FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198565. July 4, 2018.]
RURAL BANK OF KORONADAL, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, AND JUSAME GALAURA BALBUENA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 4, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 198565 (Rural Bank of Koronadal, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, and Jusame Galaura Balbuena). — This is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Rural Bank of Koronadal, Inc. (RBKI), seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA) November 10, 2010 Decision 2 and July 11, 2011 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 01563-MIN (collectively, assailed Decision). The CA dismissed RBKI's petition for certiorari4 under Rule 65 against the September 12, 2006 Resolution 5 and January 19, 2007 Order 6 of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COSLAP Case No. 2005-07-45, upholding the claim of ownership of Jusame Balbuena (Balbuena) over a parcel of land. 7
Balbuena filed a letter-complaint dated June 25, 2005 against RBKI before the COSLAP concerning her ownership over a parcel of land described as Lot Nos. 7 and 8, Pls. - 214-D-16 in Across-Allah, Banga, Cotabato (now Barangay Buenavista, Surallah, South Cotabato) with an area of 16 hectares (property). Balbuena claims that she and her family are in possession of the property, and have occupied it in the concept of an owner since 1953. In 1963, they applied for a title over the property, but their application was denied because the land was declared to be within a watershed area. When her parents advised the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in Surallah, South Cotabato of their ownership over the property, they were surprised to find that it was already foreclosed by RBKI. 8
RBKI countered that it acquired the property through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale in 1965. It was previously owned by one Dominador Tato (Tato) who obtained approval for the issuance of a homestead patent on June 13, 1957. Tato later on mortgaged the property to secure his loan with RBKI. When Tato defaulted, RBKI extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage over the property. On that same year, RBKI consolidated its ownership over the property. 9
The COSLAP, in its September 12, 2006 Resolution, 10 ruled in favor of Balbuena. It found that the homestead application of RBKI's predecessor, Tato, did not cover the property. 11 Thereafter, RBKI filed a petition for certiorari12 under Rule 65 with the CA, attributing lack of jurisdiction on the part of COSLAP.
The CA dismissed outright RBKI's Rule 65 petition on the ground of improper remedy. It held that the proper remedy against a final order of the COSLAP is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. There being an available remedy, certiorari will not prosper.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
RBKI claims that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Balbuena's complaint. 13 The dispute is not among those disputes cognizable by the COSLAP under Section 3, paragraph 2 (e) of Executive Order (EO) No. 561. 14 Since the petition below alleges lack of jurisdiction, the CA erred in dismissing the petition below on the ground that the action should have been brought under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The sole issue here is whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the conflicting claims of Balbuena and RBKI on the property.
We grant the petition.
I
At the outset, we are mindful that the assailed Decision is a final disposition of RBKI's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. The right recourse for RBKI against the dismissal of its petition is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and not certiorari under Rule 65. 15 Likewise, we note that the correct recourse against the orders, resolutions, or decisions of the COSLAP as a quasi-judicial agency is a petition for review under Rule 43. 16 The existence and availability of appeal preclude resort to the remedy of certiorari since the latter may only be resorted to in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 17 Thus, as a rule, certiorari cannot be made as a substitute for a lost appeal.
Nevertheless, in line with the liberal spirit pervading the rules, and in the interest of justice, there are instances where we exercised our discretion to relax the rules. While certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. 18
In Davao New Town Development Corporation v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, 19 we treated a petition for review under Rule 45 as one for certiorari under Rule 65. In that case, the petitioner sought to nullify a resolution of the COSLAP, and to restrain the agency from enforcing it for lack of jurisdiction by directly filing with this Court a petition under Rule 45. We treated the petition as one filed under Rule 65. We said that in view of the nullity of the questioned resolution, being rendered without jurisdiction, it may be attacked any time:
Although the petition is captioned as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (with prohibition and application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order) and pursuant to Section 3, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, series of 1979, the Court shall properly treat the same as an original action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules on account of the jurisdictional question raised therein and the reliefs sought.
The instant petition seeks to nullify the assailed Resolution of respondent Commission and to restrain respondent Commission from enforcing the same for lack of jurisdiction and for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner alleges that respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion when it refrained from passing upon the jurisdictional questions raised in its motion to dismiss and that respondent Commission had threatened to immediately enforce said patently void resolution, thereby rendering petitioner without any plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The Court is not unmindful of the explicit directive in Sy v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, where it was held that appeals from the COSLAP may not be brought directly before the Court in view of Rule 45, Section 1 but must be elevated to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the same manner that orders, resolutions or decisions of other quasi-judicial agencies are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals.
As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, in view of the nullity of the assailed Resolution, the Court may entertain the petition notwithstanding the failure of petitioner to appeal the Resolution to the Court of Appeals. If a decision is rendered without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity, the same may be attacked anytime. While certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. The Court has given due course to petitions for certiorari although appeal is the proper remedy where the equities of the case warranted such action, mindful that dismissals based on technicalities are looked upon with disfavor. 20 (Citations omitted, italics in the original.)
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties' action or conduct. 21 A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. As such, it cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation; all acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. 22 It is also for this reason that a void judgment can be attacked at anytime, even on appeal. 23 Here, we find that similar to Davao New Town Development Corporation, the allegation of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter suffices for us to relax the rules. And as will be shown below, the COSLAP was indeed without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case.
II
The COSLAP was created by virtue of EO No. 561 on September 21, 1979. It is an attached agency of the Department of Justice vested with quasi-judicial powers and functions to settle land problems involving small landowners and members of cultural minorities. 24 The COSLAP took over the functions of the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) which was tasked "to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of land disputes, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or recommend other solutions." 25 Compared to the enabling laws of PACLAP, EO No. 561 enumerated the instances where the COSLAP may exercise adjudicatory functions:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessioners;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude. (Emphasis supplied.)
We explained in Vda. de Herrera v. Bernardo26 and in previous cases that the COSLAP does not have the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. It may only assume jurisdiction over a land dispute if: (1) it is critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action; and (2) it falls under any of the enumeration in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of EO No. 561:
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem. 27 (Citations omitted.)
In this case, we find that the COSLAP exceeded its mandate when it assumed jurisdiction over the dispute.
First, the parties are not among those enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of EO No. 561. While Balbuena and her family claim to be occupants of the property since 1953, RBKI cannot be considered a claimant or applicant of public land. RBKI claims that the property is already a private land which it acquired by virtue of its foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. Although its predecessor-in-interest, Tato, acquired the property through a homestead application, Tato was not impleaded as a respondent in the case before the COSLAP.
Second, and more importantly, the dispute between the parties is not "critical and explosive in nature" as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate action. The dispute is not of such magnitude as it only involves two parties claiming better title to a parcel of land the public character of which is disputed.
Given the conflicting claims of the parties, the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, whose decision may be subject to review by the DENR Secretary by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 141, 28 in relation to Executive Order No. 192. 29 Thus, the COSLAP should have refrained from acting on the letter-complaint and instead referred the matter to the Land Management Bureau for proper action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' November 10, 2010 Decision and July 11, 2011 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 01563-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The September 12, 2006 Resolution and January 19, 2007 Order of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 2005-07-45 are declared NULL and VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED." Leonardo De Castro, J., on official leave; Del Castillo, J., designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2562 dated June 20, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as acting member per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENAActing Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-16.
2.Id. at 19-25; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Ramon Paul L. Hernando.
3.Id. at 33-34; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan.
4.Id. at 35-47.
5.Id. at 48-50; rendered by Commissioner Carlos N. Ortega and Associate Commissioners Lina Aguilar-General and Jorge N. Bernardo.
6.Id. at 55.
7.Id. at 50. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant is hereby directed to coordinate with the Lands Management Bureau regarding the present status of Lot Nos. 7 & 8, Pls. -214-D-16, Across-Allah, Banga, Cotabato (now Brgy. Buenavista, Surallah, South Cotabato). If said land was already declared to be alienable and disposable, complainant, if qualified, may file the appropriate land application.
SO ORDERED.
8.Id. at 6, 20.
9.Id. at 20-21.
10.Supra note 5.
11.Rollo, p. 49.
12.Supra note 4.
13.Rollo, p. 9.
14. Creating the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems; Id.
15.Dycoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147257, July 31, 2013, 702 SCRA 566, 577.
16.Sy v. Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 140903, September 12, 2001, 365 SCRA 49, 60-61.
17.Dycoco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15 at 576-578.
18.Davao New Town Development Corporation v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 141523, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 491, 505. Citation omitted.
19.Id.
20.Supra note 18 at 504-505.
21.Machado v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 156287, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 546, 559. Citation omitted.
22.Id. at 560.
23.Davao New Town Development Corporation v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, supra note 18 at 505.
24. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 11, Sec. 32.
25.Davao New Town Development Corporation v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, supra note 18 at 507.
26. G.R. No. 170251, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 87, 94. Citation omitted.
27.Id. at 93-94.
28. The Public Land Act.
29. Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Bagunu v. Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011, 655 SCRA 413, 429.