THIRD DIVISION
[OCA IPI No. 19-3063-MTJ. June 20, 2022.]
TRINIDAD GAMBOA ROCES, petitioner, vs.JUDGE RANHEL A. PEREZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, ENRIQUE B. MAGALONA-MANAPLA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 20, 2022, which reads as follows:
"OCA IPI No. 19-3063-MTJ (Trinidad Gamboa Roces v. Judge Ranhel A. Perez, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Enrique B. Magalona-Manapla, Negros Occidental). — The pivotal issue for this Court's disposition is whether or not respondent Ranhel A. Perez, Presiding Judge of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Enrique B. Magalona-Manapla, Negros Occidental, should be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, oppression, and abuse of authority when he denied the Motion to Release the Supersedeas Bond 1 filed by Serafin R. Gamboa (Serafin), the brother of complainant Trinidad Gamboa Roces, in Civil Case No. 476-M.
We answer in the negative. As recommended by the Judicial Integrity Board in its Report and Recommendation 2 dated 16 February 2022, the Complaint must perforce be dismissed.
Foremost, it bears stressing that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to impugn the actions of a magistrate. As the Court edifyingly enunciated in Dagani-Hugo v. Castilla3 —
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, it any, committed by a judge in the exercise or his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. Moreover, a judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment, in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. 4
In the case at bench, complainant took issue with the act of respondent in denying the motion to release the supersedeas bond 5 filed by her brother Serafin in Civil Case No. 476-M, an ejectment case. Perceivably, this matter involves respondent's exercise of his judicial prerogatives, which may only be assailed through the apposite remedies under the Rules of Court and not by way of an administrative inquiry.
Appropriately, Serafin could have sought reconsideration of respondent's Order 6 denying his motion, but complainant opted to repugn respondent's issuance which was adverse to her brother, Serafin, through the instant disciplinary proceedings. It cannot be overemphasized that judicial remedies take precedence over administrative proceedings in correcting errors which may have been committed by a judge in the exercise of his or her adjudicative functions.
Likewise, this Court finds no discernible reason to hold respondent liable for gross ignorance of the law, oppression, and abuse of authority. Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court 7 ordains that the money deposited by the defendants for purposes of staying the execution of the judgment shall be held until the final disposition of the appeal, and "shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the [RTC]." 8 This being so, respondent's postulation that he could not act on Serafin's motion to release the supersedeas bond without any specific directive from the RTC is not devoid of legal and factual mooring. Ergo, respondent cannot be liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Indeed, respondent's directive 9 for Serafin to serve copies of his motion to release the supersedeas bond upon the defendants is required under Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. 10 Invariably, Section 2, Rule 13 11 thereof expressly provides that courts have the discretion to direct service upon the parties themselves. Thence, respondent unerringly denied Serafin's motion without any proof of service thereof upon the defendants.
Evidently, complainant adduced no morsel of proof evincing any wrongdoing, bad faith or malice on the part of respondent which would warrant the imposition of any sanctions against him. It bears accentuating that in the absence of any extrinsic evidence proving bad faith or ill motive on the part of the judge, the following presumptions stand: first, that official duty has been regularly performed; and second, that a judge, acting as such, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction. 12
In epitome, complainant failed to satisfactorily discharge her burden of proving that respondent knowingly and willfully acted with gross ignorance of the law, oppression, and abuse of authority in denying the motion to release the supersedeas bond filed by her brother Serafin in Civil Case No. 476-M.
WHEREFORE, the instant Complaint against Judge Ranhel A. Perez, Presiding Judge of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Enrique B. Magalona-Manapla, Negros Occidental, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 48-50.
2.Id. at 97-103.
3. OCA IPI No. 20-3093-MTJ, 14 October 2020.
4.Id.
5.Supra note I.
6.Id. at 57-59.
7.SEC. 19.Immediate execution of judgement; how to stay same. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
8.Id.
9. Order dated 23 January 2019. Id. at 55-56.
10.SEC. 4.Papers required to be filed and served. — Every judgment, resolution, order, pleading subsequent to the complaint, written motion, notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties affected.
11.SEC. 2.Filing and service, defined. — Filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court.
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side. [Underscoring supplied]
12. See Baculi v. Belen, 695 Phil. 598, 611 (2012).