Recleo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 206129. July 31, 2013.]

RUBEN ECLEO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 31 July 2013 which reads as follows:

G.R. No. 206129 (Ruben Ecleo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines). — On October 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision 1 finding Ruben Ecleo, Jr., among others, guilty of three counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Ecleo moved for reconsideration, 2 but he was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan. 3

Through the RRV Legal Consultancy Firm, Ecleo initially went to the Supreme Court and asked for time to file a petition for review; 4 he later withdrew it 5 however and filed a motion for new trial with the Sandiganbayan. 6 The prosecution opposed his motion. In reply, Ecleo, through counsel, explained that he "decided not to pursue the filing of a petition for review but rather to file the . . . motion for new trial to exhaust first all legal remedies available to him[.]"7

Again, Ecleo's motion was rebuffed. Ecleo moved for reconsideration twice, both of which were denied, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, through the Avila Galisanao Law Office.

During the pendency of the petition, the Avila Galisanao Law Office moved to withdraw as counsel. 8 HIEASa

In a November 16, 2009 Resolution, 9 the Court dismissed Ecleo's petition for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan. Ecleo moved for reconsideration, averring as follows:

Petitioner may be guilty of some complacency and cavalier reliance on his support personnel on matters requiring technical expertise, but he could not be guilty of corruption. . . .

Indeed, petitioner was trusting and reliant on his support officers and he felt comfortable doing so secure as he was in his own good faith. . . .

It is this same full belief in his innocence that led petitioner to grant leave to his former counsel to pursue the recourse, in lieu of outright appeal, of a Motion for New Trial before the Sandiganbayan, on the well-founded perception that serious irregularities attended the proceedings . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

On hindsight, one may go to the extent of accusing the former counsel [RRV Legal Consultancy Firm] of negligence in electing for the petitioner this recourse of new trial, rather than outright appeal[.]10 (emphasis ours)

In its February 8, 2010 Resolution, 11 the Court denied Ecleo's motion for reconsideration "with finality." The Court also stated that "[n]o further pleadings or motions shall be entertained in this case." The Court also granted the Avila Galisanao Law Office's motion to withdraw.

Meantime, the Ammuyutan Purisima Ortega and Desierto Law Office entered its appearance for Ecleo. 12

Ecleo filed a "Second Motion for Reconsideration to Convert Petition under Rule 65 to Rule 45." 13 In its April 26, 2010 Resolution, 14 the Court merely noted without action this second motion in view of (i) the Court's February 8, 2010 Resolution and (ii) the fact that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. DaHcAS

Still, Ecleo filed a "Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration," 15 citing cases where the Court exceptionally entertained and/or granted a second motion for reconsideration. In a September 15, 2010 Resolution, 16 the Court merely noted this motion without action "in view of the entry of judgment made on 24 March 2010."

More than three years later, Ecleo seeks to resurrect his case by filing the present "petition for relief." On July 2, 2013, Ecleo filed a "Manifestation with Motion to Admit the Required Pleadings to be Appended to the Petition for Relief from Judgment." Attached therewith is an Affidavit (Statement of Material Dates).

Ecleo insists that the Sandiganbayan's denial of his (i) motion for new trial; (ii) motion for reconsideration; and (iii) second motion for reconsideration is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. He invites the Court's attention to the fact that before he filed his motion for new trial, he originally manifested his intention to file a petition for review with the Court (by asking for time to file a petition for review) although he withdrew this later. When the Sandiganbayan denied his motion for new trial, his counsel (instead of appealing the decision itself) filed a petition for certiorari with the Court which denied it for failure to show grave abuse of discretion.

Ecleo claims that this situation left him in a dilemma: he withdrew his appeal to the Court in order to file a motion for new trial which the Sandiganbayan denied. The Court, in turn, denied his certiorari petition questioning this denial. He submits that his counsel's gross negligence should not prejudice his right to appeal.

Ecleo also claims that "his constitutional rights to due process of law and liberty are matters of transcendental importance to justify relaxation of the rules in this case and to consider the review of this case on the merits." 17 SACHcD

To begin with, Ecleo does not expressly state who among his previous counsels is allegedly grossly negligent, depriving him of his right to appeal. In the first motion for reconsideration he filed with the Court, Ecleo expressly imputed negligence to the RRV Legal Consultancy Firm for filing a motion for new trial instead of immediately filing a petition for review with the Court under Rule 45. In his present petition for relief, Ecleo impliedly imputed negligence to the Avila Galisanao Law Office for filing a petition for certiorari (assailing the Sandiganbayan's denial of his motion for new trial) instead of questioning the Sandiganbayan's decision of conviction on the merits.

At any rate, whoever of these counsels may have been the subject of Ecleo's accusation, his present petition must be dismissed.

The filing of a "petition for relief"

First, while Ecleo captions his petition as a "petition for relief," he would ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan's denial of his: (i) motion for new trial; (ii) motion for reconsideration; and (iii) second motion for reconsideration as tainted with grave abuse of discretion. This is not proper in a petition for relief, but in a petition for certiorari.

Second, the settled rule is that the mistake or negligence of a counsel binds the client. Since it is the counsel who is responsible for the conduct of litigation, particularly on the remedial aspect of the case, 18 the negligence or the mistakes of the counsel on these matters are binding on the client. A client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case, and the former cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. 19 Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.

Under Section 2, Rule 38 (Relief from Judgment) of the Rules of Court, 20 under which the present petition was filed, a party may be relieved from the counsel's negligence that resulted in preventing him from taking an appeal — as was Ecleo's theory — if the negligence is excusable. ASEcHI

To begin with, however, we cannot consider the counsels' acts (of filing a motion for new trial with the Sandiganbayan instead of immediately filing a petition for review with the Court under Rule 45 and in filing a petition for certiorari — to assail the Sandiganbayan's denial of his motion for new trial — instead of questioning of Sandiganbayan's decision of conviction on the merits) as acts of negligence, much less of gross negligence. This matter properly falls within a counsel's legal judgment. Thus, whether these are excusable or not is beside the point.

The RRV Legal Consultancy Firm had explained that it simply wanted to exhaust all remedies available to Ecleo in filing a motion for new trial. When the motion for new trial was denied, Ecleo's right to appeal was not thereby lost. Second, the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the denial of the motion for new trial is impliedly authorized under Section 1 (a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and its last paragraph. 21 In either situation, the counsels have protected Ecleo's interest.

While the resort to a Rule 65 petition resulted in the loss of his right to file a petition for review, a re-reading of Ecleo's petition for certiorari and its accompanying annexes would readily show the commendable adequacy in their preparation and the competence of the counsel to represent him in his defense and plea of innocence.

At any rate, in his second motion for reconsideration, Ecleo already sought from the Court a conversion of his Rule 65 petition to a Rule 45 petition. Again, the Court re-read the merits of this motion and is of the considered view that it is without merit. Under Section 6 of Rule 45, review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion.

Third, while the Court has suspended the rules under exceptional circumstances and allowed an accused to again fully ventilate his defense, there is no compelling reason in the present case to do so. 22SIcCEA

Ecleo's petition contains a

Ecleo's statement in his Affidavit (Statement of Material Dates) appears misleading. According to his Affidavit, he received a copy of the Court's November 16, 2009 Resolution on January 31, 2013. Hence, according to him, the filing of the petition for relief on March 26, 2013 was seasonably made. If Ecleo received the Court's November 16, 2009 Resolution only on January 31, 2013, it is a wonder how he was able to file two motions for reconsideration and a supplement to his second motion for reconsideration, through his counsel. Under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, if a party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the petition with the reiteration that this dismissal is final and that NO FURTHER PLEADINGS shall be entertained.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, G.R. Nos. 189236-38, pp. 247-275.

2.Id. at 276-308.

3.Id. at 389-391.

4.Id. at 392-395.

5.Id. at 397-399.

6.Id. at 400-463.

7.Id. at 504.

8.Id. at 593.

9.Id. at 598-599.

10.Id. at 607-609.

11.Id. at 646-647.

12.Id. at 600.

13.Id. at 656-721.

14.Id. at 724-725.

15.Id. at 726-734.

16.Id., page unnumbered.

17.Petition for Relief, p. 1.

18.Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 19, Rule 19.3.

19.United States v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33, 35 (1910).

20.Rule 38, Section 2 reads:

    Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. — When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course.

21.Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from:

    (a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

xxx xxx xxx

    In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

22.See Apostol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141854, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 80, 90, 91. For example, in Jose v. Court of Appeals, et al. (162 Phil. 364, 376 [1976]), in granting the accused new trial, the Court considered the "peculiar circumstances . . . which may be classified as exceptional enough to warrant a new trial[.]" In Aguilar v. CA (320 Phil. 456, 461 [1995]), the Court ruled that the accused should not lose his liberty "by default of an insensitive lawyer" especially where his co-accused was allowed extension to file brief while the accused himself was not. In People v. Del Mundo (G.R. Nos. 119964-69, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA 266, 273), the Court granted new trial "on the broader ground of substantial justice, taking into account the variance" created by the accused's belated submission of exculpatory evidence that "raised substantial doubt as to [his] guilt[.]" Furthermore, the penalty imposed in this case is death. In Abrajano v. Court of Appeals, (397 Phil. 76, 96 [2000]), the Court allowed the accused new trial upon a showing through the evidence submitted by the accused to the Court that these pieces of evidence would "probably alter the result of this case."