Roces v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 167499. September 15, 2005.]

MILES ANDREW MARI ROCES, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIA ZENAIDA B. ANG PING,respondents.

Romulo B. Macalintal for petitioner.

Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

 

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. — The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it. This exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether that state of facts exists which confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters which arise in the case legitimately before it. Accordingly, it has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction. One of the three essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be present. Consequently, the HRET merely exercised its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to contest the election of Roces.

2. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTION; RULES OF PROCEDURE; MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DIVISION'S DECISIONS, RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS OR RULINGS MUST FIRST BE FILED IN THE DIVISION BEFORE THE COMMISSION EN BANC MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — To make matters worse, the COMELEC en banc usurped the jurisdiction of the COMELEC First Division when it issued Resolution No. 6823 on May 8, 2004 which ordered the deletion of Mr. Ang Ping's name from the Certified List of Candidates and denied the spouses Ang Ping's motions to withdraw and substitute despite the fact that: (1) the reglementary period of Mr. Ang Ping to appeal had not yet expired; and (2) Mr. Ang Ping had filed a motion for reconsideration of the preceding order on May 10, 2004 within the five-day reglementary period. Nowhere is it provided in the law that the COMELEC en banc has the power to assume jurisdiction motu proprio over a petition to deny due course pending before a division of the Commission. Diametrically opposed thereto are the provisions of the Constitution and COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provide that motions for reconsideration of the COMELEC division's decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings must first be filed in the Divisions before the Commission en banc may take cognizance thereof. . . .

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTIONS THEREOF CONSIDERED VOID AB INITIO IN CASE AT BAR FOR VIOLATING THE PARTY'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; EFFECTS OF A VOID JUDGMENT. — There is no iota of doubt that the COMELEC's resolutions are void ab initio for violating Mrs. Ang Ping's constitutional right to due process. Judgments entered in a proceeding failing to comply with procedural due process are void, as is one entered by a court acting in a manner inconsistent with due process. A void judgment is defined as one that, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect. A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to, and is attended by none of the consequences of, a valid adjudication. Indeed, a void judgment need not be recognized by anyone, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair, or create rights, nor can any rights be based on it. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for any purpose. Needless to stress, the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest as the COMELEC Resolution dated April 30, 2004, Order of May 5, 2004, and Resolution No. 6823 were void ab initio.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A VOID JUDGMENT OR DECREE IS SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK AT ANY TIME. — Petitioner contends that the HRET cannot review decisions of the COMELEC and that COMELEC decisions, orders, or rulings may be solely reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. It is true that generally, the method of assailing a judgment or order of the COMELEC is via petition for certiorari. As aforestated, however, it was petitioner who submitted these resolutions to the HRET as proofs that Mrs. Ang Ping was not a proper party. These same resolutions were collaterally attacked by Mrs. Ang Ping before the HRET when she alleged that these violated her right to due process. A void judgment or resolution may be impeached through collateral attack. A direct attack on a judgment or resolution is defined as an attempt to avoid or correct it in some manner provided by law, in a proceeding instituted for that very purpose, in the same action and in the same tribunal. Conversely, a collateral attack is an attempt to impeach the judgment or resolution by matters dehors the record, before a tribunal other than the one in which it was rendered, in an action other than that in which it was rendered; an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it; any proceeding which is not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying such decree; an objection, incidentally raised in the course of the proceeding, which presents an issue collateral to the issues made by the pleadings. The rule that a void judgment or decree is subject to collateral attack at any time is based upon a court's inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records. The void resolutions of the COMELEC, especially the April 30, 2004 resolution issued by its First Division, cannot oust the HRET of its jurisdiction over the case at bar.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS SHOULD ONLY BE DECLARED VOID IN THE MOST EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES; CASE AT BAR. — We hasten to add that judgments, orders and resolutions should only be declared void in the most exceptional circumstances due to detrimental effects on the doctrine of finality of judgments. The circumstances of this case, however, are unique in that the private respondent was denied due process and was forced to seek justice in the HRET. In fact, it was this Court that referred the private respondent to the HRET when it dismissed the latter's petition in G.R. No. 163259 on the ground of the pendency of HRET Case No. 04-004. To grant the petition now would effectively foreclose the private respondent's access to any remedy despite violation of her right to due process.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., dissenting opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; RULE; ANY FINAL ACTION TAKEN BY THE TRIBUNAL ON A MATTER WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION SHALL NOT BE REVIEWED. — The mandate of the HRET to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members is constitutionally endowed. So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW RESOLUTIONS OR DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. — More importantly, it is beyond the HRET's jurisdiction to review, whether as a preliminary matter or not, resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, as it rests with this Court by constitutional fiat, to wit: SEC. 7. . . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. In Codilla vs. De Venecia, the Court, citing the HRET case of Puzon vs. Cua, stated that: . . . even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTION PROTEST, WHO MAY FILE. — Under Rule 16 of the 1988 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, as amended, "an election protest shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy. . . ." Consequently, Zenaida cannot be deemed a proper party to file the election protest, as there was no valid substitution of candidates given that Harry's certificate of candidacy was already denied due course by the COMELEC at the time the substitution was made.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DECISION THEREOF MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT WHERE THE SAME WAS RENDERED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR UPON A SHOWING OF CAPRICIOUS, ARBITRARY AND WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF ITS POWER. — In exceptional cases, the Court had to exercise its power of judicial review, as when the HRET's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of its power. I believe this case falls under the exception. It should be emphasized that the dismissal of the petition, in effect, sustains the HRET's finding regarding the invalidity of the COMELEC orders, which virtually gives authority to the HRET to rule upon the COMELEC's issuances, a matter that is exclusively lodged with this Court.

5. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; ORDERS THEREOF ENJOY THE PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH AND REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY. — It is my opinion that the HRET exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling upon the COMELEC (First Division) May 5, 2004 Order in SPA No. 04-224, which considered the Order denying due course to and canceling the Certificate of Candidacy of Harry as having been promulgated on April 30, 2004, as well as on the COMELEC Resolution No. 6823, which considered the affidavit of withdrawal of Harry as moot and academic and denied Zenaida's bid to be a substitute candidate. In the first place, these COMELEC orders enjoy the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty. Absent palpable evidence, the HRET cannot impute bad faith, collusion, or irregularity in the issuance of these COMELEC orders.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTRAORDINARY POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PASS UPON AN ORDER OR DECISION THEREOF SHOULD BE EXERCISED RESTRICTIVELY, WITH CARE AND CAUTION, WHILE GIVING IT THE HIGHEST REGARD AND RESPECT DUE A CONSTITUTIONAL BODY. — It was not necessary for the HRET to make any ruling on the substantial merits of the COMELEC orders. It could have resolved the question of Zenaida's standing to file the election protest simply by applying the rule on finality of COMELEC decisions. In fact, even the Court cannot make any declaration on these COMELEC issuances, as these are not properly before the Court in the present petition. It should be stressed that the extraordinary power of this Court to pass upon an order or decision of the COMELEC should be exercised restrictively, with care and caution, while giving it the highest regard and respect due a constitutional body.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY OF DECISIONS ON DISQUALIFICATION CASES. — The COMELEC's jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy is beyond question. Such jurisdiction continues even after the elections, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or taken his oath of office. A decision by the COMELEC to disqualify a candidate shall become final and executory only after a period of five days: . . . .

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SUSPENDS THE EXECUTION OR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISION THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — Moreover, Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1988 COMELEC Rules of Procedure explicitly states that the filing of a motion for reconsideration suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling. In this case, the cancellation of Harry's certificate of candidacy and Zenaida's substitution as candidate in his stead, was yet to attain finality at the time Zenaida filed her ad cautelam election protest before the HRET on May 24, 2004. When it was converted into a regular election protest on September 9, 2004, the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC (First Division) Order dated April 30, 2004 was still pending before the COMELEC En Banc. As such, the enforcement of the COMELEC's order denying due course and canceling Harry's certificate of candidacy is deemed suspended. While the COMELEC En Banc already denied respondents' motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 04-224 on April 28, 2005, it is premature to rule that it is a final and executory order of disqualification, considering that respondents may then still assail the COMELEC's issuances to this Court.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF THE ORDERS THEREOF PREVAILS UNLESS SHOWN TO BE INVALID. — To stress, at the time Zenaida filed the election protest, Harry's motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC (First Division) April 30, 2004 Order canceling his certificate of candidacy, was yet to be resolved by the COMELEC En Banc, and Harry's disqualification cannot yet be enforced. Hence, at the time of the filing of the election protest ad cautelam, Zenaida could have been presumed to be a proper party as substitute candidate; but her legal personality to file a protest is made clear in the advent of the April 28, 2005 Order of the COMELEC En Banc which denied Harry's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated April 30, 2004. As of even date, records do not show whether the Ang Pings timely questioned the COMELEC (First Division) Order dated May 5, 2004 denying Harry's motion to cancel the scheduled promulgation and to dismiss the petition to deny due course and cancel his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 28, 2005, denying his motion for reconsideration, before this Court. The April 30, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC (First Division) denied due course and cancelled Harry's certificate of candidacy. Resolution No. 6823 issued by the COMELEC En Banc considered as moot and academic Harry's withdrawal of candidacy and denied Zenaida's bid to be the substitute candidate of their political party. Hence, given the presumption of regularity of these COMELEC orders and until it is shown that these orders are invalid in the proper forum, the same must prevail.

 

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J p:

If there is a right, there must be a remedy is an old legal adage. The case at bar provides the perfect setting for the application of this adage which is a demand for simple justice. The facts will show how the respondent's right to run for a public office has been frustrated by unscrupulous officials in charge of the sanctity of our electoral process.

Petitioner Miles Roces (Roces) and former Congressman Harry Ang Ping (Mr. Ang Ping) filed their respective certificates of candidacy (COCs) for the position of Representative for the 3rd Congressional District of Manila in the May 2004 elections.

On January 5, 2004, a registered voter of Manila named Alejandro Gomez questioned Mr. Ang Ping's candidacy before the COMELEC through a petition to deny due course or cancel his COC. 1 The petition alleged that Mr. Ang Ping misrepresented himself to be a natural-born citizen, hence was disqualified for the position.

Acting for the COMELEC First Division, Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcilliano issued an order on April 30, 2004 scheduling the promulgation of its resolution on May 5, 2004. 2 Two days before the scheduled promulgation or on May 3, 2004, Mr. Ang Ping filed with the COMELEC a Sworn Declaration of Withdrawal of his COC. 3 The next day, May 4, 2004, the General Counsel for the Nationalist Peoples Coalition, the political party of Mr. Ang Ping, sought that Mr. Ang Ping's wife, Ma. Zenaida Ang Ping (Mrs. Ang Ping), substitute for him. 4 Mr. Ang Ping also filed a motion to cancel the scheduled promulgation and dismiss the petition to deny due course or cancel his COC on the same date. 5 On May 5, 2004, Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra deferred the promulgation for lack of quorum as he was the sole Commissioner in attendance. 6

Despite all these developments, the COMELEC First Division, through Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier, Resurreccion Z. Borra, and Virgilio O. Garcilliano, issued a resolution granting the petition to deny due course to Mr. Ang Ping's COC and ordering the Board of Election Inspectors of Manila not to count any vote cast in his favor. 7 It ruled that the resolution which was originally scheduled for promulgation by Commissioner Garcilliano on May 5, 2004 was instead promulgated on April 30, 2004, the same date that the notice of promulgation was issued. 8 The resolution was served on Mr. Ang Ping's counsel on May 8, 2004. 9

Compounding the woes of Mr. Ang Ping, and despite the deferment of the promulgation by Commissioner Borra at a hearing on May 5, 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued on the same date an order denying Mr. Ang Ping's motion to dismiss. It held that the motion to dismiss was filed after the "promulgation" of the April 30, 2004 resolution granting the petition to deny due course to Mr. Ang Ping's COC. 10 On May 9, 2004, and before the expiration of the five-day reglementary period, 11 Mr. Ang Ping moved for reconsideration of the April 30, 2004 resolution and the case was elevated to the COMELEC en banc. 12

While the case was still with the COMELEC First Division, or on May 8, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 6823, declaring moot Mr. Ang Ping's Affidavit of Withdrawal, denying due course to the substitute COC of Mrs. Ang Ping and ordering the Regional Election Director to delete Mr. Ang Ping's name from the certified list of candidates. 13 Among the signatories to the Resolution were Commissioners Javier, Borra, and Garcilliano of the COMELEC First Division before which the petition to deny due course was still pending. 14 Mr. Ang Ping had no knowledge of the resolution. aAEIHC

Racing against time or on May 11, 2004, the spouses Ang Ping repaired to this Court and filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order, status quo order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as G.R. No. 163259, assailing COMELEC Resolution No. 6823. 15 The next day or on May 12, 2004, this Court issued a resolution requiring Roces to comment and denied the issuance of an order suspending the proclamation. 16

On the election day itself, the Manila City Board of Canvassers resolved not to canvass the votes for Mr. or Mrs. Ang Ping citingCOMELEC Resolution No. 6823. 17 On May 15, 2004, after counting only 6,347 votes out of the 150,387 registered voters in the district, it proclaimed Roces winner. 18 The spouses Ang Ping appealed the Board resolution to the COMELEC en banc 19 and filed a petition to annul the proclamation 20 but these were dismissed by COMELEC's Resolution No. 7257 and Omnibus Order of July 6, 2004. 21

On May 19, 2004, Roces filed his Comment to the petition of spouses Ang Ping with this Court. 22 On May 25, 2004, this Court required the spouses Ang Ping to file their consolidated reply to the Comment. 23

On May 24, 2004, Mrs. Ang Ping filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which was docketed as HRET Case No. 04-004. 24 In her election protest, Mrs. Ang Ping alleged, among others, that COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 was a "glaring case of deprivation" of Mr. and Mrs. Ang Ping's right to "elevate SPC 04-224 to the Commission en banc" and that the COMELEC's April 30, 2004 resolution was irregularly promulgated. Roces filed his answer alleging, among others, that the HRET has no jurisdiction over the case. 25

On July 16, 2004, the spouses Ang Ping filed their consolidated reply with this Court. 26 On July 27, 2004, we required Mrs. Ang Ping to show cause why the petition in G.R. No. 163259 should not be dismissed in view of the filing and pendency of HRET Case No. 04-004. 27 In her Compliance filed on July 30, 2004, Mrs. Ang Ping explained that the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 may be ventilated as one of the issues to be settled in the HRET Election Protest since the non-canvassing of the "Ang Ping votes" and the proclamation of petitioner Roces were founded on COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 and were raised as the principal issues in the HRET Election Protest. This notwithstanding, the spouses Ang Ping manifested that they will "submit to any disposal which this Honorable Court may find appropriate under the above circumstances" and "would defer and will accept any order/resolution of the Honorable Court that would resolve to dismiss the instant petition/controversy, but allowing them to pursue and concentrate their time and effort in the above-mentioned Ad Cautela HRET Election Protest Case, which they intend to convert to a REGULAR PROTEST case, in such an event." 28

On August 10, 2004, this Court dismissed G.R. No. 163259 in view of the pending HRET protest filed by Mrs. Ang Ping. 29 The resolution eventually became final and executory. 30 Thereafter, Mrs. Ang Ping filed in the HRET a motion to convert the ad cautelam protest to a regular protest. The HRET granted the motion on September 9, 2004. 31

In the HRET, Roces filed a motion to dismiss the protest, assailing in the main the personality of Mrs. Ang Ping to file the protest. It also raised the following issues: (1) whether the HRET has jurisdiction to review COMELEC Resolution No. 6823; (2) whether Mrs. Ang Ping can validly substitute for Mr. Ang Ping; (3) whether the protest may be resolved by mere canvass of election returns; (4) whether the proceeding is a "protest" considering that it questions proceedings held before the Manila City Board of Canvassers; (5) whether Mrs. Ang Ping could claim any right to the ballots cast considering she was not listed in the certified list of COMELEC candidates; (6) whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance despite failing to state the specific precincts protested; and (7) whether forum shopping was committed.

After extensive oral arguments, the HRET denied Roces's motion to dismiss on March 3, 2005. It ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to file the protest against Roces since: (1) there was no final COMELEC resolution disqualifying or denying due course to the COC of Mr. Ang Ping, thus her substitution for the latter was legally permissible under the Omnibus Election Code; 32 (2) she was one of the candidates voted for during election day in the 3rd District of Manila; 33 and (3) the COMELEC Order of May 5, 2004 was of questionable validity for the reason that: (a) it was issued in violation of its April 30, 2004 resolution setting the promulgation for May 5, 2004 and despite the fact that the records had not yet reached the COMELEC en banc; 34 and (b) there was no prior notice and hearing in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 35 Roces's motion for reconsideration of the HRET order was denied on March 21, 2005.

Roces then filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the two preceding resolutions of the HRET. 36 The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to file the election protest despite the denial in due course and cancellation of her COC under COMELEC Resolution No. 6823; and (2) whether or not HRET has jurisdiction to review a resolution or order of the COMELEC and/or declare the same as void and disregard or set it aside.

After several months or on April 28, 2005, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying Mr. Ang Ping's motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC's April 30, 2004 resolution for being moot and academic due to the petitioner's proclamation, Mr. Ang Ping's withdrawal of his candidacy and Mrs. Ang Ping's attempt to substitute for her husband. 37

We hold that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss for the following reasons:

First. The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives 38 and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it. 39 This exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether that state of facts exists which confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters which arise in the case legitimately before it. 40 Accordingly, it has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction. 41 One of the three essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be present. 42 Consequently, the HRET merely exercised its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to contest the election of Roces. HACaSc

Second. There is no dispute that to support his motion to dismiss, Roces offered as evidence the COMELEC resolutions denying due course to Mrs. Ang Ping's COC. In doing so, Roces submitted to the HRET the admissibility and validity of these resolutions and the HRET cannot be faulted in reviewing the said resolutions especially for the purpose of determining whether Roces was able to discharge his burden of proving that Mrs. Ang Ping is not the proper party to assail his election. In passing upon the COMELEC resolutions especially for that purpose, it cannot be said that the HRET usurped the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

On the merits of the HRET ruling, we hold that the HRET did not abuse its discretion in holding that Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to contest the election of Roces. Under COMELEC rules, the procedure of promulgation of a decision or resolution is as follows:

SECTION 5. Promulgation. — The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram. 43

Promulgation is important because it determines when the reglementary period begins to toll. In the case at bar, Commissioner Garcilliano fixed the promulgation of its resolution whether to give due course to the candidacy of Mr. Ang Ping on May 5, 2004.

For mysterious reasons, the COMELEC First Division of Commissioner Garcillano did not promulgate the resolution on May 5, 2004 in accordance with its notice of promulgation. In violation of the abovecited rule, and despite the deferment of the promulgation by Commissioner Borra to a date to be set by the COMELEC First Division, the resolution was deemed "promulgated" by the COMELEC on April 30, 2004 when it was filed with the clerk of court. The April 30, 2004 COMELEC resolution was received by Mr. Ang Ping's counsel only on May 8, 2004. 44

The mysterious April 30, 2004 resolution was thereafter used to run roughshod over the rights of the Ang Pings. Thus, on May 5, 2004, the COMELEC First Division of Commissioner Garcilliano denied Mr. Ang Ping's motion to dismiss. Allegedly, Mr. Ang Ping's motion was filed after the April 30, 2004 resolution.

To make matters worse, the COMELEC en bancusurped the jurisdiction of the COMELEC First Division when it issued Resolution No. 6823 on May 8, 2004 which ordered the deletion of Mr. Ang Ping's name from the Certified List of Candidates and denied the spouses Ang Ping's motions to withdraw and substitute despite the fact that: (1) the reglementary period of Mr. Ang Ping to appeal had not yet expired; and (2) Mr. Ang Ping had filed a motion for reconsideration of the preceding order on May 10, 2004 within the five-day reglementary period. Nowhere is it provided in the law that the COMELEC en banc has the power to assume jurisdiction motu proprio over a petition to deny due course pending before a division of the Commission. Diametrically opposed thereto are the provisions of the Constitution and COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provide that motions for reconsideration of the COMELEC division's decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings must first be filed in the Divisions before the Commission en banc may take cognizance thereof, viz.:

SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. 45

SECTION 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission. 46

SECTION 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of. — Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc. IAaCST

SECTION 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Resolution. — The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof. (Emphases supplied) 47

This premature COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 was then used on May 12, 2004, or on the election day itself, by the Manila City Board of Canvassers as the basis of its resolution not to canvass the votes for Mr. or Mrs. Ang Ping. It then proclaimed Roces the winner despite having counted only 6,347 votes out of the 150,387 registered voters of the district. 48 Following these highly suspect resolutions, Roces was proclaimed winner on May 15, 2004. All told, it cannot be denied that the effect of COMELEC en banc Resolution No. 6823 was to execute the April 30, 2004 resolution of its First Division which, at that time, had not yet become final and executory. These irregularities cannot be swept away by the belated COMELEC en banc'sApril 28, 2005 resolution denying Mr. Ang Ping's motion for reconsideration dated May 10, 2004. 49

It is argued that Mrs. Ang Ping's motions for reconsideration and appeals "cured" whatever defects occurred at the COMELEC. Citing T.H. Valderama & Sons, Inc. v. Drilon, 50 Roces points to the petition for certiorari filed with this Court on May 11, 2004 by Mrs. Ang Ping assailing COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 and her acquiescence to any "appropriate action taken (by the Court) including the dismissal of the above petition." Contrary to Roces's posture, Valderama and its kin required that the aggrieved party be given an opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, it ought to be emphasized that the private respondent was systematically denied the opportunity to be heard. The resolution of the COMELEC's First Division was made before its priorily set date of promulgation, deemed final and executory by the COMELEC en banc in Resolution No. 6823 before expiry of the reglementary period, and executed by the Manila City Board of Canvassers. The petition for certiorari filed by Mrs. Ang Ping challenged these resolutions and could not have cured these blatant violations of her right to due process. In truth, this Court referred the case of Mrs. Ang Ping to the HRET where she has filed a protest ad cautelam.

There is no iota of doubt that the COMELEC's resolutions are void ab initio for violating Mrs. Ang Ping's constitutional right to due process. Judgments entered in a proceeding failing to comply with procedural due process are void, as is one entered by a court acting in a manner inconsistent with due process. 51 A void judgment is defined as one that, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect. A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to, and is attended by none of the consequences of, a valid adjudication. Indeed, a void judgment need not be recognized by anyone, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair, or create rights, nor can any rights be based on it. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for any purpose. 52 Needless to stress, the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest as the COMELEC Resolution dated April 30, 2004, Order of May 5, 2004, and Resolution No. 6823 were void ab initio.

Third. Petitioner contends that the HRET cannot review decisions of the COMELEC and that COMELEC decisions, orders, or rulings may be solely reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 53 It is true that generally, the method of assailing a judgment or order of the COMELEC is via petition for certiorari. 54 As aforestated, however, it was petitioner who submitted these resolutions to the HRET as proofs that Mrs. Ang Ping was not a proper party. These same resolutions were collaterally attacked by Mrs. Ang Ping before the HRET when she alleged that these violated her right to due process. 55 A void judgment or resolution may be impeached through collateral attack. 56 A direct attack on a judgment or resolution is defined as an attempt to avoid or correct it in some manner provided by law, in a proceeding instituted for that very purpose, in the same action and in the same tribunal. Conversely, a collateral attack is an attempt to impeach the judgment or resolution by matters dehors the record, before a tribunal other than the one in which it was rendered, in an action other than that in which it was rendered; an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it; any proceeding which is not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying such decree; an objection, incidentally raised in the course of the proceeding, which presents an issue collateral to the issues made by the pleadings. 57 The rule that a void judgment or decree is subject to collateral attack at any time is based upon a court's inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records. 58 The void resolutions of the COMELEC, especially the April 30, 2004 resolution issued by its First Division, cannot oust the HRET of its jurisdiction over the case at bar. HSTAcI

 

Fourth. We hasten to add that judgments, orders and resolutions should only be declared void in the most exceptional circumstances due to detrimental effects on the doctrine of finality of judgments. The circumstances of this case, however, are unique in that the private respondent was denied due process and was forced to seek justice in the HRET. In fact, it was this Court that referred the private respondent to the HRET when it dismissed the latter's petition in G.R. No. 163259 on the ground of the pendency of HRET Case No. 04-004. To grant the petition now would effectively foreclose the private respondent's access to any remedy despite violation of her right to due process.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order previously issued by the Court is lifted.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mrs. Justice Martinez in her dissenting opinion.

Panganiban, J., took no part. HRET chair.

Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., took no part.

Austria-Martinez, J., see dissenting opinion.

Carpio Morales, J., I concur in the dissent of J. Martinez.

Azcuna, J., I concur in the dissent of Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., dissenting:

With all due respect to my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, I dissent with his ponencia insofar as it will, to all intents and purposes, confer upon the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) the jurisdiction to rule upon the validity of decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), a power vested solely in the Supreme Court under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

Assailed in this petition are the resolutions of the HRET in HRET Case No. 04-004, entitled "Ma. Zenaida B. Angping vs. Miles Andrew Mari Roces," to wit:

(1) Resolution dated March 3, 2005, denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss respondent's election protest, and setting the case for preliminary conference; and

(2) Resolution dated March 21, 2005, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and setting the preliminary conference to April 14, 2005.

As advanced by petitioner, these are the following issues:

1. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that ZENAIDA is a property party to file the election protest against ROCES despite the denial in due course and cancellation of her COC under COMELEC Resolution No. 6823;

2. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction to review a resolution or order of the COMELEC and/or declare the same as void and disregard or set it aside. 1

The ponencia ruled that the petition should be dismissed on the following grounds:

(1) The HRET, being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, has jurisdiction to determine whether Ma. Zenaida Ang Ping is a proper party to file the election protest;

(2) Roces submitted to the jurisdiction of the HRET when he offered as evidence the COMELEC resolutions denying due course to Mrs. Ang Ping's certificate of candidacy; DaTHAc

(3) The HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that Ma. Zenaida Ang Ping is a proper party to file the election protest, as there appear certain irregularities in the promulgation of the COMELEC Resolution dated April 30, 2004 and Resolution No. 6823, which renders these resolutions void ab initio;

(4) It was the Court's own dismissal of G.R. No. 163259 that Ma. Zenaida Ang Ping was forced to seek recourse with the HRET.

The fundamental question that must be resolved in this case is whether the HRET, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, has the authority to rule upon the validity of the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying Harry as candidate and denying due course to Zenaida's substitute candidacy, in order to determine whether the latter is the proper party to file the electoral protest.

The mandate of the HRET to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members is constitutionally endowed. 2 So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. 3

In the assailed HRET Resolution dated March 3, 2005, the HRET refused to recognize the COMELEC's May 5, 2004 Order dismissing Harry's motion to cancel the scheduled promulgation, and to dismiss the petition to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy, because it was allegedly issued with only one Commissioner present.

The HRET also delved into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 and ruled that: (1) it cannot be considered as a resolution on the motion for reconsideration because at the time it was promulgated in May 8, 2004, the records of SPA No. 04-224 was yet to reach the Commission En Banc and as such, it did not have jurisdiction over the case when the resolution was rendered; and (2) the resolution was issued by the COMELEC En Banc in its administrative power, and a cancellation and/or denial of a certificate of candidacy can only be done through its quasi judicial function and requires prior notice and hearing.

It is my opinion that the HRET exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling upon the COMELEC (First Division) May 5, 2004 Order in SPA No. 04-224, which considered the Order denying due course to and canceling the Certificate of Candidacy of Harry as having been promulgated on April 30, 2004, as well as on the COMELEC Resolution No. 6823, which considered the affidavit of withdrawal of Harry as moot and academic and denied Zenaida's bid to be a substitute candidate.

In the first place, these COMELEC orders enjoy the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty. 4 Absent palpable evidence, the HRET cannot impute bad faith, collusion, or irregularity in the issuance of these COMELEC orders.

More importantly, it is beyond the HRET's jurisdiction to review, whether as a preliminary matter or not, resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, as it rests with this Court by constitutional fiat, to wit:

SEC. 7. . . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 5

In Codilla vs. De Venecia, 6 the Court, citing the HRET case of Puzon vs. Cua, stated that:

. . . even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc. (Emphasis supplied)

It was not necessary for the HRET to make any ruling on the substantial merits of the COMELEC orders. It could have resolved the question of Zenaida's standing to file the election protest simply by applying the rule on finality of COMELEC decisions. cAaDHT

In fact, even the Court cannot make any declaration on these COMELEC issuances, as these are not properly before the Court in the present petition. It should be stressed that the extraordinary power of this Court to pass upon an order or decision of the COMELEC should be exercised restrictively, with care and caution, while giving it the highest regard and respect due a constitutional body. 7

Notably, COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 adopted the recommendation of its Law Department, which considered as moot Harry's Sworn Affidavit of Withdrawal, as his certificate of candidacy was already denied due course by the COMELEC per Resolution dated April 30, 2004 in SPA No. 04-224. Said resolution also denied due course to the substitution of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination with Acceptance of Zenaida as substitute candidate for Harry. It also directed the Regional Election Director of 3rd District, Manila City to delete the name of Harry Ang Ping from the Certified List of Candidates, for Congressman, 3rd District, Manila.

In arriving at said recommendation, it was the finding of the Law Department that:

The records of the Commission show that on April 30, 2004, the First Division promulgated its Resolution in APA No. 04-224, entitled Alejandro Gomez -vs- Harry Ang Ping for petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy . . .

The affidavit of withdrawal of HARRY C. ANG PING was filed on May 3, 2004, three (3) days after the First Division of the Commission promulgated its resolution denying his certificate of candidacy for Member of the House of Representatives, 3rd District, Manila. Considering that his certificate of candidacy was denied due course, there can be no proper substitution in accordance with Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code and as enunciated in the case of Joel G. Miranda - vs- Antonio Abaya, et al., supra.

In the HRET Resolution dated March 3, 2005, the HRET stated that the ruling in Miranda vs. Abaya 8 finds no application in this case. In the Miranda case, there was a final determination by the COMELEC disqualifying Miranda and denying due course and canceling his certificate of candidacy, when his son filed his own certificate of candidacy as substitute for him. In the Ang Pings' case, there was no final resolution disqualifying Harry and denying due course to and canceling his certificate of candidacy; hence, the substitution by Zenaida is allowed by Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The HRET admitted that COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 was touched upon in its Resolution to show that there was no valid cancellation or denial of due course of Harry's candidacy and the substitute certificate of candidacy of Zenaida. The HRET also points out that said COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 was seasonably questioned through the filing of G.R. No. 163259, and the issues raised therein were not yet resolved by the Court, as G.R. No. 163259 was even dismissed due to the pendency of the election protest before the HRET. Thus, the HRET concluded that Zenaida is a qualified and proper party to file the election protest.

The COMELEC's jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy is beyond question. Such jurisdiction continues even after the elections, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or taken his oath of office. 9 A decision by the COMELEC to disqualify a candidate shall become final and executory only after a period of five days:

Sec. 3. Decisions After Five Days. — Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. 10

In this connection, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 (May 7, 2001), pertaining to finality of resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, provides:

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases). cEAHSC

Special Action cases refer to the following:

(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;

(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;

(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and

(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;

(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence, citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the election the resolution has not become final and executory the BEI shall tally and count the votes for such disqualified candidate;

(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;

(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.

All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1988 COMELEC Rules of Procedure explicitly states that the filing of a motion for reconsideration suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling.

In this case, the cancellation of Harry's certificate of candidacy and Zenaida's substitution as candidate in his stead, was yet to attain finality at the time Zenaida filed her ad cautelam election protest before the HRET on May 24, 2004. When it was converted into a regular election protest on September 9, 2004, the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC (First Division) Order dated April 30, 2004 was still pending before the COMELEC En Banc. As such, the enforcement of the COMELEC's order denying due course and canceling Harry's certificate of candidacy is deemed suspended. While the COMELEC En Banc already denied respondents' motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 04-224 on April 28, 2005, it is premature to rule that it is a final and executory order of disqualification, considering that respondents may then still assail the COMELEC's issuances to this Court.

To stress, at the time Zenaida filed the election protest, Harry's motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC (First Division) April 30, 2004 Order canceling his certificate of candidacy, was yet to be resolved by the COMELEC En Banc, and Harry's disqualification cannot yet be enforced. 11 Hence, at the time of the filing of the election protest ad cautelam, Zenaida could have been presumed to be a proper party as substitute candidate; but her legal personality to file a protest is made clear in the advent of the April 28, 2005 Order of the COMELEC En Banc which denied Harry's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated April 30, 2004. EaCSHI

As of even date, records do not show whether the Ang Pings timely questioned the COMELEC (First Division) Order dated May 5, 2004 denying Harry's motion to cancel the scheduled promulgation and to dismiss the petition to deny due course and cancel his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 28, 2005, denying his motion for reconsideration, before this Court. The April 30, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC (First Division) denied due course and cancelled Harry's certificate of candidacy. Resolution No. 6823 issued by the COMELEC En Banc considered as moot and academic Harry's withdrawal of candidacy and denied Zenaida's bid to be the substitute candidate of their political party. Hence, given the presumption of regularity of these COMELEC orders and until it is shown that these orders are invalid in the proper forum, the same must prevail.

Under Rule 16 of the 1988 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, as amended, "an election protest shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy . . ." Consequently, Zenaida cannot be deemed a proper party to file the election protest, as there was no valid substitution of candidates given that Harry's certificate of candidacy was already denied due course by the COMELEC at the time the substitution was made.

In exceptional cases, the Court had to exercise its power of judicial review, as when the HRET's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of its power. 12 I believe this case falls under the exception.

It should be emphasized that the dismissal of the petition, in effect, sustains the HRET's finding regarding the invalidity of the COMELEC orders, which virtually gives authority to the HRET to rule upon the COMELEC's issuances, a matter that is exclusively lodged with this Court.

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and DISMISS HRET Case No. 04-004, entitled Ma. Zenaida B. Ang Ping vs. Miles Andrew Mari Roces for not having been filed by a proper party.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 105-111; Docketed as SPC No. 04-224 and raffled to the COMELEC First Division.

2.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 36.

3.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 112-113; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 37-39.

4.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 121-123; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 47-48.

5.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 42-46.

6.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 49-54.

7.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 63-74.

8.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 36.

9.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 63, 75.

10.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 119-120; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 61-62.

11.COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 18, Section 13(b) (1993).

12."Attachment 1" to Respondent's "Comment."

13.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 124-126; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 32-34.

14.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 34.

15.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 3-31.

16.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 131, 156.

17.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 127-128; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 93-94.

18.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 129-130; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 129; Respondent's "Comment," p. 8.

19.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 95-110; Docketed as SPC No. 04-016.

20.Docketed as SPC No. 04-084.

21.Respondent's "Comment," p. 9.

22.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 132-142, 161.

23.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 161.

24.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 132-153.

25.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 154-160.

26.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 162-178.

27.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 180-181.

28.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 182-187.

29.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 188.

30.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 190.

31.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 161-163.

32.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 41, 49-50.

33.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, p. 50.

34.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 42-44.

35.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, p. 46.

36.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 3-30.

37."Attachment 1" to Respondent's "Comment."

38.Const., Article VI, Section 17 (1987).

39.II Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, pp. 87-88; Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, p. 731 (2003).

40.21 C.J.S. Courts § 9 (2005) citing In re National Labor Relations Board, 58 S.Ct. 1001, 304 U.S. 486, 82 L.Ed. 1482; People ex rel. Carlstrom v. Shurtleff, 189 N.E. 291, 355 Ill. 210; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Jones, Com. App., 24 S.W.2d 366.

41.21 C.J.S. Courts § 88 (2005) citing State v. S & R Sanitation Services, Inc., 521 A.2d 1017, 202 Conn. 300; Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So.2d 1221; Stoll v. Gottlieb, Ill., 59 S.Ct. 134, 305 U.S. 165, 83 L.Ed. 104 and other cases.

42.21 C.J.S. Courts § 16 citing Noxon Chemical Products Co. v. Leckie, C.C.A.N.J., 39 F.2d 318; Telesco v. Telesco, 447 A.2d 752, 187 Conn. 715; Harder v. Johnson, 76 P.2d 763, 147 Kan. 440 and other cases.

43.COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 18, Section 5 (1993).

44.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 63, 75.

45.Const., Article IX-C, Section 3 (1987).

46.COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 3, Section 3 (1993).

47.COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 19, Sections 5-6 (1993).

48.Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 129; Respondent's "Comment," p. 8.

49."Attachment 1" to Respondent's "Comment."

50.181 SCRA 308 (1990).

51.49 C.J.S. Judgments § 17 (2005); 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 2d § 2862, citing Simer v. Rios, C.A.7th, 1981, 661 F.2d 655, 663.

52.46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 31 (2005), citing Ripley v Bank of Skidmore, 355 Mo 897, 198 SW2d 861; Apple v Edwards, 123 Mont 135, 211 P2d 138 and other cases; 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 499 (2005); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 110 (1999); Paredes v. Moya, 61 SCRA 525 (1974).

53.Const., Article IX, Section 7 (1987).

54.1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 64.

55.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 132-152.

56.Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717 (1925); Dahl v. Grenier, 1 Dist., 467 N.E.2d 992, 81 Ill. Dec. 870, 126 Ill. App. 3d 891; In re Petition of Stern (1954), 2 Ill. App. 2d 311, 120 N.E.2d 62; Sherman & Ellis, Inc., v. Journal of Commerce, 259 Ill. App. 453.

57.50 C.J.S. Judgments § 505 (2005).

58.Dahl v. Grenier, 1 Dist., 467 N.E.2d 992, 81 Ill. Dec. 870, 126 Ill. App. 3d 891; In re Petition of Stern (1954), 2 Ill. App. 2d 311, 120 N.E.2d 62; Sherman & Ellis, Inc., v. Journal of Commerce, 259 Ill. App. 453.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., dissenting:

1.Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 16-17.

2.Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.

3.Libanan vs. HRET, G.R. No. 129783, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 520.

4.Barbers vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165691, June 15, 2005.

5.Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

6.G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639.

7.Arao vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103877, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 290.

8.G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617.

9.Saya-ang, Sr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155087, November 28, 2003, 416 SCRA 650.

10.Rule 39, Section 3 of the 1988 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

11.Codilla vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639.

12.Aggabao vs. HRET, G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005.