Sabocohan v. Radial Golden Marine Services Corp.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 190252. August 30, 2016.]

JAMES SABOCOHAN, petitioner, vs. RADIAL GOLDEN MARINE SERVICES CORP., CAPT. FRANCISCO T. GALO, represented by FRANCISCO T. GALO, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 30, 2016, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 190252 — JAMES SABOCOHAN, Petitioner, v. RADIAL GOLDEN MARINE SERVICES CORP., CAPT. FRANCISCO T. GALO, represented by FRANCISCO T. GALO, Respondents. — The letter dated July 18, 2016 of Aurora A. Mua, Records Officer III, Officer-in-Charge, Archives Section, Judicial Records Division, Court of Appeals, Manila, transmitting the Court of Appeals rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 107438 consisting of 329 pages, with attached SC petition for certiorari (sic) is NOTED.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated July 14, 2009 and Resolution 2 dated November 9, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 107438, which annulled and set aside, on a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Resolutions dated August 22, 2008 3 and November 28, 2008 4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner James Sabocohan filed a complaint for permanent total disability compensation, sick wages for 120 days, damages and attorney's fees against respondents Radial Golden Marine Services Corporation and Capt. Francisco Galo, as local agents, and Naveriver Navegacao Fluvial LTDA 5 (M/V River King) and Yu Ming Oceanic Dev't Co. Ltd. (M/V Win Terng Far), as foreign principals.

The factual antecedents of this case and the arguments of the parties in the complaint and position papers were succinctly summarized by the NLRC:

Complainant [James Sabocohan] was employed by respondents as an ordinary seaman for a period of twelve (12) months, commencing on November 5, 2005 on board MV Win Terng Far (now MV Win Yu Ni). While his one (1) year contract of employment technically expired on November 5, 2006, complainant was not repatriated by respondents, as allegedly, the vessel was still in the territorial waters of the Federated State of Micronesia and as a matter of practice, complainant was to disembark in the port of call in Bangkok, Thailand. Complainant, nonetheless, claim that the captain of the vessel "refused to repatriate him and instead required him to extend his employment contract for another six (6) months as there was no available seafarer to take his place."

On December 13, 2006, however, while on duty, the big rope of the ship suddenly gave way, hitting complainant, severely injuring his right hand, head and chin, that his tooth was even forcibly removed because of the impact, causing him to be hospitalized and confined at Pohnpei State Hospital in Micronesia from December 13-18, 2006.

Complainant was medically repatriated on January 27, 2007. Upon his arrival in Manila, complainant's medical needs, including operation, was duly attended to by [the] company-designated physician, Dr. Tammy L. dela Rosa, at the expense of respondents.

On May 7, 2007, the company-designated physician issued a recommendation saying that "he cannot assess his [complainant's] disability at the present as he [Dr. dela Rosa] needs to examine complainant again after a sufficient amount of rehabilitation, possibly a period of 4-6 months treatment." CAIHTE

Complainant claimed that he is entitled to total permanent disability compensation considering that his injury, "Close Fracture of the Radices D3 (R)", was sustained or suffered while rendering sea duty at the respondents' vessel and that he is now unfit for sea duty permanently.

Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the instant [complaint] was filed prematurely as the company-designated physician has yet to give his assessment as to the medical condition of the complainant within 4-6 months further treatment. 6

The Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on August 29, 2007, ruling in favor of Sabocohan. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered, ordering the respondents to pay complainant US$60,000.00 dollars as permanent and total disability benefits plus 10% thereof as attorney's fees. 7

The Labor Arbiter ruled that the following facts — (1) Sabocohan's inability to perform his work as a seafarer for more than 120 days from the date of the injury, and (2) the failure of the company-designated physician to declare whether or not he was fit to resume his sea duty — are sufficient bases to consider Sabocohan to be permanently disabled, citing our ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad. 8

Respondents appealed to the NLRC. On August 22, 2008, the NLRC rendered its Resolution affirming the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's application of the Crystal Shipping doctrine that since Sabocohan has been unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days, total permanent disability benefit should be awarded, regardless of whether the illness is incurable. On respondents' argument that there was no employer-employee relationship between respondents and Sabocohan at the time of the accident, the NLRC added that there was an implied extension of the employment contract when respondents failed to repatriate Sabocohan after the lapse of his employment contract on November 5, 2006, and continued to render sea duty until he sustained the subject injuries on December 13, 2006. On November 28, 2008, the NLRC issued another Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, raising anew that there was no employer-employee relationship at the time of the accident and that the company-designated physician has not determined the injury of Sabocohan to be permanent.

On July 14, 2009, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC and thus granting the Petition for Certiorari. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated August 22, 2008 and November 28, 2008 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint dated February 12, 2007 for permanent disability benefits filed by James Sabocohan is DISMISSED. 9 DETACa

The Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the NLRC's finding that there was an implied extension of Sabocohan's employment contract. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that Sabocohan is not entitled to his claim of permanent and total disability benefits, citing the 2008 case of Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.10 which modified the Crystal Shipping doctrine and ruled that a temporary total disability becomes permanent only when so declared by the company-designated physician within the period he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.

Hence, this Petition for Review, based on the following grounds:

I.

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE NLRC, SECOND DIVISION AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER AWARDING TO PETITIONER THE SUM OF US$60,000.00 AS HIS PERMANENT DISABILITY COMPENSATION PLUS 10% ATTORNEY'S FEES.

II.

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS HASTE AND FAST SPEED HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SETTING ASIDE AND REVERSING THE FINDING OF FACTS OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND AFFIRMED BY THE NLRC FINDING PETITIONER AS ALREADY UNFIT PERMANENTLY TO PERFORM ANY WORK AS SEAFARER AND THEREFORE HE IS ENTITLED [TO] A PERMANENT DISABILITY COMPENSATION AND OTHER BENEFITS AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

III.

THAT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE NLRC, SECOND DIVISION AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER IS CONTRARY TO LAW, TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, TO THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WELL AS THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. 11

The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ordered respondents to pay Sabocohan US$60,000.00 as permanent and total disability benefits in accordance with the following provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract:

SECTION 20. Compensation and Benefits

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B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

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3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. aDSIHc

 For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

 If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

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6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

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SECTION 32. Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases Including Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted

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NOTE: Any item in the schedule classified under Grade 1 shall be considered or shall constitute total and permanent disability.

SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY ALLOWANCES

Impediment Grade	Impediment
1	US$50,000	x	120.00%
2	"	x	88.81%

The award was made despite there being no assessment from the company-designated physician or a third doctor that the disability of Sabocohan is total and permanent, as the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC relied on the following pronouncements by this Court in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad: 12

Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.

Although the company-designated doctors and respondent's physician differ in their assessments of the degree of respondent's disability, both found that respondent was unfit for sea-duty due to respondent's need for regular medical check-ups and treatment which would not be available if he were at sea. There is no question in our mind that respondent's disability was total.

. . . The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.

To recapitulate, Sabocohan sustained his injury on December 13, 2006 and was confined in a hospital from December 13 to December 18. He was repatriated on January 27, 2007 (45 days after the date of the injury), and was immediately treated by the company-designated physician Dr. Tammy Dela Rosa, who operated on and treated him at the expense of respondents. The complaint praying for permanent total disability benefits was filed on February 12, 2007 (61 days after the injury; 16 days after repatriation and start of treatment by the company-designated physician). The medical certificate from Sabocohan's personal physician, Dr. Raul F. Sabado, certifying that he is permanently unfit for sea duty was dated March 13, 2007 (90 days after the injury; 45 days after the start of treatment). The recommendation by company-designated physician Dr. Dela Rosa stating that he cannot assess Sabocohan's disability at the present, as he needs to examine him after a sufficient amount of rehabilitation of around 4-6 months (120-180 days) was issued on May 7, 2007 (165 days after the injury; exactly 120 days from the start of treatment). During this entire period, Sabocohan has been unable to perform the customary work of a seafarer due to his injury. TIADCc

On Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in its August 22, 2008 Resolution for not applying this Court's pronouncements in Vergara which modified the Crystal Shipping doctrine.

In Vergara, we correlated the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract with the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, which implements the provisions of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code. These Amended Rules provide:

RULE VII — BENEFITS

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SEC. 2. Disability. — (a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided in Rule X of these Rules.

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.

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RULE X — TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY

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SEC. 2. Period of entitlement. — (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or ill sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.

Thus, in Vergara, the pronouncements in Crystal Shipping was modified by requiring the declaration of unfitness to work by a company-designated physician for it to be considered as a permanent total disability:

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.

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As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. . . . . 13

This Court, however, clarified in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, 14 and in Barko International, Inc. v. Alcayno15 that the Vergara doctrine cannot be applied to complaints filed before the ruling laid down in Vergara on October 6, 2008 in observance of the principle of prospectivity. This Court held in Barko International that:

This Court, moreover, agrees with the CA regarding the applicability of the doctrine in the case of Crystal Shipping that a seafarer's continuous inability to work due to a work-related illness for a period of more than 120 days need not be qualified by a declaration of fitness to work by a company-designated physician for it to be considered as a permanent total disability which is compensable. It would, thus, be illogical to apply the ruling laid down in Vergara which was promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more than two years from the time the complaint was filed. The observance of the principle of prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip the respondent of his cause of action for total and permanent disability that accrued since the time of his inability to perform his customary work. 16

The complaint in the case at bar was filed on February 12, 2007, which was more than one year before the promulgation of Vergara. In accordance, therefore, with this Court's pronouncements in Kestrel and Barko International, the doctrine in Crystal Shipping, which requires the company-designated physician to issue a certification of fitness to work or a disability rating within 120 days, still applies to the case at bar.

Upon close inspection, however, the doctrine in Crystal Shipping would nevertheless not require a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

As recently stated, the complaint praying for permanent total disability benefits in the case at bar was filed on February 12, 2007, after a lapse of only 61 days after the injury on December 13, 2006 and a mere 16 days from Sabocohan's medical repatriation. Respondents seasonably filed their position paper asserting that the complaint was premature and likewise presented documentary evidence, including hospital receipts and medical certificates, that Sabocohan continued to receive medical care from the company-designated physician even after the filing of his complaint. In recent jurisprudence on the 240-day period of medical evaluation accorded to the company-designated physician, we have held that, when a seafarer files his complaint for total permanent disability benefits before the lapse of said period and while still undergoing medical treatment by the company-designated physician, no cause of action had yet accrued and the complaint should be dismissed for being premature. 17 Analogously, Sabocohan had no cause of action for total permanent disability benefits when he filed the complaint on February 12, 2007 before the lapse of the 120-day medical evaluation period applicable in this case and the Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed Sabocohan's complaint for such benefits.

Notwithstanding however the prematurity of Sabocohan's claim for total permanent disability benefits, we find that he is entitled to sickness allowance under Section 20-B, paragraph 3 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract which provides:

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. (Emphases supplied.)

In Javier v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., 18 we explained the rationale for the grant of sickness allowance in this wise:

Since the seafarer is repatriated to the country to undergo treatment, his inability to perform his sea duties would normally result in depriving him of compensation income. To address this contingency, Section 20-B(3), paragraph 1, of the POEA-SEC imposes on the employer the obligation to provide the seafarer with sickness allowance that is equivalent to his basic wage until the seafarer is declared fit to work or the degree of his permanent disability is determined by the company-designated physician. The period for the declaration should be made within the period of 120 days or 240 days, as the case may be.

In his Complaint, 19 Sabocohan specifically prayed for "sick wages for 120 days," separately and in addition to his prayer for "permanent disability benefits." In Javier, we emphasized that the three kinds of liabilities on the part of the employer under the POEA-SEC — sickness allowance (which has not been granted by respondents), medical treatment (which was provided by respondents), and compensation for permanent total or partial disability (for which respondents are hereby declared not liable) — are separate and distinct, and therefore the grant or disallowance of one should not bar the grant or disallowance of the others:

The separate treatment of, and the distinct considerations in, these three kinds of liabilities under the POEA-SEC can only mean that the POEA-SEC intended to make the employer liable for each of these three kinds of liabilities. In other words, employers must: (1) pay the seafarer sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage in addition to the medical treatment that they must provide the seafarer with at their cost; and (2) compensate the seafarer for his permanent total or partial disability as finally determined by the company-designated physician.

Significantly, too, while Section 20 of the POEA-SEC did not expressly state that the employer's liabilities are cumulative in nature — so as to hold the employer liable for the sickness allowance, medical expenses and disability benefits — it does not also state that the compensation and benefits are alternative or that the grant of one bars the grant of the others.

Under this setup, the Court must be guided by the principle that as a labor contract, the POEA-SEC is imbued with public interest. Accordingly, its provisions must be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of the seafarer in the pursuit of his employment on board ocean-going vessels. After all, the constitutional policy, which we here uphold and emphasize in construing as we do these POEA-SEC provisions, accords and guarantees full protection to labor, both local and overseas.

Notably, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010 (or the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships) makes more explicit the POEA-SEC's intent we earlier discussed. As matters stand, the pertinent POEA-SEC provisions now expressly and clearly state that, in addition to the obligation of the employers to provide the seafarer with the needed medical attention at their cost, they shall likewise provide the latter sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage. It also expressly states that the disability benefits to which the seafarer may be entitled shall be based solely on the listed disability gradings without regard to the duration of the seafarer's medical treatment or the period with which he was given sickness allowance. Without doubt, medical expenses, sickness allowance and disability benefits are separate and distinct from one another. Employers are liable to provide these compensation and benefits, subject to the satisfaction of the requisite degree of proof. 20

For this reason, there is no bar for the Court to grant a claim for sickness allowance even if the claim for permanent total disability benefits should be dismissed for being premature. We have, in fact, done so in several past cases. 21

As we previously observed, the applicable maximum medical evaluation period in the case at bar is 120 days in consonance with Crystal Shipping and the POEA Standard Employment Contract. To be sure, Sabocohan himself in his Complaint prayed to be paid sickness allowance for 120 days. We further note that on the 120th day from Sabocohan's repartriation (May 7, 2007), the company-designated physician issued a medical certificate detailing the medical treatments that Sabocohanwas undergoing as of that date and recommending another four to six months of treatment and rehabilitation. Indubitably, based on respondents' own evidence, Sabocohan is entitled to the maximum 120 days of sickness allowance mandated under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. EcTCAD

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 14, 2009, and Resolution dated November 9, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 107438 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondents are directed to jointly and severally pay James Sabocohan sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage for a period of 120 days.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 29-43; penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Magdangal M. de Leon concurring.

2. Id. at 45-46.

3. CA rollo, pp. 33-38.

4. Id. at 39-40.

5. Also referred to as Neveriver Nevegacao Fluvial LTDA in other parts of the record.

6. CA rollo, pp. 34-35.

7. Id. at 107.

8. 510 Phil. 332 (2005).

9. Rollo, p. 42.

10. 588 Phil. 895 (2008).

11. Rollo, pp. 9-10.

12. Supra note 8 at 340-341.

13. Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 10 at 912-913.

14. 702 Phil. 717, 738 (2013).

15. G.R. No. 188190, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 197.

16. Id. at 210.

17. See, for example, Gargallo v. Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc., G.R. No. 215551, September 16, 2015 and New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. Despabeladeras, G.R. No. 209201, November 19, 2014, 741 SCRA 375.

18. G.R. No. 204101, July 2, 2014, 729 SCRA 157, 171.

19. CA rollo, pp. 99-100.

20. Javier v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., supra note 18 at 172-175.

21. See, for example, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 711 Phil. 614, 630 (2013); New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. Despabeladeras, supra note 17; Gargallo v. Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc.., supra note 17.