Republic v. Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 210015. December 7, 2020.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs.ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, REPRESENTED BY FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedDecember 7, 2020, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 210015 (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, v. ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, represented by FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., respondent). — The Court resolves to NOTE:

(1) the Withdrawal of Appearance dated January 20, 2020, filed by Atty. Jose Amor M. Amorado of MOST Law as counsel for respondent Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., with the client's conformity, and GRANT his request that copies of all pleadings, notices and other court processes in this case be directly sent to respondent's new counsel of record; and

(2) the Entry of Appearance dated August 25, 2020, filed by Atty. Vanithie V. Varez of M & Associates as counsel for respondent Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., with the client's conformity, and GRANT her request that she be furnished with copies of all pleadings, notices and other court processes in this case at 30/F, Ore Central Tower, 31st Street corner 9th Ave., Bonifacio Global City, Taguig 1634.

This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Resolutions 2 of the Sandiganbayan, which granted the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos's (Estate of Marcos) Motion to Dismiss the Republic of the Philippines' Bill of Particulars for not complying with this Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 148514.

This case is a sequel of G.R. No. 148154, Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., 3 where this Court upheld the propriety of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions granting the Estate of Marcos's Motion for Bill of Particulars.

On July 21, 1987, the Republic, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, filed a Complaint 4 for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against Roman A. Cruz, Jr. 5 (Cruz), Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos), and Imelda R. Marcos (Imelda). It sought to recover the funds and properties that the defendants, individually and through their concerted action, unlawfully accumulated over the 20 years of Marcos's presidency. CAIHTE

On April 25, 1988, the Republic filed an Expanded Complaint 6 with the Sandiganbayan's approval. Cruz filed an Answer on September 15, 1988, while the Marcos Spouses were declared in default on April 6, 1989 7 for their failure to file an answer within 60 days after the alias summons had been served in their house in Hawaii.

After Marcos had died on September 29, 1989, he was substituted by his Estate, represented by Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., the appointed executor. The default order was later lifted on Imelda's motion, and she was able to file her Answer on September 6, 1995. 8 The Estate of Marcos, on the other hand, moved for leave to file a responsive pleading, 9 which was granted. However, after three requests for extension of time, on July 15, 1999, the Estate of Marcos filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars 10 instead of an answer.

In its Motion, the Estate of Marcos moved for a more definite statement on the following matters: (a) the specific nature, manner, and extent of Marcos's participation in acquiring the properties listed in Annex "A" of the Expanded Complaint, particularly as to whether Marcos was a beneficial owner and how he acquired beneficial control; 11 (b) the specific amount of actual damages to be proven during trial; 12 and (c) the specific nature, manner, time, and extent of support, participation and collaboration of Marcos in the following transactions:

As to par. 12 (a):

i. . . . purchase of the lot and building at 212 Stockton Street, San Francisco, California with the use of GSIS funds in a manner grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government[;]

ii. . . . the act of defendant Cruz, Jr. to allow the intervention of Sylvia Lichauco as a broker in the sale contrary to the existing policies of PAL and resulting to the prejudice of GSIS and PAL[;]

As to par. 12 (b):

iii. . . . the act of defendant Cruz, Jr. of converting and appropriating to his own use and benefit the funds of Commercial Bank of Manila . . .;

iv. . . . the disbursement by defendant Cruz, Jr. of the funds of Commercial Bank of, among others, the amount of P81,152.00 for the personal services rendered to the latter by Brenda Tuazon[;]

As to par. 12 (c):

v. . . . the act of defendant Cruz, Jr. of entering into an agency agreement, on behalf of the GSIS, with Integral Factors Corp. (IFC) . . ., as a result of which IFC effected a great part of its reinsurance with INRE Corporation, a non-insurance company registered in London [of which Cruz, Jr. was] one of its directors[;]

vi. [Whether] Ferdinand E. Marcos [was] in any way connected to IFC and INRE Corporation[;]

vii. . . . the act of defendant Cruz, Jr. of allowing IFC to service the accounts . . . [of] government agencies like the Bureau of Buildings, Philippine National Oil Corporation, National Power Corporation, Ministry of Public Works and Highways . . .[;]

As to par. 12 (d):

viii. . . . the agreement between GSIS and Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) on account of which GSIS ceded, transferred, and conveyed to AIC five (5) parcels of land in Manila in exchange for AIC's Pinugay Estate property in Tanay, Rizal[;] [and]

As to par. 12 (e):

ix. . . . the purchase by PAL of three (3) additional Airbus 300 in an amount much more than the market price[.] 13

In a January 31, 2000 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted the Motion. Its dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the defendant-movant's motion for bill of particulars is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, the plaintiff is hereby ordered to amend pars. 9 and Annex "A", 12(a) to (e), and 19 in relation to par. 3 of the PRAYER, of the Expanded Complaint, to allege the ultimate facts indicating the nature, manner, period and extent of participation of Ferdinand E. Marcos in the acts referred to therein, and the amount of damages to be proven during trial, respectively, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this resolution[.]

SO ORDERED. 14

When its Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court. 15

In a December 17, 2007 Resolution, 16 this Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for Bill of Particulars. It found that the pertinent allegations in the Expanded Complaint were couched in general terms, and did not show how the Marcos Spouses acted "in unlawful concert" with Cruz in illegally amassing assets, property, and funds. It continued:

While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they were vague and unclear as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly "in unlawful concert with" the former. There was no factual allegation in the original and expanded complaints on the collaboration of or on the kind of support extended by former President Marcos to Cruz in the commission of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the allegations against the Marcoses, aside from being maladroitly laid, were couched in general terms. The alleged acts, conditions and circumstances that could show the conspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and sufficiently set forth by petitioner. 17 DETACa

The Sandiganbayan disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, funding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting respondent's Motion for Bill of Particulars, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 and March 27, 2001 in Civil Case No. 0006 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ordered to prepare and file a bill of particulars containing the ultimate facts as prayed for by respondent within twenty (20) days from notice.

SO ORDERED. 18 (Emphasis in the original)

On February 5, 2008, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion 19 before the Sandiganbayan, requesting a fresh period of 30 days or until March 6, 2008 to file the Bill of Particulars. On March 6, 2008, the Republic again moved to have it extended for another 15 days. 20 Both motions were granted. 21

However, on March 14, 2008, the Republic filed a manifestation and Motion, stating:

4. After a careful perusal of the complete record of the case and upon consultation with senior PCGG lawyers familiar with the case, it was found out that the required Bill of Particulars going into the specifics of the allegations against the late Ferdinand E. Marcos could not most likely be filed considering that the previous lawyers (PCGG and OSG) who were privy to the case are no longer around. Also, the original copies of the documentary evidence supporting the allegations of the Complaint have yet to be reviewed and secured.

5. In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully manifested that a motion for leave to file an amended complaint together with the amended complaint, the preparation of which is now underway, will be filed in lieu of the Bill of Particulars for convenience and expediency. 22

The Republic prayed that it be allowed to move for leave to file an amended complaint within 15 days from March 21, 2008, or until April 5, 2008. 23 Later, on April 2, 2008, the Republic filed its Motion for Leave to file Amended Complaint with the attached Amended Complaint. 24 The Estate of Marcos and Cruz filed their respective Oppositions. 25

The Sandiganbayan denied admission of the Amended Complaint, as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. 26

On February 21, 2012, the Republic requested 30 days from February 22, 2012, or until March 23, 2012, to file a bill of particulars. Against opposition from the Estate of Marcos and the heirs of Cruz, the Sandiganbayan granted the extension. 27

On March 23, 2012, the Republic filed a Bill of Particulars, 28 stating the following:

2. In compliance with [the January 14, 2000 Resolution], Plaintiff alleges the following —

3. Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos ("Marcos["]) used Defendant Roman A. Cruz ("Cruz") as dummy. As such and in concert with the Defendant Marcos, Defendant Cruz perpetrated unlawful acts, committed abuse of right and power, which cause untold misery, suffering and damages to Plaintiff.

4. Defendant Marcos, as President of the Republic of the Philippines, wielded his power, authority and influence to ensure that Defendant Cruz's actions were executed.

5. To illustrate the foregoing, Plaintiff shall provide a more definitive statement regarding the involvement of Defendant Marcos involving the transaction between Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) in connection with the Pinugay Estate. Plaintiff shall address the question propounded in the Defendant Marcos' motion for bill of particulars, to wit:

"As to par. 12(d)

i. What is/are the specific nature, manner, time and extent of support, participation and collaboration of Ferdinand E. Marcos with defendant Cruz, Jr. in the agreement between GSIS and Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) on account of which GSIS ceded, transferred, and conveyed to AIC five (5) parcels of land in Manila in exchange for AIC's Pinugay Estate property in Tanay, Rizal?["]

6. Defendant Cruz, in unlawful concert with Defendant Marcos, entered into an agreement with the AIC whereby GSIS ceded, transferred, and conveyed property consisting of five (5) adjoining parcels of land situated in Manila covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 49853, 49854, 49855 and 49856 to AIC in exchange for AIC property known as the Pinugay Estate located in Tanay, Rizal, covered by TCT No. 271378, under terms and conditions grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.

7. The appraised value of the GSIS parcels of land was P14,585,600.00 as of June 25, 1971 while the value of the Pinugay Estate was P2.00 per square meter or a total amount of P15,219,264.00. But in the barter agreement, the Pinugay Estate was overvalued at P3.50 per square meter or a total of P41,852,976.00, thus GSIS had to pay AIC P27,287,976.00, even when it was GSIS which was entitled to payment from AIC for its failure to pay the rentals of the GSIS property then occupied by it.

8. Defendant Marcos, by his authority as President of the Republic of the Philippines, ordered then Executive Secretary Alexander Melchor, to approve the transaction in view of the representations and recommendations made by then GSIS General Manager, Defendant Cruz. This approval is contained in a 1st Indorsement Letter dated September 10, 1973 and signed by then Executive Secretary Alexander Melchor, acting by authority and under the auspices of Defendant Marcos. aDSIHc

xxx xxx xxx

10. Thus, based on the foregoing, it is clear that Defendant Marcos, in collaboration with Defendant Cruz, had a direct and integral involvement in the acquisition of the Pinugay Estate under terms and conditions grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the Plaintiff much to its damage and prejudice. 29 (Emphasis in the original)

The Estate of Marcos filed a Motion to Dismiss 30 the case, claiming that the Bill of Particulars was filed out of time, defective, and did not supply a more definitive statement as required by this Court and the Sandiganbayan. The Republic filed a Joint Comment/Opposition. 31

The Sandiganbayan, in its now assailed October 25, 2012 Resolution, 32 granted the Motion and dismissed the case against the Estate of Marcos. It held that the Bill of Particulars still contained statements couched in general terms that did not provide information on how Marcos used Cruz as dummy, or why Cruz was perceived as dummy. 33 It also found that the 1st Indorsement, dated September 10, 1973 and signed by Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor (Executive Secretary Melchor), did not show the nature, manner, period, and extent of Marcos's participation in the acts alleged. 34

On November 28, 2012, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion, 35 asking the Sandiganbayan to disregard the first copy, and admit instead the second copy, of its Motion for Reconsideration, both copies filed on November 23, 2012. The Estate of Marcos opposed both the Motion for Reconsideration 36 and the Manifestation and Motion. 37

On October 24, 2013, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed Resolution, 38 denying the Republic's Manifestation and Motion and Motion for Reconsideration for being pro forma and for lack of merit. It held that the Motion for Reconsideration did not controvert its finding on the following particulars:

a) the absence of any hint or information as to the nature and manner of how President Marcos utilized Roman A. Cruz, Jr. as dummy or why the latter was perceived as such dummy; b) there was only a general reference on the agreement between GSIS and AIC; and c) the 1st Indorsement dated September 10, 1973 signed by Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor did not show the nature, manner, period and extent of participation of Ferdinand E. Marcos. 39

Hence, the Republic filed this Petition. 40 Respondent filed a Comment, 41 and in turn, petitioner filed its Reply. 42

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the respondent's Motion to Dismiss. 43 It argues that the Bill of Particulars and Expanded Complaint sufficiently alleged the ultimate facts that formed the three essential elements of a cause of action to recover ill-gotten wealth. 44

Petitioner expounds that its Bill of Particulars illustrated the pattern used by Marcos and Cruz in their scheme to defraud the Republic. 45

First, Marcos allegedly gave Executive Secretary Melchor the authority to approve the barter agreement between the Government Service Insurance System and Asiatic Integrated Corporation. As Marcos never reprobated the approval, it was allegedly deemed to be his personal act, per Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v Paño. 46

Similarly, Marcos allegedly facilitated, ordered, caused, and approved: (1) the purchase of the San Francisco property and payment of brokerage fee; (2) the misappropriation of the funds of the Commercial Bank of Manila; (3) the agency agreement with the Integral Factors Corporation and reinsurance with INRE Corporation; and (4) the purchase of the three Airbus 300 airliners. 47

In its Comment, 48 respondent argues that the Petition was filed out of time. 49 It posits that since petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was declared a scrap of paper and pro forma, on the grounds that it failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and was not set for hearing within 10 days from filing, 50 the 15-day period to file an appeal did not toll. 51

Even if the Petition were timely filed, respondent says it did not stop the Sandiganbayan's October 25, 2012 Resolution from attaining finality. Allegedly, the Petition did not discuss any error in the October 24, 2013 Resolution, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration. 52

Lastly, respondent asserts that the Bill of Particulars failed to provide the ultimate facts showing the alleged "unlawful concert" between Marcos and Cruz. 53 It highlights how petitioner attached no other document to the Bill of Particulars to show how Marcos allegedly conspired with Cruz to acquire the properties. 54

In its Reply, 55 petitioner counters that the Sandiganbayan's October 24, 2013 Resolution has not yet become final. 56 It claims that while it did not belabor the propriety of the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, this cannot be taken to mean an abandonment of the main issue, which is whether the case's dismissal was proper. It submits that since procedural rules are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, these rules may be relaxed to attain that prime objective. 57

Petitioner maintains that respondent had been adequately informed of the causes of action against it through the Bill of Particulars and Expanded Complaint. It adds that were it true that the Expanded Complaint needed particularization, respondent should have sought for a bill of particulars to begin with, and not after it had filed a motion for leave to file a responsive pleading, followed by three successive motions for extensions. Petitioner points out that respondent itself admitted in its motions that it had already prepared the initial draft of its responsive pleading. 58

Finally, petitioner asserts that a motion for bill of particulars may not call upon evidentiary matters, and it is sufficient that the bill of particulars inform the defendant of the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action. 59 ETHIDa

For this Court's resolution is whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the Complaint against respondent Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The Petition is partially granted.

I

First, on the procedural aspect, respondent argues that the Petition was filed out of time, 60 since the Motion for Reconsideration was declared pro forma for not complying with the three-day notice rule and not being set for hearing within 10 days from filing. 61 Thus, it says the Motion did not toll petitioner's 15-day period to appeal. 62 Even if the Petition were timely filed, respondent says the October 25, 2012 Resolution attained finality, since the Petition did not discuss any error in the Sandiganbayan's October 24, 2013 Resolution, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration. 63

Petitioner counters that the October 24, 2013 Resolution, which found the Motion to be pro forma, has not yet become final. 64 It also raises that while it did not belabor the propriety of the Motion's denial, this cannot mean abandoning the main issue of whether case dismissal was proper. It submits that rules of procedure can be relaxed to promote the ends of justice. 65

This Court finds respondent's argument to be untenable.

It is true that the Sandiganbayan, in its October 24, 2013 Resolution, held that the second copy of the Motion for Reconsideration was pro forma for noncompliance with Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court. 66 However, the Sandiganbayan still proceeded to rule on the substantive merits of the Motion:

A perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration shows that the same contains the very same facts and arguments that the plaintiff has raised in the Bill of Particulars filed on March 23, 2012 and in the Joint Comment/Opposition filed on April 30, 2012. Lamentably, the plaintiff has failed to show which part of the assailed Resolution deserves reconsideration, and neither has it controverted the Court's finding on the following particulars: a) the absence of any hint or information as to the nature and manner of how President Marcos utilized Roman A. Cruz, Jr. as dummy or why the latter was perceived as such dummy; b) there was only a general reference on the agreement between GSIS and AIC; and c) the 1st Indorsement dated September 10, 1973 signed by Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor did not show the nature, manner, period and extent of participation of Ferdinand E. Marcos. As no new argument was presented, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse or issue a different ruling. 67

In the dispositive portion, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reconsideration "for being pro formaand for lack of merit." 68

Petitioner's timely filing of an appeal via a Rule 45 petition before this Court subjects for review not only the Sandiganbayan's October 24, 2013 Resolution, but also the October 25, 2012 Resolution. The latter Resolution has been precluded from attaining finality.

Furthermore, the Petition primarily assails the Sandiganbayan's dismissal of the case, an issue that was likewise passed upon in the October 24, 2013 Resolution. Hence, respondent's contention that the Petition did not assail the October 24, 2013 Resolution is misplaced.

II

This Court proceeds to evaluate petitioner's Bill of Particulars in light of the December 7, 2007 Resolution in G.R. No. 148154.

First, in paragraph 3 of the Bill of Particulars, petitioner alleged that Marcos "used . . . Cruz . . . as dummy"; particularly, it said that "in concert with the Defendant Marcos, Defendant Cruz perpetrated unlawful acts, committed abuse of right and power, which cause[d] untold misery, suffering and damages to [petitioner]." 69

The phrase "used Cruz as dummy" is an inference from facts not averred in the Expanded Complaint or in the Bill of Particulars. In other words, no facts were alleged as to how Cruz became or is considered a Marcos dummy. As the Sandiganbayan aptly observed:

It will be easily observed that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Bill of Particulars quoted above, which allege that President Marcos used Defendant Cruz as his dummy, and that he wielded his power, authority and influence to ensure that Defendant Cruz's actions were executed, are again statements couched in general terms that do not provide any hint of information as to the nature and manner of how President Marcos utilized Defendant Cruz, Jr. as his dummy, as well as the extent of participation of President Marcos in the acquisition of properties by Cruz, Jr., his supposed dummy. It does not answer the question posed by the Defendant Estate of how defendant Cruz became or why he is perceived to be a dummy of Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. 70 cSEDTC

Second, in paragraph 4 of the Bill of Particulars, petitioner alleged that "Marcos, as President of the Republic of the Philippines, wielded his power, authority and influence to ensure that Defendant Cruz's actions were executed." 71 To illustrate this, petitioner used the transaction between the Government Service Insurance System and Asiatic Integrated Corporation in connection with the Pinugay Estate. Petitioner averred:

6. Defendant Cruz, in unlawful concert with Defendant Marcos, entered into an agreement with the AIC whereby GSIS ceded, transferred, and conveyed property consisting of five (5) adjoining parcels of land situated in Manila covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 49853, 49854, 49855 and 49856 to AIC in exchange for AIC property known as the Pinugay Estate located in Tanay, Rizal, covered by TCT No. 271378, under terms and conditions grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.

7. The appraised value of the GSIS parcels of land was P14,585,600.00 as of June 25, 1971 while the value of the Pinugay Estate was P2.00 per square meter or a total amount of P15,219,264.00. But in the barter agreement, the Pinugay Estate was overvalued at P3.50 per square meter or a total of P41,852,976.00, thus GSIS had to pay AIC P27,287,976.00, even when it was GSIS which was entitled to payment from AIC for its failure to pay the rentals of the GSIS property then occupied by it.

8. Defendant Marcos, by his authority as President of the Republic of the Philippines, ordered then Executive Secretary Alexander Melchor, to approve the transaction in view of the representations and recommendations made by then GSIS General Manager, Defendant Cruz. This approval is contained in a 1st Indorsement Letter dated September 10, 1973 and signed by then Executive Secretary Alexander Melchor, acting by authority and under the auspices of Defendant Marcos.

8.1 Attached and made an integral part of this Bill of Particulars as its Annex "A" is an original photocopy of the 1st Indorsement dated September 10, 1973, signed by Executive Secretary Alexander Melchor, by authority of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. 72 (Emphasis supplied)

In finding these allegations insufficient, the Sandiganbayan held:

The only item illustrated by the plaintiff to show the alleged collaboration of President Marcos with Defendant Cruz in the aforementioned transaction is the photocopy of the 1st Indorsement dated September 10, 1973 signed by Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor. . . .

Does this piece of document sufficiently show the ultimate facts indicating the nature, manner, period and extent of participation of Ferdinand E. Marcos in the acts referred to in the Expanded Complaint, and the amount of damages to be proven during trial? This Court is of the considered view that it does not. Even assuming that Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor signed the 1st Indorsement "by authority of the President," and assuming even further that his signature as such should be regarded as the President's decision, it only means that the President approved the transaction, and nothing more. The same does not depict that the transaction was entered into by Defendant Cruz, Jr. at the behest of or upon orders of President Marcos. Neither does it delineate how President Marcos benefited from the said transaction. These are precisely the matters that the Defendant Estate wanted to be clarified on when it filed the Motion for Bill of Particulars. 73 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that Marcos's signature does not even appear on the 1st Indorsement and no other document was attached to show how he allegedly "conspired" with Cruz in the acquiring the transacted properties.

This Court disagrees.

Petitioner revealed in the Bill of Particulars that Marcos's collaboration with Cruz was shown by his approval, through Executive Secretary Melchor, of the exchange of the Government Service Insurance System's five parcels of land with Asiatic Integrated Corporation's overvalued Pinugay Estate, resulting in gross disadvantage or prejudice to the government. In other words, Marcos's approval ensured Cruz's execution of the transaction. The extent of the overvaluation of the Pinugay Estate was also stated, showing the resultant damages supposedly incurred by the Republic in the transaction. These allegations are complete. Beyond these would be evidentiary facts.

In Tan vs. Sandiganbayan, 74 this Court expounded on what is and what is not the purpose of a bill of particulars:

It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of particulars to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill. SDAaTC

It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply material allegations necessary to the validity of a pleading, or to change a cause of action or defense stated in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or defense other than the one stated. Also it is not the office or function, or a proper object, of a bill of particulars to set forth the pleader's theory of his cause of action or a rule of evidence on which he intends to rely, or to furnish evidential information whether such information consists of evidence which the pleader proposes to introduce or of facts which constitute a defense or offset for the other party or which will enable the opposite party to establish an affirmative defense not yet pleaded. 75 (Emphasis supplied)

A complaint only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. 76 "Its primary objective is to apprise the adverse party of what the plaintiff wants — to preclude the latter from springing a surprise attack later." 77 Petitioner's first and second causes of action for breach of public trust 78 and abuse of right and power, respectively, 79 are manifested in the allegation on Marcos's approval of the exchange transaction for the overvalued Pinugay Estate, causing financial prejudice to the government by at least P27,287,976.00. 80 This averment is specific enough as to enable respondent to frame an intelligent answer and prepare for trial.

Any more particulars or details — for instance, whether the 1st Indorsement was competent proof of Marcos's approval or how Marcos benefited from the transaction — would be evidentiary in character, and are best threshed out during trial.

Other than the exchange transaction involving the Pinugay Estate, however, the Bill of Particulars did not elaborate on Marcos's participation on the following transactions:

1) The purchase of several properties listed in Annex "A" of the Complaint;

2) The purchase, using Government Service Insurance System funds, of a lot and building in San Francisco, California and the payment of broker's fee of US$300,000.00;

3) The disbursement of P81,152.00 from Commercial Bank of Manila, for personal services rendered to Cruz by one Brenda Tuazon;

4) Government Service Insurance System's agency agreement with Integral Factors Corporation to solicit insurance and effect reinsurance on its behalf; the Integral Factor Corporation's reinsurance with INRE Corporation and its servicing government agencies' accounts; and

5) The purchase of additional three Airbus 300 airliners at amounts more than the market price, and payment of non-refundable deposit of US$200,000.00. 81

Under Rule 12, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, in case of insufficient compliance with the order for a bill of particulars, "the court may order the striking out of the pleading or the portions thereof to which the order was directed or make such other order as it deems just."

Consequently, respondent must be excluded from these other transactions, which were averred in paragraphs 9, and 12 (a), (b), (c), and (e) of the Expanded Complaint.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The October 25, 2012 and October 24, 2013 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Estate of Marcos is excluded from paragraphs 9 and 12 (a), (b), (c), and (e), without prejudice to the standing valid effect of paragraph 12 (d), of the Expanded Complaint.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 35-60. Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2.Id. at 61-74 and 75-82. The October 25, 2012 and October 24, 2013 Resolutions were penned by Associate Justice Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos and concurred in by Associate Justices Napoleon E. Inoturan and Oscar C. Herrera, Jr. of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.

3. 565 Phil. 172 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

4.Rollo, pp. 106-128.

5. Then President and General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System; President of the Philippine Airlines; Chair and President of the Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc.; owner of Hyatt Regency Manila; Chair and President of Manila Hotel Corporation; and Chair of the Commercial Bank of Manila.

6.Rollo, pp. 129-149. Captioned as Complaint (Expanded Per Court-Approved Manifestation/Motion Dated December 18, 1987 of Plaintiff).

7.Id. at 149-156. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose S. Balajadia and Cipriano A. Del Rosario of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.

8.Id. at 157.

9.Id. at 158-160.

10.Id. at 161-168 and 169-170.

11.Id. at 162.

12.Id. at 165.

13.Id. at 163-164.

14.Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 565 Phil. 172, 179-180 (2007) [Per. J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

15.Id.

16.Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., 565 Phil. 172 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

17.Id. at 190.

18.Id. at 192-193.

19.Rollo, pp. 297-302.

20.Id. at 304-306.

21.Id. at 303 and 307.

22.Id. at 309-310.

23.Id. at 310.

24.Id. at 314-349.

25.Id. at 350-374.

26.Id. at 375-384.

27.Id. at 402.

28.Id. at 223-228.

29.Id. at 223-227.

30.Id. at 229-235.

31.Id. at 236-241.

32.Id. at 61-74.

33.Id. at 71.

34.Id. at 71-72.

35.Id. at 242-246.

36.Id. at 247-250.

37.Id. at 251-254.

38.Id. at 12-18.

39.Id. at 17-18.

40. A motion for extension of 30 days to file a petition for review was filed by the Republic and granted by this Court in its January 27, 2014 Resolution. Seerollo, p. 256.

41.Rollo, pp. 279-294.

42.Id. at 430-439.

43.Id. at 54.

44.Id. at 40.

45.Id. at 48.

46. 129 Phil. 123 (1967) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc]. See rollo, pp. 48-49.

47.Rollo, pp. 51-52.

48.Id. at 279-295.

49.Id. at 285.

50.Id. at 286-287.

51.Id. at 287.

52.Id. at 288.

53.Id. at 289.

54.Id. at 292.

55.Id. at 430-442.

56.Id. at 430-431.

57.Id. at 434.

58.Id. at 436.

59.Id. at 437.

60.Id. at 285.

61.Id. at 286-287.

62.Id. at 287.

63.Id. at 288.

64.Id. at 430-431.

65.Id. at 434.

66.Id. at 15-17.

67.Id. at 17-18.

68.Id. at 18.

69.Id. at 223-224.

70.Id. at 71.

71.Id. at 224.

72.Id. at 225-226.

73.Id. at 71-72.

74. 259 Phil. 502 (1989) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].

75.Id. at 513 citing 71 C.J.S. Pleading S 376.

76.Uy v. Evangelista, 413 Phil. 403 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].

77.Tan v. Sandiganbayan, 259 Phil. 502, 514 (1989) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc] citing 71 C.J.S. Pleading S 376.

78.Rollo, p. 141. Expanded Complaint, par. 14.

79.Id. at 142. Expanded Complaint, par. 15.

80.Id. at 225. Bill of Particulars, par. 7.

81.Id. at 135-140.