ADVERTISEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7599. September 4, 2019.]
RODCO CONSULTANCY AND MARITIME SERVICES CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY FATIMA B. GOMBAHALI, complainant, vs.ATTY. RODRIGO CANTILLA CENIZA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 4, 2019which reads as follows:
"A.C. No. 7599 (RODCO Consultancy and Maritime Services Corporation, represented by Fatima B. Gombahali v. Atty. Rodrigo Cantilla Ceniza). — Jurisprudence dictates that in administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his complaint by substantial evidence. If he fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which his claims are based, the respondent is not obliged to prove his exception or defense. 1 Considering that herein complainant failed to comply with the rules on admissibility of evidence, and to present relevant evidence that would lend credibility to its accusations of ethical violations against respondent, the Court finds no other proper conclusion than the outright dismissal of the complaint.
Complainant RODCO Consultancy and Maritime Services Corporation (RODCO) is a company engaged in providing consultancy and professional services to repatriated seafarers in the pursuit of benefits from their local manning agencies, correspondent insurance, and principal foreign ship owners. RODCO employed lawyers to handle the cases of its clients under a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which defines the scope of work and attorney's fees. One of these lawyers was respondent Atty. Rodrigo Cantilla Ceniza (Atty. Ceniza), who voluntarily entered into a MOA with RODCO for a period of three months, from April 30, 2005 to July 30, 2005. In due course, RODCO referred the cases of four seafarers to Atty. Ceniza and the latter was paid the corresponding appearance fees and fees for other legal services performed. 2
After the termination of Atty. Ceniza's MOA with RODCO, the latter observed that some of its seafarer clients began conveying their desire to revoke their service contracts with the company. Some of RODCO's office staff had also resigned to join Atty. Ceniza's new law office. To top it all, some of RODCO's seafarer clients filed complaints against it for illegal practice of law before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). 3 Believing that these incidents are products of Atty. Ceniza's malicious persuasions, RODCO filed a complaint 4 against Atty. Ceniza with the Court, praying that the latter either be removed, suspended, or disbarred for violating Canon 1, 5 Rule 1.01, 6 Rule 1.02, 7 Canon 15, 8 and Canon 17 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his comment, 10 Atty. Ceniza alleged that RODCO is engaged in illegal practice of law and victimizes its seafarer clients by collecting illegal, excessive, and unconscionable fees. 11 This is the reason why he immediately terminated his relationship with the company. 12 He denied persuading RODCO's clients to breach their agreements with the company and preparing a complaint for illegal practice of law against RODCO. 13 Granting arguendo that he convinced some of RODCO's clients to terminate their contract with the latter, he argues that there is nothing wrong or unlawful with that since he was merely protecting them from being victimized by the company. 14 He denied having committed infractions against the Code of Professional Responsibility. 15
After RODCO filed its answer (to respondent's comment), 16 and Atty. Ceniza filed his reply 17 thereto, the Court issued a Resolution 18 dated February 6, 2008 referring the case to the IBP for report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt of the record.
On December 6, 2008, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner Cachapero) of the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) rendered his Report and Recommendation 19 finding the charges against Atty. Ceniza meritorious and recommending the penalty of suspension of four months with warning that a repetition of the same acts would invite a stiffer penalty. He found that seven seafarers withdrew from their contract of services with RODCO almost at the same time, with their withdrawal letters having identical appearance and format, making it appear that it was a concerted action. He concluded that these seafarers were coaxed or cajoled to act in the same way by someone who had ascendancy over them. 20 He also found noteworthy the notarized affidavits of Marcial L. Lola and Ananias Llona Seva, who both averred that Atty. Ceniza had solicited their accounts, for which reason they transferred to and retained his services instead. Commissioner Cachapero concluded that Atty. Ceniza's denial in this regard was a faint effort to cover up a misdeed, and found him to have been involved in solicitation of clients or professional touting.
On April 16, 2010, the IBP CBD Board of Governors passed a Resolution 21 unanimously adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation. However, it later granted Atty. Ceniza's motion for reconsideration 22 and reduced the penalty of suspension to one month. 23 Undeterred, Atty. Ceniza filed another motion for reconsideration. 24 In Our October 7, 2013 Resolution, We treated the motion as a petition for review on certiorari. 25
The issue for consideration is whether Atty. Ceniza committed professional touting for which he should be meted with one month suspension from the practice of law.
We hold that RODCO failed to prove by substantial evidence that Atty. Ceniza committed professional touting. Hence, the dismissal of the complaint is in order.
Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. While substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases, it should be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. 26 Here, the complaint was not supported by substantial evidence.
RODCO asserts in the complaint that Atty. Ceniza "brainwashed, convinced and pirated" some of its office staff, "snatched" its seafarer clients and instructed them to disregard their contracts with RODCO, and instructed some of its seafarer clients to file a complaint against RODCO for illegal practice of law. 27 However, RODCO or any of its employees do not have personal knowledge of these acts that they are imputing against Atty. Ceniza. They anchor their allegations entirely on documents such as letters 28 and affidavits 29 that were executed by other persons. The Court, however, cannot accord these documents probative value.
First, the documents attached to the record are not original, but mere photocopies. It is a basic rule of admissibility that when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. 30 The rule admits of some exceptions, but none exists in this case. In the absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced, the photocopy submitted in lieu thereof must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence. 31
Second, the affidavits attached to the record have not been identified by the affiants. It is settled that an affidavit is only prima facie evidence. Unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon, an affidavit is considered hearsay. 32
Commissioner Cachapero scheduled only one mandatory conference in this case — the one held on September 12, 2008 and attended by RODCO's representative, Danilo Rabe, and Atty. Ceniza. 33 On even date, Commissioner Cachapero issued an order terminating the mandatory conference and directing the parties to submit their respective verified position papers with documentary evidence and affidavits of witnesses. The order further provided that after the lapse of the non-extendible period of 10 days to file the verified position papers, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution unless a clarificatory hearing is found necessary. 34 Unfortunately, as evinced by the record, no such hearing was subsequently called. A hearing would have given RODCO an opportunity to present witnesses who would to attest to the truth of the contents of their respective affidavits that impelled the present disciplinary action against Atty. Ceniza. On the part of RODCO, there is nothing that precludes it from requesting a hearing, but it chose to remain silent.
As it is, the affidavits that have not been properly affirmed by their affiants remained hearsay and do not constitute evidence that would prove Atty. Ceniza's administrative accountability for professional touting. The Court has emphasized that to satisfy the substantial evidence requirement for administrative cases, hearsay evidence should necessarily be supplemented and corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay. 35 Since no such other evidence was presented here, the complaint is properly dismissible.
Finally, most of RODCO's documents are irrelevant as they do not show that Atty. Ceniza committed the acts imputed to him. For example, several of RODCO's clients executed letters 36 revoking their respective agreements with RODCO, or documents denominated as withdrawal of counsel 37 which terminated the services of the counsel hired by RODCO to handle their cases. However, there is nothing on the face of these documents that shows Atty. Ceniza's involvement in their execution. In fact, there is no allegation in the complaint that these former clients of RODCO have subsequently been represented by Atty. Ceniza. The cash vouchers 38 showing RODCO's payment of Atty. Ceniza's fees and the entry of appearance 39 filed by Atty. Ceniza in various cases do not indicate the commission by the latter of the acts complained of. In other documents, Atty. Ceniza's name was either not mentioned, 40 or even if mentioned, the soliciting of RODCO's clients is shown to have been done by other persons without proof that it was sanctioned by Atty. Ceniza. 41
In consideration of the gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his complaint through substantial evidence. 42 A complainant's failure to dispense this standard of proof requires no other conclusion than that which stays the hand of the Court from meting out a disbarment or suspension order. 43
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Re: Letter of Lucena Ofendoreyes Alleging Illicit Activities of a Certain Atty. Cajayon Involving Cases in the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA, June 6, 2017, 826 SCRA 74, 79.
2.Rollo, p. 610.
3.Id. at 610-611.
4.Id. at 1-13.
5. Canon 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
6. Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
7. Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel of abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
8. Canon 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
9. Canon 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
10.Rollo, pp. 85-114.
11.Id. at 88-89.
12.Id. at 95.
13.Id. at 102.
14.Id. at 104.
15.Id. at 112.
16.Id. at 150-160.
17.Id. at 218-223.
18.Id. at 224-225.
19.Id. at 610-614.
20.Id. at 613.
21.Id. at 609.
22.Id. at 615-622.
23.Id. at 681.
24.Id. at 651-654.
25.Id. at 688.
26.Simeon V. Marcelo v. Bungubung, G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 589, 608.
27.Rollo, p. 6.
28. Letter of Atty. Ceniza to Adelfa B. Corpuz dated May 22, 2006 (Rollo, p. 57), and Letter of Atty. Ceniza to Marcial L. Lola dated February 19, 2007 (Id. at 58).
29. Affidavits of: 1) Rodolfo P. Nardo, Jr. dated February 6, 2007 (Id. at 50-51); 2) Marcial L. Lola dated February 22, 2007 (Id. at 52-53); 3) Ananias Llona Seva dated July 16, 2007 (Id. at 54-55); 4) Richard B. Berry dated August 19, 2004 (Id. at 187); 5) Leonelyn M. Longyapon dated October 26, 2007 (Id. at 188-189); 6) Carlos Gonzales Oreto dated December 15, 2006 (Id. at 190); and 7) Trinidad Ramos Hernandez dated October 22, 2007 (Id. at 213-215).
30. REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 130, Sec. 3.
31. Intestate Estate of the Late San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103727, December 18, 1996, 265 SCRA 733, 757.
32. Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 96685, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 164, 172.
33. Rollo, pp. 227, 240.
34. Id. at 310.
35. Re: Letter of Lucena Ofendoreyes Alleging Illicit Activities of a Certain Atty. Cajayon Involving Cases in the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, supra note 1 at 74, 79.
36. Rollo, pp. 38-40.
37. Id. at 41-46, 48-50.
38. Id. at 28-37.
39. Id. at 60-63.
40. E.g., Sinumpaang Salaysay of Richard B. Berry (Id. at 187) and Leonelyn M. Longyapon (Id. at 188-189).
41. E.g., Handwritten letter of Hory S. Beltran to Mr. Riofrir (Id. at 59) and Affidavit of Carlos Gonzales Oreto (Id. at 190).
42. Reyes v. Nieva, A.C. No. 8560, September 6, 2016, 802 SCRA 196, 219.
43. Goopio v. Maglalang, A.C. No. 10555, July 31, 2018.