SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 211585. April 23, 2014.]
FLORO D. RAYMUNDO, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DELA CARLOTA/LUIS MA. L. ZABALAJAUREGUI, PEDRO A. ROXAS, ROGELIO G. CORDOVA AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 23 April 2014which reads as follows: ACcDEa
G.R. No. 211585 (Floro D. Raymundo, petitioner v. Central Azucarera Dela Carlota/Luis Ma. L. ZabalaJauregui, Pedro A. Roxas, Rogelio G. Cordova and National Labor Relations Commission, respondents)
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, Cebu City (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 04493 dated 10 October 2012 and 29 January 2014, respectively.
On 24 July 2007, the Labor Arbiter granted the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by petitioner and ruled that private respondent's alleged re-engineering or retrenchment program resulting to the abolition of its Agricultural Extension Department (AED), where petitioner held his position, was illegal. Thereafter, upon appeal by both parties, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) modified in its 25 November 2008 Decision the aforesaid Labor Arbiter's ruling of illegal dismissal and ruled that petitioner was not illegally dismissed but legally retrenched. Subsequently, petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the NLRC in the 24 April 2009 Resolution.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated said judgment by the NLRC before the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 04493, which was denied on its 10 October 2012 Decision. The appellate court declared that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that petitioner was not illegally dismissed from service, based on the following factual and legal considerations: (a) petitioner was not singled out by private respondent in its re-engineering program considering that several other employees were likewise affected by the abolition of the AED were they were assigned, and manifested their intention to avail of the early retirement package offered by private respondent or to seek re-assignment to other departments; thus, without proof that said program was tainted by malice and ill-will on the part of private respondent, its management prerogative to effect a more economic and efficient method of production could not be questioned; and (b) Article 283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines does not require that the employer should be suffering financial losses before it can terminate the services of its employees on the ground of redundancy; hence, with proper notices to petitioner and to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) of the abolition of the AED, private respondent legally terminated petitioner's services. Subsequently, petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in the 29 January 2014 Resolution.
Hence, the instant appeal.
This Court is being presented with the issue of whether or not the CA erred in affirming the subject Decision and Resolution of the NLRC which considered petitioner's termination from the service valid and in accordance with our labor laws on the ground of redundancy. THaAEC
A perusal of petitioner's contentions, we find that there is no error on the part of the CA in rendering its assailed Decision and Resolution dated 10 October 2012 and 29 January 2014, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 04493.
At the outset, redundancy is among the authorized causes for separation from service. However, to protect labor, dismissals due to redundancy are subject to strict requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code, to wit:
ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL. — The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title by serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly from the foregoing, the only requirements to be observed in removing an employee from service on the ground of redundancy are proper notices to the said employee concerned and to the DOLE, at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the appellate court, private respondent had indeed complied with the abovementioned notices and furthermore gave petitioner the option either to avail of an early retirement package or receive a retrenchment pay. As a matter of fact, it was actually petitioner who failed to choose within the given period any of the aforesaid options which eventually contributed to the finality of his termination from the service under said authorized cause.
Worthy to emphasize that redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. 1DTEScI
Simply put, redundancy exists when the number of employees is in excess of what is reasonably necessary to operate the business. The declaration of redundant positions is a management prerogative. The determination that the employee's services are no longer necessary or sustainable and therefore properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment by the employer. The wisdom or soundness of this judgment is not subject to the discretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC. 2
Based on the allegations of petitioner and factual findings of the appellate court, private respondent took the apparent effort of explaining to petitioner the financial condition of the company, the reason why his position was considered as redundant, and the possible options he could avail of, all contained in the notice given to him more than a month before his removal from the service. These factual circumstances indeed produced adequate proof of such redundancy to justify the dismissal of the affected employees. Similarly, in one case, 3 the fact of redundancy was sufficiently established through affidavits executed by the officers of the company, explaining the reasons and necessities for the implementation of the redundancy program.
Note that only substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies. Substantial evidence, as amply explained in numerous cases, is that amount of "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 4 In the case at bench, private respondent has established redundancy based on relevant evidence appreciated and considered by the NLRC and the CA. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that petitioner was not illegally dismissed.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals in its 10 October 2012 Decision and 29 January 2014 Resolution, in CA-G.R. SP No. 04493, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Sebuguero v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115394, 27 September 1995, 248 SCRA 532, 542.
2. San Miguel Corporation v. Del Rosario, G.R. Nos. 168194 & 168603, 13 December 2005, 477 SCRA 604, 614.
3. Soriano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 165594, 23 April 2007.
4. Reno Foods, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116462, 18 October 1995, 249 SCRA 379, 385.