Province of Davao Del Norte v. Buenaventura-Navarro

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 208771. February 27, 2019.][Formerly UDK-14957]

THE PROVINCE OF DAVAO DEL NORTE, REPRESENTED BY ITS GOVERNOR, HON. RODOLFO P. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. LINA BUENAVENTURA-NAVARRO, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated February 27, 2019which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 208771 [Formerly UDK-14957] — (The Province of Davao Del Norte, represented by its Governor, Hon. Rodolfo P. Del Rosario v. Lina Buenaventura-Navarro)

This is an appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the January 8, 2013 Decision 1 and June 19, 2013 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 01690-MIN. The decision and resolution affirmed the June 5, 2006 Order and the February 20, 2007 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Panabo City, Branch 34 (RTC), in a petition for relief from judgment.

Antecedents

Lina Buenaventura-Navarro (respondent) is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-47666 with an area of 70,463 square meters, more or less, particularly described as:

A parcel of land (Lot 1441-A, Psd-11-017154, being a portion of lot 1441, Tagum Cad-276), situated in the Barrio of La Paz, Mun. of (Tagum) Carmen, Province of Davao[,] Island of Mindanao. Bounded as follows: On the N., along lines 5-6-7 by Lot 1455, Tagum Cad-276; on the E., along line 7-1 by lot 1441-B of the subdivision plan; on the SW., along lines 1-2-3 by Lot 1442, Tagum Cad-276; on the W., along lines 3-4-5 by Lot 1443, Tagum Cad-276. Beginning at a [point] marked "1" on plan being N. 23 deg. 34' W., 916. 19 m. from BLLM No. 63, Tagum Cadastre, x x x. Containing an area of SEVENTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY[-]THREE (70,463) SQUARE METERS, more or less. 3

Allegedly, the Municipal Government of Carmen, Davao del Norte, constructed a barangay road at Barrio La Paz, Carmen, appropriating a 3,587 square-meter portion of the said property (subject road) without just compensation being paid to respondent. This road is now a provincial road and is maintained by the Province of Davao Del Norte (petitioner). 4 CAIHTE

Respondent sent formal demand letters to the local government of Carmen, Davao del Norte, as well as to petitioner, for back rentals and payment of just compensation. The two local governments ignored her demands. This prompted her to file an action for just compensation, back rentals, and attorney's fees. 5

On January 26, 2004, the RTC declared petitioner in default for its failure to file a pre-trial brief and to appear during the pre-trial conference. Thus, respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte. 6

On June 30, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby in favor [of] plaintiff Lina Buenaventura-Navarro, M.D., and against defendant Province of Davao del Norte (Davao), ordering the latter to pay the former the following:

1. Just compensation of the property subject of this action at the fair market value of P315.00 per square meter or in the total amount of ONE MILLION [ONE HUNDRED] TWENTY NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIVE ([P]1,129,905.00) PESOS with legal interest thereon of six percent (6%) per annum from October 27, 1974 until full payment is made;

2. [P]100,000.00 as moral damages.

The award of moral damages is not intended to enrich the plaintiff as (sic) the expense of the defendant.

3. [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich the party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to cure socially deleterious actions. x x x

4. Attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to fifteen (15%) percent of the total amount of [P]1,129,905.00 as stated above which the Court finds to be reasonable considering that this case has not undergone a full-blown trial[,] plus [P]2,000.00 per appearance;

5. (sic)

6. Costs.

SO ORDERED. 7

Petitioner did not appeal the decision; hence, on July 31, 2004, respondent moved for its execution. Consequently, the RTC issued a writ of execution on August 12, 2004. 8

On September 1, 2004, petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. 9

The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2006 Order, 10 the RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It did not agree with petitioner's argument that the negligence of its employees was so gross that it should not be bound by it. It held that petitioner was never denied its day in court. On the contrary, it was afforded every opportunity to be heard. It found inexplicable petitioner's failure to avail of the legal remedies available at all stages of the proceedings in the lower court. First, it failed to file a motion to lift the order of default. Second, it failed to file the necessary pleading within the reglementary period to assail the June 30, 2004 decision of the RTC. Third, it failed to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration of the said decision. It also noted that it took respondent exactly two months before it broke its silence on its failure to appear during the January 26, 2004 pre-trial but never on its failure to file its pre-trial brief. 11

On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued an entry of final judgment certifying that its June 30, 2004 decision had become final and executory on August 4, 2006. 12

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the June 5, 2006 order which the RTC denied in its February 20, 2007 resolution. 13 Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its Decision, the CA denied the petition for certiorari, unconvinced by petitioner's arguments. It found that the omission of petitioner's former counsel could not be characterized as excusable or unavoidable. It could have been prevented had prudence and ordinary diligence been exercised. Further, it ruled that petitioner was as guilty as its former counsels because it failed to periodically check the status of the case before the RTC. Thus, it affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment. 14 DETACa

The CA also held that the issue of whether the RTC erred in rendering the June 30, 2004 decision is no longer within the realm of the petition for certiorari. It stated that the non-appointment of a commissioner to determine the just compensation for the subject road is not an error reviewable under certiorari. 15

In fine, it found that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the petition for relief from judgment.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this decision, which the CA denied in its June 19, 2013 resolution.

Hence, this petition.

First, petitioner insists that respondent is not entitled to just compensation for the subject road which had allegedly been used as a public road prior to its award to its original owner, Porferio Jain (Jain). It alleges that the road was the only ingress and egress of Barangay La Paz, Municipality of Carmen, Davao del Norte. Since Jain acquired the land by virtue of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act, Section 39 thereof applies. It provides that every person receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those which may be subsisting, including any servitude or legal encumbrance. It argues that the doctrine laid down in National Irrigation Administration (NIA) v. Court of Appeals and Manglapus16 should be applied here. It adds that even if respondent is entitled to just compensation, her claim is barred by Jain's failure to question or ask for compensation. 17

Second, petitioner alleges that the RTC erred in adopting the valuation presented by respondent. Purportedly, respondent's appraiser declared a misleading formula or computation of the property's market value, by allegedly using the 2004 valuation of the property as the basis for computation. Since petitioner was not afforded the chance to rebut respondent's evidence, it was unable to present other sources for the valuation of the property, such as the tax declaration or the zonal valuation/appraisal. These documents would have reflected the valuation of the property in 1975, the time of the supposed actual taking of the subject road. Further, it insists that the RTC should have appointed commissioner/s for the determination of just compensation pursuant to Sec. 5, 18 Rule 67 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court). 20

Third, petitioner implores the Court to consider the nature of the position of the provincial prosecutor and the coterminous position of the provincial legal officer. The provincial prosecutor primarily handles criminal cases but was mandated to handle the instant civil case due to the vacancy in the position of the provincial legal officer. However, then provincial prosecutor, Atty. Ruben L. Pasamonte (Atty. Pasamonte), was allegedly busy lobbying in Manila for the appointment of young lawyer prosecutors. Allegedly, Atty. Pasamonte sacrificed the cases he handled, including this case, for that purpose. 21

On the other hand, the provincial legal officer, Atty. Edwin M. Sevilla (Atty. Sevilla), was appointed only on July 1, 2004. He initiated and filed the instant petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner points out that the nature of his appointment is coterminous and political in nature. He was appointed after the 2004 election. Thus, while he received the June 30, 2004 decision of the RTC on the last week of July 2004, he could not attend to it immediately because he was busy preparing the provincial structure of personnel. Petitioner asseverates that it only received the June 5, 2006 order of the RTC, denying the petition for relief from judgment, on October 10, 2006 because a copy was first served on the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. 22

Fourth, petitioner insists that the petition for relief from judgment should be granted because excusable negligence is present. The work load of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is allegedly gargantuan and is aggravated by support personnel unfit for the job or inadequate. Thus, RTC notices relevant to the case were not given full attention. The negligence of its former counsel should not bind it because it would deprive it of its right to due process. 23

Lastly, petitioner reiterates its plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

In her September 18, 2014 Comment, 24 respondent first argues that the instant petition raises questions of fact which is outside the province of an appeal by certiorari, hence, it should be denied.

Respondent argues that NIA v. Manglapus25 (2000) is not "good law." Rather, it is the doctrine laid down in Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de Onorio26 (2001) and Digran v. Auditor General27 (1966) which should be applied. Digran allegedly held that for Sec. 39 of Act No. 496 to apply, the servitude must have pre-existed at the time of the registration of the land to compel the registered owner to respect it. Herein, the servitude was allegedly imposed only after the registration of the title. Accordingly, Sec. 39 cannot be applied. 28 aDSIHc

Respondent insists that petitioner is proscribed from raising the ground of excusable negligence in the present appeal by certiorari since said ground is only available in a petition for relief from judgment. 29

Respondent asseverates that petitioner is not entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for because it failed to show a clear and positive right to be protected in its favor. She asserts that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim of excusable negligence. 30

Lastly, respondent argues that a final and executory decision, such as the subject June 30, 2004 decision, may no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter if erroneous. 31

In its March 9, 2015 Reply, 32 petitioner reiterates its position insisting that the negligence of its counsels should be considered excusable. Further, it argues that the petition only raises questions of law and not questions of fact. It claims that the doctrine laid down in the NIA case applies. The subject road has existed before the grant of the patent to Jain; thus, subject to the servitude existing at the time of the grant. Finally, it argues that the RTC erred when it did not observe the alleged mandatory requirement to appoint at least a single competent and disinterested commissioner. 33

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE REMEDY OF RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT.

THE COURT'S RULING

We deny the appeal for lack of merit. The CA did not err in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to the remedy of relief from judgment.

Petitioner failed to prove that excusable negligence, as a ground for the grant of relief from judgment, is present in this case. The Court finds that petitioner's predicament arose from its own inexcusable negligence despite being given every opportunity to present its case. Its failure to avail of such opportunities, due to its own negligence, cannot now be used to set aside a final and executory decision.

Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy of relief from judgment to any person against whom a decision or order is rendered through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Such relief is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the lower court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rule 38. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to avoid the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy in law is due to his own negligence or a mistaken mode of procedure. Otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure by counsel. 34

Petitioner prays for relief from the June 30, 2004 judgment, on the ground that excusable negligence prevented it from assailing the said decision before its finality.

Negligence, to be "excusable," must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. 35

Measured against this standard, it is apparent that the reasons offered by petitioner for its counsels' failure: that Atty. Pasamonte was allegedly busy lobbying in Manila for the appointment of young lawyer prosecutors and sacrificed this case for that purpose; that the nature of Atty. Sevilla's appointment is coterminous and political in nature; that upon his appointment, he was busy fixing the political structure of the province; that the workload of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is allegedly gargantuan, aggravated by the fact that support personnel were lacking or not fit for the job, by no means constitute the excusable negligence recognized by law as a ground for the grant of relief from judgment.

The negligence of petitioner's counsels could have been prevented by their exercise of ordinary diligence and prudence. Simple attention to and care for the progress of the case before the RTC would have prevented the default order, the ex-parte presentation of evidence by respondent, the adverse judgment and its subsequent finality. The Court notes that the counsels of petitioner failed to exercise an iota of ordinary diligence and prudence in handling the case before the lower court. Thus, the Court cannot consider the actuations of petitioner's counsels as excusable negligence.

Nevertheless, petitioner asserts that it should not be bound by its counsels' negligence as it would deprive it of its right to due process.

This Court has previously held that "[a]xiomatic is the rule that negligence of counsel binds the client. x x x Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client." 36 But, there is an exception to this doctrine of binding agency between counsel and client. This is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, almost bordering on recklessness and utter incompetence, that we can safely conclude that the due process rights of the client were violated. 37 ETHIDa

For the exception to apply, gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him. 38

Petitioner is bound by the

The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner itself is guilty of negligence. It failed to exercise any diligence or prudence in monitoring the status of its case. In fact, nothing in the record supports the conclusion that petitioner monitored its case or regularly checked with its counsels on its progress. Thus, petitioner should suffer the adverse judgment of the RTC.

Contrary to its assertion, petitioner was not deprived of its right to due process. It was given every opportunity to present its case before the RTC. Nothing prevented it from filing a motion to set aside the order of default. Nothing prevented it from filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial upon receipt of the June 30, 2004 order of the RTC or from assailing the order through ordinary appeal. Nothing prevented it from opposing respondent's motion for execution of the June 30, 2004 order. And nothing prevented it from assailing the writ of execution issued by the RTC on August 12, 2004.

Its consistent failure to avail itself of the numerous remedies afforded by law is due to its failure to exercise ordinary diligence and prudence in the defense of the case. Petitioner was not deprived of its right to due process of law; it squandered its right to it.

At this juncture, the Court notes that the present petition assails not only the dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment but the very merits of the June 30, 2004 decision of the RTC granting respondent's prayer for just compensation, damages, and attorney's fees. Petitioner did not limit itself to the issue of excusable negligence; it challenged the merits of the June 30, 2004 decision in this appeal by certiorari.

Considering that the Court has resolved that petitioner is not entitled to relief from judgment, a discussion of the merits of the June 30, 2004 decision is unnecessary and would amount to obiter dictum. The June 30, 2004 decision is final and executory. Petitioner lost the right to assail the merits of the decision when it failed to perfect an appeal within the prescribed reglementary period.

In any case, the Court cannot entertain petitioner's argument concerning the public character of the subject road prior to its grant to Jain because it is a question of fact.

It is well established that only questions of law should be raised in an appeal by certiorari filed under Rule 45. The Court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court when supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal to the Court. 39

The Court has previously distinguished a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what law applies to a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any one of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised. 40

The issue of whether the subject road was already a public road prior to the grant of the patent to Jain is a question of fact. It requires an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by petitioner. To buttress its claim, petitioner cites several documents, such as the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (P-566) P-1592, Homestead Patent No. V-3135, and Panlalawigan Resolution No. 376, series of 1971. These pieces of evidence have not been scrutinized by the lower courts or by respondent. Not being a trier of facts, the Court is not equipped to determine the probative value of these pieces of evidence. Thus, the Court cannot entertain this argument.

Petitioner's argument concerning the RTC's alleged error in its failure to appoint a commissioner for the determination of just compensation, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is without merit. cSEDTC

The Court notes that the initial proceedings before the RTC were not for expropriation, but for payment of just compensation, back rentals, and attorney's fees.

The Court has previously held that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing with the appropriate court of a complaint for eminent domain by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements and, hence, has waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. 41 When there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable. 42 This ruling was reiterated by the Court in the 2016 case of National Power Corp. v. Spouses Asoquel. 43

Since the initial proceedings before the lower court was not for expropriation but for payment of just compensation, petitioner is considered to have violated procedural requirements and has waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67. The provisions on ascertainment of just compensation are no longer applicable and a trial before commissioners is dispensable.

In fine, the CA did not commit any error in affirming the RTC's dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment. The negligence of petitioner's counsel is inexcusable. Further, petitioner itself is guilty of negligence in its manner of handling the instant case. It must bear the effects of the final and executory June 30, 2004 RTC decision, no matter how adverse it may be.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 8, 2013 Decision and June 19, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 01690-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." Bersamin, C.J., and Carandang, J., both on official leave.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 47-64; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Francisco, with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Oscar V. Badelles, concurring.

2.Id. at 66-67.

3.Id. at 48.

4.Id.

5.Id. at 48-49.

6.Id. at 50.

7.Id. at 51.

8.Id. at 51-52.

9.Id. at 52.

10. A copy of the RTC order was not provided. The foregoing discussion is based on excerpts from the CA decision.

11.Rollo, pp. 53-55.

12.Id. at 55.

13. A copy of the resolution was not attached.

14.Rollo, pp. 58-60.

15.Id. at 62-63.

16. 395 Phil. 48 (2000).

17.Rollo, pp. 24-29.

18. Sec. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. — Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to the court.

   Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the objections.

19. Rule 67. Rule on Expropriation.

20.Rollo, pp. 30-34.

21.Id. at 35.

22.Id. at 35-37.

23.Id. at 37-40.

24.Id. at 96-108.

25.Supra note 16.

26. 412 Phil. 667 (2001).

27. 123 Phil. 583 (1966).

28.Rollo, pp. 98-102.

29.Id. at 102-104.

30.Id. at 105-108.

31.Id. at 102.

32.Id. at 120-127.

33. Id.

34. Samonte v. S.F. Naguiat, Inc., 617 Phil. 435, 441-442 (2009), citing Ibabao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 234 Phil. 79, 88-89 (1987); citation omitted.

35. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 497 Phil. 738, 744 (2005); Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Ramos, 415 Phil. 492, 503 (2001).

36. Air Philippines Corp. v. International Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., 481 Phil. 366, 380-381 (2004); citations omitted.

37. Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, et al., 752 Phil. 15, 25 (2015).

38. Id., citing Bejarasco, Jr. v. People, 656 Phil. 337, 340 (2011).

39. Pascual v. Burgos, et al., 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016); citations omitted.

40 Tongonan Holdings and Development Corp. v. Atty. Escaño, Jr., 672 Phil. 747, 756 (2011), citing Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, et al., 646 Phil. 631, 637-638 (2010); citation omitted.

41. Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 612 Phil. 965, 978 (2009), citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 494 Phil. 494, 505 (2005).

42. Id.

43. 795 Phil. 19 (2016).