Reboredo v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 195070. November 21, 2018.]

JONATHAN C. REBOREDO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., AND/OR ORIENT LINES — A DIVISION OF NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE,respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 21, 2018, which reads as follows: CDHaET

"G.R. No. 195070 (JONATHAN C. REBOREDO, Petitioner, v. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., and/or ORIENT LINES — A DIVISION OF NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, Respondents.) — This case involves a claim for disability benefits. The seafarer seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on July 30, 2010, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and held the petitioner entitled only to US$7,465.00 as disability benefits and US$746.50 as attorney's fees. 2

The factual and procedural facts, as rendered by the CA, were as follows:

Respondent Jonathan Reboredo filed a complaint on 22 April 2004 alleging that he was hired and employed on 5 March 2003 by the petitioner CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., for its foreign principal Orient Lines, a Division of Norwegian Cruise Line, as a second officer for five (5) months. He was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician, and consequently joined vessel M/V Marco Polo. Sometime in April 2003, while conducting a fire drill using fog on board the vessel, respondent accidentally slipped on the staircase (since it was foggy) and his lower extremities hit the staircase and bump many steps down. He suddenly felt a snap on his back followed by pain in his back radiating down to his hips and since the pain was tolerable, he finished the drill. However, the pain became unbearable which prompted him to consult the ship's doctor whose initial finding was a nerve compression between L4 and L5 radiculopathy of respondent. He was advised to rest for one week but since the pain became severe and he had difficulty in walking with pain and numbness radiating down to his left thigh and he could hardly bend. As a consequence thereof, he was repatriated on 11 July 2003. Upon arrival in Manila he was referred to Dr. Paul Teves, a company-designated physician who believed that respondent's case is a surgical one but meanwhile he was advised to have MRI examination which he did and the result was: ISCDEA

"LARGE LEFT PARACENTRAL-FORAMINAL DISK EXTRUSION L4-L5, WITH DISK DESICCATION AND SECONDARY SIGNIFICANT LEFT NEURAL FORAMINAL NARROWING AND LEFT L4 NERVE ROOT COMPRESSION.

STRAIGHTENED LUMBAR CURVATURE LIKELY DUE TO MUSCLE SPASM.

INCIDENTAL LIPOMA OF THE FILUM TERMINALE."

Dr. Teves also advised respondent to undergo rehabilitation and EMG-NCV which revealed that: TaCEHA

"PATIENT WAS DIAGNOSED TO HAVE L4-L5, L5-S1 RADICULOPATHY."

Respondent was referred to a private rehabilitation physician in the person of Dr. Inciong for physical therapy sessions. He was able to complete the Physical Therapy sessions and the private rehabilitation physician reported as follows:

PATIENT WAS DIAGNOSED TO HAVE L4-L5 DISC BULGE BY MRI AND L4, L5, L5-S1 RADICULOPATHY BY EMG-NCV. THE RESPONDENT HAD DECREASED BACK PAIN, IMPROVED MOTOR STRENGTH, AND NO NEUROLOGICAL DEFICITS. COMPLAINANT HAS ALSO DISCONTINUED ALL MEDICATIONS BECAUSE OF HIS IMPROVED CONDITION. HE HAS ALSO BEEN ADVISED ON PRECAUTIONS REGARDING LIFTING AND RECOMMENDED THAT HE CONTINUE ALL THERAPEUTIC EXERCISE TAUGHT. HE MAY ALSO DO HOME PROGRAM.

PATIENT IS NOT ALLOWED TO LIFT HEAVY OBJECTS DUE TO THE PRE-EXISTING BULGE IN HIS LUMBAR DISC. PRESENTLY, HIS CONDITION IS GUARDED.

That on 7 October 2003, he was further referred to Dr. Jose Anthony Q. Jocson for x-ray examination and underwent physical therapy sessions and avoided lifting of heavy loads. He was again referred to another surgeon (Dr. Melissa Tanchanco-Gozum) and he was advised to continue his therapeutic exercises but respondent's symptoms persisted despite therapy since he still suffers from intolerable pain.

Dr. Teves in his medical report dated 6 March 2004 recommended that the respondent is not fit for sea duty and cannot return to his previous job as a seafarer and assessed his disability rating as Grade 11. acHTIC

Respondent was concerned about his ailment, sought a second medical opinion of an orthopedic surgeon in the person of Dr. Marciano F. Almeda, Jr. who diagnosed complainant to have:

LUMBAR STRAIN WITH COMPRESSION NEUROPATHY SECONDARY TO EXTRUDED DISC L4-L5.

DEGENERATIVE DISC DISEASE, LUMBAR SPINE.

That Dr. Almeda issued a medical report explaining that the MRI finding revealed that the respondent suffered a disc extrusion, disc desiccation, and nerve root compression which means that he can probably tolerate light or office work but his job as a seaman entails heavy chores. Dr. Almeda further reported that respondent is no longer fit to work as a seafarer and is now partially and permanently disabled with Grade 11 impediment based on the POEA contract.

Respondent demanded payment of disability benefits from the petitioners in accordance with the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA but was denied. This prompted him to file a complaint on 22 April 2004 before the Labor Arbiter which granted the same in its decision dated 31 May 2005, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc./Atty. Nicolas C. Torres to pay complainant Jonathan C. Reboredo the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$132,000.00) or its equivalent in Philippine Peso at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing his disability benefits and attorney's fees. ScaCEH

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed their appeal with the NLRC on 18 July 2005 but the same was dismissed on 15 June 2006 for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Consequently, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied in NLRC Resolution dated 27 September 2006. 3

After receiving the NLRC's resolution denying the respondents' motion for reconsideration on October 26, 2006, 4 the respondents filed on November 16, 2006 a petition for certiorari in the CA, alleging therein that the NLRC had thereby gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 96910). 5 ACTIHa

On December 11, 2006, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 96910 on the ground of the respondents' failure to attach the required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. 6

Considering that the respondents had 60 days from the receipt of the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration within which to file their petition for certiorari (i.e., until December 26, 2006), they filed a second petition for certiorari on December 22, 2006. 7

On July 30, 2010, the CA, acting on the second petition for certiorari, promulgated its assailed decision, 8 disposing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc./Atty. Nicolas C. Torres are ordered to pay private Respondent the amount of US$7,465 as disability benefits and US$746.50.00 n as attorney's fees, or their equivalent in Philippine peso at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment. TIEHDC

SO ORDERED. 9

The CA declared that the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the respondents' appeal for having been filed out of time. It found that the respondents had received the decision of the Labor Arbiter via registered mail only on July 6, 2005, which was contrary to the NLRC's finding that they had received the same on June 7, 2005; and that they had then appealed on time to the NLRC on July 18, 2005. 10

Nevertheless, the CA, concurring with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, categorized the case as a claim for disability benefits resulting from the injury sustained by the petitioner on board the respondents' vessel. It concluded that the petitioner had fully substantiated his claim for and entitlement to the disability benefits, warranting the affirmance of the judgment of the Labor Arbiter; but pointed out that the Labor Arbiter had seriously erred in using the AMOSUP CBA as the basis for the award considering that the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), which was controlling, entitled the petitioner to Grade 11 disability equivalent to 14.93% of US$50,000.00, or US$7,465.00. 11 HCSAIa

Finding no compelling reason to disturb its decision, the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on January 10, 2011.

Hence, this appeal, wherein the petitioner raises the following issues:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF THE RESPONDENTS' FIRST PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 96910 OPERATES AS RES JUDICATA TO BAR THE RESPONDENTS' SECOND PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. NO. SP NO. 97326.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN NOT APPLYING THE PROPER LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING FULL DISABILITY BENEFITS.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN MODIFYING THE JUDGMENT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND IN NOT GRANTING FULL DISABILITY BENEFITS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. 12

The petitioner submits that the CA should not have entertained the petition for certiorari of the respondents subsequent to the dismissal of the petition dated November 16, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96910 because the dismissal of the earlier petition already barred the petition for certiorari under the doctrine of bar by res judicata; and that the modification of the decision of the NLRC was not based on the appropriate law and jurisprudence.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

To begin with, the CA did not commit any reversible error in giving due course to the second petition for certiorari.

The doctrine of the bar by res judicata has no application herein. Literally, res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." The doctrine of res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 13 A prior decision is conclusive in a second suit where the elements of res judicata are present. For a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur, namely: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over parties; (3) there must be between the two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action; and (4) the judgment or order must be upon the merits. 14 CaSAcH

The elements of res judicata do not concur herein. The dismissal of the first petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 96910 — being based on the failure to comply with the procedural requirements — was not a dismissal on the merits. Although the CA no longer saw the need to rule on the merits of the case and just dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, it did not forbid the respondents from bringing the second petition for certiorari. As can be seen, the filing of the second petition for certiorari was made within the 60-day period for them to do so as stipulated in Section 4, 15 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The ruling in Talidano v. Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, Inc.16 is on all fours with the case at bench. Therein the Court observed:

The respondent's two arguments essay on certain developments in the case after the NLRC rendered its decision. He points out with alacrity that an entry of judgment was issued twice — first by the NLRC with respect to its decision and then by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals after it dismissed on technical grounds the first petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner. Neither event, for sure, militates against the institution of a second petition for certiorari. A decision of the NLRC is never final for as long as it is the subject of a petition for certiorari that is pending with a superior court. A contrary view only demeans our certiorari jurisdiction and will never gain currency under our system of appellate court review. It is more to the point to ask if a second petition can stand after the first is dismissed, but under the particular circumstances in which the second was brought, we hold that it can. The theory of res judicata invoked by the respondent to bar the filing of the second petition does not apply. The judgment or final resolution in the first petition must be on the merits for res judicata to inhere, and it will not be on the merits if it is founded on a consideration of only technical or collateral points. Yet this was exactly how the first petition was disposed of SP 73521 was dismissed as a result of the failure of the petitioner to comply with the procedural requirements of a petition for certiorari. The case never touched base. There was no occasion for the determination of the substantive rights of the parties and, in this sense, the merits of the case were not involved. The petitioner had actually the option of either refilling [sic] the case or seeking reconsideration in the original action. It chose to file SP 73790 after realizing that it still had enough time left of the original period of 60 days under Rule 65 to do so. 17

Secondly, there was no dispute that the petitioner had suffered a work-related injury that entitled him to recover disability benefits. The only remaining issue was which between the CBA with the Norwegian Cruise Line, on one hand, and the POEA-SEC, on the other, governed the case.

On this issue, we uphold the CA, and declare that it correctly held that the POEA-SEC was the controlling agreement. When the petitioner first brought his claim to the Labor Arbiter, he had simply quoted a portion of the CBA but did not present an authentic copy of the agreement. The Labor Arbiter grossly erred in accepting the petitioner's demand without any hesitation or reservation despite the absence of the authentic copy of the CBA. The petitioner submitted a copy of the CBA for the first time only in the CA, but even then the copy did not appear to have been signed by the purported parties. He clearly failed to establish the genuineness and due execution of the CBA that he submitted. Consequently, the POEA-SEC was controlling, and, in this regard, what version of this contract should apply was not the 1996 POEA-SEC, as held by the CA, but the 2000 POEA-SEC, which was the POEA-SEC in force when the respondents employed the petitioner in 2003. Clearly, he did not fully convince the CA about the CBA being the controlling guideline. IaHDcT

And, thirdly, we stress that it was the company-designated physician's findings that should be the basis of the disability claim of the petitioner. The petitioner could opt to seek the opinion of a different physician, and if said physician disagreed with the assessment of the company-designated physician, the opinion of a third physician chosen jointly by the employer and the seafarer could be sought. The third physician's findings would then be final and binding on the parties. In this case, the company-designated physician, Dr. Teves, certified that the petitioner was not fit for sea duty, and assessed his disability rating as Grade 11. When the petitioner sought a second opinion, Dr. Almeda, the second physician, gave the same disability rating of Grade 11. With both physicians being in agreement on their assessments, consulting a third physician became superfluous.

Inasmuch as there is no more controversy on the entitlement of the petitioner to the Grade 11 disability benefits under the 2000 POEA-SEC, we affirm the rest of the CA's decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 30, 2010, without pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED." Bersamin, J., designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2606 dated October 10, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as Additional Member per Special Order No. 2607 dated October 10, 2018. CScTED

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 229-241; penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with the concurrence of Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.

2.Id. at 114-122.

3.Id. at 229-232.

4.Id. at 149-150.

5.Id. at 151-180.

6.Id. at 185.

7.Id. at 282.

8.Supra note 1.

9.Id. at 241.

10.Id. at 233.

11.Id. at 240.

12.Rollo, p. 19.

13. Heirs of Maximino Derla v. Heirs of Catalina Derla Vda. de Hipolito, G.R. No. 157717, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 638, 652.

14. Dela Rosa v. Mercado, G.R. No. 101703, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 236, 240.

15. Sec. 4. Where petition filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

16. G.R. No. 172031, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 279.

17. Id. at 290.

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy.