FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-19-2555. April 1, 2019.][Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-4772-RTJ]
CLEOFE RICAMARA, FELICIDAD BONTOC, AND MA. CECILIA LOVINO, complainants, vs.HON. CHONA E. PULGAR-NAVARRO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, GUMACA, QUEZON, BRANCH 61, AND EDGAR D. DAYUNOT, SHERIFF IV, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, GUMACA, QUEZON, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 1, 2019which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. RTJ-19-2555 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-4772-RTJ] (Cleofe Ricamara, Felicidad Bontoc, and Ma. Cecilia Lovino v. Hon. Chona E. Pulgar-Navarro, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 61, and Edgar D. Dayunot, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Gumaca, Quezon)
This is a Complaint-Affidavit 1 dated November 9, 2017 filed by Cleofe Ricamara, Felicidad Bontoc, and Ma. Cecilia Lovino (complainants) charging Presiding Judge Chona E. Pulgar-Navarro (Judge Pulgar-Navarro), and Sheriff IV Edgar D. Dayunot (Sheriff Dayunot), Office of the Clerk of Court, both of Regional Trial Court, Gumaca, Quezon (RTC), with grave abuse of authority, grave abuse of discretion, and grave misconduct.
Antecedents
Complainants were the defendants in an ejectment case initiated by plaintiff Lyle Enrico Tan (Tan) before the Municipal Trial Court of Pitogo, Quezon (MTC) docketed as Civil Case No. 528. On February 12, 2008 (2008 decision), the MTC rendered a Judgment 2 in favor of Tan. On appeal, the RTC Branch 62, in an Omnibus Order 3 dated November 24, 2008, set aside the decision "for having been issued without authority by the ponencia" and ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for the incumbent judge to decide the case with dispatch. 4
On February 23, 2009 (2009 decision), the MTC rendered a Decision 5 in favor of Tan. Complainants appealed before the RTC. While the case was pending appeal, Tan filed a motion for execution pursuant to Section 19, 6 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. On February 15, 2012, the RTC, presided by Judge Pulgar-Navarro, issued a Resolution 7 denying the motion for reconsideration of the March 1, 2011 Resolution and granted the prayer for a writ of execution. 8
On April 2, 2012, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued ordering the sheriff to cause the execution of the February 12, 2008 Decision instead of the February 23, 2009 Decision. 9 Complainants filed a motion to quash the writ, alleging that they were denied due process as they were still looking for a counsel when the writ was issued. 10
On April 12, 2012, Tan filed a Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Demolition 11 pursuant to the said writ of execution. Judge Pulgar-Navarro granted the motion after Tan posted the required bond and commanded the sheriff to demolish the improvements built by complainants on the subject property. 12 Complainants sought reconsideration of the order but Judge Pulgar-Navarro, in a Resolution dated January 28, 2015 denied both the motion to quash the writ of execution and the motion for reconsideration, and directed the sheriff to proceed with the execution of the writ of demolition. 13 Complainants, again, moved for reconsideration but it was denied in the March 2, 2015 Resolution. 14
Undeterred, complainants filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the January 28, 2015 and March 2, 2015 resolutions issued by Judge Pulgar-Navarro. In the July 13, 2017 Decision, 15 the CA reversed and set aside the resolutions issued by respondent judge and declared that, indeed, Judge Pulgar-Navarro committed grave abuse of discretion when she issued a writ of execution based on a void decision. 16
As a result, complainants filed the instant complaint seeking administrative sanction and damages against Judge Pulgar-Navarro for issuing a writ of demolition based on a void decision, and Sheriff Dayunot for violating Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279 17 for using heavy equipment during the demolition. 18
In her Comment 19 dated March 5, 2018, Judge Pulgar-Navarro claimed that the February 15, 2012 Resolution did not specifically mention the void 2008 decision but merely mentioned a judgment referring to the 2009 decision. She stated that the April 2, 2012 Writ of Execution pending appeal, wherein the dispositive portion of the 2008 void decision was quoted, was signed and issued by Rosario D. Mendoza, the officer-in-charge. 20
When the writ of execution returned unsatisfied, Tan filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition. After granting Tan's motion, Judge Pulgar-Navarro issued a writ of demolition but the one who prepared the writ merely copied the dispositive portion in the writ of execution previously prepared by Mendoza, which referred to the void 2008 MTC decision. Judge Pulgar-Navarro asserted that when complainants filed their motion for reconsideration and omnibus motion on July 3, 2014, they made no mention of any oversight or clerical error; and that during the pre-demolition conference on June 24, 2014, Tan gave complainants three (3) months extension to vacate the subject property which they accepted. 21
Judge Pulgar-Navarro pointed out that on September 13, 2016, she rendered a decision in favor of Tan and quoted the dispositive portion of the correct 2009 decision. She averred that complainants were focusing on technicalities to further delay the execution. She also asserted that a judge's failure to interpret the law does not necessarily render her administratively liable because only judicial errors tainted with fraud or deliberate intent to do injustice were subjected to administrative sanctions. 22
In his Comment 23 dated February 5, 2018, Sheriff Dayunot denied that he committed grave abuse of authority as he was merely implementing the order issued by the Court. He, however, admitted allowing the use of a payloader to remove the structures erected on the subject property pursuant to Section 28 24 of R.A. No. 7279 which allows the use of heavy equipment for demolition of structures made of permanent and concrete materials. Sheriff Dayunot also stated that he inquired from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and was informed that for as long as there was no temporary restraining order, he, as sheriff, was mandated to proceed with the implementation of the court order. 25
The Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In its September 28, 2018 Report, 26 the OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Pulgar-Navarro despite the CA decision finding grave abuse of discretion on her part because there was no evidence of bias, partiality, bad faith or deliberate intent to do injustice on her part. 27 The OCA observed that the writ of execution and writ of demolition have their origin in the March 1, 2011 Resolution issued by Judge Pulgar-Navarro but the error lies when Legal Researcher/OIC Mendoza prepared the writ of execution and quoted the dispositive portion of the 2008 decision which Judge Pulgar-Navarro unwittingly signed the writ of demolition, relying on the flawed writ of execution. 28
The OCA also recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Sheriff Dayunot as the latter did not violate R.A. No. 7279. The OCA opined that considering that the use of heavy equipment is allowed when the structure to be demolished is permanent and made of concrete materials, the burden of proving that the structures demolished were not permanent lies with the complainants. 29
Lastly, the OCA found that Judge Pulgar-Navarro and Sheriff Dayunot cannot be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by complainants. It noted complainants' refusal to vacate notwithstanding the notice to vacate and despite expiration of the 3 months extension to vacate given to them. The OCA observed that from the time the first notice to vacate was served on June 24, 2014, until the demolition of the structures on April 23, 2015, complainants employed several strategies to delay the implementation of the writ. 30
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the findings of the OCA except as to the penalty.
Judge Pulgar-Navarro
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires that a magistrate be the embodiment of judicial competence. 31 Competence means "the quality or state of being functionally adequate or having sufficient knowledge, judgment, skill, or strength." 32
"The administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. It requires that everyone involved in its dispensation — from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk — live up to the strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public service. Any impression of impropriety, misdeed, or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. The Court shall not countenance any conduct, act, or omission on the part of those involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Indeed, public confidence in our courts is vital to the effective functioning of the Judiciary." 33
"[T]he Court expressly enjoins a judge to carefully pore over all documents before signing them and giving them official imprimatur. The judge's signing of orders must not be taken lightly, or be regarded as the usual paper work that passes through the judge's hands for signature." 34
In this case, the OCA found Judge Pulgar-Navarro to be erroneously negligent when she signed the writ of demolition, which copied the dispositive portion of the void 2008 decision. While the error started with the writ of execution being prepared by the legal researcher which quoted the dispositive portion of the void 2008 decision, Judge Pulgar-Navarro's act of signing the writ of demolition without carefully reading and verifying the document, shows that she was remiss in the performance of her official functions as a judge. As the legal researcher was under her control and supervision, Judge Pulgar-Navarro should have been circumspect in examining the writs prepared by her staff. Notably, even the CA found grave abuse of discretion on her part for issuing the said writ of demolition.
Judge Pulgar-Navarro's act of issuing a writ of demolition based on an invalid decision constitutes simple neglect of duty. It is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. 35 Simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense under Rule IV, Section 52 (B) (1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. 36 This notwithstanding, the Court as the disciplining authority, is granted the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty. These factors range, among others, from the erring individual's admission of guilt, remorse, length of service, or high performance rating. 37
In Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Hon. Marilou Runes-Tamang, 38 the Court found the judge therein guilty of simple neglect of duty because she approved the irregular bail bonds. She, however, merely relied on the representations of her process server and, thus, only a penalty of reprimand was imposed against her.
Here, although Judge Pulgar-Navarro was remiss of her duty to ascertain the correctness of the writ of execution, she merely relied on the representation of her subordinate that the said writ was properly drafted. Further, the records show that this case is her first offense in her service in the judiciary. Thus, the penalty of reprimand is sufficient.
Sheriff Dayunot
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA that Sheriff Dayunot should not be held administratively liable. Under Sec. of R.A. No. 7279, in the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the use of heavy equipment for demolition is prohibited except for structures that are permanent and are of concrete material. Considering that the structures erected by complainants were made of permanent and concrete materials, the use of a payloader to demolish the same is authorized.
Finally, the Court finds that Judge Pulgar-Navarro and Sheriff Dayunot cannot be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by complainants. They were given notice and ample time to vacate the subject property. Despite chances to peaceably/peacefully vacate the subject property, complainants continuously refused to leave, and even employed means to avoid the order of the court.
WHEREFORE, Judge Chona E. Pulgar-Navarro, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 61 is GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She is hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or any similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
The complaint against Edgar D. Dayunot, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Gumaca, Quezon is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."Jardeleza, J., on official business.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-7.
2.Id. at 146-155A; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Aniceto B. Razo.
3.Id. at 141-145; penned by Judge Hector B. Almeda.
4.Id.
5.Id. at 128-139; penned by Presiding Judge Walter Inocencio V. Arreza.
6.Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
7.Rollo, pp. 156-159.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 160-161.
10.Id. at 236.
11.Id. at 164-165.
12.Id. at 167-168.
13.Id. at 175-177.
14.Id. at 179.
15.Id. at 20-29; penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes with Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, concurring.
16.Id. at 25-28.
17. Republic Act No. 7279 or An Act to Provide for a Comprehensive and Continuing Urban Development and Housing Program, Establish the Mechanism for Its Implementation, and for Other Purposes or also known as the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992."
18. Rollo, p. 5.
19. Id. at 116-127.
20. Id. at 118-119.
21. Id. at 119-120.
22. Id. at 238.
23. Id. at 57-63.
24. Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas where they are to be relocated;
(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.
This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above provision.
25. Rollo, p. 58.
26. Id. at 236-241.
27. Id. at 239.
28. Id. at 240.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Canon 6.
32. Third New International Dictionary.
33. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Hon. Runes-Tamang, 631 Phil. 425, 430 (2010).
34. Id. at 443-444, citing Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, 562 Phil. 301 (2007) and Padilla v. Judge Silerio, 387 Phil. 538 (2000).
35. Olandria v. Fuentes, Jr., A.M. No. P-18-3848, June 27, 2018.
36. Ferrer, Jr. v. Dating, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2478, November 8, 2017.
37. Re: Report of Atty. Pabello, Chief of Office, Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator, 763 Phil. 196, 203 (2015).
38. Supra note 33.