FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 249306. March 9, 2022.]
ROSALINA RICAFUENTE, petitioner,vs. ORIENTAL CONSTRUCTION AND ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 9, 2022 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 249306 (Rosalina Ricafuente v. Oriental Construction and Electrical Supply Co., Inc.) — At the maelstrom of this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated 16 November 2018 and the Resolution3 dated 30 July 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 108754. The contested Decision sustained the Decision 4 dated 12 November 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 11-125888, directing Rosalina Ricafuente (petitioner) to pay Oriental Construction and Electrical Supply Co., Inc. (respondent) the amount of P977,330.99 representing the value of unpaid goods, plus the stipulated interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P5,000.00 per every court hearing on record as appearance fees.
Stripped of embellishments, the prevenient facts of the case unfurl as follows:
Between 29 July 2010 and 25 November 2010, petitioner, doing business under the name and style "Michael's Electrical Supply," 5 purchased various electrical supplies and analogous items on credit from respondent amounting to P977,330.99 through personal phone calls. Concomitantly, respondent prepared multiple Sales Invoices which identically prescribed that the purchase price of the materials was payable within thirty (30) days from delivery thereof, and that a one percent (1%) monthly interest would be chargeable on all overdue invoices. Pursuant to petitioner's instructions, the goods were then delivered to Manila United Electrical Supply (MUSES), a store owned by her brother-in-law and situated in Quiapo, Manila. Thereafter, Meriam Madridano (Madridano), the accounting assistant of respondent, confirmed receipt of the supplies by petitioner over the phone. Still and all, petitioner failed to pay the delivered goods even after the final written demand was made by respondent on 27 April 2011, prompting the latter to lodge an action for sum of money against her before the RTC. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11-125888. 6
Fulminating against respondent's imputations, petitioner maintained that while respondent was in truth a supplier of "Michael's Electrical Supply," she could riot have authorized any purchases or received any deliveries from it during the period in question on account of the change of her office address from 160 General Capinpin Street, Biñan City, Laguna to Malvar Street within the same city as early as May 2010. Eventually, petitioner closed shop three months after the move owing to legitimate business reverses. As a result, she had no viable means to verify any purchases made from respondent. 7
In due course, the RTC rendered the Decision8 dated 12 November 2015 in favor of respondent, the decretal portion of which reads: CAIHTE
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a judgment is hereby issued ordering (petitioner) to pay the (respondent):
a. The sum of P977,330.99 representing the value of the delivered but unpaid items plus 12% legal interests (sic) per annum starting May 2011 until the same is fully paid; and
b. The sum of P100,000.00 attorney's fees (sic) and P5,000.00 as appearance fee for every court hearing per record.
SO ORDERED. 9
The RTC ratiocinated that Madridano's testimony sufficiently evinced that petitioner was liable for the unpaid materials delivered by respondent to MUSES which was owned by petitioner's brother-in-law. Madridano even confirmed the receipt by petitioner of the supplies over the phone. By virtue of such arrangement, it was exceedingly probable that petitioner was not the one who signed the Sales Invoices issued by respondent. On the other hand, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was a supplier of her proprietorship. Likewise, her disavowal of the reception of the goods in question due to the physical transfer of her enterprise in May 2010 constituted a negative pregnant which could hardly carry the day for her. 10
Subsequently, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC through the Order 11 dated 2 March 2016.
Disgruntled, petitioner appealed the RTC's disposition to the CA, avouching that the Sales Invoices adduced by respondent could not have been the source of any obligation in its favor because they lacked her signature. In the same breath, while the Sales Invoices disclosed that respondent transacted with "Michael's Electrical Supply," the address indicated therein was located in Manila and not Laguna. Withal, the items were actually delivered to MUSES, an entirely different store owned by petitioner's brother-in-law. She also postulated that following Article 2209 of the Civil Code, the applicable interest rate would be six percent (6%) per annum since the case plainly involved the payment of a sum of money, and not an obligation arising from a loan or forbearance of money. Finally, she insisted that the RTC erroneously awarded attorney's fees without proffering any justification therefor, contravening Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 12
In the now oppugned Decision, 13 the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. The court a quo concurred with the RTC's observation that petitioner's testimony was a negative pregnant, and therefore not entitled to weighty credence. Contrariwise, Madridano categorically professed that the goods were transported to MUSES which was owned by the brother-in-law of petitioner and located in Quiapo, Manila and which was agreed upon by the parties as the delivery point. She then confirmed receipt thereof by petitioner through phone call. The fact that petitioner was a valued client of respondent who could make purchases over the phone was significantly buttressed by her admission that respondent was one of her suppliers. Resultantly, the absence of petitioner's signature on any of the Sales Invoices was understandable as she was most likely not at MUSES when respondent delivered the materials. Considering that there was already a perfected contract of sale between the parties, petitioner was undeniably obligated to pay the entire purchase price for the electrical supplies provided by respondent. 14
Anent the appropriate legal rate of interest, the CA noted that the Sales Invoices uniformly specified that "one percent (1%) interest per month will be charged on all overdue accounts." 15 It decreed that such rate took the form of compensatory interest under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which petitioner was bound to pay since it was not unconscionable under the circumstances. Lastly, the CA justified the award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent by highlighting the attestation of Madridano that the unfounded refusal of petitioner to pay for the delivered goods constrained respondent to engage the services of a law firm to protect its rights. 16
Petitioner's supplication for a reconsideration of the foregoing disquisition was denied by the CA via the repugned Resolution. 17
Through the present recourse before this Court, petitioner ascribes the following errors 18 to the CA in rendering the assailed Decision and in issuing the subsequent Resolution:
I
THE CA ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RTC'S DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE WANT OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDINGS.
II
THE CA ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.
The Petition is devoid of merit. The judgment of the CA is affirmed with modification.
Incipiently, it must be underscored that the errors raised by petitioner were already extensively passed upon by the CA. By the same token, these issues necessitate a review of the evidence, specifically the Sales Invoices and the testimony of Madridano. However, it is axiomatic that questions of fact, which would require a re-evaluation of the evidence, are inappropriate under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the jurisdiction of the Court under this particular rule is limited only to errors of law. The Court is not a trier of facts and it cannot rule on questions which determine the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, the determination of which is best left to the courts below. While this rule not absolute, none of the recognized exceptions which allow the Court to review the factual issues exists in the instant case. 19 DETACa
Therewithal, as a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, more so, when as here, such findings are undisturbed by the appellate court. 20
All the same, petitioner's disputations concerning her liability towards respondent fail to inspire assent.
It is a basic jurisprudential teaching that in civil cases, like in a complaint for sum of money, the burden of proof lies on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue. In such a case, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, must establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of truth. Simply put, it is that evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 21
Furthermore, preponderance of evidence is determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it. 22
After conscientiously sifting through the records, the Court finds and so holds that the CA infallibly ruled that petitioner must be impelled to settle her overdue accounts with respondent together with the corresponding legal interest.
Madridano candidly narrated that between 29 July 2010 and 25 November 2010, petitioner personally ordered electrical supplies from respondent through phone calls. She then prepared several Sales Invoices indicating that the said supplies were sold to Michael's Electrical Supply. While the same documents reflected that the goods were received by MUSES which was owned by petitioner's brother-in-law and based in Manila, Madridano expounded that the materials were delivered in accordance with the instructions of petitioner. Thence, her signature did not appear thereon as it was highly implausible for her to be at the place of delivery when the deliveries transpired. Nonetheless, Madridano confirmed the receipt of the goods by petitioner over the phone. 23
A converso, petitioner merely denied having any means to confirm the purchases from respondent due to a change in her business address, 24 but stopped short of specifically refuting the subsistence of the transactions themselves. Invariably, such denial is a negative pregnant, or a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party, 25i.e., the purchase of electrical supplies by petitioner from respondent. Moreover, petitioner's stance is enfeebled by her own admission that respondent was one of her suppliers. 26
Given the foregoing discourse, it is ineludible that the evidence preponderates in favor of the existence of a perfected contract of sale between petitioner and respondent. On this score, it bears emphasis that a contract of sale is classified as a consensual contract. No particular form is required for its validity. Upon perfection thereof, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, i.e., the vendee may compel the transfer of ownership over the object of the sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay for the thing sold. 27
In the case at bench, the Sales Invoices coupled with Madridano's exposition satisfactorily demonstrate that respondent already held up its end of the bargain by delivering the supplies in accordance with petitioner's instructions. Whence, petitioner's obligation to pay the purchase price within 30 days from delivery of the goods as reflected in the Sales Invoices arose and ought to be demanded by respondent. Article 1475 of the Civil Code expressly states:
The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
A sensu contrario, petitioner tendered not an iota of proof to show that payment was already made. Indubitably, she is bound to settle her unpaid accounts with respondent in conformity with the terms of the Sales Invoices.
Apropos the applicable interest rate, Article 2209 of the Civil Code dictates that when a debtor incurs a delay in obligations to pay a sum of money, the indemnity for damages shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, 28viz.:
If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum.
Appositely, if the rate of interest is stipulated, such stipulated interest shall apply and not the legal interest, provided the stipulated interest is not excessive and unconscionable. The stipulated interest shall be applied until full payment of the obligation because that is the law between the parties. The legal interest only applies in the absence of stipulated interest. 29
Here, the Sales Invoices similarly provided that "one percent (1%) per month will be charged on all overdue accounts" 30 or twelve percent (12%) per annum. Inevitably, petitioner is obliged to pay the same reckoned from the time of extrajudicial demand on 27 April 2011, 31 such rate not exceeding three percent (3%) per month, which is characterized as iniquitous and unconscionable. 32
Incidentally, pursuant to Article 2212 33 of the Civil Code, the twelve percent (12%) per annum due on the principal amount accruing as of the judicial demand, i.e., the filing of the Complaint on 15 June 2011, 34 shall also earn legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of judicial demand on 15 June 2011 until 30 June 2013, and thereafter at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from 1 July 2013 until full payment. 35
A final inflection. Upon a perspicacious evaluation of the factual milieu of the case, this Court holds that there is plausible basis to delete the award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent. aDSIHc
It is hornbook doctrine that attorney's fees generally cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his or her rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his or her cause. 36 Corollary thereto, the court must state the award's basis in the decision. 37
The Decision dated 12 November 2015 of the RTC did not contain any explication as to why respondent was entitled to attorney's fees. For the CA, however, the "testimony on the part of the witness of (respondent) that the unjustified refusal of (petitioner) to pay her obligation constrained (respondent) to hire the services of a law firm to protect its right"38 justified such award. Be that as it may, there is no scintilla of evidence showing that petitioner was motivated by bad faith in her persistence towards this case.
In précis, except the deletion of the award for attorney's fees, the Court perceives no other discernible reason to reverse or set aside the ruling of the CA enjoining petitioner to pay respondent the sum she owed together with the stipulated legal interest.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 16 November 2018 and the Resolution dated 30 July 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 108754, upholding the Decision dated 12 November 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 11-125888, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that —
1. Petitioner Rosalina Ricafuente is ORDERED to pay respondent Oriental Construction and Electrical Supply, Co., Inc. the following amounts:
a. P977,330.99, representing the principal amount, plus stipulated interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum to be computed from the date of extrajudicial demand on 27 April 2011 until full payment;
b. Legal interest on the interest due on the principal amount, accruing as of judicial demand, at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of judicial demand on 15 June 2011 until 30 June 2013, and thereafter at the rate of six (6%) per annum from 1 July 2013 until full payment; and
2. The awards of attorney's fees and appearance fees in favor of respondent are DELETED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 10-21.
2.Id. at 22-28. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang (now a retired Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of this Court).
3.Id. at 29-31. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and concurred in by Associate Justices Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of this Court) and Pablito A. Perez.
4.Id. at 32-38. Penned by Presiding Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos.
5. Also referred to as "Michael Electric Supply" in portions of the Rollo.
6.Rollo, pp. 22-23, 32-36, and 43.
7.Id. at 23-24, 36, and 51.
8.Id. at 32-38.
9.Id. at 38.
10.Id. at 37-38.
11.Id. at 39.
12.Id. at 52-54.
13.Supra at 2.
14.Id. at 25-26.
15.Id. at 26; original citations omitted.
16.Id. at 26-27.
17.Supra at 3.
18.Id. at 15.
19. See Coro v. Nasayao, G.R. No. 235361, 16 October 2019; citing Gatan v. Vinarao, 820 Phil. 257 (2017).
20.Id.; citing Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, 750 Phil. 846, 855 (2015).
21. See Spouses Garcia v. Northern Islands, Co., Inc., G.R. No. 226495, 5 February 2020; citing Evangelista v. Spouses Andolong, 800 Phil. 189, 195 (2016).
22.Id.; citing Supreme Transliner, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 692, 699 (2001).
23.Rollo, pp. 22-23 and 32-36.
24.Id. at 34.
25. See Republic v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 830 Phil. 423, 457 (2018); citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 1059 (2003).
26.Rollo, pp. 25 and 37.
27. See Tamayao v. Lacambra, G.R. No. 244232, 3 November 2020; citing Article 1475 of the Civil Code and Spouses Dalion v. Court of Appeals, 261 Phil. 1033, 1039 (1990).
28. See Mojica v. Generali Pilipinas Life Assurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 222455, 18 September 2019.
29.Id.; original citations omitted.
30.Rollo, p. 26.
31.Id. at 23 and 33.
32. See Isla v. Estorga, 834 Phil. 884, 891 (2018); citing Chua v. Timan, 584 Phil. 144, 148 (2008).
33. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point.
34.Rollo, pp. 12 and 50.
35. See Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 225433, 28 August 2019; citing Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013).
36. See Sian v. Spouses Somoso, G.R. No. 201812, 22 January 2020; citing Spouses Timado v. Rural Bank of San Jose, Inc., 789 Phil. 453, 460 (2016).
37. See Spouses Castro v. Spouses Esperanza, G.R. No. 248763, 11 March 2020; citing Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma, Corp., 729 Phil. 440, 483 (2014).
38.Rollo, p. 27.