 20 days had lapsed since its issuance without the COMELEC First Division issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court held that the status quo ante Order of the COMELEC First Division was actually a temporary restraining order because it ordered Repol to cease and desist from assuming the position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the post in the meantime. Since the status quo ante Order, which was qualified by the phrase "until further orders from this Commission," had a lifespan of more than 20 days, this Order clearly violates the rule that a temporary restraining order has an effective period of only 20 days and automatically expires upon the COMELEC's denial of preliminary injunction. The Court held:
Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc, thus:
SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in Division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this constitutional provision, the COMELEC en banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of "decisions" of a Division, meaning those acts having a final character. Clearly, the assailed status quo ante Order, being interlocutory, should first be resolved by the COMELEC First Division via a motion for reconsideration.
Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of the instances over which the COMELEC en banc can take cognizance of the case. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
SEC. 2. The Commission En Banc. — The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of the Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the Members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en banc.
The present case is not one of the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the COMELEC may sit en banc. Neither is this case one where a division is not authorized to act nor a case where the members of the First Division unanimously voted to refer the issue to the COMELEC en banc. Thus, the COMELEC en banc is not even the proper forum where Repol may bring the assailed interlocutory Order for resolution.
We held in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections that —
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in division [cannot] dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order of the Division of the Commission on Elections because the case would not reach the Comelec en banc without such motion for reconsideration having been filed. x x x
Repol went directly to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC, as follows:
Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
We have interpreted this constitutional provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court has no power to review viacertiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, this rule is not ironclad. In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, we stated —
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
The Court further pointed out in ABS-CBN that an exception was warranted under the peculiar circumstances of the case since there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the 11 May 1998 elections. The same can be said in Repol's case. We rule that direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is justified under the circumstances obtaining in the present case. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to reconsider aninterlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only delay the disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the Court. This does not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. The exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining order without a time limit, which is the Repol case, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary period, which is the Kho case.
This Court has already ruled in Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, that "it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that, in accordance with Section 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution, may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari." The exception provided in Kho and Repol is unavailing in this case because unlike in Kho and Repol, the assailed interlocutory orders of the COMELEC First Division in this case are not a patent nullity. The assailed orders in this case involve the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will the Rosal case apply because in that case the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second Division and the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main case were already consolidated. 19
From the foregoing, it is clear that the proper recourse of petitioner from the assailed June 25, 2021 order of the COMELEC should have been a motion for reconsideration filed with the COMELEC En Banc. The present petition is improper for being premature and is, thus, not within the power of this Court to take cognizance of.
As We have categorically stated in the above cases, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the COMELEC must be reviewed by the COMELEC En Bancvia a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory as it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that, in accordance with Section 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution, may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. Consequently, the Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. 20
The exception enunciated in Kho v. Commissionon Elections21 and Repol v. Commission on Elections22 cases, as when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, is apparently not applicable to the case at bar. The same may be said of the exceptions stated in the ABS-CBN Corporation case where the procedural requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration was glossed over as the need for relief was extremely urgent and certiorari was the only adequate and speedy remedy available to petitioner ABS-CBN. That case involved a Resolution issued by the COMELEC En Banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, the petitioner in that case got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998 or seven (7) days before the election itself. Under the circumstances, We held that there was hardly enough opportunity for petitioner to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. In contrast, petitioner in the instant case had enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the assailed June 25, 2021 Order of the COMELEC, copy of which was received by petitioner on June 27, 2021, 23i.e., months before the May 9, 2022 elections.
Contrary to petitioner's statement that resort to a motion for reconsideration was dilatory, We reiterate Our previous ruling in Bernardo v. Abalos, Sr. 24 that the purpose of said motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. If the error is immediately corrected by way of a motion for reconsideration, then it could have been the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse. Indeed, petitioner could have easily filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching to it its MIP in the required form.
In any event, even if resolved on the merits, We find that the Second Division of the COMELEC did not commit abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion in dismissing SABAKPINOY's petition for registration. Petitioner itself admits, that its MIP lacked the required information, 25 although with an attempt to present a cure to such omission by arguing that the required information can, at any rate, be found in the petition for registration itself to which the MIP was attached.
A perusal of the said petition, however, shows the contrary. Nowhere therein, for example, can be found any information on petitioner's place of organization and its founders. These details, as well as the other information as the place of the party-list's organization, its officers, its principal and postal headquarters, its constituencies and the period of its existence, are among the information required to be indicated in the official MIP form prescribed by the COMELEC. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that there is no rule or law which justifies the COMELEC's requirement of the said information to be stated in the MIP form prescribed by the COMELEC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, states:
Sec. 61. Registration. — Any organized group of persons seeking registration as a national or regional political party may file with the Commission a verified petition attaching thereto its constitution and by-laws, platforms or program of government and such other relevant information as may be required by the Commission.
The Commission shall after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within ten days from the date it is submitted for decision. No religious sect shall be registered as a political party and no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the COMELEC may require such other relevant information in the documents submitted in support of a petition for registration as a national or regional political party, in the same way that it may require such other relevant information in connection with a party-list's application for registration. There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in requiring the abovementioned information in the prescribed MIP form.
WHEREFORE, the petition, is DISMISSED." Inting, J., no part. Hernando, J., on official leave. (10)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MARIFE M. LOMIBAO-CUEVASClerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-17.
2. Signed by Presiding Commissioner Socorro B. Inting and Commission Antonio T. Kho, Jr., id. at 19-21.
3.Id. at 22-26.
4.Id. at 5.
5.Id. at 22-26.
6.Id. at 60-61.
7.Id. at 19-20.
8.Id. at 3.
9. Section 5. Copies to be Filed. — x x x
Parties to cases before the Supreme Court are further required, on voluntary basis for the first six months following the effectivity of this Rule and compulsorily afterwards unless the period is extended, to submit, simultaneously with their court-bound papers, soft copies of the same and their annexes (the latter in PDF format) either by email to the Court's e-mail address or by compact disc (CD). x x x (Efficient Use of Paper Rule, A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC (Resolution), [November 13, 2012])
10.Rollo, pp. 14 and 16.
11.Id. at 3.
12. Section 5. Form and contents of petition. —The petition shall be verified and filed in eighteen (18) legible copies. x x x.
13.Rollo, pp. 19-21.
14. Section 5. Form and contents of petition. — x x x
The petition shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, final order or resolution subject thereof, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The requisite number of copies of the petition shall contain plain copies of all documents attached to the original copy of said petition.
15. Section 5. Forms and contents of petition. — x x x
The failure of petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
16.Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 398 Phil. 257, 275 (2000).
17. 663 Phil. 694 (2011).
18. 548 Phil. 639-655-657 (2007).
19.Supra note 17 at 699-703, citing Soriano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 548 Phil. 639, 653-656 (2007) [per J. Carpio], in turn citing Repol v. Commission on Elections, 472 Phil. 335, 351-352 (2004) [per J. Carpio], Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 398 Phil. 257, 276 (2000) [per J. Pardo]; ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections, 380 Phil. 780-804 (2000) [per J. Panganiban], in turn citing Kho v. Commission on Elections, 344 Phil. 878, 886-888 (1997) [per J. Torres, Jr.], and Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, 313 Phil. 727, 732-735 (1995) [per J. Mendoza].
20.Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, ibid. at 732.
21.Kho v. Commission on Elections, id.
22.Repol v. Commission on Elections, id.
23.Rollo, p. 4.
24. 422 Phil. 807-814 (2001).
25.Rollo, p. 8.