FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 242740. September 16, 2020.]
ROBERTO RANIN, JR. y SORIANO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 16, 2020 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 242740 — ROBERTO RANIN, JR. Y SORIANO, petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
After reviewing the Petition and its annexes, inclusive of the Decision 1 dated August 20, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 39069 affirming the Judgment 2 dated August 3, 2016, Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City in Criminal Case No. 2015-0060 finding petitioner Roberto Ranin, Jr. y Soriano (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm under Section 28 (a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 10591, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in the challenged Decision as to warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
Petitioner comes before this Court, claiming that he did not have constructive possession of the unlicensed firearm because he had no discretion over what to do with the same — all he had to do was give the firearm to a certain Marcel. Even assuming that he had constructive possession, such possession is merely temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control. 3
The Court finds no merit in petitioner's arguments.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the object of the crime is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the object of the crime is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. 4 Conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. 5
Petitioner's denial of his control and dominion over the unlicensed firearm is belied by his own testimony during cross-examination:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, when that person who was introduced as boss arrived, you were the one who instructed Larry to bring that sack to that person who was introduced as boss, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
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Q And that is why Larry has no knowledge about that transaction or about your conversation with Ying Reburiano, am I correct?
A None, sir.
Q That is why when you asked and told Larry to bring the sack to the person who claims to be the boss, he immediately complied with your instruction to bring the sack to the boss?
A Yes, sir, because the boss was already looking for it. 6
The unlicensed firearm was placed under petitioner's custody. He agreed to keep the firearm at the store under his watch. He was the only one present who had the authority to give the firearm to the buyer, Marcel, since he alone was privy to an alleged arrangement with a certain Ying·Reburiano (Reburiano). When Marcel's boss arrived, petitioner instructed Larry Paelma to get the sack containing the firearm and give it to Marcel. Clearly, petitioner had constructive possession of the subject firearm.
Anent petitioner's argument that his possession of the unlicensed firearm is temporary, incidental, casual or harmless, the Court finds otherwise. In People v. Estoista, 7 the Court described the kind of possession that would constitute as temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless:
The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact definition, and opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute violation vary. The rule laid down in the United States Courts — rule which we here adopt — is that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon. A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment x x x." 8
In People v. Melgar, 9 accused, the pledgee of a Smith and Wesson revolver Cal. 38 and eight rounds of ammunition, was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. Accused raised the argument that his keeping of the firearm is merely temporary, casual, incidental and harmless. The Court did not give credence to his argument, holding that although at the time of the search, accused had been keeping the revolver for only four days, said possession was indefinite as long as the loan was not paid. Thus, even if the possession of a firearm is temporary, an accused can nonetheless be convicted for illegal possession if he had the intent to possess the same.
Although mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Otherwise stated, to be convicted of illegal possession of firearm it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent. 10
In this case, the Court affirms the finding of the lower courts that petitioner had intent to possess the unlicensed firearm; his possession of the firearm is not merely "temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless" as these concepts are contemplated by jurisprudence. 11 Following the theory of the defense, the unlicensed firearm was entrusted to petitioner with the instruction to give the same to Marcel and, in turn, receive the payment. Petitioner voluntarily agreed to the arrangement, took the firearm — acquiring control and custody thereof — and acted as a middleman between Reburiano and Marcel. Even though his possession of the firearm as a middleman was temporary, there is no doubt that he had intent to possess the unlicensed firearm during the period that it was in his custody. Petitioner knew that the sack contained a firearm. Yet, he took it from Reburiano, kept it at the store, and facilitated the transaction between Reburiano and Marcel. In fact, contrary to the supposed instructions given to him by Reburiano, petitioner did not give the firearm to Marcel. Instead, he gave the firearm to Marcel's boss, who turned out to be SPO2 Clifford de Jesus. If petitioner were indeed just an innocent intermediary, he would not have had the discretion to wait for Marcel's boss to claim the firearm as this was not in accordance with Reburiano's instructions. Petitioner would have given the sack containing the firearm to Marcel upon the latter's arrival at the store. Clearly, petitioner is more than what he claims to be.
The case at bar is akin to Idanan v. People, 12 a case for illegal possession of lumber under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, a special law like RA 10591. After receiving a tip about illegal loggers transporting narra flitches, policemen patrolled the area and spotted the truck loaded with lumber. The policemen approached the truck and found petitioner Idanan behind the wheel and petitioners Del Barrio and Plopenio as passengers. Two other individuals, who remained at large, were seen hauling lumber to be loaded into the truck. Petitioners were not able to produce any document authorizing them to transport the lumber. Charged with illegal possession of lumber, petitioners argued that their possession of the lumber was merely temporary, incidental, casual and harmless. Idanan claimed that the truck was owned by his father while Del Barrio and Plopenio contended that they were merely present at the scene of the crime. The Court therein found that petitioners had intent to possess the lumber.
Moreover, in the instant case, petitioner knew that the sack contained a firearm. He was also aware that the keeping of a firearm without the necessary license is illegal. That he relied on Reburiano's assurances that the necessary documents were inside the sack is irrelevant. RA 10591, being a special law, is malum prohibitum.
In People v. Bongcarawan, 13 a case for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the Court held:
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the trial judge:
First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment of the imagination? He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall selling sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused.
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same. 14
Similar to Bongcarawan, there is no proof in this case that Reburiano indeed exists. Other than his self-serving testimony that he merely accommodated Reburiano's request, petitioner did not present other evidence to support his claim.
In finding petitioner guilty of illegal possession of a firearm, the CA discussed:
Even if We are to consider accused-appellant Ranin's narration of facts, it remains undeniable that the subject firearm and ammunition were under his possession. As aptly pointed out by the RTC, accused-appellant Ranin, Jr., allowed himself to act as an errand boy and courier of Reburiano x x x.
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In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime. The subject firearm and ammunitions, respectively, were duly presented before the trial court. They were also identified by SPO2 Clifford Andalis De Jesus (SPO2 De Jesus) as the firearm and ammunition accused-appellant Ranin, Jr., gave to them.
It bears emphasis that prosecution witness SPO2 De Jesus is a police officer and impartial third person who had no motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant Ranin, Jr. When there is no evidence that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. The Supreme Court have also held that when police officers have no motive for testifying falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. 15
The danger sought to be curbed by RA 10591 will be perpetuated if middlemen in the buying and selling of unlicensed firearms are permitted to go unpunished. The same perils to public safety exist whether the unlicensed possessor of a firearm is the actual seller or just the intermediary.
Section 28 (a) of RA 10591 prescribes the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period should be the penalty next lower in degree, or prision mayor in its minimum period, which is six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. The maximum period should be anywhere between eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Therefore, the penalty of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 20, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39069 finding petitioner Roberto Ranin, Jr. y Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm under Section 28 (a) of RA 10591 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the penalty for violation of Section 28 (a) of RA 10591 is six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 29-38. Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate Justices Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles and Gabriel T. Robenol concurring.
2. CA rollo, pp. 32-50. Penned by Presiding Judge Valentin E. Pura, Jr.
3.Rollo, p. 25.
4. See People v. De la Trinidad, 742 Phil. 347, 357 (2014).
5.Idanan v. People, 783 Phil. 429, 437 (2016).
6. TSN dated March 16, 2016, p. 18.
7. 93 Phil. 647 (1953).
8.Id. at 653.
9. 100 Phil. 298 (1956).
10.Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 234196, November 21, 2018, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64823>.
11. See People v. Remereta, 98 Phil. 413 (1956).
12.Supra note 5.
13. 433 Phil. 918 (2002).
14.Id. at 929.
15.Rollo, pp. 36-37.