Quimpo v. Onayan

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 222597. February 19, 2018.]

RIZAL QUIMPO, JOINED BY HIS WIFE LUZ JAINGA, REP. BY ATTY-IN-FACT ALICIA VDA. DE BLAS, petitioners,vs. LAURENTE ONAYAN AND FELISA ONAYAN, SPOUSES, CEFERINA ONAYAN, BARCELISA ONAYAN PAROHINOG AND RIZALDO PAROHINOG, SPOUSES ROMEO PAROHINOG AND RECHILDA PAROHINOG, SPOUSES ARTURO ONAYAN AND CELSA ONAYAN, SPOUSES MARIA ONAYAN ORE AND JIMMY ORE, AND SPOUSES LITO AND ALMA ONAYAN, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedFebruary 19, 2018, which reads as follows: HSAcaE

"G.R. No. 222597 (Rizal Quimpo, joined by his wife Luz Jainga, rep. by Atty-in-fact Alicia vda. De Blas v. Laurente Onayan and Felisa Onayan, Spouses, Ceferina Onayan, Barcelisa Onayan Parohinog and Rizaldo Parohinog, Spouses Romeo Parohinog and Rechilda Parohinog, Spouses Arturo Onayan and Celsa Onayan, Spouses Maria Onayan Ore and Jimmy Ore, and Spouses Lito and Alma Onayan)

Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The law aids the vigilant, but not those who slumber on their rights. This time-honored precept resonates with even more force in the case at bar.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on May 22, 2015 and Resolution 2 promulgated on December 2, 2015 of the Court of Appeals-Visayas Station (CA) in the case docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 03586. The CA decision was from an appeal from the Decision 3 dated June 15, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambusao, Capiz, Branch 20 (RTC) in Civil Case No. M-00-0029-11, dismissing the complaint filed by Rizal Quimpo (Rizal), joined by his wife, Luz Jainga (Luz) against Laurente Onayan (Laurente) and Felisa Onayan (Felisa), Ceferina Onayan Garalda (Ceferina), Barcelisa Onayan Parohinog (Barcelisa) and Rizaldo Parohinog, Spouses Romeo Parohinog and Rechilda Parohinog, Spouses Arturo Onayan and Celsa Onayan, Spouses Maria Onayan Ore and Jimmy Ore, and Spouses Lito and Alma Onayan (collectively referred to as respondents).

The Antecedents

Rizal and Luz, represented by their attorney-in-fact Ruel F. De Blas 4(petitioners), filed the complaint for quieting of title, possessoria, reivindicatoria, and damages in Civil Case No. M-00-0029-11 against respondents (the third case). The unregistered parcel of land in question is Lot No. 2440-pt. of the Sapian Cadastre in Barangay Damayan, Sapian, Capiz (the subject property), particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land, sugar land, coconut land, residential land, denominated as Lot No. 2440-pt., of the Sapian Cadastre, situated at Damayan, Sapian, Capiz containing an area of 70,621 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North by Lot 2438; on the East by Lot Nos. 2439, 2832 and 1930, covered by Tax Decl. No. 06-0187 and assessed at P85,870.00. 5

Petitioners alleged that Rizal was the true and lawful owner of the subject property, having inherited the same from his parents Jose Quimpo and Maria delos Reyes. In support of their assertions, petitioners presented two (2) witnesses: Rizal's brother Procopio Quimpo (Procopio) and Alicia Flores de Blas (Alicia). Procopio testified that Rizal acquired the subject property by inheritance; Rizal and his siblings filed a case against respondents which was resolved in their favor; as such, a sheriff went to see Bienvenido Onayan and ordered them to vacate the subject property; while Rizal took possession of the land and instituted a caretaker, the subject property was under the possession of Laurente; and a settlement was reached before a barangay captain where Laurente agreed to vacate the land if Rizal needed it, but Laurente did not fulfill this promise. 6

Alicia narrated that she was familiar with the subject property; she stayed in the property from 1964 to 1967 and only left after a sheriff went to the subject property and told them to vacate the same; she was asked by Rizal to be the administrator of the subject property but they were only able to take possession of one (1) hectare of the seven (7) hectare lot; and because respondents did not surrender possession of the subject property, a case was filed against them, which was dismissed. 7 AcICHD

Respondents Laurente, Felisa, and Ceferina, on the other hand, countered that they have been in open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property since 1968 while the rest of them occupied the same with the knowledge and consent of Laurente and Ceferina. Respondents Laurente and Ceferina claimed that they bought half portions each of the subject property from Arquilina Onayan vda. De Onao (Arquilina).

The respondents presented three (3) witnesses, Risil Luching (Luching), the Municipal Treasurer of Sapian, Capiz, and respondents Laurente and Ceferina. Luching brought with her several tax declarations. She testified that from her records, the subject property was declared in the name of Felisa and taxes were paid up to year 2005. 8

Respondent Laurente declared that the subject property was originally owned by Francisco Onao, father of Arquilina; that he bought 3 and 1/2 hectares of the subject property on May 15, 1968, but that even before the purchase, he was already Arquilina's tenant; the other 3 and 1/2 hectares was bought by respondent Ceferina; he and Ceferina have occupied the subject property since 1950 up to the time of his testimony; and in 1988, Rizal's administrator Ruel de Blas filed a case against them but the same was dismissed. 9 Respondent Ceferina added that from 1968, no one disturbed their possession of the subject property. 10

As gathered from the witnesses' testimonies and evidence presented by the parties, the subject property already became the subject of a civil case between petitioners' predecessors-in-interest and respondents' predecessors-in-interest filed before the Court of First Instance of Capiz (CFI), entitled Independencia Quimpo, et al. v. Jose Onayan, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. V-883 (the first case). The CFI, in a decision dated March 24, 1958, decided in favor of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the plaintiffs owners of the land in question which is Lot 2 in Exhibit "A";

(b) Sentencing the defendants to restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the land in dispute;

(c) Sentencing the defendants Alipio Estores and Consorcia Estores, to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of P200.00 yearly from September 17, 1953, until the date of the sale of the land to the defendant, Bienvenido Onayan, on February 12, 1955;

(d) Sentencing the defendant Bienvenido Onayan to pay the plaintiff the sum of P200.00 yearly from February 11, 1955, until the possession of the land is restored to the plaintiffs; and

(e) Sentencing the defendants to pay the plaintiffs P200.00 as attorney's fee and the costs of this action. 11

The respondents' predecessors-in-interest appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the CFI, and the decision became final and executory on April 18, 1964. 12 This then gave rise to the issuance of a writ of execution against respondents' predecessors-in-interest and also included herein respondents Ceferina, Barcelisa, and Laurente. A Supplemental Sheriff's Return 13 was eventually executed on July 1, 1967 by Deputy Provincial Sheriff Enrique Asis, stating:

For further compliance with the Writ of Execution and in view of the foregoing, that one of the defendant BIENVENIDO ONAYAN, were not personally serve [sic] with the copy of the Writ of Execution and a copy for the Demand for Payment Notice of Attachment and/or Levy, in connection with the above-entitled case, the undersigned went to the land in question at Barrio Damayan, Sapian, Capiz, on the 30th day of June 1967. The undersigned contacted the three occupants, namely Cefirina [sic] Onayan, Barsila [sic] Onayan and Laurente Onayan, who according to them they are the sisters and nephew of the defendant Bienvenido Onayan respectively. The undersigned had notified the three occupants mentioned above, that the land in question which is Lot 2, declared by the Court that the plaintiffs Independencia R. Quimpo, et al., are the owners, as per Writ of Execution issued and dated April 13, 1967. The undersigned had ordered the occupants to vacate and get out from the land in question. The undersigned, entered and took the possession of the land from the occupants, and delivered same possession to the plaintiff's representative on June 30, 1967. The plaintiff's representative had actually received the possession of the land in question from the undersigned, in the presence of the witness. 14 TAIaHE

Meanwhile, due to Luz's failing health, petitioners moved to Commission Civil, Jaro, Iloilo. Despite the earlier decision in favor of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, respondents continuously occupied portions of the subject property. This prompted petitioners, through their attorney-in-fact Ruel de Blas, to file a case for ejectment and damages against respondents before the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Sigma, Capiz (the second case) on January 31, 1996. The second case was dismissed on November 17, 1998 15 due to being filed more than one (1) year from the date of illegal entry made by the respondents upon the land in question. Thus, petitioners filed the present third case.

During the pendency of the instant case, Rizal died. After motion filed by petitioners' counsel, the RTC ordered the substitution of Rizal by his heirs Michael Foster Jainga Quimpo, Luz Jimenez Jainga-Quimpo, Luz Evelyn Jainga Quimpo-Buenseco, Fulgencio Ibarra Jainga Quimpo, Patricia Grace Jainga Quimpo, Rosita Fe Jainga Quimpo-Herbilla, and Robert Jonathan Jainga Quimpo. 16 The heirs thereafter represented Rizal as plaintiffs, and eventually petitioners, in the instant case. 17

The RTC Ruling

In its decision dated June 15, 2010, the RTC held that petitioners were the owners of the land in question, evidenced by the decision of the CFI of Capiz dated March 24, 1958 in the first case. Nevertheless, the RTC likewise ruled that petitioners could not recover the portion of the land in the possession of the respondents, as respondents Laurente and Ceferina were already in possession of the subject property since 1953 and bought the subject property in 1968. Because of Procopio's testimony and supplemental sheriff's return, which stated that respondents occupied the subject property, the trial court considered respondents as having acquired title over the land by acquisitive prescription. This was because respondents were already in possession of the land for a period of forty-six (46) years before the second case was filed on January 31, 1996. 18 The fallo of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing and finding the defendants to have acquired the land in question by acquisitive prescription, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 19

The CA Ruling

In its decision dated May 22, 2015, the CA ruled that respondents acquired the subject land from Arquelina as evidenced by the Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land in favor of Ceferina and a separate Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land in favor of Felisa Ochente married to Laurente Onayan, both executed on May 15, 1968. Granting that respondents were aware of the defect in Arquilina's title, the requirements for extraordinary acquisitive prescription were still met. It is from the date of the deeds of sale that respondents' adverse possession should be reckoned and should be counted up to the filing of the complaint subject of the case on appeal on November 14, 2000, which showed that respondents were in possession of the property for more than thirty (30) years. Also, the period for filing the instant action for quieting of title, possessoria and reivindicatoria had lapsed since it has been more than ten (10) years since 1968 up to the filing of the instant case. The CA disposed of the appeal thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the RTC, Branch 20, Mambusao, Capiz, dated June 15, 2010 in Civil Case No. M-00-0029-11 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 20

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit. cDHAES

Hence, this petition, 21 raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER THERE IS ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION WHEN THE RESPONDENTS ARE IN BAD FAITH

II.

WHETHER EXTRAORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS INTERRUPTED BY THE FILING OF CIVIL CASE NO. V-883 BEFORE THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (CFI) OF CAPIZ ENTITLED "INDEPENDENCIA QUIMPO, ET AL. V. JOSE ONAYAN, ET AL." AND CIVIL CASE NO. 161 FOR EJECTMENT FILED BEFORE THE 5TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT IN SIGMA, CAPIZ 22

Petitioners argued that there can be no ordinary acquisitive prescription as the respondents were in bad faith; with the issuance of a writ of execution arising from the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. V-883, respondents Ceferina and Laurente had knowledge that they were not lawful owners of the land; since respondents Ceferina and Laurente had knowledge that they were not owners of the said lot, they cannot be deemed as possessors in good faith which may enable them to acquire the land by ordinary prescription; the thirty (30) year period for extraordinary acquisitive prescription was interrupted by the filing of the second case on January 31, 1996; and the deeds of sale in favor of respondents Ceferina and Felisa were registered only on January 18, 1996 and the adverse acquisitive prescription should be reckoned only from this date.

In their Comment 23 to the petition dated August 8, 2016, respondents emphasized that the courts a quo ruled that the subject property was acquired by them through acquisitive prescription; they acquired the land through acquisitive prescription and through the document of sale executed in their favor by Arquilina dated May 15, 1968; they have been in possession of the subject property since 1953; and their possession had been open, peaceful, continuous and in the concept of owner and adverse against the whole world.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

It is important to first point out that not only acquisitive prescription favored the respondents; petitioners also lost their right of action through extinctive prescription. The equitable principle of lathes is likewise demonstrated here.

Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines (New Civil Code), distinguishes between two (2) kinds of prescription. Acquisitive prescription, also called "adverse possession" or "usucapcion," is the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time. Meanwhile, extinctive prescription is the kind of prescription where rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time. This is also known as "limitation of action." 24 This distinction has been explained thus:

Prescription was a statute of limitations. Whereas usucaption expressly 'vests the property' and raised a new title in the occupant, prescription did nothing more than bar the right of action. The concept most fundamental to a system of title by possession is that the relationship between the occupant and the land in terms of possession is capable of producing legal consequences. In other words, it is the possessor who is the actor. Under a statute of limitations, however, one does not look to the act of the possessor but to the neglect of the owner. In the former the important feature is the claimant in possession, and in the latter it is the owner out of possession which controls. 25

On acquisitive prescription

Adverse possession is recognized as a mode of acquiring title to real property uncovered by a Torrens title, 26 although it is not a favored mode. Thus, it has been said that the doctrine of adverse possession is to be taken strictly, and the acts of one claiming title by adverse possession are to be strictly construed. 27 Acquisitive prescription can either be ordinary or extraordinary, each with its own different requirements. In both cases, however, the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted. 28 ASEcHI

The requirements for ordinary acquisitive prescription are possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. The Court has discussed these elements for ordinary acquisitive prescription in this wise:

Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands that possession be "in good faith," which consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit that ownership. There is "just title" when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but that the grantor is neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the right. 29

The element of good faith could be sufficiently proven by the one who asserts the status. Good faith being an essential ingredient of ordinary acquisitive prescription, it is not enough to merely invoke the same. 30 Through ordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property is acquired through possession of ten (10) years. 31 Meanwhile, extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which does not need title or good faith, would transfer ownership and other real rights over immovables through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years. 32 In either case, the possession, which should be clearly established, should be characterized as public, open, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted, and in the concept of owner. 33

In this case, the Court should not deviate from the factual findings of both the RTC and the CA that respondents have long been in possession of the subject property. According to the courts a quo, respondents were the occupants and possessors of the subject property, since 1953 as found by the RTC, and 1968 as determined by the CA. Despite this difference, both courts found that from the moment of the supplemental sheriff's return until the filing of the instant case, possession was always with the respondents and never, in actuality, reverted to petitioners. This fact was established through the testimony of Procopio, which was quoted in the RTC decision, to wit:

Q: Do you know when did Laurente Onayan and Felisa Onayan occupy the land in question?

A: In 1953.

Q: And they are still occupying the land in question up to the present?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about Felisa Onayan, when did she occupy the land in question?

A: They were together because Felisa Onayan is the wife of Laurente Onayan.

Q: How about Ceferina, do you know when did she occupy the land in question?

A: They were together but I don't know some of their relatives.

Q: And they were occupying the land in question since 1953 up to the present?

A: Yes, sir. 34

Doubtless, the nature of respondents' possession was open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse to all other parties. The CA noted the acts of adverse possession that tipped the case in favor of respondents, e.g., construction of their houses, declarations of property for taxation purposes, payment of real property taxes therein, and actual possession of the subject property. 35 Based on these, both courts dismissed petitioners' complaint. Thus, to the Court, respondents' possession and occupation of the subject property is already well-established.

As to the acquisition of ownership and other real rights, the Court agrees with the conclusion of the RTC and the CA that respondents have acquired the same through adverse possession. However, the Court disagrees with the basis of the conclusions of the courts a quo. ITAaHc

To the mind of the Court, the period from which to count the extraordinary acquisitive prescription is from the date of the supplemental sheriff's return. This is because from that point on, respondents were with the knowledge that they were not entitled to possession and occupation of the subject property. They were also properly informed of the outcome of the case where the ownership of the subject property was put into question. Despite this, respondents continue to be in possession of the subject property, contrary to the report in the supplemental sheriff's return. And while after a year, respondents bought the property from Arquilina, they also were aware that neither Arquilina nor the latter's predecessors-in-interest were not the valid owners of the subject property. This knowledge notwithstanding, they carried on with their use and possession of the subject property. Indeed, as petitioners argue, there could be no ordinary acquisitive prescription arising from the facts established. However, good faith and just title are not requirements for extraordinary acquisitive prescription to take place. Such is the case here. And despite there being no ordinary acquisitive prescription in this instance, respondents still met the requisites of extraordinary acquisitive prescription which could also vest ownership and other real rights onto them.

Petitioners are incorrect in saying that the adverse acquisitive prescription should only be reckoned from January 18, 1996 because this was the date when the deeds of sale in favor of Ceferina and Felisa were registered. This claim clearly has no basis in law. What is important for extraordinary acquisitive prescription is the adverse possession in the concept of owner for thirty (30) years, to the exclusion of any other party, which fact respondents were able to prove to be existent here.

The question here becomes whether the second case, i.e., the ejectment case filed on January 31, 1996, effectively tolled the period of acquisitive prescription, as claimed by petitioners. If the answer to this question is yes, respondents could not have fulfilled the thirty (30) years as required by the New Civil Code for extraordinary acquisitive prescription as only 28 years, 6 months, and 30 days had elapsed between July 1, 1967 and January 31, 1996, assuming that judicial summons was received on that day. Notably, between July 1, 1967 and November 17, 1998, when the second case was dismissed, only 31 years, 4 months, and 13 days had lapsed. In any case, the Court answers in the negative.

It is true that judicial summons to the possessor interrupts possession for the purposes of prescription. 36 However, Article 1124 gives the instances when despite the issuance of judicial summons, the period of interruption is not tolled, to wit:

Judicial summons shall be deemed not to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption:

(1) If it should be void for lack of legal solemnities;

(2) If the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse;

(3) If the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.

In all these cases, the period of the interruption shall be counted for the prescription.

In his Civil Code commentaries, Sen. Arturo Tolentino remarked that the use of the phrase "period of interruption" in the last paragraph of the foregoing provision is misleading as there is really no interruption. In these instances, possession is deemed continuous. 37

The Court has heretofore ruled that a suit brought and abandoned, or decided against the petitioners, is considered as never having been commenced so far as the statute of limitation is concerned. 38 This was echoed in the subsequent case of Arboso v. Andrade, 39(Arboso) where it was definitively held that the service of such summons shall be inoperative and shall not cause interruption if the suit against the possessor should be decided in the possessor's favor. In the case of Arboso, the Court observed that there were attempts on the part of the heirs of Arboso to regain ownership and possession of the land in litigation. However, these attempts could not have the effect of interrupting the possession because they resulted in failure and were either dismissed or decided in the possessor's favor. Even occasional entry into the land was ineffective because those were opportunely repelled. Thus, Andrade's possession of the land has never been interrupted either naturally or civilly. 40 Both cases were decided using the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the pertinent provision of which states: CHTAIc

Article 1946. The judicial summons shall be deemed not to have been given, and shall cease to generate an interruption:

1. If it should be null and void as a result of lack of the legal solemnities.

2. If the plaintiff should abandon the claim or should let the action lapse.

3. If the possessor should be acquitted.

The above provision is similar, but not identical, to that in the New Civil Code, as quoted above. Despite the differences in wording, most especially the use of "absolved" instead of "acquitted," it can be said that this case decided under the Spanish Civil Code is comparable to the case at bar.

Further, under American Jurisprudence, a failed suit on the part of the owner does not break the continuity of adverse possession. 41 It was also decided that "[A]n action of ejectment, or an action to try the title to, or obtain the possession of real estate which fails or which does not result in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff does not have the effect of suspending or tolling the running of the statute of limitations in favor of the defendant." 42 Notably, the case of Arboso also cited authorities such as American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum to interpret and reaffirm the concept of civil interruption in the context of adverse possession.

Applying this interpretation to the instant petition, and contrary to the assertions of petitioners, the period for adverse possession was not interrupted by the filing of the ejectment case (second case) in 1996.

It is evident that despite the filing of the second case for ejectment, and even counting from May 15, 1968, more than thirty (30) years had lapsed before the complaint in the third case was filed on November 14, 2000. Even with this generous timeline, 32 years, 5 months, and 30 days passed without any valid action by petitioners. The conclusion to be had is that respondents have indeed acquired the subject property by acquisitive prescription. As such, there is no error on the part of the CA and the RTC, and the dismissal of the complaint and the instant appeal are warranted.

On extinctive prescription

As stated earlier, not only does this case show a clear assertion of acquisition of property through prescription, petitioners likewise lost their right to defend their claim due to extinctive prescription. And though this issue was not raised by petitioners in their petition, the matter is still worthy of discussion as it bolsters the conclusion that the instant petition should be denied.

The CA characterized the instant case as an accion reivindicatoria, which should be availed of within ten (10) years from dispossession. 43 The Court agrees with this finding. Even though the complaint stated that it is an action for "possessoria," the CA is correct in saying that the instant case is properly an accion reivindicatoria, as the allegations put forth a claim of ownership over the subject property.

An accion publiciana or plenariade posesion refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the date the lessee began to withhold unlawfully the possession of the realty. 44 An accion reivindicatoria, on the other hand, is a remedy seeking the recovery of ownership and includes the jus possidendi, jus utendi and jus fruendi. It is an action where a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. 45 It may be availed of within ten (10) years from dispossession. 46

It is beyond cavil that the third case was filed more than ten (10) years from the period of dispossession. In fact, even if the Court reckons the date from the supplemental sheriff's return executed on July 1, 1967, or the date of sale on May 15, 1968, more than thirty (30) years had expired when petitioners' complaint was filed on November 14, 2000. EATCcI

Further, the filing of the case is also barred under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. This provision states:

Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.

This provision is used to reassert one's title of ownership over a real property, 47 which is precisely what petitioners did here. Again, counted from July 1, 1967, when respondents already had full knowledge of their illegal occupation of the subject property, more than thirty (30) years had lapsed. Between July 1, 1967 and November 14, 2000, when the instant case was filed, a total of 33 years, 4 months, and 13 days had lapsed. This total time that lapsed is clearly over and above the thirty (30) years requirement set forth by law.

On laches

Finally, the failure of the petitioners to pursue their cause of action and exercise all their remedies at the proper time are also grounds to deny the instant petition.

There is a difference between extinctive prescription and laches, and they operate independently of each other. The Court has distinguished these two (2) defenses in this wise:

. . . While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not. 48 (emphasis supplied)

For the Court to properly appreciate the presence of laches, the following elements must be present:

(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;

(2) Delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

(3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and

(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. 49

Thus, even if the Court considers the instant case as not having overcome the hurdle of extinctive prescription, the complaint in the third case was still properly dismissed as it was barred by laches as all the elements are present. Certainly, the long period of possession of respondents, despite being told to vacate by virtue of the decision in the first case, already gave rise to a cause of action on the part of petitioners as early as 1964. However, there was an inordinate delay on the part of petitioners, in spite of notice that the property was occupied by respondents. From 1967 onwards, there was no indication that respondents were even disturbed in their possession of the subject property. At present, if petitioners' accion reivindicatoria is adjudged in their favor, it will cause undue injury or prejudice to the respondents who have actually exercised the rights and responsibilities of ownership over the subject property. DHITCc

Indeed, equitable considerations demand that the Court deny petitioners' prayer. The lapse of more than thirty (30) years of not enforcing the judgment in petitioners' favor and in which time respondents had already made full use of the property and without interruption for much longer than the petitioners have even occupied the subject property makes equity side with respondents. It is surely not the intent of the law to protect petitioners at this point when they have been negligent in asserting their rights. Where the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, courts of equity should not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect. 50 As ruled by the Court in Salandanan v. Court of Appeals, 51 citing Catholic Bishop ofBalanga vs. Court of Appeals, 52viz.:

The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant.

"The doctrine of laches or stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and x x x is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted."

The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become 'stale' or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.53 (emphasis supplied)

As early as 1964 when the first case became final, and the sheriff's supplemental return was issued in 1967, petitioners were already adjudged owners of the subject property and have all the rights to assert ownership thereof. Despite this, however, petitioners did not do anything and let an inordinate amount of time to pass before asserting their claim of ownership over the subject property. Further, they have failed to exercise even a measure of any act of ownership over the subject property, such as the payment of real property taxes thereon, an act which respondents have done. Indeed, petitioners have lost their right to insist on their ownership of the subject property at this point. As remarked by the Court in Gonzales vda. De Delima v. Tio, 54 while one is enabled to seek protection through the remedies given by law when there is injury to his person or property, the right should be seasonably exercised otherwise it could be lost due to laches or prescription. This is compelled by "policy considerations of the most exigent character." Petitioners should have exercised all their rights the soonest, and not decades later after they were aggravated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 22, 2015 Decision and the December 2, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03586 are hereby AFFIRMEDin toto.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez with Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, concurring; rollo pp. 89-105.

2.Id. at 117-119.

3.Id. at 53-66, penned by Judge Ignacio I. Alajar.

4. Sometime during the pendency of the proceedings in the RTC, or in September 2004, the attorney-in-fact became Alicia vda. De Blas by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Rizal.

5.Id. at 31.

6.Id. at 57-58.

7.Id. at 58-59.

8.Id. at 59.

9.Id. at 59-60.

10.Id. at 60.

11.Id. at 61; records p. 114; penned by Judge Roberto Zurbano.

12.Id. at 62.

13.Id. at 102.

14.Id. at 102-103; Exh. "F", records, p. 125.

15. Records, p. 105.

16.Rollo, pp. 93-94.

17.Id. at 133.

18.Id. at 65.

19.Id. at 66.

20.Id. at 105.

21. Rizal's heirs are represented by Robert Jonathan Jainga Quimpo in the filing of the present petition.

22. "Reasons for Allowance of the Petition" enumerated in rollo, p. 23.

23.Id. at 136.

24.De Morales v. Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, et al., 186 Phil. 596, 598 (1980).

25.Id. at 599, citing Montgomery, Prescriptive Acquisition of Land Titles, XXVI, Philippine Law Journal, 353, 356-357 (1951).

26. NEW CIVIL CODE, Art. 712.

27. 3 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 93.

28. NEW CIVIL CODE, Art. 1118.

29.Aguirre, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 466 Phil. 32, 44 (2004).

30.Id. at 45.

31. NEW CIVIL CODE, Art. 1134.

32. NEW CIVIL CODE, Art. 1137.

33.Pacheco, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 237 Phil. 372, 378 (1987).

34.Rollo, pp. 63-64.

35.Id. at 100.

36. NEW CIVIL CODE, Art. 1123.

37. Arturo Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. 4, p. 20 (1991 reprinting).

38. Lacuesta, et al. v. Guerrero, et al., 8 Phil. 719, 720-721 (1907).

39. 87 Phil. 782 (1950).

40. Id. at 786-787.

41. 3 AmJur 2d, p. 215.

42. Id.

43. Rollo, p. 101.

44. Bernabe et al. v. Dayrit, et al., 210 Phil. 349, 351 (1983).

45. Capacete, et al. v. Baroro, et al., 453 Phil. 392, 402 (2003).

46. Heirs of Dolleton, et al. v. Fil-Estate Management, Inc., et al., 602 Phil. 781, 800 (2009).

47. Arturo Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. 4, p. 39 (2002 reprinting).

48. Cutanda, et al. v. Heirs of Cutanda, 390 Phil. 740, 747 (2000), citing Maneclang v. Baun, 284 Phil. 302 (1992).

49. Vda. de Tirona, et al. v. Encarnacion, 560 Phil. 650, 666 (2007).

50. Id. at 672 citing Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 (1956).

51. 353 Phil. 114, 120-121 (1998).

52. 332 Phil. 206 (1996).

53. Id. at 121.

54. 143 Phil. 401, 404-405 (1970).