Re: Venusto D. Hamoy, Jr.

EN BANC

[IPI No. 17-249-CA-J. September 5, 2017.]

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF VENUSTO D. HAMOY, JR. AGAINST HON. OSCAR V. BADELLES, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, RELATIVE TO CIVIL CASE NOS. 6769 AND 6831 AND C.A. G.R. SP NO. 02671-MIN

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated SEPTEMBER 5, 2017, which reads as follows:

"IPI No. 17-249-CA-J (Re: Verified Complaint of Venusto D. Hamoy, Jr. against Hon. Oscar V. Badelles, Associate Justice, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, relative to Civil Case Nos. 6769 and 6831 and C.A. G.R. SP No. 02671-MIN). — Before Us is an administrative complaint filed by Venusto D. Hamoy, Jr. against respondent Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar V. Badelles for alleged gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.

Antecedent Facts

The complaint stems from the actions and rulings of the respondent during his term as presiding judge of the Iligan City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, to wit: (1) Civil Case No. 6769 entitled "Venusto D. Hamoy, Jr. vs. National Transmission Corporation, Alan T. Ortiz, and Alexander B. Cortez," and (2) Civil Case No. 6831 entitled "Temotea Bonocan-Gumba, as one of the Heirs of Andres B. Bonocan and Victoriana S. Bonocan vs. Faith Daven Hamoy and Neil Anthony Halibas Marzo, et al."

Prior to the institution of Civil Case Nos. 6769 and 6831, complainant was embroiled in several cases before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). These are (1) DARAB Case No. 12-39-84-92 for Legal Redemption and Damages with Preliminary Injunction filed by Teresita Roble, (2) DARAB Case No. XII-338-LN-98 filed by Rafael Roble, and (3) Special Proceeding No. 03-2275, entitled "In the Matter of the Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession" (collectively, the DARAB Cases).

The DARAB Cases

The DARAB Cases involved a property, composed of several parcels of land owned by Rufino Booc and Felisa Booc. The said property was eventually mortgaged by the Boocs to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Iligan, as security for their loan therewith. Due to the Booc's failure to pay their mortgage obligation, PNB extra-judicially foreclosed the property. The property was thereafter acquired by the complainant during the public auction sale.

Claiming to be share tenants of the property even while it was still owned by the Badelles Family, Teresita and Rafael Roble instituted DARAB Case Nos. 12-39-84-92 and XII-338-LN-98 against PNB prior to the conduct of the auction sale. These DARAB Cases, however, were eventually decided in favor of PNB and the complainants. Subsequently, in Special Proceeding No. 03-2275, a Writ of Possession was issued by the Iligan City RTC, Branch 3, in favor of the complainant to place him in possession of the property.

Complainant alleges that before his appointment as presiding judge of the Iligan RTC, Branch 5, respondent served as legal counsel of the Spouses Robles in the proceedings before the DARAB, as well as in Special Proceeding No. 03-2275.

Civil Case Nos. 6769 and 6831

Upon being appointed to the bench as the presiding judge of the Iligan City RTC, Branch 5, respondent presided over Civil Case Nos. 6769 and 6831.

Civil Case No. 6769 is an action for injunctive relief which the complainant filed against the National Transmission Corporation in relation to his employment thereat. The case was dismissed for forum shopping and complainant's failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Civil Case No. 6831, on the other hand, is an action for the declaration of nullity of a deed of sale filed by a certain Temotea Bonocan-Gumba against several defendants, including Faith Daven Hamoy, the complainant's daughter whom he allegedly represented in the said case. The respondent rendered judgment therein based on a compromise agreement executed by the parties' counsel.

Complainant's Arguments

The complainant contends that respondent should have voluntarily recused himself from resolving Civil Case Nos. 6769 and 6831 due to the latter's involvement in the adverted DARAB Cases as his opposing counsel. Respondent's failure to do so, according to the complainant, tainted his appearance as an impartial and neutral judge which is tantamount to gross misconduct and violation of Section 5 (a), Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings; x x x

Complainant further alleges that respondent approved the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. 6831 even without a Special Power of Attorney from him or his daughter authorizing their counsel to enter into a compromise agreement with the adverse party. This, complainant insists, constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure.

Respondent's Comment

For his part, respondent counters that there was no factual nor legal ground for his inhibition in Civil Case Nos. 6769 and 6831.

While admitting that he indeed took part in Special Proceeding No. 03-2275, respondent justified that his participation therein was only limited to the filing of an Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Possession. Anent Civil Case No. 6831, respondent points out that complainant is not a party thereto, and thus is not the proper party to assail the approval of the Compromise Agreement. 1

In both cases, respondent emphasizes that complainant never moved for his inhibition.

Issue

The sole issue for the resolution of this Court is whether or not respondent has committed gross misconduct and gross violation of law.

Our Ruling

The complaint is dismissed for lack of merit.

At the outset, We emphasize that, in administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence, 2 or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. As will be discussed hereunder, complainant utterly failed to discharge this burden.

The applicable rule governing the disqualification or inhibition of judges is found in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

In relation thereto, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct calls for the judges' disqualification in instances where they are unable to decide the controversy with impartiality or will be perceived to do so:

SECTION 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to instances where:

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;

(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;

(c) The judge or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy;

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

(e) The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or

(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.

The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned. 3 The second paragraph, which governs voluntary inhibition, gives judges the exclusive prerogative to recuse themselves from hearing cases for reasons other than those pertaining to their pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous rulings or decisions. 4 Time and again, We have held that the matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judges. 5 As explained in People v. Dela Torre-Yadao, 6 the judges concerned are in a better position to determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect their attitude towards the parties or their cases.

Be that as it may, the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, does not give the judge the unfettered discretion to decide whether he should desist from hearing a case. The mere imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment is not enough ground, absent clear and convincing evidence that can overcome the presumption that the judge will perform his or her duties according to law without fear or favor. 7 The inhibition must be for just and valid causes, and there is a necessity to prove the existence or even manifestation of such partiality. The proof required needs to point to some specific act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for inhibition.

In these lights, no such grounds exist which could have warranted the voluntary inhibition of the respondent in Civil Case Nos. 6769 and 6831. The partiality and bias being attributed to the respondent is more imagined than real.

For one, the DARAB Cases and Civil Case Nos. 6769 and 6831 are separate and distinct cases that are totally unrelated. That respondent took part in the DARAB Cases when he was still a practicing lawyer is insufficient ground for the respondent to recuse himself from deciding the two adverted civil cases. The Rules do not require judges to inhibit themselves in every instance where their opponents during their time as practicing lawyers are parties to the cases brought before them.

Moreover, other than respondent's previous entanglement in the DARAB Cases, complainant failed to point out even a single concrete act or conduct of the respondent from where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or appreciated. Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that judges will undertake their noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. 8

Anent the allegation that respondent rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6831 based on a compromise agreement without the written consent of the defendant Faith Daven Hamoy, suffice it to state that the charge is clearly judicial in nature. Complainant essentially assails the validity of the Compromise Agreement. However, he is not the proper party to do so considering that he is not privy to the case. Clearly, he lacks standing to question respondent's ruling.

In any event, the defendant, as alleged by the respondent, accepted the amount due to her under the terms of the Compromise Agreement, and this allegation has not been refuted by the complainant. Defendant, therefore, is precluded from questioning the validity of the agreement inasmuch as she acquiesced and benefitted therefrom. Jurisprudence instructs that if the complainant felt aggrieved of the judge's actions, his or her recourse is through judicial remedies, i.e., to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. 9 An administrative inquiry on the propriety of respondent's rulings is not the proper recourse.

Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him administratively liable. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. 10 Indeed, Lago v. Abul, Jr. stresses that:

x x x x [J]udges are not administratively responsible for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction. Not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 11

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that respondent was motivated by any ill-will or bad faith in approving the Compromise Agreement.

Notably, complainant never moved for the inhibition of the respondent during the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 6769 and 6831. He only complained of respondent's involvement in the two cases after an unfavorable decision had been rendered against him. Respondent's unfavorable judgment against the complainant, however, is insufficient to prove that the former had acted with bias against him. Rubin v. Corpus-Cabochan 12 teaches that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned from mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part. Although the decision may be deemed erroneous by a losing party as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. 13 The Court will not disqualify a judge based on speculations and surmises or the adverse nature of the judge's rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him or her. 14

To reiterate, only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned, which do not obtain herein. For these reasons, the complaint against the respondent is dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the complaint against Associate Justice Oscar V. Badelles is DISMISSED for lack of merit." Sereno, C.J., on official leave. (adv1)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) FELIPA B. ANAMAClerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Comment dated June 14, 2017, p. 5.

2.Duduaco v. Laquindanum, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 428, 434.

3.Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74, September 27, 2010, 631 SCRA 312, 319.

4.People v. Ong, G.R. Nos. 162130-39, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 679, 687.

5.Latorre v. Ansaldo, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1563, May 31, 2001, 358 SCRA 311, 317.

6. G.R. Nos. 162144-54, November 13, 2012, 685 SCRA 264, 280.

7.Id. at 280, citing Spouses Abrajano v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr., 517 Phil. 663, 674-675 (2006).

8.Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc., G.R. No. 160966, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 355.

9.Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana against Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., et al., A.M. No. CA-13-51-J, July 2, 2013, 700 SCRA 348; Bacolot v. Paño, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2241, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 17.

10.Re: Complaint dated January 28, 2015 of Catherine Damayo, represented by her mother, Veniranda Damayo, against Hon. Marilyn Lagura-Yap, Associate Justice, Court of Appeals-Visayas, Cebu City, Cebu, A.M. No. CA-15-53-J, July 14, 2015, 762 SCRA 581, 587-588.

11. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 247, 251.

12. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3589-RTJ, July 29, 2013, 702 SCRA 330, 343.

13.Dipatuan v. Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 48, 54.

14.Supra note 8, at 362.