Ricketts v. Sandiganbayan-Fourth Division

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 236897. November 18, 2021.]

RONALD N. RICKETTS, petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 18, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 236897 (Ronald N. Ricketts v. Sandiganbayan-Fourth Division, People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, and Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman). — Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction) 1 filed by Ronald N. Ricketts (petitioner), seeking the review, reversal, and setting aside of Resolutions 2 dated October 12, 2017 and November 16, 2017 issued by the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division (Sandiganbayan) in Criminal Case No. SB-15-CRM-0132.

In the aforementioned case, petitioner, then the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Optical Media Board (OMB), was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019 before the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division (Sandiganbayan). 3 Accused in the same case were four other OMB officers, namely, Executive Director Cyrus Paul S. Valenzuela (Valenzuela), Head of the Enforcement and Inspection Division (EID) Manuel J. Mangubat (Mangubat), Investigation Agent Joseph D. Arnaldo (Arnaldo), and Computer Operator Glenn S. Perez (Perez). The accusatory portion of the Information 4 dated May 31, 2014 states:

That on 27 May 2010, or sometime prior to or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Ronald N. Ricketts, a high ranking public officer (SG 29), being the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Optical Media Board (OMB), conspiring, confabulating and confederating with Cyrus Paul S. Valenzuela, Manuel J. Mangubat, Joseph D. Arnaldo, and Glenn S. Perez, Executive Director, Head of the Enforcement and Inspection Division (EID), Investigation Agent I of EID, and Computer Operator, respectively, while in the performance of their official functions as such, taking advantage thereof and committing the offense in relation to office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to Sky High Marketing Corporation, thru manifest partiality, evident had faith or gross inexcusable negligence, by allowing and causing the release and reloading into the corporation's vehicle the pirated Digital Video Discs (DVDs) and Video Compact Discs (VCDs) that were confiscated from the establishment in the afternoon of the same day, 27 May 2010, which compromised the pieces of evidence that could support the case(s) that should have been filed against the said violators, and by not filing the appropriate charges against the violators of Republic Act 9239 (the Optical Media Board Act of 2003), to the damage and prejudice of the government and to the detriment of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

The Antecedents

The indictment, as recounted by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution 6 dated February 26, 2018, followed the events of May 27, 2010 when petitioner instructed Arnaldo and a team of OMB agents to proceed to an establishment located at Carlos Palanca Street in Quiapo, Manila to verify the existence of pirated DVDs and VCDs in the area. Upon confirmation, a raid was conducted which resulted in the seizure of 127 boxes and two sacks of pirated DVDs and VCDs (pirated materials) as well as one video recording unit. The raid also caused the arrest of three Chinese nationals. The pirated materials were then loaded inside an Isuzu Elf truck 7 with license plate number RGW 474 (Isuzu truck) and brought to the OMB office at around 1:30 p.m. that same day where they were turned over to the guard on duty. At around 10:00 p.m., Perez, allegedly acting on the instruction of petitioner, had 121 boxes of the pirated materials hauled out of the OMB premises and placed inside the same Isuzu truck without an approved gate pass. Despite the incident being reported to the offices of the petitioner and Valenzuela, no investigation was conducted. There were also no charges filed against any person or entity in connection with the compound at Carlos Palanca Street, Quiapo, Manila where the pirated materials were confiscated. 8

On July 18, 2019, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint against petitioner and his co-accused. After a finding of probable cause, the corresponding Information was filed. 9

During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of, among others, security guard Pedro C. Gazzingan (Gazzingan) and Chief of the OMB's Administrative and Finance Division Evelyn F. Asoy (Asoy). 10

Gazzingan testified that while he was on duty at the OMB premises on May 27, 2010, Perez came at around 9:00 p.m. to take out the pirated materials. When he told Perez that a gate pass issued by the Officer-in-Charge of the Human Resources is required before he could do so, the latter responded that it was the Chairman who gave the instruction, and such an order was official. This prompted Gazzingan to seek the guidance of Executive Director Valenzuela, who then told him, "Kung utos ni Chairman, wala tayong magagawa" (if that is the order of the Chairman, we cannot do anything about it). When he returned to his post, he saw that the pirated items were already being loaded into the Isuzu truck, by Perez and some porters. Gazzingan also attested that the said truck was a confiscated vehicle marked "Sky High Marketing." 11

For her part, Asoy testified that on her way out of the OMB office on May 27, 2010, she noticed the boxes and sacks of confiscated items that were placed near the security guard's area. However, when she arrived the next day, the said items were already gone. Thus, she asked the security guard assigned in the morning to inform the security guard assigned in the evening (Gazzingan), to submit an incident report. Asoy then recited the contents of the said report, which stated that a pull-out of the pirated materials was conducted by Perez. With this, she issued memoranda addressed to Gazzingan and Perez, asking them to explain why the items were hauled out without a gate pass. After receiving the respective written explanation of Gazzingan and Perez, she furnished the offices of the Chairman, Executive Director, and the Human Resources with copies thereof. Asoy further clarified that gate passes can be issued by each division and approved by either the Executive Director or the Chairman, or in their absence, the division head. She confirmed that items cannot be brought outside the OMB premises without a gate pass and such policy applies to all offices and divisions of the OMB. Asoy further attested that neither the Chairman nor the Executive Director issued a memorandum in relation to the incident. 12

In addition to the testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecution also offered several pieces of documentary evidence, among which were:

1. The respective service records, position, and descriptions of each of the accused which formed part of the testimony of prosecution witness Lucia Ferrer Guevarra; 13

2. The Memorandum 14 dated June 3, 2010 prepared by Asoy and addressed to Perez, asking him to explain why the pirated materials and the Isuzu truck were taken out of the OMB premises without an approved gate pass;

3. The written explanation 15 of Perez, informing Asoy that the loading of the pirated items was for safekeeping, as per the instruction of the Chairman;

4. The Sworn Statement 16 of Asoy executed before the Office of the Ombudsman. This and the two preceding exhibits were identified by Asoy and formed part of her testimony;

5. The Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Pedro G. Gazzingan, 17 executed before the Office of the Ombudsman and identified in court by the former, narrating that Perez hauled out 121 boxes of the pirated materials seized from the raid in Quiapo, Manila without a gate pass;

6. The Report 18 dated May 31, 2010 prepared by Gazzingan and addressed to Asoy informing her of the said incident;

7. The log book 19 which includes the recorded entries of the seized items in the OMB premises and the removal thereof on May 27, 2010;

8. The Memorandum 20 dated June 3, 2010 prepared by Asoy and addressed to Gazzingan, requiring the latter to explain why he allowed the pirated materials to be taken out without a gate pass;

9. Gazzingan's Report 21 dated June 7, 2010 informing Asoy that the pull out of the seized items was supervised by Perez as per the instruction of the Chairman. This and the four preceding exhibits formed part of the testimony of Gazzingan;

10. The Certification 22 dated January 28 2013 issued by prosecution witness Atty. Victor Q. Padilla II, Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Division of the OMB and identified by him in court, affirming that no cases were filed by the OMB against any person or entity owning the building/compound in Carlos Palanca Street, Quiapo, Manila where the pirated materials were seized.

After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence 23 and Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court, 24 both dated Augusts 18, 2017. Similar motions were filed by his co-accused Arnaldo, Perez, and Valenzuela.

In his motion, petitioner alleged that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because none of the prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify him as the one responsible for the removal of the pirated materials from the OMB premises. He pointed out that it is the Board, and the agents or investigators of the Legal Department of the OMB, who are duty-bound to initiate the filing of the criminal and administrative cases, and that there is no proof that he conspired with his co-accused to commit the offense charged.

In turn, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition 25 dated September 11, 2017. It submitted that the prosecution was able to present overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and documentary, establishing the offense charged in the Information and the participation of the petitioner and his co-accused therein. As to petitioner's arguments, it argued that his absence at the OMB office during the removal of the pirated materials does not mean that he is not a co-conspirator. Petitioner's participation was established by his conduct and the admission of Perez in the latter's written explanation 26 to Asoy dated June 8, 2010 and his Sworn Statement dated December 13, 2012. 27

On October 12, 2017, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed Resolution 28 denying the respective motions of petitioner, Arnaldo, and Perez, while granting the motion of Valenzuela, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respective Motions for Leave of Court to file Demurrer to Evidence of accused Ronald N. Ricketts, Joseph D. Arnaldo and Glenn S. Perez are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

The initial reception of defense evidence set on 25 and 26 October 2017, at 1:15 p.m., shall proceed as scheduled, unless any of the aforementioned accused manifests an intention to file a demurrer to evidence even without prior leave of court, in which case an order shall be issued affording said accused a period of time within which to file the same.

Meanwhile the Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence dated 22 August 2017 of accused Cyrus Paul S. Valenzuela is GRANTED. Accordingly, accused Valenzuela is given leave of court to file his demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice hereof. The prosecution is given the same period often (10) days, from receipt of the copy of the demurrer to evidence, within which to file its comment. Thereafter, accused Valenzuela's demurrer to evidence shall be considered submitted for resolution.

SO ORDERED.29

In denying petitioner's motion, the Sandiganbayan found that the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution is prima facie sufficient to sustain a conviction for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. It observed that the prosecution's evidence exposed not only the commission of the offense, but also the precise degree of participation of petitioner and his co-accused in the commission thereof. Such evidence, if unrebutted, is enough to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Under such circumstances, the Sandiganbayan advised petitioner and his co-accused to present their respective evidence in order to counter the charge against them. 30

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution, but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan in the second assailed Resolution 31 dated November 16, 2017. Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

Petitioner raises the lone issue of whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and the demurrer itself.

In essence, petitioner reiterates the arguments raised in his Motion for Leave to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence. He maintains that there is no sufficient evidence either to sustain his indictment for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 or to support a verdict against him, as the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner submits that the testimonies of Gazzingan and Asoy on how Perez informed them that it was he who gave the order for the removal of the pirated items from the OMB premises, are hearsay. He likewise asserts that Perez' written explanation against him should not have been given credence, the same having come from a polluted source, is self-serving, and should otherwise bind only the latter pursuant to the evidentiary rule on res inter alios acta.

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner likewise seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the Sandiganbayan from enforcing the assailed resolutions and conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-15-CRM-0132 while the instant petition remains pending.

Meanwhile, on February 26, 2018, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 32 granting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by Valenzuela and dismissing the case with respect to him for lack of sufficient evidence. In view of this, petitioner filed before this Court a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari33 dated March 14, 2018, positing that with the acquittal of Valenzuela, the case against him should similarly be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In its Consolidated Comment, 34 the OSP points out that the instant petition should be dismissed, as an order denying a motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself is not reviewable by appeal or certiorari. It likewise submits that in resolving the said motion or demurrer to evidence, the court's basis is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but only prima facie evidence, which the prosecution sufficiently established during trial. Anent the testimonies of Gazzingan and Asoy in relation to Perez' admission, the OSP argues that the hearsay rule does not apply as such testimonies fall under the doctrine of independently relevant statement. The OSP additionally contends that Perez' written explanation regarding petitioner's instruction is an exception to the rule on res inter alios acta, having been an admission made by a conspirator.

In his Reply 35 dated February 13, 2019, petitioner reiterated his contentions in the instant petition. He submits that the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 have not been established, the Sandiganbayan having falsely relied on the testimonies of Asoy and Gazzingan as well as the written explanation of Perez.

Our Ruling

At the outset it is observed that no TRO or writ of preliminary injunction was issued to stop the Sandiganbayan from continuing the proceedings in this case. As pointed out by the OSP, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with the reception of evidence for the defense and on July 4, 2018, petitioner through counsel, manifested that he would no longer be presenting any evidence, adopting some of the evidence of the prosecution as his own. 36 Notwithstanding, the continuation of the trial should not prevent this Court from ruling on the instant petition. Should the denial of the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence be found to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the proceedings conducted before the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the instant petition will be considered void. 37

Anent the question of resorting to a petition for certiorari in order to assail the denial of a demurrer to evidence, the issue is no longer a novel one. The Rules of Court dictate that a motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. 38 Significantly, in Tadeo v. People39(Tadeo), the Court emphasized that "an order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory" and not appealable, the same cannot be subject to a petition for certiorari. 40 However, the Court in Tadeo also recognized that while the proper remedy in the face of such denial is to appeal the case in due time, certiorari may be availed of if there has been "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or an oppressive exercise of judicial authority." 41

Similarly, in Cruz v. People, 42 the Court ruled that while the extraordinary writ of certiorari may not be availed of to challenge the denial of the demurrer to evidence, it may be resorted to "when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion." 43

Accordingly, a petition for certiorari challenging the denial of a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence will prosper only when such grave abuse of discretion is palpable. In such a case, the petitioner bears the burden of proving such grave abuse of discretion which amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court which issued the assailed order. 44 "Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave." 45

On this score, the petition fails.

In Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, 46 this Court recapitulated the definition of grave abuse of discretion in this wise:

Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. "The abuse of discretion must he patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." 47

Meanwhile, in Go-Yu v. Yu, 48 this Court outlined the nature of a demurrer to evidence and the duty of the trial court in resolving the same:

A demurrer to evidence is defined as 'an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue.' The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt." Moreover, "[t]he grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. 49

Verily, when an accused files a demurrer to evidence, the court must determine whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. 50 It bears stressing that the resolution of a demurrer to evidence is consigned to the sound discretion of the court, which is given wide latitude in the exercise of such judgment. 51 It is only when such exercise is tainted with grave abuse of discretion may such court's ruling on the matter be disturbed. 52

Guided by the foregoing, there is nothing from the instant petition that would validate petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion or acted beyond its jurisdiction in denying his motion and the demurrer itself. There is no showing that the finding of the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution was made without legal or evidentiary basis, or that the same was reached in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that would warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

On the contrary, a review of the assailed Resolutions reveal that the Sandiganbayan reached its conclusion after a careful evaluation of the evidence submitted before it. 53

What is apparent in the instant petition is that petitioner's allegations rest on the admissibility and credibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution as well as the examination and appreciation of such evidence by the Sandiganbayan. These matters clearly pertain to alleged errors in judgment which are beyond the scope of certiorari.

It is settled that a special civil action of certiorari may only correct errors of jurisdiction, specifically, those resulting from grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It does not include the correction of the trial court's "evaluation of the evidence or its factual findings thereon." 54

Furthermore, a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, as determined by the Sandiganbayan, exists outside the office of certiorari, "as it intrudes into the prerogatives of Rule 45, under ordinary appeals, where an alleged error of judgment may be subjected to review." 55

While a trial court may have committed erroneous conclusions, these do not amount to grave abuse of discretion, as we have discussed in Miranda v. Sandiganbayan: 56

x x x the alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and whatever flawed conclusions of the Sandiganbayan, is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction, and therefore not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari. Erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion. For as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any supposed error committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable and may be corrected by a timely appeal. The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void judgment. 57

Thus, in questioning the sufficiency of the evidence against him, grounded on the admissibility of the testimonies of, and documents presented by Gazzingan and Asoy, as well as the credibility of the statement of his co-accused Perez, petitioner is raising alleged errors in judgment. These matters are properly the subject of an appeal and not a certiorari.

The foregoing considered, petitioner is not without recourse. In Cruz v. People, 58 this Court outlined the remedy of an aggrieved party in the event his demurrer to evidence is denied, thusly:

Regarding the denial of the demurrer to evidence, we have likewise ruled that the question of whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convince the court that the defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt rests entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court. The error, if any, in the denial of the demurrer to evidence may be corrected only by appeal. The appellate court will not review in such special civil action the prosecution's evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The orderly procedure prescribed by the Revised Rules of Court is for the accused to present his evidence, after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence submitted, will then properly render its judgment of acquittal or conviction. If judgment is rendered adversely against the accused, he may appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses and objections for review by the appellate court.

Hence, where the demurrer to evidence is denied, such denial having been made within the jurisdiction of the trial court, the aggrieved party may present his evidence. Should the judgment be rendered against him, the proper remedy is to appeal the same, raising his defenses and objects for review before the appellate court. 59

All told, the denial of petitioner's motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and the demurrer itself was made by the Sandiganbayan in the due exercise of its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated October 12, 2017 and November 16, 2017 issued by the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division in Criminal Case No. SB-15-CRM-0132 denying petitioner Ronald N. Ricketts' Motion for Leave of Court to file Demurrer to Evidence and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively, are AFFIRMED. aScITE

SO ORDERED." Lopez, M.,J., on official leave.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

by:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-47.

2. The assailed Resolutions were penned by Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz with Associate Justices Alex L. Quiroz and Bayani H. Jacinto, concurring; id. at 78-84, 116-117.

3. Otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (1960);

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

4.Rollo, pp. 53-54.

5.Id. at 54.

6.Id. at 137-153.

7. Also referred to as an Isuzu van in other pleadings.

8.Rollo, pp. 137-138.

9.Id. at 139.

10.Id. at 140.

11.Id. at 141.

12.Id. at 145.

13. Exhibits "A," "A-6," "A-8," "B," "B-3," and "B4"; id. at 80, 147.

14. Exhibits "C-37"; id. at 81, 174.

15. Exhibits "C-39"; id.

16. Exhibits "C-43"; id.

17. Exhibits "C-52" to "C-54;" id.

18. Exhibit "F"; id.

19. Exhibits "F-1" to "F-3"; id.

20. Exhibit "F-4"; id. at 81-82, 174.

21. Exhibit "F-5"; id. at 82, 174.

22. Exhibit "C-51"; id.

23.Id. at 55-57.

24.Id. at 58-67.

25.Id. at 68-77.

26. Exhibit "C-39," supra note 15.

27.Rollo, p. 75.

28.Supra note 2.

29.Rollo, pp. 83-84.

30.Id. at 82.

31.Id. at 116-117.

32.Supra note 6.

33.Rollo, pp. 120-129.

34.Id. at 179-196.

35.Id. at 212-226.

36.Id. at 194.

37. See Nicolas v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 568 Phil. 297, 308 (2008).

38. RULES OF COURT, Rule 119, Section 23 (5).

39. 360 Phil. 914 (1998).

40.Id. at 919.

41.Id.

42. 363 Phil. 156 (1999).

43.Id. at 161.

44.Lagon v. Velasco, 826 Phil. 75 (2018).

45.Id. at 82.

46. 675 Phil. 656 (2011) citing People v. Tan, 639 Phil. 402 (2010).

47.Id. citing People v. Tan, 639 Phil. 402, 411 (2010), citing People v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 169, 180 (1999).

48. G.R. No. 230443, April 3, 2019.

49.Id. (citations omitted.)

50.People v. Go, 740 Phil. 583, 602 (2014) citing Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan, 698 Phil. 110, 126 (2012).

51.Te v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 127, 139 (2000); See also Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, 694 Phil. 206, 222 (2012).

52.People v. Go, supra.

53.Rollo, pp. 80-83.

54.Microsoft Corp. v. Best Deal Computer Center Corp., 438 Phil. 408, 413 (2002).

55. 309 Phil. 45, 51 (1994).

56. 815 Phil. 123 (2017).

57.Id. at 141-142.

58. 363 Phil. 156 (1999) (citations omitted).

59.Id. at 161.