SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 193075. October 12, 2016.]
EMMANUEL REYES, SR. and MUTYA M. REYES, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF DEOGRACIAS FORLALES, namely: NAPOLEON FORLALES, LITA HELEN FORLALES-FRADEJAS, JAIME FORLALES, JR., JULIUS FORLALES FORTUNA, HORACE FORLALES, GALAHAD FORLALES, JR., INDEPENDENCIA FORLALES-FETALVERO, MELITON FORLALES, JR., MILAGROS V. FORLALES and MERCEDES FORLALES-BAUTISTA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated12 October 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 193075 (EMMANUEL REYES, SR. and MUTYA M. REYES v. HEIRS OF DEOGRACIAS FORLALES, namely: NAPOLEON FORLALES, LITA HELEN FORLALES-FRADEJAS, JAIME FORLALES, JR., JULIUS FORLALES FORTUNA, HORACE FORLALES, GALAHAD FORLALES, JR., INDEPENDENCIA FORLALES-FETALVERO, MELITON FORLALES, JR., MILAGROS V. FORLALES and MERCEDES FORLALES-BAUTISTA).
The petitioners, Emmanuel Reyes, Sr. and Mutya M. Reyes (Spouses Reyes), filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for the reversal of the October 27, 2009 decision and July 9, 2010 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107624.
In our June 20, 2016 Decision, we granted the petition and reversed the assailed CA rulings. Effectively, we ordered the dismissal of the complaint for ejectment dated October 27, 2005 filed by the heirs of Deogracias Forlales (Forlaleses) with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Odiongan-Ferrol, Branch 5, Odiongan, Romblon, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-288.
The respondents are now before us on the present motion for the reconsideration of our June 20, 2016 Decision. 1
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
In October 27, 2005, the Forlaleses filed an action for unlawful detainer against Spouses Reyes (Civil Case No. 03-288 mentioned above) to vacate a portion of Lot No. 1408 (disputed portion) located at Odiongan, Romblon. But previous to this case, the Forlaleses had already filed a similar action on August 28, 1997, docketed as Civil Case No. OD-229, which the MCTC dismissed for having been filed beyond the one (1) year period allowed by the Rules of Court.
The MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the Forlaleses in Civil Case No. 03-288 and ordered Spouses Reyes to vacate the disputed portion. On appeal, the RTC and the CA shared the view that the occupancy of the Spouses Reyes — from May 28, 1993 (the date of the first demand to vacate) up to the time they received the last demand to vacate on May 27, 2005 — had been tolerated by the Forlaleses.
In reversing the lower courts' conclusion, we essentially held that the Spouses Reyes' possession of the disputed portion during this period could have not been "by mere tolerance" because the Forlaleses filed a complaint for unlawful detainer after Spouses Reyes received the first demand to vacate; unfortunately for the Forlaleses, they filed the first unlawful detainer suit more than four (4) years too late. DTCSHA
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
In support of their motion for reconsideration, the Forlaleses reiterate the arguments below and pointed out as well what they characterized as "inconsistencies" in this Court's ruling.
First, this Court held in the assailed ruling that it was bound by the factual findings of the trial court, i.e., Spouses Reyes were occupying the lot that belongs to the Forlaleses, only to state in the end that there was no credible evidence on record establishing where (on which lot) the house of the Spouses Reyes actually stands on.
Based on this alleged inconsistency, the Forlaleses urge this Court to take a second look at the assailed Decision as the issue involving the identification of the disputed portion had long been settled by the lower courts. They conclude that this Court should have simply respected the factual findings and conclusion of the lower courts on this point.
Second, the Forlaleses argue the dismissal of the first ejectment suit does not constitute res judicata as it was not a judgment on the merits. A judgment or order is said to be on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented for trial. The dismissal of the first unlawful detainer suit allegedly failed to settle the rights and liabilities of the parties, namely the issues of (1) who between the parties have a better right to possess the property, and (2) who between the parties are liable for damages.
Third, the Forlaleses disagree with this Court's conclusion that they did not tolerate the petitioners' occupancy after the date of the first demand to vacate. They point out the finding of the lower courts that there was already an admission on the part of the Spouses Reyes of their tolerated possession of the lot.
Fourth, the Forlaleses maintain that the reckoning point of the one (1) year limitation to file an ejectment suit should be the date of the last demand to vacate.
OUR RULING
We see no substantial argument raised by the Forlaleses that merits a reconsideration of our earlier Decision.
On the alleged inconsistency in our Decision, the Forlaleses took our declarations out of context and we are not at all impressed nor amused by this maneuver. Nevertheless, we discuss the matter below to enlighten them on the point they apparently misunderstood.
We clarify that the factual finding of the lower courts binding on this Court is the finding that Spouses Reyes admitted that they are occupying a portion of the lot that belongs to the Forlaleses. The respondents should note that our appreciation of this admission is only for purposes of resolving the ejectment complaint they filed with the MCTC.
To fully grasp this point of law, the respondents should fully understand the nature of an ejectment case for the recovery of physical possession. An accion interdictal, which may either be that for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one (1) year. 2 In these proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, i.e., to possession de facto, not possession de jure. 3
Separately classified from accion interdictal is accion publiciana where the issue is the better and legal right of possession (possession de jure), 4 not simply the possession de facto critical in accion interdictal. As mentioned above, when we made our statement on possession, we were referring to the admission of the Spouses Reyes and only for purposes of resolving the ejectment complaint filed with the MCTC. CScTED
On the other hand, when we declared later on in our Decision that no conclusive evidence existed that could establish the exact location where the house of the Spouses Reyes actually stood, we were referring to evidence on record sufficiently conclusive to determine whether or not the Spouses Reyes had the legal right to occupy the area their house presently stands on.
Recall in these regards that the Spouses Reyes admitted that they have been occupying a portion of the land that they bought for consideration from the ascendants of the Forlaleses. To avoid further conflict, they still executed an affidavit dated September 18, 1998 saying that their occupancy was by mere tolerance of the Forlaleses. This was the only evidence that was considered by the lower courts to conclude that the Spouses Reyes had been occupying the lot of the Forlaleses.
To our mind, this piece of evidence — as evaluated by the MCTC and reviewed by the RTC and the CA on appeal — was enough to establish the fact of de facto possession in an ejectment case, but not in an action involving the issue of legal right of possession. The context of our statement, i.e., no evidence on the location of the house of Spouses Reyes, was in relation to our conclusion that the Forlaleses should have filed an action to recover possession filed before the RTC.
We already considered and ruled in our Decision on the other arguments raised in the respondents' motion for reconsideration. We, therefore, see no reason to reverse the conclusions we made in this case.
To reiterate, the dismissal of the first complaint for unlawful detainer was a judgment on the merits because it was based on the complaint and its annexes and on the allegations of the Forlaleses. A decision on the merits existed because the respondents failed to show that the complaint was filed within one (1) year after making a formal demand — a jurisdictional requirement for a complaint for unlawful detainer. We held that this error is not a mere matter of form or technicality for such allegation is a material allegation in any unlawful detainer complaint. EDCcaS
While Spouses Reyes made an admission (by affidavit) that they were occupying the Forlaleses' lot by mere tolerance, this does not erase the Forlaleses' attempt to eject them: when the Forlaleses filed the first ejectment complaint, it was manifest that the Forlaleses no longer tolerated the Reyes' occupancy.
Finally, given the sequence of events in this case, we cannot reckon the one (1) year limitation to file an unlawful detainer suit from the date of the last demand; this kind of ruling would effectively allow any plaintiff to make a new formal demand to vacate every time the trial court dismisses the complaint on grounds that it was filed beyond the one-year limitation period.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the respondent Forlaleses' motion for the reconsideration of our June 20, 2016 Decision, for failing to raise any substantial argument meriting a reconsideration.
SO ORDERED. Leonen, J., on official leave."
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 319-331.
2. Corpuz v. Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 350.
3. David v. Cordova, 502 Phil. 626 (2005).
4. Bejar v. Caluag, G.R. No. 171277, February 15, 2007, 516 SCRA 84, citing Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291 (1906); Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618, 620 (1908).