Remolar v. Anglobuilders Construction and Development, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 246800. December 5, 2022.]

EDWIN E. REMOLAR and SHERWIN REMOLAR, petitioners, vs.ANGLOBUILDERS*CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., RUBEN C. CARIDO, and RUBEN BACAY, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court's First Division issued a Resolution datedDecember 5, 2022which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 246800 (Edwin E. Remolar and Sherwin Remolar vs. Anglobuilders Construction and Development, Inc., Ruben C. Carido, and Ruben Bacay). — This is an Appeal by Certiorari1 seeking to reverse and set aside the October 11, 2018 Decision 2 and the April 11, 2019 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 143209, which upheld with modifications the July 30, 2015 4 and September 28, 2015 5 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 07-001951-15 (4). The NLRC affirmed with modifications the May 27, 2015 Decision 6 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC-NCR-Case No. 10-12643-14, which dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal.

The Antecedents

Anglobuilders Construction and Development, Inc. (Anglobuilders) is engaged in the construction business. Ruben Carido (Carido) and Ruben Bacay (Bacay; collectively, respondents) are its project engineer and president, respectively. 7 Edwin Remolar (Edwin) and Sherwin Remolar (Sherwin; hereafter, petitioners) filed a complaint against respondents for illegal dismissal before the LA together with one Gilbert De Vera. 8

Petitioners claimed that they were former construction workers of Anglobuilders. They both held the position of steelman. Edwin was hired on January 10, 2011, and was allegedly dismissed on September 18, 2013. Meanwhile, Sherwin was hired on April 30, 2011, and was allegedly dismissed on July 23, 2013. Both contended that they were illegally dismissed without due process. 9 CAIHTE

Edwin asserted that he was assigned in one of Anglobuilders' construction projects in Barangay Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Sometime in July 2013, he was temporarily assigned to a project in Bauan, Batangas. After a week of working in Bauan, his salary was decreased from P360.00 to P300.00 per day. He asked Jerry Batioco (Batioco), the foreman, to revert his salary to P360.00 but to no avail. Batioco informed him that since he was not satisfied with his salary, he would be removed from employment and was free to leave Anglobuilders. When Edwin reported to work the next day, Batioco did not allow him to work and told him that his services were no longer needed by Anglobuilders. 10

Sherwin, in turn, contended that, on July 23, 2013, Batioco directed him to sign a document. After doing so, Batioco instructed him to surrender his ID. Without explanation, Batioco likewise informed him that his services were no longer needed. Further, Batioco told him that he would be hired in Anglobuilders' next project and to just await his text message. 11

Respondents, on the other hand, denied that petitioners were employees of Anglobuilders. They alleged that Anglobuilders entered into a contract to provide materials and labor for the construction of the EVM Convention Center project in Culiat. In turn, Anglobuilders hired subcontractors, one of which was Freddie Tuazon (Tuazon). Respondents allege that petitioners were members of the group brought in by Tuazon when Anglobuilders asked for additional workers. Anglobuilders paid petitioners' wages from March to June 2012. Beginning July 2012, when Anglobuilders' contract with the main contractor was pre-terminated, it was Tuazon who continued to pay petitioners' salaries, until all works for the subcontractors ended in July 2013. 12

The LA Ruling

In its May 27, 2015 Decision, the LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint of Illegal Dismissal for lack of merit. However, respondent Anglo Builders [sic] Construction and Development, Inc., is ordered to pay complainants proportionate [13th] month pay, to wit:

Name	13th month pay (2013)
1. Edwin E. Remolar	P9,937.80
2. Sherwin S. Remolar	P5,104.19
3. Gilbert De Vera	P5,104.19

All other claims are DISMISSED for want of basis.

SO ORDERED. 13

The LA held that petitioners were regular employees of Anglobuilders. Respondents failed to prove that petitioners were the employees of Tuazon, and that the latter was a legitimate job contractor. On the other hand, the LA held that petitioners failed to prove that they were illegally terminated by Anglobuilders. In the case of Edwin, the LA refused to believe his contention that he was no longer allowed to continue working starting September 19, 2013 because he failed to adduce proof that he was refused entry to the company premises. As to Sherwin, the LA declared that his claim must be similarly denied because he failed to support his allegation that he was terminated on July 23, 2013. The LA denied their monetary claims for lack of factual basis. However, the LA ordered Anglobuilders to pay petitioners their 13th month pay for the year 2013 since Anglobuilders failed to prove payment thereof. 14 DETACa

Respondents did not appeal the LA's finding that petitioners were regular employees of Anglobuilders. Only petitioners appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In its July 30, 2015 Resolution, the NLRC affirmed the LA Decision. The dispositive portion provides:

WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by complainants Edwin Remolar, Sherwin Remolar and Gilbert De Vera is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the 13th month pay for 2012 is concerned only.

The dismissal of the charge of illegal dismissal and other claims is AFFIRMED.

Respondent Anglobuilders Construction and Development, Inc. is ordered to pay complainants Edwin Remolar, Sherwin Remolar and Gilbert De Vera their 13th month pay for the year 2012, in addition to the 13th month pay awarded by the Labor Arbiter.

SO ORDERED. 15

The NLRC held that Edwin failed to prove his allegation of illegal dismissal. It stated that, even granting Batioco informed him that he would be removed from employment and that he was free to leave the company if he was not satisfied with his salary, Edwin was merely given the choice to leave Anglobuilders. It refused to believe Edwin's claim that Batioco refused to allow him to work the next day due to lack of evidence in support thereof. For the NLRC, it was more logical and convincing that Edwin chose to sever the employment relationship when his request for a salary increase was denied. 16

It also ruled that Sherwin failed to prove that he was illegally dismissed. It noted that, by his own admission, Sherwin merely believed at that time that he was being terminated. It concluded that, absent any showing of an overt or positive act proving that he was dismissed, the charge of illegal dismissal must fail. 17

The NLRC affirmed the denial of petitioners' monetary claims, but ordered Anglobuilders to pay their 13th month pay for the year 2012, in addition to the 13th month pay for the year 2013 awarded by the LA. 18

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 19 which the NLRC denied in its September 28, 2015 Resolution. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari. 20

The CA Ruling

In its October 11, 2018 Decision, the CA upheld the NLRC Resolutions. The fallo provides:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. ACCORDINGLY, the Resolutions dated July 30, 2015 and September 28, 2015 which were issued by the National Labor Relations Commission, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is hereby imposed on the total amount of monetary awards in favor of the petitioners, from the finality of this judgment until the same are fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 21

The CA affirmed the lower tribunals' finding that petitioners failed to prove the fact of their dismissal by Anglobuilders. It agreed with the NLRC that Edwin opted to leave and sever his employment with Anglobuilders. It quoted with approval the NLRC's discussion on petitioners' failure to adduce evidence in support of their claim. It modified the NLRC Resolutions by imposing legal interest of 6% per annum on the total monetary awards in favor of petitioners. 22

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 23 which the CA denied in its April 11, 2019 Resolution, hence this appeal.

Issues

Petitioners ascribe the following errors on the part of the CA:

I

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

II

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THEIR MONEY CLAIMS. 24

Petitioners acknowledge that their appeal raises mixed questions of fact and law. They claim, however, that the findings of fact of the CA may be passed upon by the Court on account of the exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. 25

Petitioners contend that they adequately established the fact of their illegal dismissal. They insist that between the categorical and detailed assertions of Edwin, and respondents' bare denial, the former is more worthy of credence. They also allege that the finding that Edwin voluntarily left his employment is totally unwarranted. In the case of Sherwin, they emphasize that the circumstances attending his case clearly show positive or overt acts indicating that he was illegally dismissed. They refer to the fact that he was required to sign a document for the release of his salary and to surrender his ID. They assert that by the manner in which they were dismissed, it would be highly unreasonable, if not absurd, to require them to adduce concrete and competent evidence in support of the dismissal, precisely because their termination from employment was effected sans the twin-notice requirement under the law. 26 ETHIDa

Since they were illegally dismissed, they claim that they are entitled to separation pay and backwages. Petitioners also assert their entitlement to their claims for underpayment of wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 27

In their Comment, 28 respondents insist that petitioners were not illegally dismissed. To substantiate their position, they quoted the discussions of both the LA and the NLRC. 29 They also argue that there is no basis to petitioners' claim for other monetary awards. They reiterate that petitioners are not entitled to these monetary awards because they were not under Anglobuilders' employ. Even assuming without conceding that petitioners were employees of Anglobuilders, the benefits and entitlements due them were all paid. 30

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is granted. Petitioners proved the fact of their illegal dismissal from Anglobuilders.

In an appeal by certiorari, only

It is axiomatic that only pure questions of law may be raised and considered by the Court in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is well-established that "[f]actual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor tribunals, are accorded much respect by this Court as they are specialized to rule on matters falling within their jurisdiction especially when these are supported by substantial evidence." 31 However, there are exceptions to this general rule:

1. [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

2. [W]hen the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3. [W]hen there is grave abuse of discretion;

4. [W]hen the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5. [W]hen the findings of fact are conflicting;

6. [W]hen in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

7. [W]hen the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;

8. [W]hen the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

9. [W]hen the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,] are not disputed by the respondent;

10. [W]hen the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; [and]

11. [W]hen the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 32

Ordinarily, the general rule constrains the Court from reviewing factual issues raised. However, three of the recognized exceptions are present herein: first, the inferences made are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; second, the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and, third, the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Accordingly, the Court hereby undertakes a review of the instant appeal despite the mixed questions of fact and law raised.

Petitioners proved the fact of

At the outset, the Court must address the fact that respondents argued in their Comment that petitioners were not Anglobuilders' regular employees but were the employees of Tuazon, Anglobuilders' supposed subcontractor. 33 cSEDTC

Respondents may no longer question this finding of fact. "The rule is well-settled that a party cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him; and while he may make counter assignment of errors, he can do so only to sustain the judgment on other grounds but not to seek modification or reversal thereof, for in such case, he must appeal." 34

To recapitulate, the LA held in its May 27, 2015 Decision that petitioners were regular employees of Anglobuilders. Respondents did not appeal the LA Decision. While petitioners appealed the LA Decision, it was only as to its findings that they were not illegally dismissed and that they were not entitled to their monetary claims. In fact, the grounds for appeal by petitioners are based on the LA's finding that they were regular employees of Anglobuilders. Accordingly, the finding that petitioners were regular employees of Anglobuilders is final and binding on the parties. Respondents cannot now impugn this finding of fact.

The NLRC itself recognized such fact and remarked in its July 30, 2015 Resolution that "[r]espondents did not appeal from the ruling that complainants were their regular employees. Thus, their employment with the respondent company is undisputed." 35 Respondents, again, did not assail or object to this declaration.

Having established the foregoing, the Court now proceeds to determine whether petitioners were able to prove the fact of their illegal dismissal.

Edwin recounted that while working in Bauan, his salary was decreased from P360.00 to P300.00 per day. He asked the foreman, Batioco, to revert his salary. Instead, Batioco told him that if he was not satisfied with his salary, he would be removed from employment and was free to leave Anglobuilders. The next day, Edwin reported for work, but Batioco did not allow him to work and informed him that his services were no longer needed. 36

Meanwhile, Sherwin narrated that, on July 23, 2013, Batioco instructed him to sign a document and to surrender his ID. Without any other explanation, Batioco relayed to him that his services were no longer needed and that he would be hired in Anglobuilders' next project. 37

In holding that they failed to prove their assertion, the CA stated that Edwin merely opted to leave and sever his employment. It quoted with approval the NLRC's disquisition that Edwin failed to substantiate his claim that Batioco no longer allowed him to work the next day. 38 As to Sherwin, it also quoted the NLRC's finding that he merely believed at that time that he was being terminated. Allegedly, there was no overt or positive act to support the charge of illegal dismissal. 39

The Court disagrees.

The record before the Court is devoid of any evidence that respondents denied that: (1) Batioco refused to allow Edwin to work and that he informed Edwin that his services were no longer needed; and (2) Batioco directed Sherwin to sign a document and surrender his ID, and informed him that his services were no longer needed.

Respondents do not deny that these incidents occurred. Rather, they only argued that petitioners were not their regular employees and, hence, could not have been terminated by them. Again, this defense holds no sway because, as previously established, petitioners were found to be regular employees of Anglobuilders.

The Rules of Court supplements the NLRC Rules of Procedure, pursuant to Section 3, Rule l of the latter. Sec. 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that material allegations, other than the amount of unliquidated damages, are deemed admitted when not specifically denied. 40 SDAaTC

The Court, thus, rules that respondents admitted Edwin and Sherwin's individual narration of events concerning the fact of their dismissal.

While the lower tribunals' expected petitioners to present competent evidence — such as documentary evidence — to buttress their individual claims of illegal dismissal, the Court finds that the very nature and manner of the dismissal wrought upon petitioners necessarily resulted in the lack of such documentary evidence that may corroborate their narration of events. It is noteworthy that Batioco effected the dismissal of both Edwin and Sherwin by verbal means.

Aside from the foregoing, the Court is further unconvinced of the stance that Edwin voluntarily severed his employment with the company, in view of the filing of the instant complaint. Employees who take steps to protest their alleged illegal dismissal cannot be said to have abandoned their work. 41

The Court further disagrees with the discourse of the lower tribunals that Sherwin merely assumed that he had been dismissed. Even assuming that he was not dismissed outright on July 23, 2013, he was sent home without work, waiting for a text message on Anglobuilders' next project, effectively placing him on a floating status. While this may be allowed in certain circumstances, the employer must establish such reasons justifying the necessity for placing the employee on a floating status, and that such situation must not exceed six months, after which the employee should be recalled. Otherwise, the employee would be deemed to have been dismissed. 42 Nothing in the records show that Sherwin was recalled or assigned to any other project by the time the complaint was filed more than a year later.

Considering that petitioners were regular employees of Anglobuilders, they could only be dismissed from employment upon compliance with both substantive and procedural due process requirements. "Substantive due process mandates that an employee may be dismissed based only on just or authorized causes under Articles 297, 298, and 299 (formerly Arts. 282, 283, and 284) of the Labor Code, as amended. On the other hand, procedural due process requires the employer to comply with the requirements of notice and hearing before effecting the dismissal. In all cases involving termination of employment, the burden of proving the existence of the above valid causes rests upon the employer. The quantum of proof required in these cases is substantial evidence." 43

Respondents miserably failed to prove their compliance with both substantive and procedural due process requirements. The records are woefully absent of any allegation as to the presence of a just or authorized cause in dismissing petitioners. The records are also devoid of any indication that there was an attempt on the part of respondents to comply with the procedural due process requirements. Respondents merely relied on their blanket claim that petitioners are not Anglobuilders' employees, but the subcontractor's. This defense cannot save them. Accordingly, the Court finds that Anglobuilders illegally dismissed petitioners.

Since petitioners were illegally dismissed, they are entitled to full backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

Art. 294 of the Labor Code, formerly numbered as Art. 279 per the Department of Labor and Employment Department Advisory No. 1, series of 2015, provides that:

Article 294. [279] Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 44 (Emphasis supplied)

Jurisprudence is consistent that "separation pay may [also] be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement." 45 Separation pay may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement where the dismissed employee opted not to be reinstated, 46 as in this case.

"Separation pay, equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, is awarded as an alternative to reinstatement when the latter is no longer an option. Separation pay is computed from the commencement of employment up to the time of termination, including the imputed service for which the employee is entitled to backwages, with the salary rate prevailing at the end of the period of putative service being the basis for computation." 47 Backwages is to be computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay. 48

Applying the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioners are entitled to separation pay and backwages. Separation pay shall be computed at one month's salary for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year. Meanwhile, full backwages shall be computed from the time of the illegal dismissal — from September 18, 2013 in the case of Edwin, and from July 23, 2013 in the case of Sherwin — until the finality of this judgment.

Petitioners are entitled to their

Petitioners contend that they are entitled to their claim for underpayment of wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

The Court finds that petitioners are only entitled to their claim for attorney's fees.

Petitioners' claim for underpayment of wages is unsubstantiated and, thus, cannot be granted. They argue that during the entire duration of their employment they were merely receiving P360.00 per day, which is below the minimum wage in the National Capital Region (NCR). They claim that respondents included made-up deductions to be able to establish the amount of P450.00 on their payslips, which amount is compliant with the Minimum wage in the NCR. 49 Unfortunately, they failed to substantiate their claim that the deductions indicated in the payslips were made-up. Their allegations, absent proof, cannot pass muster. For this reason, the Court denies their claim for underpayment of wages. EcTCAD

Petitioners' claim for overtime pay is likewise unsubstantiated and, thus, cannot be granted. It is well-established that "entitlement to overtime pay must first be established by proof that the overtime work was actually performed before the employee may properly claim the benefit. The burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay rests on the employee because the benefit is not incurred in the normal course of business. Failure to prove such actual performance transgresses the principles of fair play and equity." 50 Here, petitioners merely alleged that they rendered overtime work and were not paid for it. They referred to their payslips as proof. However, scrutiny of these payslips would show that overtime work is reflected therein and overtime pay included. 51 Petitioners' mere blanket claim of entitlement to overtime pay, without any details as to what overtime work was not compensated, is fatal to their cause.

The same is true for their claim of holiday pay. Petitioners failed to allege or assert which holidays they worked on and were not compensated for. Thus, the claim must likewise fail.

The grant of 13th month pay for the years 2012 and 2013 to petitioners by the lower tribunals was not contested or appealed by respondents. There is no need to discuss this monetary award.

As to the award of moral damages, it is settled that, in this jurisdiction, "moral damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy." 52 Meanwhile, an award of exemplary damages is proper by way of example or correction for the public good if the employer acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manners. 53 Here, petitioners merely alleged their entitlement to moral and exemplary damages without alleging or asserting what factual circumstances their claim is based on. Hence, the claim for moral and exemplary damages must be denied.

Nevertheless, petitioners are entitled to attorney's fees. "It is settled that where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally justifiable." 54 Petitioners were forced to litigate and incur expenses due to their illegal dismissal. Hence, petitioners are each entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of 10% of their respective total monetary awards. "The attorney's fees awarded to them shall be paid to the PAO [Public Attorney's Office]. It serves as a token recompense to the PAO for its provision of free legal services to litigants who have no means of hiring a private lawyer." 55 Such award shall be deposited in the National Treasury as trust fund and be disbursed for special allowances of authorized PAO officials and lawyers. 56

The CA's award of legal interest is proper. The legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards granted at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

Lastly, the Court dismisses the complaint against respondents Carido and Bacay. In illegal dismissal cases, corporate officers may be held solidarily liable with the corporation if the termination was done with malice or bad faith. 57 Here, petitioners failed to establish that their terminations were effected, whether directly or indirectly, by the individual respondents at all, much less that they did so in bad faith.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The October 11, 2018 Decision and the April 11, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 143209 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent Anglobuilders Construction and Development, Inc. is ORDERED to PAY: HSAcaE

1. Petitioner Edwin E. Remolar:

a. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to three (3) month's salary;

b. Backwages computed from his illegal dismissal on September 18, 2013 until the finality of this judgment; and

c. 13th month pay for the years 2012 and 2013.

2. Petitioner Sherwin S. Remolar:

a. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to two (2) month's salary;

b. Backwages computed from his illegal dismissal on July 23, 2013 until the finality of this judgment; and

c. 13th month pay for the years 2012 and 2013.

3. The Public Attorney's Office:

a. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.

The total monetary awards shall earn legal interest at 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until their full satisfaction. AScHCD

The Labor Arbiter is ORDERED to COMPUTE the total monetary benefits awarded and due in accordance with this judgment.

The complaint is hereby DISMISSED insofar as respondents Ruben C. Carido and Ruben Bacay are concerned.

SO ORDERED." Hernando, J., on official leave.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

* Also referred to as "Anglo Builders" and "AngloBuilders" in some parts of the rollo (see rollo, pp. 169 and 275).

1. Rollo, pp. 11-29.

2. Id. at 31-42; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by Associate Justices Edwin D. Sorongon and Rafael Antonio M. Santos.

3. Id. at 44-45.

4. Id. at 169-179; penned by Presiding Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III and concurred in by Commissioners Erlinda T. Agus and Alan A. Ventura.

5. Id. at 202-203.

6. Id. at 138-149; penned by Labor Arbiter Marita V. Padolina.

7. Id. at 31-32.

8. Id. at 138.

9. Id. at 32.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Id.

13. Id. at 149.

14. Id. at 142-149.

15. Id. at 178-179.

16. Id. at 175-176.

17. Id. at 176.

18. Id. at 176-178.

19. Id. at 192-200.

20. Id. at 46-61.

21. Id. at 42.

22. Id. at 39-42.

23. Id. at 220-227.

24. Id. at 17.

25. Id.

26. Id. at 18-20, 264.

27. Id. at 20-23.

28. Id. at 232-243.

29. Id. at 236-238.

30. Id. at 238-239.

31. Reyes v. Global Beer Below Zero, Inc., 819 Phil. 483, 493 (2017).

32. Id. at 494.

33. Rollo, p. 234.

34. Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 202 Phil. 850, 854-855 (1982).

35. Rollo, p. 174.

36. Id. at 32.

37. Id.

38. Id. at 40.

39. Id. at 41.

40. See also JR Hauling Services v. Solamo, G.R. No. 214294, September 30, 2020.

41. Gososo v. Leyte Lumber Yard and Hardware, Inc., G.R. No. 205257, January 13, 2021.

42. Lopez v. Irvine Construction Corp., 741 Phil. 728, 740-741 (2014).

43. Telephilippines, Inc. v. Jacolbe, G.R. No. 233999, February 18, 2019, 893 SCRA 210, 222.

44. Labor Code of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Amended & Renumbered), July 21, 2015.

45. Bani Rural Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman, 721 Phil. 84, 100 (2013).

46. Upod v. Onon Trucking and Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 248299, July 14, 2021.

47. Masagana Concrete Products v. National Labor Relations Commission, 372 Phil. 459, 481 (1999).

48. Bani Rural Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman, supra at 102.

49. Rollo, p. 20.

50. Robina Farms Cebu v. Villa, 784 Phil. 636, 651 (2016).

51. Rollo, pp. 77-91.

52. Litonjua Group of Companies v. Vigan, 412 Phil. 627, 643 (2001).

53. Lu v. Enopia, 806 Phil. 725, 744 (2017).

54. Id.

55. Our Haus Realty Development Corp. v. Parian, 740 Phil. 699, 720 (2014).

56. Id., citing Republic Act No. 9406, Sec. 6.

57. Bogo Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 357 Phil. 110, 127 (1998).