FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 187572. September 7, 2015.]
CONSOLACION RABINA-VALDEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES DOMINADOR VALDEZ, SR., ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 7, 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 187572 (Consolacion Rabina-Valdez, et al. v. Spouses Dominador Valdez, Sr., et al.). — The letter dated July 28, 2015 of Teresa P. Gajo, Records Officer III, Officer-in-Charge, Archives Section, Court of Appeals, transmitting the Court of Appeals rollo in CA-G.R. CV No. 90094 with 125 pages is NOTED.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90094 dated 26 February 2009. The CA affirmed the Decision 2 dated 2 July 2007 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilocos Sur, Branch 71. The challenged ruling ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to respondents.
On 20 January 2006, a Complaint 3 for accion reivindicatoria and Accounting of Fruits with Damages was filed by petitioners against respondents before the RTC of Candon City, Ilocos Sur, where the Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1038-C. 4 The material allegations of the Complaint are as follows:
2. That Nicolas, Eugenia, Filomena, Rufina, Felix, Fortunato, Avelino and Peregrino, all surnamed Valdez are the registered owners in undivided equal shares of a certain parcel of land situated in Allangigan 1st, Candon City, Ilocos Sur . . . 5 as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1042 under Tax Declaration No. ARP No. 005-00681. 6
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8. That plaintiffs/registered owners sometime in May 1991 decided to have the subject property subdivided among themselves and hired the services of a geodetic engineer to conduct a re-location survey and to prepare the subdivision plan, and after the relocation was made, it was found out that one-half of the aforementioned property particularly the southern portion is in the possession of the defendants described as Lot Nos. 3446-E, 3446-F, 3446-G, 3446-H, 3446-I and 3446-J of the subdivision plan, . . . . 7
9. That . . . plaintiffs/registered owners demanded from the defendants to vacate the premises as the portion they are occupying is part of Lot No. 3446 which is owned by them . . . . 8
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11. That due to their refusal to vacate the premises by claiming ownership thereof, the matter was referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa/Pangkat for conciliation or settlement but to no avail . . . . 9
In their Answer with Counterclaim, 10 respondents denied the existence of OCT No. 0-1042 and contended that it was Simeon Valdez (Simeon) and his son Doroteo who had bought the property from Eugenio Abaya and Emerenciana Nisse. The lot, located at Allangigan, Candon City, Ilocos Sur, had an area of 17,355 square meters (sq.m.) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale written in Spanish. 11 Allegedly, Simeon and Doroteo were co-owners of the land, and the former agreed that the property be registered in the name of the latter. 12 Later, Simeon gave his one-half share of the land to his other son Justo Valdez (Justo) with the knowledge of his other children including Doroteo. 13 When Justo died, respondents inherited his one-half share of the land, and they possessed and occupied it in the concept of owners for more than seventy (70) years with the knowledge of petitioners. 14
On 29 May 2006, respondents filed an Amended Answer with Counterclaim. They prayed, inter alia, that judgment be rendered ordering a reconveyance of the title to the subject property in their favor. 15 TIADCc
Thereafter, pre-trial was conducted. 16 In the Pre-trial Order 17 dated 06 July 2006, the parties agreed to reverse the order of trial by having respondents present their evidence first. 18
During trial, respondents presented the testimonies of Simplicio, Mariano, Roberto, Dominador — all surnamed Valdez — and Engr. Ermelo de Leon. They testified, among others, that it was Justo who owned and possessed the subject property, which was later on inherited by his children, herein respondents. No testimonial evidence was presented by petitioners. 19
After the submission of the parties' Memoranda, the RTC rendered a Decision 20 dated 2 July 2007 dismissing the case and ordering the reconveyance to respondents of the title to Lot Nos. 3446-E, 3446-F, 3446-G, 3446-H, 3446-I and 3446-J. 21
The RTC found that Eugenio Abaya and Emerenciana Nisse had indeed executed a Deed of Sale written in Spanish over a parcel of land located in Allangigan, Candon, Ilocos Sur, in favor of Simeon and Doroteo. 22 Petitioners, however, did not present any evidence controverting this fact. Because of their failure to do so, the presumption under Rule 131, Section 3 (e) 23 of the Rules of Evidence, was raised against them. 24
The RTC ruled thus:
The testimonies of Simplicio and Mariano are to be accorded great weight because their respective fathers were brothers of Justo, from whom the defendants claim to have inherited Lot 3446-E to Lot 3446-J, and Doroteo, from whom the plaintiffs claim to have inherited the whole Lot 3446. Simplicio and Mariano, therefore, have first hand knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the ownership of Lot 3446. . . . . Besides, the plaintiffs did not even attempt to prove that they had extraneous reasons to testify falsely in favor of the defendants.
Rule 131, Sec. 3 (e) of the Rules of Evidence provides "that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced." By not testifying themselves or presenting other evidence to disprove the facts that Simplicio and Mariano testified to in plain, simple, and categorical manner, the presumption, according to this rule, is that any evidence the plaintiffs would have presented would have been adverse to their cause.
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. . . . [T]he trial court cannot help but notice that while the plaintiffs have been registered owners of the whole of Lot 3446 since 1956, they only claim for the accounting of the fruits of the southern one-half portion occupied by the defendants from the time of their demand in 1991. But why not from 1956? Because if they claim for the accounting of fruits from 1956 they would have admitted in their own pleading that the defendants and their ancestors before them have been in possession of the same since 1956 and that neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessors-in-interest have ever been in possession of it. 25 cSEDTC
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA, which rendered a Decision 26 dated 26 February 2009 affirming the RTC ruling. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 2 July 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Candon City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 71 in Civil Case No. 1038-C is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED. 27
The CA held that respondents had been in possession of the subject land since 1954 — possession that was adverse, continuous and in the concept of owners. 28 Further, the appellate court found that the case had been filed beyond the prescriptive period of ten (10) years under Article 555 (4) of the Civil Code. Since petitioners were not in possession of Lot Nos. 3446-E to 3446-J, their accion reivindicatoria had already prescribed.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
Respondents filed their Comment 29 contesting the Petition and praying for its dismissal for failure to establish by a preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over the subject property. On 27 October 2009, they filed a Supplemental Comment 30 alleging that they had received a Resolution from the CA declaring its Decision dated 26 February 2009 final and executory for failure of petitioners to file either an MR of its Decision or a petition before this Court.
In their Reply to the Comment, 31 petitioners reiterated the allegations in their Petition.
OUR RULING
We dismiss the Petition.
As a general rule, certiorari will not lie unless a court a quo has, through a Motion for Reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. 32 The law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office, an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have committed before a resort to the courts of justice can be had. 33
While there are recognized exceptions 34 to this rule, petitioners have not convinced us that this case is one of those. They have failed not only to explain their failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the CA, but also to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement. Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners' own omission to file the required motion for reconsideration. 35
On this ground alone, the Petition should be dismissed outright. There is, however, another cogent reason for dismissing it.
What is being contested in this case is whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the RTC ruling.
In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent. 36 "Grave abuse of discretion" means a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 37
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. 38 It must be grave abuse of discretion, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 39
Here, we see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in affirming the RTC ruling.
We held in Philippine Surety and Insurance Co. v. Jacala40 that where the question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, not its validity or the jurisdiction of the court that rendered it, the question is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
Petitioners raise the following allegations or issues: (1) that the CA wrongfully affirmed that respondents were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject properties; (2) that it disregarded the Decision in a cadastral proceeding granting petitioners ownership of the subject properties; (3) that it failed to give credence to the documentary evidence of petitioners; (4) that it erroneously declared, in the absence of proof, that the subject properties were inherited properties of Justo; and (5) that it wrongfully declared that their Complaint for accion reivindicatoria had already prescribed, even if they were also in possession of the other half of Lot No. 3446, which is not the subject of this case.
A reading of these issues raised by petitioners readily shows that they are questions of fact. In this regard, great weight is accorded to the findings of fact of the RTC. 41 The trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled to great weight and respect. 42 In this case, we find nothing that would require us to depart from this well-established rule.
Besides, the issues raised by petitioners will only affect the wisdom or legal soundness of the Decision rendered by the CA. They will not in any way touch on the jurisdiction of the court that rendered that Decision.
As culled from Jacala:
[T]he office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any purpose. It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted only to extraordinary cases — cases in which the action of the inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps in the case would result in a waste of time and money and would produce no result whatever, where the parties, or their privies would be utterly deceived; where a final judgment or decree would be naught but a snare and delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a recorded falsehood, a standing menace. 43
Hence, this case evidently falls outside the province of a special civil action for certiorari. SDAaTC
Even assuming arguendo that this case satisfies a correct special civil action for certiorari, we still find no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the trial or the appellate court. The courts a quo have found that while it appears that Lot 3446 was registered in the names of petitioners, the latter were not able to establish their indubitable ownership over Lot Nos. 3446-E to 3446-J by a preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 26 February 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90094 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 41-62. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., and Sesinando E. Villon concurring.
2. Records, pp. 14-23. Penned by Judge Policarpio P. Martinez.
3. Rollo, pp. 65-70.
4. Id. at 42.
5. Id. at 66.
6. Id. at 55.
7. Id. at 67.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 67-68.
10. Id. at 71-76.
11. Id. at 72.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 73.
14. Id. at 73-74.
15. Id. at 45.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 85-88.
18. Id. at 45-46.
19. Id. at 48.
20. Records, pp. 14-23.
21. Id. at 23.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
24. Records, p. 20.
25. Id. at 19-21.
26. Supra note 1, at 41-62.
27. Id. at 61.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 146-149.
30. Id. at 153-154.
31. Id. at 172-176.
32. PAL Employees Ass'n v. PAL, Inc., 197 Phil. 203 (1982).
33. Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 743 (2002).
34. However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
(Abraham v. National Labor Relations Commission, 406 Phil. 310 (2001).
35. Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33.
36. Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, 377 Phil. 268 (1999).
37. Zarate v. Maybank Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 160976, 08 June 2005, 459 SCRA 785, 794.
38. Solvic Industrial Corp. v. NLRC, 357 Phil. 430 (1998).
39. Id.
40. 108 Phil. 177, 184 (1960).
41. Rosaroso v. Soria, G.R. No. 194846, 19 June 2013, 699 SCRA 232.
42. Belonghilot v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, 450 Phil. 265 (2003).
43. Philippine Surety and Insurance Co. v. Jacala, et al., 108 Phil. 177, 184 (1960).