SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 250407. July 7, 2021.]
ONOFRE REYES, JR. y QUERUBIN alias "JUN", petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated07 July 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 250407 (Onofre Reyes, Jr. y Querubin alias "Jun" v. People of the Philippines). — We affirm.
Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
The elements of homicide are: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide. 1
Onofre Reyes, Jr. y Querubin alias "Jun" (petitioner) was properly identified as the person who killed the victim. Prosecution witness Kristalyn Romero (Kristalyn) credibly and positively identified petitioner as the one who pulled the trigger and fired the shot which hit and killed her brother Christopher Dave Dugayo Romero (Christopher). Thus, right after she heard the shot, she also heard petitioner utter "hindi ko sinasadya" and saw him holding a smoking gun. Equally inculpatory was petitioner's own admission that the deadly gunshot indeed came from the gun he was grappling for with PO1 Danilo Garcia (PO1 Garcia). 2
As for intent to kill, the foregoing pieces of evidence indubitably show that indeed petitioner pulled the trigger of his firearm which directly resulted in the death of Christopher. It is well settled that if the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is presumed and it is incumbent upon the accused to prove otherwise. Unfortunately for petitioner, this presumption was rendered conclusive in view of his absolute failure to present evidence to the contrary.
In any event, petitioner's plea that what occurred was an accident must be examined vis-à-vis the following requisites: 1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he or she causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it. 3
Here, petitioner's factual version depicted that he and PO1 Garcia grappled for the gun after it was drawn by the latter, who resisted being brought to the barangay hall. Petitioner narrated that in the course of this grappling incident, the gun accidentally got discharged, resulting in the death of Christopher. This narrative, however, is not only unsubstantiated but also cogently negated by inculpatory evidence on record. In any case, the gun belonged to him, not to PO1 Garcia. No less than prosecution eyewitness Kristalyn positively identified him to be holding the still smoking gun right after the gunshot hit and felled her brother. ETHIDa
Besides, despite petitioner's testimony that on the night in question, he was patrolling their barangay in the company of his fellow kagawad Reynaldo Miranda, the defense did not bother to present the latter to corroborate his version.
Even more strange was the failure of the defense to present petitioner's own brother Bong Reyes (Bong) to testify on the incident considering that he was actually in the area when the incident occurred, was seen talking to PO1 Garcia right after Christopher got shot, and was even the first to respond to Kristalyn's call for help and the one who rushed Christopher to the hospital. Bong, therefore, would have had personal knowledge of what truly happened on that fateful night and would have been competent to corroborate the version of petitioner, his own brother, if it were true.
Too, despite petitioner's insistence that PO1 Garcia who tried to draw the gun to resist being taken to the barangay hall, who was the person he was grappling with when the gun accidentally fired, and the one he confronted right after Christopher got hit, but who reacted by hitting him in the chest, causing him to faint — petitioner surprisingly did not file even a single case against PO1 Garcia. As it was, he took all the blows, including the responsibility of shouldering the hospital expenses of the victim. His actuations and omission under the circumstances hardly speak of the innocent man he claims to be.
Finally, the Court keenly notes that the certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office, Civil Security Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP) states that petitioner is not a licensed and/or registered firearm holder. Consequently, he had no legitimate reason to hold, possess, let alone, carry and fire a gun in public at any given time, even during his alleged foot patrol of the area around the barangay.
In any case, Wacoy v. People4 decreed that even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is still homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly at the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.
Indeed, the factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are conclusive and binding upon the Court, absent any clear showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could very well affect the outcome of the case. 5 This rule assumes more significance when these factual findings carry the full concurrence of the Court of Appeals, as in this case. 6
All told, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding petitioner guilty of homicide beyond any shadow of doubt.
Penalty
Under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. Considering that no aggravating and mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime here, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal, with the minimum penalty selected from the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor. 7
Although the minimum of the penalty imposed here by the Court of Appeals, ten (10) years of prision mayor, is within the range of the minimum of the indeterminate penalty prescribed by law, we adopt the lower minimum of the indeterminate penalty imposed in People v. Aquino, 8i.e., eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, the same being more beneficial to petitioner. Hence, petitioner should be sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. 9
On the monetary awards, in accord with People v. Jugueta10 the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the award of P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages. Considering that no aggravating circumstance attended the crime, it also properly deleted the award of exemplary damages.
With respect to the award of actual damages of P133,300.00 which was duly supported by receipts, the same too was properly sustained by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 17, 2019 and Resolution dated November 5, 2019 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Onofre Querubin Reyes, Jr. alias "Jun" is found GUILTY of HOMICIDE. He is sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to PAY the heirs of Christopher Dave Dugayo Romero the following monetary awards:
(a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P133,300.00 as actual damages.
All monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this resolution until fully paid. cSEDTC
SO ORDERED." (J. Lopez, J., designated additional member per Special Order No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. See Villanueva v. Caparas, 702 Phil. 609, 616 (2013); see also Wacoy v. People, 761 Phil. 570, 578 (2015), and Anisco v. People, G.R. No. 242263, November 18, 2020.
2.Rollo, pp. 78-79.
3. See People v. Macal, 778 Phil. 379, 390 (2016).
4.Supra note 1, at 580.
5.People v. Collamat, 838 Phil. 888, 894-895 (2018), citing Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 829 (2002).
6. See People v. Pigar, G.R. No. 247658, February 17, 2020.
7. See People v. Menil, G.R. No. 233205, June 26, 2019.
8. 829 Phil. 477 (2018).
9. See also People v. Menil, supra note 7 and People v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 238171, June 19, 2019 where the Court also imposed the same penalty for Homicide.
10. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).