Rosario y Fontanilla v. People

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 256113. February 14, 2022.]

ORLANDO ROSARIO y FONTANILLA A.K.A. "MAKOY", petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated14 February 2022which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 256113 (Orlando Rosario y Fontanilla a.k.a. "Makoy", v. People of the Philippines). — Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated March 3, 2020 and Resolution 3 dated February 15, 2021 in CA-G.R. CR No. 42720. The CA affirmed the Judgment 4 dated December 4, 2018 of Branch 93, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Balanga City, Bataan in Criminal Case No. 17378 that found Orlando Rosario y Fontanilla a.k.a. "Makoy" (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder defined and penalized under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Antecedents

An Information 5 was filed against petitioner as follows:

That on or about June 12, 2017, in Balanga City, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to kill, with treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab [sic] Edmond G. Baciles with a kitchen knife on his chest and other parts of his body, causing upon him fatal injuries, thus the said accused had performed all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of a cause independent of his will, that is, the timely and able medical attention rendered to Edmond G. Baciles, which prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of [the] victim. 6

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." 7 Trial ensued.

Private complainant Edmond G. Baciles sustained four stab wounds 8 caused by petitioner, who was the live-in partner of private complainant's mother-in-law. 9

Immediately prior to the incident, private complainant had just arrived at his mother-in-law's house. He was washing his feet at the faucet outside the house when his mother-in-law asked him to cook some chicken. Private complainant refused his mother-in-law's request as he was already tired from work. 10

Petitioner, who was drinking alcohol by his lonesome at that time, overheard private complainant's response and commented, "Ano kakain ka na lang, mamumulutan?" To which private complainant replied, "Hindi naman po ako kakain at mamumulutan."11 After washing his feet, private complainant walked towards the house. CAIHTE

Irked by private complainant's refusal and succeeding response, petitioner, armed with a knife, began stabbing private complainant, before the latter could enter the house. 12

After the incident, private complainant sought medical treatment and thereafter recovered from the injuries. 13

Petitioner's main contention was that he acted in self-defense. He asserted that the private complainant initiated the altercation and was the one who was armed with a knife. 14

Ruling of the RTC

In the Judgment 15 dated December 4, 2018, the RTC convicted petitioner as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused ORLANDO ROSARIO y FONTANILLA ALIAS MAKOY GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal by direct participation in the felony of FRUSTRATED MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and he is hereby SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR [as minimum] to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum, with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of his sentence and that of absolute perpetual disqualification. The accused is further directed to PAY complainant Edmund G. Baciles the amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (Php75,000.00) as CIVIL INDEMNITY, TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) as TEMPERATE DAMAGES, SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (Php75,000.00) as MORAL DAMAGES and SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (Php75,000.00) as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. The damages awarded shall earn INTEREST at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the judgment until fully paid.

Pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the time spent by the accused on preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 16 (Emphasis omitted).

The trial court found as follows:

First, the 13-inch kitchen knife, a deadly weapon, which petitioner used to stab private complainant with, and the nature, location, and number of wounds inflicted indicate his intent to kill. 17

Second, private complainant would have died from the stab wounds had he not received timely medical assistance. 18

Third, petitioner had suddenly attacked private complainant just as he was simply about to enter the house. He did not notice petitioner rushing towards him. That petitioner very suddenly attacked private complainant from behind and stabbed him four times in rapid succession show that private complainant had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. These establish the presence of the element of treachery. 19

Fourth, petitioner failed to establish the elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. His claims are belied by the facts that he did not even sustain any injury and that he himself initiated the previous altercation and attack. 20

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, 21 the CA denied petitioner's appeal and upheld the RTC's conviction. 22

The CA explained that the burden of proof in criminal cases rests on the prosecution. However, the onus shifts to the accused when he admits to have inflicted the injury and justifies his actions as a form of self-defense. 23

The CA ruled that petitioner failed to establish the elements of self-defense for the following reasons:

First, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The petitioner asserted that he struck and inflicted injury on the private complainant with a knife just as he saw the private complainant was about to punch him. 24 However, this is not unlawful aggression as contemplated under the law. The private complainant's supposed attempt to punch the petitioner would not have brought real peril to the latter's life or personal safety.

Second, there was no reasonable necessity for the petitioner to stab the private complainant to repel the alleged aggression. The petitioner insisted that the private complainant had a knife at the time of the altercation. However, petitioner admitted that he had already dispossessed the private complainant with his knife. At such time, any alleged aggression would have already ceased. 25

Third, there was no sufficient provocation. It was established that the petitioner initiated the altercation/attack. 26

Fourth, the number and nature of the private complainant's wounds negated the claim of self-defense. The private complainant sustained wounds, initially, on the chest and abdomen, then on his left forearm and left medial arm when he attempted to parry the petitioner's attacks. There was no need to stab the private complainant several times if the petitioner's purpose was simply to disable or prevent him from his unlawful assault. 27

The CA also agreed with the RTC's finding that the crime was attended by treachery or alevosia. The private complainant did not expect the attack. The swiftness of the attack rendered the private complainant, who was unarmed, helpless and unprotected from the knife-wielding petitioner. 28

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. 29

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner argues that the CA committed the following reversible errors: first, it affirmed his conviction despite the prosecution's failure to prove the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and second, it failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. 30 DETACa

The Issue

Did the CA err in upholding the RTC's conviction?

Our Ruling

The petition is without merit.

In the main, petitioner insists that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of Frustrated Murder beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, petitioner asserts that the altercation was preceded by a heated argument; thus, there was no treachery. 31 Also, it was private complainant who threw the first punch and attempted to stab him with a knife. Hence, he had no choice but to protect himself by taking possession of the knife. 32

Inasmuch as the averments question the RTC's appreciation of the testimonies of the witnesses, particularly in relation to the presence of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, petitioner raises questions of fact. The basic rule is that the Court's jurisdiction over Rule 45 petitions is limited to questions of law. "The Court is not a trier of facts and its function is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower Courts." 33

Furthermore, the factual findings of the RTC's, when affirmed by the CA, may no longer be disturbed by the Court. The factual findings of the trial court, when sustained by the appellate court, are binding in the absence of any indication that both courts misapprehended any fact that could change the disposition of the controversy. 34 In the absence of any clear showing by the petitioner of any abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower courts, their factual findings will neither be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to the Court. 35

At any rate, it appears that the CA correctly upheld the RTC's conviction of petitioner.

First, the elements of the crime of Frustrated Murder are present. Petitioner admitted that he stabbed private complainant. There was intent to kill: as consistently found by the lower courts, petitioner, wielding a 13-inch kitchen knife, aimed and struck the private complainant on his chest and abdomen first, which are vital parts of the body. He continued stabbing him even if the private complainant was already on the ground parrying his attacks. Further, the attack was treacherous: private complainant testified that he was washing his feet, using the faucet located a few steps away from the entrance of the house, when petitioner suddenly attacked him. It is clear from the records that, immediately prior to the incident, private complainant refused his mother-in-law's request to cook chicken. Significantly, petitioner was a stranger to that conversation. Nonetheless, he was irked by what he overheard. While he taunted private complainant, there was no heated discussion or previous altercation between private complainant and petitioner. It was merely an exchange that private complainant never took as an altercation or a quarrel considering that he left the scene. As a result, the lower courts consistently found that petitioner attacked private complainant suddenly and unexpectedly without the slightest provocation on the part of private complainant. 36 The medical doctor who treated the private complainant after the incident testified that the injuries sustained by the private complainant in the chest and abdomen areas, if left untreated, would have caused "peritonitis or bacterial infection of the abdominal cavity causing septic shock and ultimately death." 37 Fortunately, private complainant received timely medical attention and treatment that allowed him to recover from the injuries.

Second, the elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense are not present. Petitioner's actuations during the incident, as established on record, coupled with the nature and character of the injuries inflicted, are inconsistent with his claim of self-defense. Petitioner asserted that he was only trying to avoid being stabbed by private complainant, who was allegedly wielding a knife and about to stab him. However, it is already settled in jurisprudence that the mere possession of a knife does not amount to unlawful aggression. 38 On the one hand, an individual is allowed to, in self-defense, wound or disable his attacker. However, petitioner stabbed the private complainant four times; the first two blows aimed at the vital parts of the body and the other two inflicted upon the extremities just as private complainant was parrying the attacks. Further, petitioner himself admitted that he already took possession of the knife but proceeded to stab private complainant thereafter. Certainly, there was no reasonable necessity to stab private complainant multiple times especially when he was already unarmed and disabled by the first blow. 39

Third, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in petitioner's favor. Contrary to petitioner's claim, it is established on record that he did not go to the police station to subject himself voluntarily to the authorities. He was arrested by the authorities in Sitio Bani, Brgy. Cataning, Balanga City where he was hiding and brought to the police station for detention. There is also no evidence that petitioner surrendered the knife used during the altercation or that he submitted himself to barangay officials. 40

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 3, 2020 and Resolution dated February 15, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 42720 are AFFIRMED. aDSIHc

SO ORDERED." (LOPEZ, M.V. J., designated as Additional Member vice DIMAAMPAO, J., per Raffle dated November 10, 2021.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 14-33.

2.Id. at 38-53; penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta. Jr. with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao (now a member of the Court) and Louis P. Acosta, concurring.

3.Id. at 55-57.

4.Id. at 80-105; penned by Presiding Judge Philger Noel B. Inovejas.

5. As culled from the CA Decision, id. at 38-39.

6. As culled from the CA Decision, id.

7.Id. at 39.

8. Inflicted on the private complainant's chest, abdomen, left forearm, and left medial arm; id. at 40.

9.Id.

10.Id. at 39.

11.Id.

12.Id.

13.Id. at 40.

14.Id.

15.Id. at 80-105.

16.Id. at 100.

17.Id. at 88.

18.Id. at 89.

19.Id. at 91-92.

20.Id. at 92-94.

21.Id. at 38-53.

22.Id. at 52.

23.Id. at 42.

24.Id. at 43.

25.Id. at 43-44.

26.Id. at 44.

27.Id.

28.Id. at 51-52.

29.Id. at 14-33.

30.Id. at 21.

31.Id. at 23-26.

32.Id. at 27.

33.Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 239756, September 14, 2020.

34.Viray v. People, 720 Phil. 841, 849 (2013).

35.Capitol Insurance and Surety Co., Inc.v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., 775 Phil. 1, 15-16 (2015); See Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167 (2016).

36.People v. Kalipayan, 824 Phil. 173, 186 (2018).

37.Rollo, p. 102.

38.People v. Maghuyop, G.R. No. 242942, October 5, 2020.

39.See People v. Panerio, 823 Phil. 738 (2018).

40.Rollo, p. 95.