ADVERTISEMENT
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 201063. March 6, 2019.]
ROMMEL L. RIMANDO, petitioner, vs.HOMESONIC APPLIANCE CENTER/STEVEN YONG, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated March 6, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 201063 (ROMMEL L. RIMANDO, petitioner, v. HOMESONIC APPLIANCE CENTER/STEVEN YONG, respondents). — An employee who has rendered at least a year of service, be it continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he or she is employed. His or her employment shall continue while that activity exists. 1
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assailing the December 28, 2011 Decision 3 and March 9, 2012 Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116146, which reversed the National Labor Relations Commission April 15, 2010 Decision. 5 The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Labor Arbiter's April 30, 2009 Decision 6 finding petitioner Rommel L. Rimando (Rimando) illegally dismissed, and ordering his reinstatement and the payment of back wages.
On July 16, 2007, Rimando was hired by Homesonic Appliance Center (Homesonic) as a motorized messenger for five (5) months without any written employment contract. 7 As verified by pay slips, 8 he was given a daily salary of P382.00 and a motorcycle allowance of P750.00 every 15 days since he used his own motorcycle for work. 9
When the five (5)-month period expired, Rimando was rehired for another five (5) months under a contractual employment contract. When that period also lapsed, he was again rehired, but this time as a probationary employee for five (5) months. 10
All in all, Rimando worked at Homesonic for three (3) employment periods, five (5) months each. CAIHTE
The probationary employment commenced on May 16, 2008 and was to end on October 16, 2008.
On August 19, 2008, during office hours at the parking lot of Metropolis Mall in Muntinlupa City, Rimando had a squabble with his live-in partner, Rosalie Humabad, who was the branch supervisor of Homesonic. On October 16, 2008, Rimando's employment was terminated for allegedly failing to meet the prescribed standards since he violated the company rules and regulations. 11
Rimando, in his Reply, admitted that he signed a quitclaim as he had no other means to support his family. The amount he received covered his last pay. 12
Thus, Rimando filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal. He stressed that the squabble with his lover happened outside the office premises, and that it was merely a verbal squabble. 13
On the other hand, Homesonic countered that Rimando's infraction of a company rule is sufficient manifestation of his inadequacy to meet reasonable employment norms. Thus, petitioner was not illegally dismissed, and his probationary employment was validly terminated. 14 It claimed that he was adequately informed of the reasonable standards with which his performance will be gauged. 15
In its April 30, 2009 Decision, 16 the Labor Arbiter held that Rimando was illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement and the payment of back wages. It found him to be a regular employee, and that Homesonic failed to discharge the burden of proof required to show that the termination of Rimando's employment was valid. DETACa
The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered declaring the dismissal of complainant as illegal and ordering the respondents to reinstate complainant and pay his backwages from the date of dismissal until [his] reinstatement computed initially at P64,160.72 (P382 x 26 x 6.46).
Respondents [are] further directed to submit a report of compliance on the reinstatement aspect ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED. 17
In its April 15, 2010 Decision, 18 the National Labor Relations Commission denied Homesonic's appeal. It ruled that Rimando was a regular employee, notwithstanding the fixed term contract and probationary employment contract that he had signed. It further held that since the argument occurred outside the company premises, Rimando did not violate any company rule. 19
The dispositive portion of the National Labor Relations Commission Decision read: HEITAD
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit and the Labor Arbiter's Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 20
Undaunted, Homesonic filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, 21 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission. It argued that Rimando had not attained regular employment and that the dismissal was valid. 22
In its December 28, 2011 Decision, 23 the Court of Appeals granted Homesonic's Petition and dismissed the Complaint for Illegal Dismissal. In nullifying both labor tribunals' decisions, it held that Rimando was indeed a probationary employee who had never attained the status of a regular employee. 24
The Court of Appeals further held that there was no evidence that Rimando's employment status had ripened into regular employment. It found that Rimando had been properly informed of the company rules. The verbal squabble with his lover during office hours, it added, sufficiently manifested his inadequacy to meet reasonable employment norms. 25
On January 12, 2012, Rimando filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 26 maintaining that he was a regular employee, and thus, was illegally dismissed. 27 In its March 9, 2012 Resolution, 28 however, the Court of Appeals denied Rimando's Motion. ATICcS
Aggrieved, Rimando filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 29 emphasizing that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals differ from those of the Labor Arbiter and National Labor Relations Commission.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that he was a mere probationary employee, and thus, was not illegally dismissed. He claims that he was a regular employee because he has rendered services necessary and desirable to respondents' business for over a year, or a total of 16 months. 30
In their Comment, 31 respondents argue that the contract shows that petitioner was only a probationary employee who failed to meet the company standards. They claim that petitioner himself admitted that the altercation he had with his live-in partner was considered by the management as a company infraction. As such, respondents had the legal right to terminate his employment. 32
In his Reply, 33 petitioner reiterates that he was already a regular employee of respondents, having rendered 16 months of service at the time of his dismissal on October 16, 2008. 34
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner Rommel L. Rimando is a regular employee due to respondents Homesonic Appliance Center and Steven Yong's (impleaded as managing director) act of hiring and re-hiring petitioner from July 16, 2007 to October 16, 2008.
The Petition is meritorious.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the dismissal was valid and justified.
The Labor Code provides: TIADCc
ARTICLE 295. [280] Regular and casual employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, petitioner worked as a motorized messenger for 15 months, or a year and four (4) months, making him a regular employee based on the Labor Code's definition.
The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission correctly found that he was a regular employee, and not merely probationary. In Goma v. Pamplona Plantation Incorporated: 35
We stress herein that the law overrides such conditions which are prejudicial to the interest of the worker whose weak bargaining position necessitates the succor of the State. What determines whether a certain employment is regular or otherwise is not the will or word of the employer, to which the worker oftentimes acquiesces. Neither is it the procedure of hiring the employee nor the manner of paying the salary or the actual time spent at work. It is the character of the activities performed by the employer in relation to the particular trade or business of the employer, taking into account all the circumstances, including the length of time of its performance and its continued existence. Given the attendant circumstances in the case at bar, it is obvious that one year after he was employed by the respondent, petitioner became a regular employee by operation of law. 36 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The different nomenclature of the contracts, from training, to contractual, to probationary, all show that respondents attempted to circumvent the laws on employee regularization. Obviously, it was a mere ploy to prevent petitioner from attaining regular status and should not be tolerated. In San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission: 37 AIDSTE
The act of hiring and re-hiring workers over a period of time without considering them as regular employees evidences had faith on the part of the employer. Where, from the circumstances, it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, the policy, agreement or practice should be struck down as contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or public order. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The contrivances may be many and the schemes ingenious and imaginative. But this Court will not hesitate to put pen to a line and defend the worker's right to be secure in his (or her) proprietary right to regular employment and his right to a secure employment, viz., one that is free from fear and doubt, that anytime he could be removed, retrenched, his contract not renewed or he might not be re-hired. The ramifications may seem trivial, but we cannot allow the ordinary Filipino worker's right to tenurial security to be put in jeopardy by recurrent but abhorrent practices that threaten the very lives of those that depend on him. 38 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Here, respondent Homesonic's continued rehiring of petitioner under different nomenclature for over a year shows that his functions were, indeed, necessary and desirable in the usual trade of business. As a regular employee, he is entitled to security of tenure and may only be terminated for causes provided by law. The Labor Code provides:
ARTICLE 294. [279] Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (As amended by Republic Act No. 6715 (1989), Section 34) (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents aver that petitioner was terminated for his failure to meet the standards for regularization. This Court disagrees. Since petitioner has attained the status of a regular employee, as this Court finds, he may only be removed for just cause with due process of law.
In line with current jurisprudence, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on all damages awarded from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals December 28, 2011 Decision and March 9, 2012 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 116146 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The National Labor Relations Commission April 15, 2010 Decision is REINSTATED. AaCTcI
The total monetary award shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until its full satisfaction. 40
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. LABOR CODE, art. 295.
2.Rollo, pp. 10-34. Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
3.Id. at 36-49. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4.Id. at 51-52. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo of the Former First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
5.Id. at 91-99. The Decision, in NLRC LAC No. 06-001805-09, penned by Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Romeo L. Go of the First Division, NLRC, Quezon City.
6.Id. at 202-207. The Decision, in NLRC-NCR-12-16908-08, was penned by Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam of the National Labor Relations Commission, National Capital Region, Quezon City.
7.Id. at 12.
8.Id. at 177-180.
9.Id. at 37-38.
10.Id. at 12 and 38.
11.Id. at 38.
12.Id. at 39.
13.Id.
14.Id. at 38-39.
15.Id.
16. Id. at 202-207.
17. Id. at 206-207.
18. Id. at 91-99.
19. Id. at 94-98.
20. Id. at 98.
21. Id. at 63-90.
22. Id. at 73-81.
23. Id. at 36-49.
24. Id. at 41-44.
25. Id. at 44-46.
26. Id. at 53-62.
27. Id. at 54.
28. Id. at 51-52.
29. Id. at 10-34.
30. Id. at 17-18.
31. Id. at 256-265.
32. Id. at 257-259.
33. Id. at 267-274.
34. Id. at 267.
35. 579 Phil. 402 (2008) (Per J. Nachura, Third Division).
36. Id. at 413-414.
37. 539 Phil. 236 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second Division].
38. Id. at 249-250.
39. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
40. Id.