FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 207998. June 16, 2021.]
TERESITA RACADIO, ALDRINE RACADIO, ESTRELLITA ESTRADA,1ET AL., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ROMEO AND DAHLIA VINLUAN, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 16, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 207998 — (TERESITA RACADIO, ALDRINE RACADIO, ESTRELLITA ESTRADA, ET AL., petitioners v. SPOUSES ROMEO AND DAHLIA VINLUAN, respondents). — This is a petition for review on certiorari2 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 3 dated February 22, 2013 and Resolution 4 dated June 13, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125128. The CA reversed the Decision 5 dated March 13, 2012 and Order 6 dated May 11, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41, in Civil Case No. 2011-0267-D, which in turn reversed the Decision 7 dated June 6, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Dagupan City, Branch 3, in the ejectment case docketed as Civil Case No. 16454.
The Antecedent Facts
The CA in its Decision summarized the facts of this case and the parties' respective arguments as follows:
The antecedents of the case show that [respondents] spouses Romeo and Dahlia Vinluan are the owners of the subject parcels of land located in Bonuan, Gueset, Dagupan City, covered by TCT No. 75394, registered in the names of [respondents]; and TCT No. 59204, registered in the name of one Jose A. Mejia [collectively, "Subject Property"]. [Petitioners] Teresita Racadio, Aldrine Racadio, Estrellita Besa Cruz, Minda Vidal, Teresita Estrada, Virgie Aguilar, Patricio Genuinio and Chito Limbos are the occupants of the subject parcels of land.
The previous registered owners of the property, Camilo Mejia and Trinidad Mejia, filed sometime in March 1988 an ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 7953, against the occupants thereof which included some of the [petitioners] herein or their predecessors in interest. In a Decision dated July 14, 1988 rendered by the MTCC, Branch 3, Dagupan City, the defendants therein [including some of petitioners herein] were ordered to vacate the subject premises within a period of one month. The said decision became final and executory. This notwithstanding, [petitioners] were allowed to stay in the premises subject to a promise to vacate upon demand by the owners.
Thereafter, [respondents] acquired the subject parcels of land and they demanded that [petitioners] vacate the same but the latter refused. [Respondents] then filed a complaint before the Barangay for purposes of conciliation. A certificate to file action was thereafter issued by the Barangay when [petitioners] failed to appear during the conciliation hearing. Accordingly, a complaint for ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 16454, was filed by [respondents] against [petitioners] before the MTCC, Branch 3, Dagupan City.
In their traverse, [petitioners] alleged that their occupation of the subject premises was through the permission granted to them by the primitive registered owners who are also the ancestors of some of the [petitioners]. They also claimed that they are not residing in the land owned by [respondents] but in Lot 17 which is owned by Jose Mejia. 8
MTCC Decision
The MTCC rendered its Decision 9 dated June 6, 2011 in favor of respondents and ordering petitioners to vacate the Subject Property:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and ordering the defendants Teresita Racadio, Aldrine Racadio, Estrellita Besa Cruz, Minda Vidal, Teresita Estrada, Virgie Aguilar, Patricio Genuinio and Chito Limbos:
(1) to vacate the premises;
(2) to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30.00 each as reasonable compensation to the use of the premises;
(3) to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the amount of P6,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(4) to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 10
The MTCC held that respondents were the established owners of the land where petitioners erected their houses and were staying (Subject Property). They merely tolerated petitioners' occupancy and thus had the right to demand them to vacate.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the decision to the RTC on the basis of the following arguments:
1. The previous Decision dated July 14, 1988 in Civil Case No. 7953 11 (Old Decision) cannot serve as basis to eject petitioners. Even if respondents admittedly own Lots 2 and 17 of Pcs-1-00383, the lands involved in Civil Case No. 7953 were different, namely Lots 1, 9, and 18 of Pcs-1-00383.
2. Petitioners' houses are located in Lot 17 of Pcs-1-00383 which is owned by Jose A. Mejia (Mejia) and not respondents. Mejia allegedly gave them permission to construct their houses on the Subject Property and stay there.
3. Respondents' Complaint should be dismissed because their proper remedy was to enforce and execute the Old Decision and not to file a new case. 12
RTC Decision
The RTC rendered its Decision 13 dated March 13, 2012 reversing and setting aside the MTCC Decision and dismissing respondents' Complaint for ejectment:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside and vacating the subject decision and a new one is rendered dismissing the complaint.
SO ORDERED. 14
The dismissal by the RTC relied on the procedural ground that respondents' remedy should have been to execute and enforce the Old Decision, and not to file a new action for ejectment. It pertinently explained:
After a careful review of the decision appealed from, the Court finds the appeal meritorious. Admittedly, an action for Ejectment was earlier filed by the plaintiffs-appellees against the herein defendants-appellants docketed as Civil Case No. 7953 and a decision was rendered in the said case on July 14, 1988 by the MTCC, Branch 3, Dagupan City ordering the defendants-appellants to vacate the premises in question and to remove their respective houses therein. The said decision has become final and executory. The plaintiffs' remedy therefore is for the execution and enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 7953 without the need of filing another action for ejectment. The issues in this case have been litigated and have been resolved in the earlier case filed and they can no longer be re-litigated. 15
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the Decision but was denied by the RTC in its Order 17 dated May 11, 2012.
Respondents appealed the RTC Decision and Order to the CA through a petition for review 18 under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court raising the following errors:
1. Petitioners did not file a Notice of Appeal in accordance with Section 3, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. 19
2. The RTC wrongly applied the principles of Res Judicata and Bar by Prior Judgment based on the Old Decision to dismiss respondents' Complaint. On the contrary, these principles should have favored respondents since the Old Decision proves their ownership over the Subject Property and the fact that petitioners' occupation was only due to their tolerance. 20
3. The RTC erred in ruling that respondents' proper remedy was to enforce the Old Decision. The prescriptive period to enforce it already lapsed and thus could no longer be done. 21
Petitioners filed a Comment 22 to the petition claiming that they filed a Notice of Appeal. They did not refute any of respondents' substantive arguments.
CA Ruling
The CA rendered its Decision 23 dated February 22, 2013 reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision, and reinstating the MTCC Decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 13, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the Decision dated June 6, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Dagupan City, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 24
It concurred with respondents' argument that enforcing the Old Decision was no longer an available remedy. The filing of a motion to execute and enforce a final and executory judgment prescribes in five years while an action to revive it prescribes in 10 years. In this case, more than 20 years had already lapsed since the issuance of the Old Decision. Respondents therefore no longer had the remedy of enforcing it and correctly filed the new Complaint for ejectment. 25
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 26 of the Decision but was denied by the CA in its Resolution 27 dated June 13, 2013.
Hence, petitioners come to this Court with the following assignment of errors:
First Assigned Error
In brushing aside the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding that the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by private respondents sufficiently alleged facts that would substantiate their claim that they merely permitted or tolerated the occupation of the subject parcels of land by the petitioners.
Second Assigned Error
In brushing aside the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in concluding that the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment does not apply in the present case.
Third Assigned Error
In brushing aside the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court and in effect, reinstating the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities which is contradicted by the evidence on record.
Respondents filed a Comment 28 arguing that their ownership over the Subject Property and their right to demand petitioners to vacate are factual matters already established by the lower courts which should no longer be reviewed. Further, the CA did not err in ruling that res judicata did not apply. Respondents' cause of action for the instant unlawful detainer case arose only after the finality of the Old Decision when they tolerated petitioners' occupancy anew. The Old Decision therefore cannot serve to bar the instant case which is based on different facts.
Petitioners filed a Reply 29 to the Comment claiming that this case fell under the exceptions when the Court may review factual issues and essentially reiterating the other arguments in their petition.
Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision, and reinstating the MTCC Decision ordering petitioners to vacate the Subject Property.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is clear that a party may file a motion to execute a final and executory judgment within five years from the date of its entry. Beyond this period, the judgment may still be revived through an independent action before it is barred by the statute of limitations:
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
In this regard, Article 1144 of the Civil Code requires that an action upon a judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
The Court in Olongapo City v. Subic Water and Sewerage Co., Inc.30 elucidated on the two modes available to enforce a judgment, to wit:
Under Rule 39, Section 6, a judgment creditor has two modes in enforcing the court's judgment. Execution may be either through motion or an independent action.
These two modes of execution are available depending on the timing when the judgment creditor invoked its right to enforce the court's judgment. Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5) years from the date of its entry. On the other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion had already elapsed. However, for execution by independent action to prosper — the Rules impose another limitation — the action must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment. 31 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
The five-year prescriptive period has bearing on the jurisdiction of the court. Beyond this prescriptive period, the court loses jurisdiction and its issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the judgment is necessarily void. 32 The winning party must therefore avail of the remedies to enforce a final and executory judgment within the prescriptive periods or otherwise lose them.
In this case, the Old Decision was issued on July 14, 1988. On the other hand, respondents' Complaint for ejectment was filed on October 12, 2010. It is clear that when respondents filed the instant complaint, over 22 years had already lapsed since the issuance of the Old Decision. The RTC thus erred when it held that respondents should have enforced the Old Decision. Based on Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, the remedies to enforce the Old Decision either through motion or independent action had long prescribed and was no longer available for respondents. Consequently, respondents' filing of the new Complaint for ejectment against petitioners was proper.
On the substantive issue of respondents' right to eject petitioners, the petition still fails.
It is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts. This Court is generally limited to review only questions of law in petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 33 The difference between questions of law and questions of fact was explained in Republic v. Malabanan: 34
And in Leoncio v. De Vera, this Court has differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
This Court will no longer review questions of fact because factual findings of the lower courts are accorded the highest degree of respect absent clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness, or capriciousness. 35 This rule is more strictly applied when such factual findings are affirmed by the CA rendering these conclusive and binding. 36
Guided by the foregoing, petitioners' argument that respondents did not have a cause of action for unlawful detainer against them involves questions of fact which requires this Court to weigh evidence anew. However, the Court finds no compelling reasons in this case to review and disturb the factual findings of the lower courts.
It bears stressing that the CA, the RTC, and the MTCC have all reviewed the evidence and consistently affirmed respondents' ownership over the Subject Property and concomitant right to eject petitioners who are occupying it by mere tolerance.
The MTCC in its Decision held that respondents were the owners of the Subject Property and had the superior right to physical possession over it:
After a circumspect consideration, the Court is of the view that the plaintiffs are entitled to the physical possession being the owners of the property subject of the instant case. The right of physical possession of a property is among the essential incidents of ownership thereof. While possession by tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal from the moment a demand to vacate is made by the owner and the possessor refuses to comply with such demand (Ballesteros vs. Ablon, 482 SCRA 23). 37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The RTC Decision reversing the MTCC was only based on procedural grounds. Nevertheless, it essentially affirmed the merits of petitioners' ejectment when it held that respondents' remedy should have been to enforce the Old Decision as the issues "have [already] been litigated and have been resolved in the earlier case filed and they can no longer be re-litigated." 38
We affirm and quote below the CA's observations in upholding respondents' ownership of the Subject Property and their right to eject petitioners:
Contrary to the court a quo's finding, the facts and issues in the present ejectment case are not identical to the facts and issues which had been resolved and laid to rest in Civil Case No. 7953.
In Civil Case No. 7953, the pivotal issue was the continued possession of the occupants of the property, which included some of [petitioners] herein, despite demands by the then owners Camilo and Trinidad Mejia to vacate the same. Meanwhile, the present complaint for unlawful detainer filed by [respondents] clearly alleged that a judgment has been rendered in Civil Case No. 7953 in favor of Camilo and Trinidad Mejia, but the same was not enforced because [petitioners] were still allowed by the former owners to continue to occupy the subject parcels of land. In short, [petitioners'] stay in the premises was again tolerated by the owners even after the finality of the said decision. Accordingly, when [respondents] acquired the subject parcels of land, they initially tolerated [petitioners'] stay therein. The issue in the present unlawful detainer case only arose subsequent to the finality of Civil Case No. 7953 and when [petitioners] again refused to vacate the premises upon the demand of [respondents] who are now the registered owners thereof. Clearly, the facts upon which the former judgment in Civil Case No. 7953 was predicated did not continue to be the same facts of the case or incident in the present ejectment case.
In all, We find that the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by [respondents] sufficiently alleged facts that would substantiate their claim that they merely permitted or tolerated the occupation of the subject parcels of land by [petitioners]. The cause of action for unlawful detainer then springs from [petitioners'] failure to vacate the premises upon demand of [respondents] who are the owners thereof. It bears to stress that persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Accordingly, [respondents'] better right to possess the subject premises as owners thereof has been sufficiently proven. [Petitioners] should then be ordered to vacate the same. 39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners' last-ditch claim that Mejia is the registered owner of Lot 17 of Pcs-1-00383 covered by TCT No. 59204 and not respondents is negated by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of respondent Dahlia Vinluan. Respondents were at the very least beneficial owners of the land entitling them to a superior right to possess it.
All told, the CA did not commit any reversible error in reversing the RTC Decision and Order, and reinstating the MTCC Decision ordering petitioners to vacate the Subject Property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 22, 2013 and the Resolution dated June 13, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125128 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. The name also appears as Estrellita Besa Cruz in other parts of the records.
2.Rollo, pp. 9-26.
3.Id. at 28-35; penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, concurred in by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Danton Q. Bueser.
4.Id. at 37-38.
5.Id. at 122-126; penned by Judge Emma M. Torio.
6.Id. at 132.
7.Id. at 99-101; penned by Presiding Judge Santiago J. Marcella, Jr.
8.Id. at 29.
9.Id. at 99-101.
10.Id. at 101.
11.Id. at 67-70.
12.Id. at 112-118.
13.Id. at 122-126.
14.Id. at 126.
15.Id. at 125-126.
16.Id. at 127-131.
17.Id. at 132.
18.Id. at 133-142.
19.Id. at 137.
20.Id. at 138.
21.Id. at 139.
22.Id. at 143-146.
23.Id. at 28-35.
24.Id. at 34.
25.Id. at 32-33.
26.Id. at 152-156.
27.Id. at 37-38.
28.Id. at 167-174.
29.Id. at 187-190.
30. 740 Phil. 502 (2014).
31.Id. at 519.
32.Villareal, Jr. v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, 826 Phil. 967, 978 (2018).
33.Heirs of Teresita Villanueva v. Heirs of Petronila Syquia Mendoza, 810 Phil. 172, 177-178 (2017).
34. 646 Phil. 631, 637-638 (2010).
35.Heirs of Teresita Villanueva v. Heirs of Petronila Syquia Mendoza, supra at 178.
36.Castillo v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 150, 158 (1996).
37.Rollo, p. 100.
38.Id. at 126.
39.Id. at 33-34.