SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226166. November 9, 2016.]
MA. TRINIDAD V. QUIAMBAO, petitioner, vs. PNTC COLLEGES AND/OR ATTY. HERNANI N. FABIA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 09 November 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 226166 — Ma. Trinidad V. Quiambao vs. PNTC Colleges and/or Atty. Hernani N. Fabia.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition filed by petitioner Ma. Trinidad V. Quiambao for failure to show that the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 127644 committed reversible error in dismissing petitioner's petition before it and in ruling that petitioner was legally dismissed and not entitled to reinstatement and backwages.
A careful consideration of the Petition further indicates petitioner's failure to show any cogent reason why the actions of the Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the CA which have passed upon the same issue should be reversed. Petitioner failed to show that their factual findings are not based on substantial evidence or that their decisions are contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence. The Court finds no compelling reason to doubt the common findings of the three tribunals that petitioner was validly dismissed from employment in view of the absence of evidence showing that she complied with the requirements or standards for regularization.
Petitioner seeks to exempt herself from the long-standing rule that petitions for review are only limited to evaluating questions of law without explaining why the exception applies to her. It may be well to stress this Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari, to wit:
. . . In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?1 (Citations omitted. Emphasis in the original)
Even on this ground alone, the Petition should be dismissed outright. A review of the Petition and the CA's Decision shows that the CA correctly found the NLRC to have aptly dismissed the appeal — with the NLRC's Decision based on the evidence on record and prevailing jurisprudence.
Petitioner insists that she is a regular employee by virtue of her full-time schedule as a member of respondent's faculty since June 13, 2007. Petitioner cites National Mines & Allied Workers' Union vs. San Ildefonso College 2 in enumerating the requirements for a private school teacher to acquire permanent status in employment. However, she conveniently fails to show how she was able to comply with the third requirement, particularly that "such service must have been satisfactory." 3 In contrast, the CA has already pointed out "that petitioner failed to secure her master's degree despite her repeated assurances that she will finish the required degree during the time of her probation." 4 SDAaTC
Petitioner claims that respondent abruptly introduced the requirement of obtaining a master's degree, contrary to our ruling in Mercado vs. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City. 5 However, the memorandum dated November 15, 2010 sent to petitioner shows that she has not finished her master's degree "despite [her] continuous verbal promises to complete it from the time [she was] first engaged by [respondent.]" 6 The same was reiterated by the CA in its Decision dated April 11, 2016. 7 In any case, the said requirement under Section 7, Article 11 of CHED Memorandum Order (LMO) No. 51, Series of 1997 8 should have been known to her even prior to her teaching position with respondent, the said memorandum being issued 10 years prior to her employment.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to AFFIRM the Decision dated April 11, 2016 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127644.
SO ORDERED. (Mendoza, J., on official leave from November 8-15, 2016 per Resolution dated January 26, 2016 in A.M. No. 07-11-02-SC under the 2016 Wellness Program)."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Montoya vs. Transmed Manila Corp., 613 Phil. 696, 707 (2009).
2. 359 Phil. 341 (1998).
3. Id. at 358.
4. Rollo, p. 41.
5. 632 Phil. 228 (2010). In the said case, this Court required that the standards to be met by probationary employees "should be made known to the teachers on probationary status at the start of their probationary period, or at the very least under the circumstances of the present case, at the start of the semester or the trimester during which the probationary standards are to be applied." See Id. at p. 225.
6. Rollo, pp. 74 and 122.
7. Id. at 41.
8. Policies and Guidelines for Maritime Education. Issued on November 18, 1997.