SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 211155. July 9, 2014.]
GLORIA E. REYES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 09 July 2014 which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 211155 (Gloria E. Reyes, petitioner v. People of the Philippines, respondent)
Petitioner Gloria E. Reyes, together with seven other accused, was charged with estafa under Article 315, 2(a) 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1689 in six separate informations. Another information for the same crime was filed, but only petitioner was charged therein. 2 Except for the names of the victims, all the informations alleged the same act: that petitioner and her co-accused solicited and accepted money from the victims purportedly to be invested in Five Vision Consultancy Services, Incorporated (Five Vision), a company allegedly engaged in the business of foreign exchange trading and which supposedly guarantees a 6% to 10% per month return of investment. 3 As security for their investments, herein petitioner issued postdated checks in favor of the victims. All these checks were, however, dishonored for the same reason: "account closed." 4 Upon verification with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the victims discovered that Five Vision and Intercontinental Services, Inc. (Intercontinental) the company which petitioner claimed would eventually replace Five Vision, are not authorized to issue certificates of stock to or solicit funds from the general public. 5
The court found probable cause against petitioner only; hence, the other accused were ordered dropped from the informations and the portions thereof alleging conspiracy were deleted. At the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to all seven counts of estafa. Thereafter, preliminary conference, pre-trial and trial ensued. 6DcSACE
On 19 November 2008, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, in relation to P.D. 1689, in three of the seven cases and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case. The other cases were dismissed for failure to prosecute. 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed. 8 Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue
The lone issue 9 presented by petitioner for resolution is whether or not P.D. 1689 is applicable to the case at bar considering that all of her co-accused were dropped from the information, thereby leaving her as the lone accused in the estafa cases.
Our Ruling
P.D. 1689, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 6 April 1980, increased the penalty for certain forms of swindling or estafa. Section 1 thereof provides:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315[s] and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers association, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.
Petitioner maintains that with the dropping from the cases of the other accused, it was error for the trial court and the CA to hold her liable for syndicated estafa under P.D. 1689 as this offense requires a syndicate of five or more persons. Besides, according to petitioner, the prosecution did not present any proof that she is a stockholder, counselor or agent of Five Vision and/or Intercontinental. Moreover, the three private complainants here can hardly be considered the "general public" contemplated by the provisions of P.D. 1689. Finally, petitioner argues that even the elements of estafa under 2(a) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had not been proven, thereby entitling her to an acquittal.
Petitioner's contentions are without merit.
It is clear from the title of P.D. 1689 itself — "Increasing the Penalty for Certain Forms of Swindling or Estafa" 10 — that a higher penalty is imposed for two types of estafa. Thus, the first paragraph of Section 1 provides the penalty of life imprisonment to death for syndicated estafa, while the second paragraph of the same section provides the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for large scale or wide scale estafa. 11 It is thus error to say that P.D. 1689 applies to syndicated estafa only, such that; if there is only a single offender, the decree becomes irrelevant. P.D. 1689 is still applicable notwithstanding that there is only one offender for as long as the amount of the fraud exceeds P100,000.00, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1 thereof. EIAaDC
Since the sum swindled by petitioner from her victims amounted to more than P5 million, the CA correctly held that petitioner is still covered by P.D. 1689. Thus:
In Catiis v. Court of Appeals, et al., it was held that where there is only one offender, he or she cannot be indicted for syndicated estafa as that would be contrary to the clear wording of the law. However, this does not mean that PD 1689 no longer applies. PD 1689 clearly contemplates not only syndicated estafa committed by five (5) or more persons but also estafa committed by less than five (5) persons. Thus, the second paragraph of Section 1 of PD 1689 provides that when the estafa is not committed by a syndicate, the penalty imposable is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds P100,000.00. 12
The other arguments of petitioner with respect to whether or not the elements of the offense with which she was charged were proven will no longer be discussed by this Court as they are factual matters which cannot be properly raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not this Court's function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. 13 Besides, the settled rule is that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. 14 Except for compelling or exceptional reasons, such as when sufficiently shown to be contrary to the evidence on record, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA, will not be disturbed by this Court. 15 Thus, once a guilty verdict has been rendered, the petitioner has the burden of clearly proving on appeal that the lower court committed errors in the appreciation of the evidence presented. 16 Here, there is no showing that the trial court or the Court of Appeals overlooked some material facts or committed any reversible error in their factual findings which would justify further review by this Court.
With respect to the imposition of penalty, the CA found that the trial court erred in sentencing petitioner to suffer reclusion perpetua. According to the CA, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable only if the estafa is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons. It held that, where the estafa is not committed by a syndicate, as in this case, the correct penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The CA accordingly modified the penalty imposed by the trial court, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-128415, the accused-appellant Gloria Reyes is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eleven (11) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Solita Dumalaog in the amount of P750,000.00, with interest thereon at 6% per annum from January 14, 2004 until fully paid, and the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-128418, the accused is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to idemnify complainant Jaime Dumalaog in the amount of US$3,000.00 or P150,000.00 its peso equivalent, with interest thereon at 6% per annum from January 14, 2004, until fully paid and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and HScCEa
3. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-128420, the accused-appellant Gloria Reyes is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Ma. Concepcion Sayo in the amount of P4,325,000.00, with interest thereon at 6% per annum from January 14, 2004 until fully paid, and the amount of P400,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. 17
Citing the case of People v. Romero, 18 the CA went on to rule that:
[T]he minimum period of the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal; the medium period is sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal; and the maximum period is reclusion perpetua. Considering that there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances alleged or proved and, applying the rules in the RPC for graduating penalties by degrees to determine the proper period, the penalty for the offense charged in this case is the medium period of the complex penalty in Section 1, which is sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. This penalty shall be the maximum range of the indeterminate sentence and the minimum shall be taken from any of the [range of the] penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor. Moreover, moral damages are in order for the moral sufferings of the complainants and, to serve as an example for the public good, exemplary damages should also be awarded. 19
Indeed, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." 20 Thus, the penalties imposed by the CA are correct. We likewise find the imposition of moral and exemplary damages proper in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May 2013 and its Resolution dated 17 January 2014 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04016 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
2. Rollo, p. 49.
3. Id. at 56.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 51.
7. Id. at 52.
8. Id. at 58-59.
9. Id. at 23.
10. Emphasis supplied.
11. See People v. Romero, 365 Phil. 531 (1999); and People v. Menil, Jr., 394 Phil. 433 (2000).
12. Rollo, p. 57.
13. Heirs of Pacencia Racaza v. Abay-Abay, G.R. No. 198402, 13 June 2012, 672 SCRA 622, 627.
14. People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 196434, 24 October 2012, 684 SCRA 604, 608.
15. Id.
16. People v. Angelio, G.R. No. 197540, 27 February 2012, 667 SCRA 102, 108.
17. Rollo, pp. 58-59.
18. Supra note 11.
19. Rollo, p. 58.
20. Section 1, Republic Act No. 4103 or the Indeterminate Sentence Law.