FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 223783. May 5, 2021.]
CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING, petitioner,vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, MA. REGINA D. EUGENIO, ELIZABETH B. FERNANDEZ, * ALEXANDER B. FERNANDEZ, and JESSE K. AYUSTE, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated May 5, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 223783 (Cecilia Rachel V. Quisumbing,Petitioner v. Office of the Ombudsman, Ma. Regina D. Eugenio, Elizabeth B. Fernandez, Alexander B. Fernandez, and Jesse K. Ayuste, Respondents.) — This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated 26 August 2015 and the Resolution 3 dated 22 March 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139264, which affirmed the Joint Resolution 4 dated 28 August 2014 and the Joint Order 5 dated 11 November 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman). The Ombudsman found petitioner Cecilia Rachel V. Quisumbing (petitioner) administratively liable for Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 7 (d) of Republic Act No. (RA) 6713, 6 and ordered her dismissal from the service.
Antecedents
Petitioner was a former Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), while private respondents Ma. Regina Eugenio (Eugenio), Elizabeth Diego-Buizon (Diego-Buizon), 7 Alexander B. Fernandez (Fernandez), and Jesse Ayuste (Ayuste) were co-terminus employees of petitioner. 8
On 25 September 2013, Eugenio filed a complaint before the Ombudsman charging petitioner with: (1) violation of Section 7 (d) of RA 6713; (2) violation of Section 3 (b), (c), and (e) of RA 3019; 9 and (3) Direct Bribery against petitioner. She accused petitioner of always mistreating and humiliating her and her officemates while she was employed at the CHR. 10
Eugenio was hired by petitioner as Administrative Aide VI on 17 November 2008. In 2013, petitioner allegedly offered to promote Eugenio to Senior Administrative Assistant III, with the condition that her salary increase differential would be given to petitioner to form part of the office fund, or the CRVQ Office Fund. Upon petitioner's instruction, Eugenio drafted a written Agreement stating that the CRVQ Office Fund would be used for any expense that the parties agreed on, such as office outings. However, petitioner never signed the Agreement. After her promotion, Eugenio claimed that she remitted to petitioner her salary increase differentials for the months of January until June 2013 amounting to Php41,292.85. Unable to bear petitioner's alleged mistreatment, Eugenio resigned from her job on 30 July 2013. 11
Meanwhile, respondents Diego-Buizon, Fernandez and Ayuste, co-terminus employees at the CHR, likewise filed a collective complaint against petitioner, and corroborated Eugenio's allegations. 12
On 27 September 2013, then CHR Chairperson Loreta Ann Rosales indorsed the Complaint-Affidavits of Diego-Buizon, Fernandez, and Ayuste charging petitioner with violations of RA 3019 and RA 6713 to the Ombudsman. The complaints against petitioner were later consolidated. 13
Petitioner denied the allegation of maltreatment. She claimed that was Eugenio who offered the CRVQ Fund for the office since the latter was only interested in the terminal leave benefit. Petitioner insisted that she only acted as custodian of the office fund, which she held in trust for the benefit of all the staff. Further, she emphasized that the nature of the CRVQ Fund as an office fund was clearly embodied in the Agreement that Eugenio admittedly drafted. As custodian, petitioner even executed acknowledgment receipts every time Eugenio, or any other staff member, gave a contribution, showing that the same was created with good intentions. 14
On 28 August 2014, the Ombudsman rendered the Joint Resolution dismissing petitioner from the service on the ground of Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 7 (d) of RA 6713. The dispositive portion of the Joint Resolution reads: CAIHTE
WHEREFORE, finding probable cause for Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and violation of Section 7 (d) of R.A. No. 6713, let the corresponding Informations against respondent CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING, be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING is likewise found GUILTY of VIOLATION OF SECTION 7(d) OF R.A. No. 6713 and GRAVE MISCONDUCT and meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, including all its accessory penalties of (a) cancellation of eligibility, (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits and (c) perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Ombudsman denied in its Joint Order dated 11 November 2014. 16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Ombudsman's ruling finding petitioner liable for Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 7 (d) of RA 6713. It noted that the Ombudsman found substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for accepting the salary increase differential of Eugenio. Such finding was based on the written Agreement between petitioner and Eugenio regarding the remittance of the latter's salary increase differential, thus:
AGREEMENT
Mga napagkasunduan kaugnay ng pagtaas ng position sa trabaho:
Una, bagaman itinaas and position ni Ms. Eugenio [to the position Sr. Administrative Asst. III], ang trabahong kanyang gagampanan ay mananatiling pareho sa gawain ng Admin Aide VI. Walang dagdag na sweldong matatanggap si Ms. Eugenio.
xxx xxx xxx
Pangatlo, LAHAT ng sobrang sweldo na makukuha ni Ms. Eugenio bilang Sr. Admin Asst. III ay pangangalagaan ni Comm. Quisumbing bilang pondo ng lahat ng nagkasundo at tatawagin itong CRVQ Office Fund. x x x 17
Moreover, the CA noted that petitioner did not deny the existence of the Agreement and even admitted in her Counter-Affidavit that she instructed Eugenio to draft the same. In addition, the receipts signed by petitioner acknowledging that she received Eugenio's salary differentials supports this conclusion. The CA opined that petitioner used her function as CHR Commissioner, and as the superior of Eugenio, to be able to get hold of the latter's salary increase differential. Considering that mere acceptance of anything of monetary value in connection with the functions of a public office is a prohibited act under Section 7 (d) of RA 6713, the CA concluded that the Ombudsman did not err in finding petitioner guilty under the said law. 18
Issue
The lone issues before this Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the Ombudsman, finding petitioner liable for Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 7 (d) of RA 6713.
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the appeal partly meritorious.
During the pendency of the case, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion 19 dated 14 December 2020, stating that the Sandiganbayan acquitted her in the criminal cases filed against her. Petitioner maintains that her acquittal in the criminal cases precludes the finding of any administrative liability against her on the basis of the same transactions.
The Court cannot subscribe to petitioner's view. Unlike in criminal proceedings where guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, in administrative proceedings, the liability attaches so long as there is adequate evidence to support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have been performed, such that reasonable doubt does not automatically result in exoneration. 20 As explained in PO2 Flores v. People: 21
It is hornbook doctrine in administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same acts or omissions. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. Given the differences in the quantum of evidence required, the procedures actually observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as the objective of the two proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Hence, the exoneration in the administrative case is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint or vice versa. 22 (Emphasis supplied).
Similarly, in Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 23 the Court held:
The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, the CA erred in finding petitioner liable for Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 7 (d) of RA 6713. The Court notes that the written Agreement prepared by Eugenio specifically stated that the salary differential of Eugenio will form part of the office fund, of which petitioner will act as the custodian, thus: "LAHAT ng sobrang sweldo na makukuha ni Ms. Eugenio bilang Sr. Admin Asst. III ay pangangalagaan ni Comm. Quisumbing bilang pondo ng lahat ng nagkasundo at tatawagin itong CRVQ Office Fund."
Clearly, the fund was not for petitioner's personal benefit but for the office staff to use. As mere custodian of the office fund, petitioner could not be held liable for violation of Section 7 (d) of RA 6713, which prohibits public officials and employees from soliciting or accepting anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties. The evidence presented are not adequate to support the conclusion that petitioner endorsed Eugenio for promotion in exchange for the salary increase differential for her personal benefit.
Neither could petitioner be held liable for Grave Misconduct. In Office of theOmbudsman v. Reyes, 25 the Court differentiated the administrative offenses of Simple Misconduct and Grave Misconduct in this manner:
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of official functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of others. 26
Thus, for an act to constitute Grave Misconduct, which carries the penalty of dismissal from the service, the elements of corruption, flagrant disregard of an established rule, or willful intent to violate the law must be proved by substantial evidence. 27 Absent any of these elements, the act amounts only to Simple Misconduct. Grave Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of Simple Misconduct, and a person charged with Grave Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct. 28
In this case, petitioner is guilty only of simple misconduct. There is no adequate evidence to show that petitioner's acquiescence to act as custodian of the office fund was motivated by corruption or that she deliberately used her position to obtain personal benefit, causing injustice to others. Neither can petitioner's act as custodian of office funds evince a pernicious tendency to ignore the law or the rules. Nonetheless, as CHR Commissioner, petitioner should have been more circumspect and prudent in her actions to dispel any doubt of unlawful behavior or gross negligence as a public officer.
Incidentally, the Sandiganbayan, in its Decision 29 dated 22 September 2020, acquitted petitioner in the criminal case for Direct Bribery, violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as amended, and violation of Section 7 (d) of RA 6713. However, it must be stressed that the Sandiganbayan likewise found, as a final note, that "although it is not criminal in nature, it does not suit well as then Commissioner Quisumbing allowed herself to act as custodian of monies. This is unethical and inappropriate."
Under Section 46 (D) (2), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), 30 Simple Misconduct is classified as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense.
Considering that this is petitioner's first offense for Simple Misconduct, the Court finds that a penalty of six (6) months suspension is appropriate in this case. 31 However, since petitioner's term as CHR Commissioner has already ended, instead of the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine equivalent to six (6) months of her salary as a CHR Commissioner. aDSIHc
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 139264 dated 26 August 2015 and 22 March 2016, respectively, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Cecilia Rachel V. Quisumbing is found GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT.
In view of the termination of petitioner's term as CHR Commissioner, petitioner is ordered to PAY a FINE equivalent to six (6) months of her salary as a CHR Commissioner.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* An apparent typographical error. It should be Elizabeth Diego-Buizon and not Elizabeth B. Fernandez.
1.Rollo, pp. 22-41.
2.Id. at 12-19. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Carmelita Salandanan Manahan of the Special Sixth (6th) Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3.Id. at 10-11.
4. CA rollo, pp. 40-62.
5.Id. at 10-39.
6. Entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on 20 February 1989.
7. Mistakenly named as Elizabeth B. Fernandez in the case title of the CA Decision.
8.Rollo, p. 13.
9. Entitled "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT," approved on 17 August 1960.
10.Supra at note 8.
11.Rollo, pp. 13-14.
12.Id. at 14-15.
13.Id. at 320-321.
14.Id. at 15.
15. CA rollo, pp. 61-62.
16.Id. at 38-39.
17.Id. at 17.
18.Id. at 17-18.
19.Id. at 583-591.
20.See Miro v. Dosono, 634 Phil. 54, 62 (2010); G.R. No. 170697, 30 April 2010 [Per J. Carpio], citing Salvador v. Philippine Mining Service Corporation, 443 Phil. 878, 888-889 (2003); G.R. No. 148766, 22 January 2003 [Per C.J. Puno].
21. 830 Phil. 635 (2018); G.R. No. 222861, 23 April 2018 [Per C.J. Gesmundo].
22.Id. at 651.
23. 379 Phil. 21 (2000); G.R. No. 114683, 18 January 2000 [Per J. Buena].
24.Id. at 27-28.
25. 674 Phil. 416 (2011); G.R. No. 170512, 05 October 2011 [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro].
26.Id. at 429, citing Salazar v. Barriga, 550 Phil. 44, 48-49 (2007); A.M. No. P-05-2016, 19 April 2007 [Per C.J. Corona].
27.Office of the Ombudsman v. Rojas, G.R. Nos. 209274 & 209296-97, 24 July 2019 [Per J. A.B. Reyes, Jr.], citing De Guzman v. Office of the Ombudsman, 821 Phil. 681, 699 (2017); G.R. No. 229256, 22 November 2017 [Per J. Velasco, Jr.].
28.See Office of the Ombudsman v. Miedes, Sr., 570 Phil. 464, 473 (2008); G.R. No. 176409, 27 February 2008 [Per J. Austria-Martinez].
29.Rollo, pp. 592-627.
30. Promulgated on 08 November 2011.
31.See Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, 683 Phil. 553, 576 (2012); G.R. No. 165132, 07 March 2012 [Per J. Brion].