THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 195056. February 18, 2013.]
PROVINCE OF CAVITE AND THE PRINCIPAL OF THE FELIPE CALDERON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, petitioners, vs. JOSEFINA JIMENEZ-AUSTRIA AND RENATO A. JIMENEZ, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated February 18, 2013, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 195056 (Province of Cavite and the Principal of the Felipe Calderon Elementary School vs. Josefina Jimenez-Austria and Renato A. Jimenez). — The transmittal letter dated November 21, 2012 of the Court of Appeals elevating to the Court the CA rollo in this case is NOTED.
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the January 6, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 113397, which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the Department of Education (DepEd), represented by the Division Superintendent of Schools, Province of Cavite; and the Principal of the Felipe Calderon Elementary School (petitioners).
Respondents Josefina Jimenez-Austria and Renato Q. Jimenez (respondents) are the surviving children of the late spouses Antonio and Maria Jimenez (Spouses Jimenez), who died on September 16, 1996 and September 30, 1999, respectively.
During their lifetime, Spouses Jimenez were the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Brgy. Daang Amaya, Tanza, Cavite, consisting of 6,618 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-217489.
In 1970, the Felipe Calderon Elementary School occupied a portion of the subject property where several buildings were constructed, without the knowledge and consent of Spouses Jimenez. The latter demanded that the school buildings be removed or rental be paid but the school authorities refused to vacate the property or pay rental therefor. Upon the death of Spouses Jimenez, respondents reiterated before the school authorities the demand to vacate the same or to pay rental but said officials again refused to do so. TcIAHS
On August 2, 2000, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court, Trece Martires City (RTC).
On September 13, 2007, the RTC rendered a judgment 2 in favor of respondents. The RTC found that the school had indeed encroached on a portion of the subject property and ordered the government to expropriate the encroached portion so as not to render the school buildings useless. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs as against the defendants. However, considering the presence of the school buildings inside the property, the government is hereby ordered to expropriate the encroached property so as not to render the school building useless.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners did not appeal the judgment. Thus, the decision became final and executory and an entry of judgment was issued on December 8, 2007. Subsequently, respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which the RTC granted in its Order, 3 dated May 5, 2008. Thus, a writ of execution 4 was issued in their favor.
When the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. 5 Petitioners filed an opposition claiming that the decision did not grant such relief to respondents as it merely ordered petitioners to expropriate the encroached portion.
In its Order, 6 dated July 3, 2009, the RTC granted the motion. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied in the Order of March 2, 2010.
Petitioners elevated the matter to the CA which dismissed the petition, in its January 6, 2011 Decision. The CA ratiocinated that: ASDCaI
Our own perusal of the records would show that the writ of possession issued by public respondent judge conforms well with its September 13, 2007 Decision. The writ did not in any way vary nor exceed the judgment which private respondents seek to enforce. It must be recalled that the instant action involves one of recovery of possession. Upon disposing of the case on the merits, public respondent judge, ruled favorably with the plaintiffs (private respondents), which meant an affirmation that private respondents were indeed entitled to recover possession of the property in dispute. As held by the Supreme Court, ambiguity in the dispositive portion of a judgment maybe rectified or clarified by reference primarily to the body of the decision itself (Montebon vs. Court of Appeals, 592 SCRA 546, 551 [2009]) for the reason that the dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision's ratio decidendi (Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. Vs. Toyota Bel-air, Inc., 550 SCRA 70, 85 [2008]). As the decision reads:
"It is very clear from the pieces of evidence submitted as well as from the statements given by the witnesses for the party plaintiff's that defendant is encroaching plaintiffs property. Engineer Alexander Buenviaje testified that the result of the survey he had conducted shows defendant encroaching on Six Thousand Six Hundred Eighteen (6,618) square meters of plaintiff's property. The Court noted that when this surveyor conducted the survey, the principal of the school was present and the latter did not interpose any objection to the survey." (Rollo, pp. 52-53)
There is no doubt that with the aforesaid encroachment, there is merit to the action for recovery of possession filed by private respondents. And, thus, to breathe life to the decision of the RTC, the issuance of the writ of possession is just in order. HSDIaC
What caused the perceived confusion is the proviso regarding the RTC's Order for the government to expropriate the property that was encroached by the Felipe Calderon Elementary School so as not to render its buildings useless. Under the dispositive portion of the decision, private respondents' right to recover possession which was sustained by the RTC is subject to the expropriation proceedings by the government. Notwithstanding the Order to expropriate, this does not hinder private respondents to enforce their right to possess the subject property which was indubitably granted to them by the Court. Conversely stated in another light, the government's power to initiate the expropriation proceedings over the subject property is not impeded by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of private respondents. 7
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed this petition contending that the July 3, 2009 Order of the RTC granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is a patent nullity since it exceeds the tenor of its September 13, 2007 Decision. 8
They assert that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered the issuance of the writ of possession. They argue that a reading of the September 13, 2007 Decision would show that they were merely ordered to expropriate the subject property so as not to render the school building useless but did not in any way order the transfer of possession of the subject property to respondents.
The Court finds no reversible error warranting the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Section 47 (c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 47. Effects of Judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: AcTHCE
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interests, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Also, Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that:
SECTION 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. —
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. — The officer shall demand of the person against whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within the three (3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee; otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the judgment obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for money.
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. — When the property subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements, except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cabang v. Basay, 9 the Court held that a writ of execution must adhere to every essential particulars of the judgment sought to be executed. An order of execution may not vary or go beyond the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. It must conform to the judgment and if it is different from, goes beyond or varies the tenor of the judgment which gives it life, it is a nullity. Otherwise stated, when the order of execution with the corresponding writ issued pursuant thereto is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, it has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law. CcTIAH
Nevertheless, a judgment extends to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto and not only confined to what appears on the face of the decision. 10 The July 3, 2009 Order of the RTC, which sought to give life to the dispositive portion of the September 13, 2007 Decision, should be read in consonance with the said decision.
In the case at bench, the RTC did not go beyond the terms of the judgment when it issued the writ of possession of the subject property when petitioners failed to expropriate it. Its decision adjudging ownership of the subject property is clear. It was stated therein that petitioners encroached on the 6,618 square meter land which formed part of the subject property owned by Spouses Jimenez. Because several school buildings had already been erected on the subject property, the RTC deemed it more practicable for petitioners to just expropriate the subject land and pay respondents just compensation. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the order of the RTC to expropriate did not hinder respondents to enforce their right over the subject property. As stated, a judgment is not only confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. 11 Thus, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the property. 12 In the case of Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 13 the Court explained that:
Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession. Indeed, it would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for the parties to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs from those who have no right to remain therein, they must submit to court litigations anew."
Nonetheless, considering that respondents admitted not being the owners of the school buildings, they are not claiming possession over the said structures. They have no right either to possess the same independently of their claim of ownership of the subject property. Hence, any removal of the improvements/school buildings on the land should be subject to the issuance of a special order by the court. 14 Respondents eventually resorted to obtaining this from the court.
As the Court sees it, there is a need to initiate expropriation proceedings because respondents are not voluntarily ceding the property to petitioners but demanding, as their predecessors-in-interest did, that the school authorities vacate the subject property or pay rent therefor. It has been held in several cases that acquisition of private lands for public use can only be exercised by the Government through expropriation proceedings under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the RTC explicitly ordered the government to expropriate the encroached portion so as not to render the school buildings useless. This decision was not questioned by petitioners rendering it final and executory. Being a final judgment, it may no longer be modified in any respect by adding thereto a relief not originally included. 15 In the case of Vios v. Pantangco, the Court discussed the rule on immutability of judgment and said that: CIHAED
It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment. 16
Despite the fact that, in the final and executory decision, petitioners were given the option to expropriate the property, they did not move to exercise said option. As the government has not taken any step to file such a case after the lapse of several years, respondents cannot be faulted for filing a motion for the execution of judgment and, later, a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.
By not exercising the option to initiate expropriation proceedings, it would seem that petitioners would like to continue using the subject property without paying for it. To uphold the position of the petitioners would be unfair for respondents. It would be disregarding the final judgment in their favor to recover possession of the subject property. It would prevent respondents from enjoying their dominical rights which is nothing but a flagrant confiscation of property without due process proscribed in the Constitution. Until expropriations proceedings are instituted in court, the owners cannot be deprived of their right over the land. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without prejudice to the right of petitioner Department of Education to institute the appropriate expropriation proceedings.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 126-142. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor and Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante.
2.Id. at 64-72.
3.Annex "F" of the Petition, id. at 75.
4.Annex "G" of the Petition, id. at 76.
5.Annex "H" of the Petition, id. at 77.
6.Annex "L" of the Petition, id. at 93.
7.Id. at 126-142.
8.Id. at 134.
9.G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172, 182-183.
10.DHL Philippines Corp. United Rank and File Asso.-Federation of Free Workers v. Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL Philippines Corp., 478 Phil. 842, 853 (2004).
11.Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 229, 235 (2000).
12.Tumibay v. Soro, G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA 169, 177.
13.383 Phil. 229 (2000).
14.Spouses Bunag v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 216, 223 (1999).
15.FGU Insurance Corporation (now BPI/MS Insurance Corporation) v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 66, G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 50, 55.
16.G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009, 578 SCRA 129, 143-144.
17.Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, G.R. No. 83987, December 27, 1994, 239 SCRA 436, 444.