Re: Pamatong
This is a civil case, specifically an administrative matter, involving a petition for disbarment filed by Atty. Elly V. Pamatong against Supreme Court Associate Justice Marvic M. V. F. Leonen. The Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated January 15, 2013, dismissed the case for lack of legal basis. The Court held that an incumbent member of the Supreme Court may only be removed from office through impeachment, as provided in the Constitution. Disbarment proceedings against a sitting Supreme Court Justice would be considered a circumvention of the constitutional mandate and is therefore prohibited. The Court clarified that this ruling does not imply immunity of Supreme Court Justices from criminal or ethical liability, but simply emphasizes that the constitutional route of impeachment must be followed in determining and enforcing liability against an incumbent member of the Supreme Court.
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EN BANC
[A.M. No. 12-11-14-SC. January 15, 2013.]
RE: PETITION FOR DISBARMENT FILED BY ATTY. ELLY V. PAMATONG AGAINST SUPREME COURT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARVIC M. V. F. LEONEN
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated January 15, 2013, which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. 12-11-14-SC (Re: Petition for Disbarment Filed by Atty. Elly V. Pamatong against Supreme Court Associate Justice Marvic M. V. F. Leonen). — The Court finds no basis to proceed with the instant disbarment case against respondent, an incumbent member of the Supreme Court, who may only be removed from office by impeachment as provided for under Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
SEC. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Italics supplied)
Jurisprudence prohibits disbarment of an incumbent member of the Supreme Court. In Cuenco v. Hon. Fernan, 1 a disbarment case filed against then incumbent Supreme Court Justice Marcelo B. Fernan was dismissed not only for utter lack of merit, but because it amounted to a circumvention of the constitutional mandate that his removal from office should only be by way of impeachment. The Court held that: SacDIE
There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id.) and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.). all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. 2 (Italics supplied)
The Court restated its ruling in In Re: Raul M. Gonzalez, 3 thus:
It is important to underscore the rule of constitutional law here involved. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. . . . . 4 (Italics supplied)
The Court clarified that the ruling in In Re: Gonzalez does not mean that Members of the Supreme Court are immune from liability for possible criminal acts or unethical behavior, but simply emphasizes that the fundamental procedural requirement for determination and enforcement of liability against an incumbent member of the Supreme Court is through the constitutional route of impeachment. 5
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition outright for lack of legal basis pursuant to Sec. 2, Article XI of the Constitution and its supporting jurisprudence." Brion, J., on leave. Leonen, J., no part. (adv14)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDALClerk of Court
Footnotes
1.241 Phil. 816 (1988).
2.Id. at 828.
3.In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez dated March 16, 1988 Requesting Honorable Justice Marcelo B. Fernan to Comment on an Anonymous Letter-Complaint, 243 Phil. 167 (1988).
4.Id. at 169-170.
5.Id. at 172.
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