THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 190296. February 21, 2018.]
RENATO REGALA, petitioner,vs. REGIONAL DIRECTOR RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, SR., DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, MANILA, IBM UNION OFFICERS, NAMELY: AMADO VIDAL, ROLANDO ROSARIO, MANUEL GALINGANA, ROMEO BALATBAT, JUANITO MARTIN, ARLENE VILLANUEVA, REYNALDO BUENAVENTURA, ALFREDO ALCASID, ROQUE SARSONA, LAURO REYES, HERMENEGILDO BANDOLA, ILDEFONSO ALCE, NELSON OCIBA AND RAMON SAMSON AND THE OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF-DOLE NCR MANILA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedFebruary 21, 2018, which reads as follows: CAIHTE
"G.R. No. 190296 (Renato Regala, petitioner, v. Regional Director Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr., Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region, Manila, IBM Union Officers, namely: Amado Vidal, Rolando Rosario, Manuel Galingana, Romeo Balatbat, Juanito Martin, Arlene Villanueva, Reynaldo Buenaventura, Alfredo Alcasid, Roque Sarsona, Lauro Reyes, Hermenegildo Bandola, Ildefonso Alce, Nelson Ociba and Ramon Samson and the Office of the Sheriff-DOLE NCR Manila, respondents) — This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision, 1 dated 15 July 2009, and Resolution, 2 dated 11 November 2009, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94212, which denied the Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by the petitioner against respondents.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Renato Regala (Regala) and 133 other union members of the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa-San Miguel Corporation Chapter (IBM-SMC) were expelled due to their objection to the imposition of a 10% special assessment fee and increased union dues from the fixed rate of P100.00 to 1% of an employee's gross salary. As a result, they filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) against the IBM-SMC union officers, namely: William Merene, Benedicto de Jesus, Amado Vidal, Rolando Rosario, Renato Roque, Manuel Galingana, Romeo Balatbat, Juanito Martin, Arlene Villanueva, Reynaldo Buenaventura, Alfredo Alcasid, Roque Sarsona, Lauro Reyes, Hermenegildo Bandola, Floreme Rodaje, George Bolivar, Ildefonso Alce, 3 Nelson Ocbina, and Ramon Samson.
On 13 September 2002, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Alex E. Maraan issued an order declaring illegal the expulsion of Regala and his co-complainants and the imposition of a 10% special assessment fee and increased union fee void. 4 On appeal, this decision was affirmed with modification by the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) in a Resolution dated 24 July 2003, which dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, both appeals are DISMISSED. The Order of the Regional Director dated 13 September 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate complainants to the roster of members immediately upon receipt of this Resolution. Respondents are further ordered to make immediate restitution to all members who were assessed special assessment fees and increased union dues. A general membership meeting is ordered within ten (10) days from receipt of this order for the opening of the union's financial book covering 1999-2002.
SO ORDERED. 5
On 25 November 2003, the DOLE-NCR Acting Regional Director Ciriaco A. Lagunzad III issued a Writ of Execution 6 ordering the collection from IBM-SMC of the estimated amount of P5,767,163.21 representing the total amount collected due to the imposition of a 10% special assessment fee and increased union fee. Sheriff Rolan E. Barte accordingly served a Notice of Garnishment 7 upon San Miguel Corporation garnishing 50% of the respondent union officers' bonuses, 50% of their net salaries, and 50% of the officers' benefits which are convertible to cash.
The respondent union officers filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment with the DOLE-NCR. The motion was denied in an Order dated 24 February 2004.
The respondent union officers appealed to the BLR. In its decision 8 promulgated on 25 November 2004, the BLR granted the motion to quash the writ of execution and notice of garnishment. On 20 March 2005, the decision of the BLR became final and executory and was recorded in the book of entries of judgment. Consequently, a Notice of Recall of Garnishment was issued by DOLE-NCR Regional Director Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr. on 17 May 2005. 9
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief from the 25 November 2004 decision of the BLR. This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89099. On 30 May 2005, the CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) to provisionally enjoin the implementation of the notice of recall of garnishment. On 19 July 2005, a writ of preliminary injunction 10 was issued.
The Ruling of the CA
On 27 October 2005, the CA rendered a decision 11 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89099 affirming the order to recall the notice of garnishment. The recall of the writ of execution was declared invalid.
Resultantly, We affirm the instant assailed decision only insofar as it set aside the Order dated February 24, 2004 of Acting Regional Director Lagunzad III and ordered the recall of the notice of garnishment, both of which is predicated upon the erroneous conclusion that the union officers should be personally liable for the restitution of the collected special assessment fees and increased union dues. But for the reasons stated above, We hold that respondent BLR erred in recalling the writ of execution issued and in resolving the complaint for indirect contempt filed by the complaining union members against the union officers, the resolution of which properly pertains to the Secretary of the DOLE.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the herein assailed Decision dated November 25, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION in the sense that the recall of the Writ of Execution dated November 25, 2003, and the resolution of petitioner's complaint for indirect contempt are hereby declared invalid. No cost. 12
Petitioner moved for a partial reconsideration of the CA decision but was denied in a resolution dated 6 March 2006.
On 15 March 2006, the union officers filed with the DOLE-NCR a reiterating motion to release garnished amount.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court and paid the corresponding fees on 24 March 2006. He also filed with the DOLE-NCR an opposition to the motion to release garnished amount contending that the appeal he filed with the Supreme Court effectively stays the enforcement of the judgment, award or order appealed from. Respondent union officers received a copy of the opposition on 27 May 2006.
On 6 April 2006, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Ricardo S. Martinez revived and reinstated the notice of recall of garnishment issued earlier 13 and the garnished amounts were released to the union officers.
On 17 April 2006, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. In view of the reinstatement of the notice of recall of garnishment, petitioner also filed with the CA a petition for indirect contempt docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94212. DETACa
On 15 July 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94212 denying the petition for indirect contempt for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 6 August 2009 which the CA denied on 11 November 2009.
Hence, this petition.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner raised the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING FOR LACK OF MERIT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 94212.
II.
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THERE WAS NOTHING CONTEMPTUOUS IN THE ISSUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE NOTICE OF RECALL OF GARNISHMENT PURSUANT TO THE DECREE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN SP NO. 89099, AS THERE WAS YET NO PETITION FILED, LET ALONE PENDING."
RULING OF THE COURT
Contempt of court is broadly defined as disregard of or disobedience to the rules or orders of a judicial body; whereas, restrictively, it means despising the authority, justice, or dignity of the court. 14 It can be classified as either direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed "in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive penalties toward others, or refusal to be sworn in or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so." 15 On the other hand, there is indirect contempt when any of the following acts enumerated in Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court has been committed:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
Petitioner faults respondents for indirect contempt by their alleged disobedience to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of the court as defined under Rule 71, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court. He asserted that the issuance and implementation of the notice of recall of garnishment was premature because it was made before the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89099 was lifted, and even before the decision in the aforementioned case became final and executory. According to Regala, the timely filing of a petition for review on certiorari with this Court effectively stayed the enforcement of the appealed judgment.
The petition is without merit.
An appeal by certiorari is made by filing a verified petition with the Supreme Court 16 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from. 17 The period for filing the petition may be extended for thirty (30) days by this Court on motion and upon payment of the docket fee and other lawful fees. 18
The notice of recall of garnishment was revived and reinstated by the DOLE-NCR on 6 April 2006. At this point, the petitioner was only able to file a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari and pay the corresponding fees. With this, it became apparent that petitioner intended to file a petition for review on certiorari but he could not claim to have already perfected an appeal. As stated under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a verified petition is required which the petitioner was able to file only on 17 April 2006, or eleven (11) days after the Notice of Recall of Garnishment was revived and reinstated.
More importantly, even if the appeal was perfected prior to the implementation of the notice of recall of garnishment, respondents still cannot be said to have disobeyed a lawful writ of the court because appeal, in this particular case, does not suspend judgment.
It must be noted that the 25 November 2004 decision of the BLR had already attained finality on 20 March 2005. Consequently, a writ of execution and a notice of recall of garnishment was issued by the Regional Director of the DOLE-NCR on 17 May 2005. Implementation of the notice would have been inevitable were it not for the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89099.
Preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party's substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. 19 It is provisional, and as such a mere incident, and is dependent upon the outcome of the main case. 20 When the main case is dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted. 21 Therefore, when the decision was rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 89099 affirming the recall of the notice of garnishment, the corresponding preliminary injunction automatically ceased to be in effect after having served the purpose for which it was issued. aDSIHc
In Unionbank v. CA, 22 this Court explained:
x x x a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction, regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. 23 (citations omitted)
Thus, there was no longer any court order or writ which would effectively prevent the issuance and enforcement of the notice of recall of garnishment pursuant to the decree of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89099.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision, dated 15 July 2009, and Resolution, dated 11 November 2009, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94212 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 43-56; penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam (now a Member of this Court), with Associate Justices Arturo G. Tayag and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring.
2.Id. at 67-69.
3. Also referred to as "Ildefonso Acle" in some parts of the rollo.
4. CA rollo, p. 108.
5.Id. at 115.
6.Id. at 116-118.
7.Id. at 119-120.
8.Id. at 126-131.
9.Id. at 60-62.
10.Id. at 152-153.
11.Id. at 139-149; penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Jose C. Mendoza (ret. member of this Court), concurring.
12.Id. at 148.
13.Id. at 60-62.
14.RCBC v. Serra, G.R. No. 216124, 19 July 2017.
15. Rules of Court, Rule 71, Section 1.
16. Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 1.
17. Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 2.
18.Id.
19.Cahambing v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 215807, 25 January 2017, citing Philippine National Bank v. RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation, et al., 534 Phil. 769, 790 (2006).
20.Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation, et al., 728 Phil. 608, 617 (2014).
21.Spouses Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, et al., 686 Phil. 236, 246 (2012).
22.Unionbank v. CA, 370 Phil. 837 (1999), citing Santiago v. Vasquez, 291 Phil. 664, 677 (1993) and Golez v. Leonidas, 194 Phil. 189, 182 (1981).
23.Id. at 845-846.