Re: Vitaliano N. Aguirre II

EN BANC

[A.M. No. 18-03-09-SC. June 26, 2018.]

RE: LETTER OF SECRETARY VITALIANO N. AGUIRRE II, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RELATIVE TO THE REQUEST OF THE PROSECUTORS LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES [PLP] AND THE CHIEF PROSECUTORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES [CIPROSA]

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedJUNE 26, 2018, which reads as follows: HTcADC

"A.M. No. 18-03-09-SC (Re: Letter of Secretary Vitaliano N. Aguirre II, Department of Justice relative to the Request of the Prosecutors League of the Philippines [PLP] and the Chief Prosecutors Association of the Philippines [CIPROSA]). — In a Letter dated March 7, 2018, Jason Antonio Amante, President of the Chief Prosecutors Association of the Philippines (CIPROSA) and Secretary General of the Prosecutors League of the Philippines (PLP), and Marylin Cynthia Fatima M. Luang, President of PLP, recommended to Department of Justice Secretary Vitaliano N. Aguirre II (Secretary Aguirre) that the necessary representation be made so that the full implementation of the continuous trial system in all courts covering criminal cases be suspended and, more importantly, that it be revisited to consider the predicament of the members of the National Prosecution Service (NPS), who are vital stakeholders in the successful implementation of the continuous trial system, thus:

Despite being undermanned, our Prosecutors regularly attend to their court duties expected to last the whole day, and in some cases, even extend beyond 5:00 p.m. Bound by the more stringent rules of procedures laid down in OCA Circular No. 101-2017, our Prosecutors continue to zealously prosecute cases without delay.

However, this leaves them with very little time to engage in their other equally important duties relative to the complaints brought before them for preliminary investigation and inquest proceedings.

Moreover, the NPS still eagerly anticipates the appointment of new prosecutors to significantly help in the active prosecution and effective management of cases pending before the different field offices. At present, the NPS still faces the arduous challenge of a prosecutor having two or more court assignments. In addition to their regular tasks of conducting preliminary investigations and inquests, it is not difficult to see how the piling demands of each court can take a dramatic toll in the performance and well-being of the overworked prosecutor.

While our Prosecutors support the reforms initiated by the Supreme Court, the continuous trial system, it creates a truly herculean and oppressive situation for them to effectively perform all their expected functions.

Also, there have been several reports that our Prosecutors are penalized if they avail of their recently granted wellness leaves citing OCA Circular No. 101-2017. These runs contrary to the envisioned wellness program for NPS members, similar to those fully enjoyed by the Judiciary.

In connection thereto, the Chief Prosecutors Association of the Philippines (CIPROSA) and the Prosecutors League of the Philippines (PLP) jointly request that the corresponding representation be made for the suspension of the said Supreme Court reform and innovation.

We reiterate that while reforms and programs designed to expedite resolution of criminal cases and declog court dockets are lauded, We deem it necessary to raise the urgent concerns of the NPS (i) that it being an important stakeholder, no prior consultations were made to seek its necessary inputs regarding the program; (ii) to address the issue of seemingly inadequate number of prosecutors vis-à-vis the number of existing courts, and, more importantly; and, (iii) to take into consideration the totality of a prosecutor's duties, which is not limited to just the active prosecution of cases.

In consideration of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the necessary representation be made so that the full implementation of the continuous trial system in all courts covering criminal cases be suspended. More importantly, that it be revisited to consider the predicament of the members of the [NPS], who are vital stakeholders in the successful implementation of the continuous trial system. 1 CAIHTE

In a Letter dated March 9, 2018, Secretary Aguirre indorsed the request of the PLP and the CIPROSA for "the suspension of the continuous trial of criminal cases." Secretary Aguirre stressed the need for the suspension of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC entitled the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, and suggested that consultations should be undertaken to ensure its success, thus:

The [NPS] is currently understaffed. Despite their numbers, our public prosecutors continue to zealously represent the People and attend regular court duties. Nevertheless, the situation caused vast majority of prosecution offices to incur back-log in their other equally important official duties and responsibilities, including the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings. Moreover, our prosecutors are being penalized heavily by the continuous trial system.

The Criminal Justice System (CJS) requires synchronized working relations between (sic) its five pillars, particularly the Courts and the prosecution service. In this regard, the Department seeks the Supreme Court's kind consideration in allowing the prosecution service to assess its actions relative [to] the continuous trial system and re-organize accordingly in order to fully adopt the system.

In anticipation of the appointment of new prosecutors, we request that the continuous trial system be suspended as we mutually assess the system since its implementation last September 2017. We suggest that consultations between the Supreme Court and the [NPS] be undertaken. The discussion could also include other stakeholders in the CJS, in order to assure the success of the innovative program. 2

The request for suspension of the full implementation of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases is not well taken.

The continuous trial system was envisioned as a mode of judicial fact-finding and adjudication conducted with speed and dispatch so that trials are held on the scheduled dates without needless postponement, the factual issues for trial, well-defined at pre-trial and the whole proceedings terminated and ready for judgment within ninety (90) days from the date of initial hearing, unless for meritorious reasons, an extension is permitted. 3 The system required that the Presiding Judge adhere faithfully to the session hours prescribed by law, to maintain full control of the proceedings, and to efficiently allocate and use time and court resources to avoid court delays.

Then as now, the rationale of continuous trial system is the expeditious disposition of cases:

The flow of cases in the trial courts from the time of filing until their final disposition has been the subject of constant public criticism. The trial period is exceedingly long. It usually takes more than two or three years to finish. The slow grind of the trial court machinery has made the legal maxim "justice delayed is justice denied" aptly descriptive of the dismal situation obtaining in that level of jurisdiction. Indeed, the ultimate victims are always the ordinary litigants. The real culprit is the common practice of piecemeal trial of cases that sets cases for one day at a time and thereafter continued or postponed to another date until all the parties have finished the presentation of evidence. 4 DETACa

The continuous trial system was first piloted in February 1989 in eighty-one (81) trial courts. 5 The Supreme Court later issued the following Orders and Circulars to widen and expedite the implementation of continuous trial, which led to its mandatory adoption in all courts nationwide: 6

1. Circular No. 1-89, January 19, 1989: Guidelines to be Observed by Designated Branches of the Regional Trial Courts in the Conduct of Mandatory Continuous Trial;

2. Administrative Order No. 135: Designating 83 RTCs to implement the Mandatory Continuous Trial;

3. Administrative Order No. 135-A dated February 6, 1989: Amending Administrative Order No. 135;

4. Administrative Circular No. 135-B: Amending Administrative Circular No. 135;

5. Administrative Circular No. 35 dated July 27, 1989: Designating 23 Manila RTC Judges in addition to 5 previously designated as Special Criminal Courts to implement mandatory continuous trial;

6. Administrative Circular No. 135-C dated August 11, 1989: Designating additional 1,377 branches of multi-sala RTC, MeTC, MTC to implement the mandatory continuous trial calendar effective September 1, 1989; and

7. Administrative Circular No. 3-90 dated January 31, 1990: Mandatory Continuous Trial in all courts. Designating all 1,900 trial courts nationwide to implement continuous trial effective February 15, 1990.

At present, the policy of continuous trial is embodied under Sections 1 to 10, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which incorporated the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8493 7 or the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." Under continuous trial, trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated, and it may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. The time limitations provided under Rule 119 shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Court provide for a shorter trial period.

In requesting the full suspension of the continuous trial system in all courts, the CIPROSA and the PLP would have the Supreme Court virtually hold in abeyance the effectivity and implementation of the following provisions of the Constitution, laws, the Rules of Court, and other issuances regarding speedy trial and continuous trial:

1. Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution:

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis ours) aDSIHc

2. Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

3. Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

4. R.A. No 8493 or The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, which is substantially incorporated in Sections 1 to 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:

SEC. 1. Time to prepare for trial. — After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order. (Sec. 6, Cir. 38-98)

SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. — Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 8, Cir. 38-98).

The time limitations provided under this Section and the preceding Section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.

SEC. 3. Exclusions. — The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:

(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused;

(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused;

(3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;

(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;

(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

(6) Delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a prejudicial question; and

(7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement. ETHIDa

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. He shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of the accused to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate trial has been granted.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial. (Sec. 9, Cir. 38-98)

SEC. 4. Factors for granting continuance. — The following factors, among others, shall be considered by a court in determining whether to grant a continuance under Section 3(f) of this Rule.

(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice; and

(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established therein.

In addition, no continuance under Section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of congestion of the court's calendar or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the prosecutor. (Sec. 10, Cir. 38-98)

SEC. 5. Time limit following an order for new trial. — If the accused is to be tried again pursuant to an order for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from notice of the order, provided that if the period becomes impractical due to unavailability of witnesses and other factors, the court may extend it but not to exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from notice of said order for a new trial. (Sec. 11, Cir. 38-98)

SEC. 6. Extended time limit. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days. (Sec. 7, Cir. 38-98) cSEDTC

SEC. 7. Public attorney's duties where accused is imprisoned. — If the public attorney assigned to defend a person charged with a crime knows that the latter is preventively detained, either because he is charged with a bailable crime but has no means to post bail, or, is charged with a non-bailable crime, or, is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, it shall be his duty to do the following:

(a) Shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner requiring such person to so advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of that notice, the custodian of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his right to demand trial. If at anytime thereafter the prisoner informs his custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.

(d) When the custodian of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for the availability of the prisoner for purposes of trial, the prisoner shall be made available accordingly. (Sec. 12, Cir. 38-98)

SEC. 8. Sanctions. — In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney, or the prosecutor:

(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;

(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;

(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions hereof, the court may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecutor, as follows:

(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, a fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);

(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de officio, public attorney, or prosecutor a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and

(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the court trying the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The punishment provided for by this section shall be without prejudice to any appropriate criminal action or other sanction authorized under these rules. (Sec. 13, Cir. 38-98)

SEC. 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. — If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this Rule, the information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under Section 3 of this Rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy. SDAaTC

Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under this section. (Sec. 14, Cir. 38-98)

SEC. 10. Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the Constitution. — No provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed by Section 14(2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. (Sec. 15, Cir. 38-98)

5. Section 55 of R.A. No. 8551 or the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, amending Section 47 of R.A. No. 6975 or the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided, however, That if it can be shown by evidence that the accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: Provided, further, That the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent: Provided, finally, That such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the chief, PNP. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis ours)

6. Section 90 of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended:

Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case for resolution.

7. Section 48 of R.A. No. 9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007:

Sec. 48. Continuous Trial. — In cases of terrorism of conspiracy to commit terrorism, the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial.

8. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9516, 8 inserting among other provisions, Section 4-B in P.D. No. 1866: 9

SEC. 4-B. Continuous Trial. — In cases involving violations of this Decree, the judge shall set the case for continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial. Such case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

9. Section 21 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (October 1993):

Section 21. Speedy Trial of Child Abuse Cases. — The trial of child abuse cases shall take precedence over all other cases before the courts, except election and habeas corpus cases. The trial in said cases shall commence within three (3) days from the date the accused is arraigned and no postponement of the initial hearing shall be granted except on account of the illness of the accused or other grounds beyond his control. acEHCD

10. Section 76 of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9208 (IRR of R.A. No. 9208) otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as amended by R.A. No. 10364 otherwise known as the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012 (2016):

Section 76. Speedy Disposition of TIP (Trafficking in Persons) Cases. — Where practicable and unless special circumstance require otherwise, cases involving violation of this Act shall be heard continuously with hearing dates spaced not more than two weeks apart. Unnecessary delay should be avoided, strictly taking into consideration then Speedy Trial Act and SC Circular No. 38-89 dated 11 August 1998. (per OCA Cir. No. 151-2010, dated 26 October 2010).

11. Section 1, Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

12. Sections 1 of Rule 17 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC on Rules of Procedure on Environmental Cases:

Sec. 1. Continuous trial. — The court shall endeavor to conduct continuous trial which shall not exceed three (3) months from the date of the issuance of the pre-trial order.

13. Section 2, Rule 14 of the A.M. No. 10-3-10-SC on the Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property Rights Cases:

Sec. 2. Conduct of trial. — The court shall conduct hearings expeditiously so as to ensure speedy trial. Each party shall have a maximum period of sixty (60) days to present his evidence-in-chief on the trial dates agreed upon during pre-trial.

14. Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 25-2007 Re: Designation of Special Courts to Hear, Try and Decide Cases Involving Killings of Political Activists and Members of Media:

The cases referred to herein shall undergo mandatory continuous trial and shall be terminated within sixty (60) days from commencement of trial. Judgment thereon shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from submission for decision unless a shorter period is provided by law or otherwise directed by this Court.

15. Sections 8 and 9 of A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC on the Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Right of Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial.

Sec. 8. Observance of time limits. — It shall be the duty of the trial court, the public or private prosecutor, and the defense counsel to ensure, subject to the excluded delays specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, compliance with the following time limits in the prosecution of the case against a detained accused: SDHTEC

(a) The case of the accused shall be raffled and referred to the trial court to which it is assigned within three days from the filing of the information;

(b) The court shall arraign the accused within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle;

(c) The court shall hold the pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days after arraignment or within ten (10) days if the accused is under preventive detention; provided, however, that where the direct testimonies of the witnesses are to be presented through judicial affidavits, the court shall give the prosecution not more than twenty (20) days from arraignment within which to prepare and submit their judicial affidavits in time for the pre-trial conference;

(d) After the pre-trial conference, the court shall set the trial of the case in the pre-trial order not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the pre-trial conference; and

(e) The court shall terminate the regular trial within one hundred eighty (180) days, or the trial by judicial affidavits within sixty (60) days, reckoned from the date trial begins, minus the excluded delays or postponements specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.

Sec. 9. Dismissal on ground of denial of the right to speedy trial. — The case against the detained accused may be dismissed on ground of denial of the right to speedy trial in the event of failure to observe the above time limits. HSAcaE

The Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, pursuant to Section 5 (5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Foremost in the mind of the Court in promulgating Rules of Procedure is the mandate that such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. By virtue of such rule-making power, the Court promulgated procedural rules regarding speedy trial and continuous trial, the most recent of which is the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases.

While it can suspend or even disregard Rules of Procedure which are mere tools designed to facilitate the administration of justice, the Court cannot suspend the effectivity and implementation of the substantive laws on speedy trial and continuous trial of criminal cases, which are entitled to the presumption of legality and constitutionality. To be sure, Article 7 of the New Civil Code states that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary, and that laws shall be void only when the courts declared them to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

With the enactment of R.A. No. 8493 or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the Court promulgated Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998 in order to implement the provisions of the said law, and Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 to ensure speedy disposition of cases. The Court substantially incorporated the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 under Sections 1 to 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000.

In a Resolution dated February 21, 2012, the Court issued A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC, Re: Guidelines for Litigation in Quezon City Trial Courts, to test the practicability and feasibility of the proposed guidelines, and to enhance the Rules of Procedure and expedite the litigation process. The Quezon City practice guidelines included rules governing criminal and civil cases, including special proceedings and land registration cases.

In a Resolution dated June 30, 2015, the Court issued A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, Re: Adopting the Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases in Pilot Courts, clarifying the application of existing rules on speedy trial to expedite trial and resolution of criminal cases, and designating fifty-two (52) pilot courts in both First and Second Levels in Metro Manila, consisting of Commercial Courts, Family Courts, Drugs Courts, Regular Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts with heavy case load. In the course of the pilot testing of the said guidelines, the Chairperson of the Special Committee on Speedy Trial, Supreme Court Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, and other members of the Committee, also visited and observed in various judicial stations to determine other causes of delay, which may not be covered by the said guidelines, namely: (1) non-availment of plea bargaining; (2) unabated filing of motions [inhibition, postponement, to quash, reconsideration, preliminary investigation, and reinvestigation]; (3) trial dates wasted due to long periods of inventory, weekly decision writing day, tardiness and non-observance of morning and afternoon session hours; (4) lack of skill in confronting dilatory tactics and in optimizing trial of cases; (5) oral sentencing in open court on a plea of guilty to a crime charged or to a lesser offense, which shall be done immediately after the plea; and (6) other methodology to hasten the termination of criminal proceedings. HESIcT

One year after the pilot testing of the continuous trial guidelines in criminal cases, the Court's Developmental Partner, The Asia Foundation, reported a significant improvement in the compliance rates of 52 pilot courts with heavy docket in criminal cases decided before the pilot implementation, and criminal cases being heard under the continuous trial guidelines, with respect to the prescribed periods for (a) raffle to arraignment; (b) arraignment to conclusion of pre-trial; (c) trial; and (d) submission for judgment to promulgation thereof, thus:

The Asia Foundation Assessment of the Pilot Implementation of the Guidelines for Continuous Trial in Criminal Cases

 

	Baseline cases (before pilot implementation) compliance rate	Pilot cases (after implementation compliance rate)
Raffle to Arraignment	Detained	- 13.92%	35.53%
Not Detained	- 19.91%	44.73%
Arraignment to Pre-Trial	Detained	- 22.08%	72.98%
Not Detained	- 12.86%	63.50%
Trial		- 14.63%	67.10%
Submission for Judgment to Promulgation		- 56.37%	91.67%

Due to the Results Analysis of Practice Guidelines Implementation in Quezon City (August 2015) conducted by the American Bar Association Rules of Law Initiative, and the Validation Workshop for the Guidelines on Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases (October 2016) held by The Asia Foundation, which both showed remarkable improvement in reducing the duration of criminal proceedings, and in improving compliance with the reglementary periods set in the Rules of Court and pertinent laws, the Supreme Court created a Technical Working Group (TWG) under the Special Committee on Speedy Trial, to review the possible consolidation of A.M. No. 15-06-10 dated June 30, 2015 and A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC dated February 21, 2012, and inclusion of other provisions that would address court delays and docket congestion.

After several consultative meetings among members of the Special Committee on Speedy Trial and its TWG, the Court Administrator, the Philippine Judicial Academy and the Philippine Mediation Center, and exhaustive deliberations before the En Banc among members of the Court for a period of four (4) months starting January 2017, the Court finally issued a Resolution dated April 25, 2017 approving A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC or the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, which took effect on September 1, 2017.

From May 2017 until March 2018, Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, the Chairperson of the Special Committee on Speedy Trial conducted nationwide training seminars followed by open fora before Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, Judges of First and Second Level Courts, Public Prosecutors, Public Attorneys, Branch Clerks of Courts or Officers-in-Charge, the Office of the Ombudsman and some chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, including the National Prosecution Service with DOJ Secretary Aguirre and some Undersecretaries in attendance in Cebu City.

It is significant to note that the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases is a consolidation of Court circulars, administrative orders, and issuances on continuous trial, intended to supplement but never to amend or revise provisions of the Rules of Court. More importantly, it is geared towards skills development of judges on the innovations and best practices introduced to protect and advance the constitutional right of persons to speedy disposition of their criminal cases. It provides for trial techniques, such as: ruling on prohibited motions; addressing dilatory tactics; proper scheduling of cases to comply with the reglementary periods through the use of flowcharts; limiting the number of witnesses to be presented; stipulations on the subject matter of the testimony of corroborative witnesses and expert and other witnesses who do not appear to have personally witnessed the crime; use of sworn statements and affidavits in lieu of oral testimony; and other skills intended to expedite the disposition of criminal cases. caITAC

Concededly, Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases is a work in progress, which attempts to simplify criminal proceedings by addressing the root causes of delay in the administration of justice and docket congestion, but it does not purport to be a panacea for such problems. The Court has anticipated some apprehensions and reservations on the part of the parties, especially those courts with heavy dockets and those in the provinces where the judicial stations are far from the cities, or situated in islands and other remote areas. Rest assured, the Court is always open and receptive to the comments and suggestions of all stakeholders in the Criminal Justice System regarding possible amendments and revision of the Rules of Procedure.

As to the claim that no prior consultations were made to seek the necessary inputs of the NPS regarding the program to expedite resolution of criminal cases and declog court dockets, the CIPROSA and the PLP would do well to know of the Letter dated February 8, 2017 from the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) regarding Comments on the draft Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases.

In the said Letter signed by Jay Karel P. Sanchez II, Prosecutor II and Chief Executive Reviewer, OPG, and noted by Prosecutor General Victor C. Sepulveda, the NPS welcomed the initiatives of the Court in introducing innovations in the Rules on Criminal Procedure, through the proposed Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, made purposely to address the need for a more expeditious disposition of criminal cases.

In light of the comments and observations of the OPC, the TWG of the Special Committee on Speedy Trial, which was in charge of drafting the continuous trial guidelines, made the corresponding amendments which are now embodied in the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases. TAIaHE

Likewise worth mention is the fact that before the issuance of the Revised Guidelines, consultations were made with Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta who also attended one of the Training Seminars on the Revised Guidelines. At any rate, the Public Attorney's Office is already aware of the continuous trial system as can be gleaned from Article 3, Sections 1 to 3 10 of its Guidelines to be Observed by Public Attorneys in Handling Criminal Cases Pursuant to the Provisions of the Speedy Trial Act (R.A. No. 8493) and its Implementing Rules (S.C. Circular No. 38-98) or Memorandum Circular No. 003, series of 2008.

With respect to the issue of seemingly inadequate number of prosecutors vis-à-vis the number of existing courts, suffice it to state that such problem is beyond the control of the Court, and that prior consultations with the Congress of the Philippines and the Office of the President is the proper recourse in order to enact laws to address such problem, and to hasten the appointments of public prosecutors.

Anent the claim that no prior consultations were made to take into consideration the totality of the prosecutor's duties which are not limited to active prosecution of cases, the TWG, in drafting the continuous trial guidelines, relied on the inputs and extensive background of the Chairperson of the Special Committee on Speedy Trial, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, as a Public Prosecutor, a Presiding Judge of a Special Criminal Court on Heinous Crimes, as well as on Drug Cases, and a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the vast experience of other members of the Committee, namely: Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Jose Catral Mendoza, both former Regional Trial Court Judges and private practitioners, as well as Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, a former Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and Assistant Solicitor General.

Contrary to the CIPROSA's and the PLP's claim of several reports that prosecutors are being penalized if they avail of their recently granted wellness leaves citing Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 101-2017, there is nothing in the said OCA circular which punishes prosecutors for availing of their wellness leaves, or even vacation leaves and sick leaves. The same OCA Circular was issued by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez for the guidance, information and strict compliance by all Judges and Clerks of Court of the First and Second Level Courts regarding the approval of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, which took effect on September 1, 2017.

While the Revised Guidelines provide that non-compliance with its provision is a ground for disciplinary action, there is nothing therein that expressly penalizes prosecutors from taking leaves of absence. What the Revised Guidelines prohibit is a motion for postponement, except if it is based on acts of God, force majeure or physical inability of the witness to appear and testify. However, if the motion is granted based on such exceptions, the moving party shall be warned that the presentation of its evidence must still be finished on the date previously agreed upon. Taking of authorized leaves of absence is a right vested by law. Considering the volume of criminal cases pending before courts, it would be irresponsible for a prosecutor or his/her superior not to make arrangements and to coordinate with the court for another prosecutor to substitute on his/her behalf. At any rate, the provision in the Revised Guidelines to the effect that non-compliance therewith is a ground for disciplinary action, is meant more to highlight the importance of reglementary periods and the right of all persons to speedy disposition of their cases, rather than to punish erring litigants. In this regard, the Supreme Court has decided administrative actions on a case-to-case basis, taking into account all relevant matters which caused the inability to comply with the Rules of Procedure. cDHAES

Just as a judge's illness should not be an excuse for failure to render decisions or resolutions within the prescribed period because the demands of public service cannot abide by such illness, 11 the same holds true with respect to a prosecutor. If a judge may ask the Supreme Court for a reasonable extension of time to decide cases as soon as it becomes clear that there would be a delay in the disposition of cases, so should a prosecutor be allowed to request a similar extension before a judge.

Heavy workload of judges due to additional work, as acting presiding judge in other courts, is likewise not a sufficient justification for the delay because they are allowed, upon motion or letter-request, extensions of the reglementary period in deciding cases, as well as relief from their additional assignments. 12 So too are the prosecutors, as well as public attorneys, not excused by the demand of their equally urgent duties and personal matters. "The conduct of every person connected with the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility." 13 A public office is a public trust. Public officers, who are accountable at all times to the people most especially to court litigants must perform their duties and responsibilities with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 14 If best efforts exerted to comply with the Revised Guidelines fall short, the remedy of the prosecutors is to coordinate with the judge and the counsel of the accused for a suitable schedule of trial, and to propose a reasonable time frame to prosecute a case, for which an extension may be requested by the judge.

In case of inability to observe the reglementary period to try and decide cases, a judge may request for extension of time before the lapse of said period, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court in relation to Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998. Judges of First and Second Level Courts can request the OCA, for extension of trial time, or the Supreme Court in the case of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals. A proper request needs to specify the subject case/s, the meritorious reason/s for the extension, and the extension period needed. Request for blanket authority to extend trial time is prohibited. The Court stressed the need to specify the particular case for which the extension is being requested, in this wise:

Cases age at different times; hence, the need to specify the particular case for which the extension is being requested. A definite date for extension will also help the judge and the Court to gauge how long a reasonable extension would be. Likewise, the judge can also concretely plan how much time he[/she] should spend on deciding each case. This encourages proper time management and the orderly administration of justice. A general request for exemption embracing all cases would provide judges a catch-all excuse for neglecting to decide; or worse, choosing not to decide by reason of money or malice, any case at all. Thus, a request for an all-embracing exemption should not spare a judge from administrative sanction for failing to decide cases on time. 15

Besides, in multi-sala courts in places where there are few practicing lawyers, A.C. No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 provides that the schedule of session hours may be modified upon the request of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines such that one-half of the branches may hold their trial in the morning while the other half in the afternoon.

It bears emphasis that the provisions of the Revised Guidelines stating that court trials shall be held from Monday to Thursday from 8:30 a.m. to noon, and from 2:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., and that arraignment, pre-trial conferences, promulgation of decisions and motion hearings shall be held every Friday morning, are not novel, but actually derived from three administrative issuances, namely:

(1) A.C. No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 regarding the Strict Observance of Session Hours of Trial Courts and Effective Management of Cases to Ensure Their Speedy Disposition: ASEcHI

I. The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall be from 8:30 A.M. to noon and from 2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M. from Monday to Friday. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Except those requiring immediate action, all motions should be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next business day. The unauthorized practice of some judges of entertaining motions or setting them for hearing on any other day or time must be immediately stopped.

(2) A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC dated February 21, 2012, Re: Guidelines for Litigation in Quezon City Trial Courts:

5. Calendar call — Courts shall call the calendar at exactly 8:30 a.m. or 2:00 p.m., as the case may be, to determine which cases are ready to proceed. No second call shall be made except only of those cases where both parties have manifested their readiness to proceed. The remaining time after the first call shall be divided equally among the ready cases to ensure that all will be heard on that day.

(3) A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC Re: Adopting the Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases in Pilot Courts dated June 30, 2015:

1. Motion Day — Trial shall be held from Monday to Thursday, at 8:30 in the morning, and 2:00 in the afternoon. Hearing on motions, arraignment, and promulgation of decision shall be held on Fridays.

Granted that A.C. No. 3-99 provides that the hours in the morning shall be devoted to the conduct of trial, and that the hours in the afternoon shall be utilized for: (1) the conduct of pre-trial conferences; (2) writing of decisions, resolutions or orders; or (3) the continuation of trial on the merits, whenever rendered necessary, as may be required by the Rules of Court, statutes or circular in specified cases, the TWG of the Special Committee on Speedy Trial found it necessary to recommend that hearing days shall be held from Monday to Thursday, and that cases shall be called at exactly 8:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., considering the heavy volume of criminal cases that are pending and being filed. It bears stressing that the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases do not require everyday hearings.

However, it is ideal that continuous trial of criminal cases must be conducted morning and afternoon at least twice a week, e.g., Monday-Wednesday, or Tuesday-Thursday, while the other days of the week, except the motion day, should be devoted to hearing and trial of civil and other cases. This gives the public prosecutors, on the one hand, sufficient time for their other duties. On the other hand, if the witnesses scheduled for the day finished in the morning their testimonies, either by oral testimony, sworn statement, affidavit or stipulation, then there is no more need to proceed with the hearing in the afternoon, during which the judges may have time to perform their other duties. It is indeed significant that the judges, the public prosecutor and counsels for the accused should coordinate and agree in scheduling continuous trial of criminal cases, so as to ensure speedy trial and compliance with the reglementary period provided by law and the Rules of Procedure. ITAaHc

Taking into account A.C. No. 3-99 which provides that all motions, except those requiring immediate action, should be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next business day, the TWG found it reasonable to recommend that hearing of motions, arraignment and preliminary conference/pre-trial, and promulgation of decisions shall be held on Friday mornings to give prosecutors time to attend their preliminary investigations and inquest duties in the afternoon. It is not amiss to state that A.C. No. 3-99 also provides that the unauthorized practice of some judges of entertaining motions or setting them for hearing on any other day or time must be immediately stopped, but the TWG deemed it unnecessary to incorporate such provision in the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases.

In fine, the request of the CIPROSA and the PLP to suspend the full implementation of the continuous trial system cannot be granted because the Supreme Court has no power to suspend the effectivity of the substantive law on continuous trial, which upholds the constitutional right of all persons to speedy disposition of their cases. Shortage of competent and efficient lawyers, court officers and employees in urban areas, more so in rural areas, has been a problem since time immemorial. It is a sad commentary that the two-decade old Speedy Trial Act of 1998, which was envisioned to uphold the right of all persons to speedy, impartial and public trial, has been honored in breach more than in practice. To accept lack of prosecutors and heavy pressure of work as justification to suspend the full implementation of the continuous trial system, which has been in effect since 1990, will inevitably worsen the problems of delay in the administration of justice and court docket congestion. After all, regarded as mandatory by their very nature, "rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business." 16

WHEREFORE, the Letter of Department of Justice Secretary Vitaliano N. Aguirre II relative to the request of the Prosecutors League of the Philippines and the Chief Prosecutors Association of the Philippines is duly NOTED and will be taken into account in the amendment or revision of Rules of Procedure, but the request for the suspension of the continuous trial system in all courts is DENIED." (adv5)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETAClerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 2-3.

2.Id. at 1.

3. Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989, Subject: Guidelines to be Observed by Designated Branches of the Trial Courts in the Conduct of Mandatory Continuous Trial.

4. Administrative Circular No. 4 dated September 22, 1988 signed by Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan.

5. Report on the Effects of the Continuous Trial System on Litigation Time and Output in the National Capital Judicial Region submitted by the Institute of Judicial Administration U.P. Law Center, Diliman, Quezon City. <http://sitesources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/ContinuousTrialStudy.pdf.> (visited March 21, 2018).

6.Id.

7. AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on February 12, 1998.

8. AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED THE CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER RELEVANT PURPOSES. Approved on December 22, 2008.

9. CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.

10.Sec. 1. Time Limit for Trial. — When the case is set for trial by the Court, the Public Attorney shall take note and see to it that the case is set for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time, EXCEPT for cases falling under the rules on summary procedure. The entire trial period shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial EXCEPT when the trial court is authorized in writing by the Chief Justice or by the Court Administrator.

   Sec. 2. When the Accused Enters a Plea of Not Guilty. — If the accused enters a plea of not guilty, the Public Attorney has at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial, which shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.

   Sec. 3. Exclusions. — The Public Attorney shall take note of the period set forth in R.A. 8493 for the Speedy Trial and/or Resolution of cases, and shall see to it that only the allowable periods of delay as provided in Section 10 thereof be excluded from computing the time within which trial must commence.

   Toward this end, the Public Attorney shall insist on the strict adherence to the period set forth in the law and shall be ready to move for the dismissal of the case, where there is delay or violation of the aforestated periods.

11.Balajedeong v. Judge Del Rosario, 551 Phil. 458, 467 (2007).

12. Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit, MTC, Bayombong & Solano & MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, 561 Phil. 349, 360-361 (2007).

13. Office of the Court Administrator v. Montalla, 540 Phil. 343, 347 (2006).

14. Concerned Litigants v. Araya, Jr., 542 Phil. 8, 19 (2007).

15. Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit, MTC, Bayombong & Solano & MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, supra at 361.

16. Balajedeong v. Judge Del Rosario, supra note 14, at 464.