Procianos-Cohen v. Heirs of Magdayao

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 241558. September 29, 2021.]

ANN PROCIANOS-COHEN, petitioner, vs.HEIRS OF ANACITO L. MAGDAYAO, NAMELY: CELITA M. BONILLO, NERIA M. JAVIER, EDDIE M. MAGDAYAO, ELSA M. AGUIRRE, AND ROLANDO M. MAGDAYAO, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 29, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 241558 (Ann Procianos-Cohen v. Heirs of Anacito L. Magdayao, namely: Celita M. Bonillo, Neria M. Javier, Eddie M. Magdayao, Elsa M. Aguirre, and Rolando M. Magdayao). — Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated July 30, 2018, seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated March 26, 2018 and the Resolution 3 dated July 19, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 149539 dismissing petitioner Ann Procianos-Cohen's (Cohen) Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated December 8, 2016.

The Antecedents

The instant proceedings stemmed from a Complaint for Cancellation and/or Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21309 with Damages 4 dated December 21, 2012 filed by respondents Heirs of Anacito L. Magdayao (heirs of Magdayao) against Cohen and the Register of Deeds of Palawan. In their complaint, they averred that, upon the death of their grandfather, Miguel Magdayao (Miguel), his heirs — one of whom was their father Anacito — executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate 5 dated January 15, 1991, adjudicating among themselves a parcel of land measuring 8.4795 hectares, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) G-724 and Tax Declaration (TD) No. 10-247-A, both issued in Miguel's name. With this, OCT G-247 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-10209 6 was issued in the name of Miguel's heirs. Of this, 1.0060 hectares was allotted to Anacito, such portion identified as Lot A, Psd-04-186355 pursuant to a Subdivision Plan H-193831. Likewise, TD No. 10-247-A was cancelled, and in its stead was issued eight TDs, among which was TD No. 10-301-A under Anacito's name and covering Lot A. CAIHTE

Controversy arose when Cohen and Felomina Magdayao (Felomina), Anacito's sister, supposedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 7 dated June 29, 2008, whereby the latter sold Lot A to the former, even if Felomina's Certificate of Death 8 indicated that she died on January 31, 2007. Notwithstanding a previous Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate 9 executed on January 15, 1991, a Partition Agreement 10 was purportedly executed among Miguel's heirs on September 12, 2008. In this Partition Agreement, Lot A was apportioned in favor of Felomina, although a number of signatories therein had already died by the time such instrument was executed. Eventually issued in the name of Cohen were TCT No. T-21309, 11 indicating that it was derived from TCT No. T-10209; and TD No. 011-0381-A, derived from TD No. 011-0012-A in Felomina's name, in turn derived from TD No. 011-0011-A also in Felomina's name, but which originated from TD No. 10-301-A in Anacito's name. 12

Claiming that Cohen's fabrication of the foregoing spurious documents had deprived them, as legal heirs of Anacito, of their property rights over Lot A, the heirs of Magdayao filed a complaint, praying as follows:

1. Annulment and/or cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 29, 2008 and order the Palawan Provincial Registry of Deeds to annul and/or cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21309 in defendant's name, Ann Procianos-Cohen;

2. Plaintiffs be declared the absolute owners of the property (Lot A) covered by TCT No. T-10209 measuring 1.0060 hectares, being the legal heirs of Anacito L. Magdayao;

3. All documents executed, made and entered into relative to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 29, 2008 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21309 be declared annulled and declared void; x x x 13

The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 4923 and the RTC issued summons therefor. A Sheriff's Return of Summons 14 showed that it was unserved "[w]ith regard to defendant Ann Procianos-Cohen." The Sheriff attempted to personally serve the Summons to Cohen at her address in No. 50-G Jose Abad Santos St., Ozamiz City. However, according to Cohen's sister, as well as the current occupant of the residence, Cohen no longer resided therein as she was already based in the United States of America. The Sheriff also secured a barangay certification that Cohen no longer resided therein. 15

As a recourse, the heirs of Magdayao filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication 16 which the RTC granted. 17 Pursuant thereto, and as indicated by an Affidavit of Publication 18 dated December 4, 2013, the national periodical newspaper PINOY TEXT published the complaint — but notably not the Summons — for three consecutive weeks. With no engagement from Cohen, the heirs of Magdayao filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and Set Pre-Trial Conference 19 dated May 30, 2014. Cohen was then declared in default and the heirs of Magdayao were allowed to present evidence ex-parte. 20

The RTC rendered its Decision 21 dated April 30, 2015 granting the heirs of Magdayao's first and third prayers, but denying the second, as records showed that Anacito had disposed of Lot A to a third person: DETACa

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 29, 2008 and the Partition Agreement dated September 12, 2008 void and non-existing document. The Register of Deeds of Palawan is hereby directed to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21309 in the name of Ann Procianos-Cohen. The Tax Declaration No. 011-0381-A of TCT No. T-[2]1309 in the name of Ann Procianos-Cohen is hereby cancelled. The prayer that the plaintiffs be declared the absolute owners of the property (Lot A) covered by TCT No. T-10209 measuring 1.0060 hectares as legal heirs of Anacito L. Magdayao is hereby denied.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 22

As indicated by a mailing envelope 23 and its corresponding Registry Return Receipt, 24 the RTC Decision was sent to Cohen by registered mail in the same address where she no longer resided.

Sometime in 2016, while out of the country, Cohen learned that the heirs of Magdayao were pursuing an adverse interest against her. 25 She then sent her Palawan-based representatives to look into such news, 26 and on October 3, 2016, she discovered the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-21309. She promptly instructed her representatives to secure copies of the records in Civil Case No. 4923 from which she learned, on that same day, of the RTC Decision rendered against her. 27

Arguing that the RTC Decision dated April 30, 2015 was rendered with extrinsic fraud and without jurisdiction over her person, Cohen filed her Petition for Annulment of Judgment 28 under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 149539. In a Resolution 29 dated April 19, 2017, the CA found prima facie merit, and gave due course, to the petition, issuing summons therefor. The heirs of Magdayao filed their Answer, 30 to which Cohen responded with a Reply Ad Cautelam. 31

The issues having been joined, Cohen then filed a Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial, 32 for which the CA issued a Resolution 33 setting the case for pre-trial and directing the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs. After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the CA issued a Resolution, 34 simplifying the issues to: "1. Whether or not the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner; [and] 2. Whether or not the Petition for Annulment of Judgment, x x x, is the proper remedy taken by the petitioner, x x x[,]" and directing the parties to submit memoranda.

Upon submission of the parties' memoranda, the CA then rendered the assailed Decision 35 dated March 26, 2018 dismissing the petition. aDSIHc

The CA found that the heirs of Magdayao's service of summons by publication in Civil Case No. 4923 was procedurally flawed, since the Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication 36 was not supported by an affidavit justifying service by publication, and because the Affidavit of Publication 37 did not mention the summons. It also failed to allege the element of publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Still, finding that Civil Case No. 4923 concerned an action quasiin rem, it was sufficient that the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the res. Ruling that the 15-day period for finality of decisions only ran against Cohen upon her notice of the RTC Decision on October 3, 2016, the CA pointed out that she could have still availed of other remedies but inexplicably failed to do so.

Cohen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 38 asserting that the RTC Decision had attained finality by the time she obtained notice thereof, that jurisdiction over the defendant is still required in actions quasi in rem, and arguing for the first time that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since the assessed value of Lot A fell below the RTC's jurisdiction. 39 The heirs of Magdayao argued that the motion was procedurally infirm, and that, at any rate, Cohen failed to avail of other available remedies prior to the Rule 47 petition, and that the complaint involved an action incapable of pecuniary estimation cognizable by the RTC.

In its Resolution 40 dated July 19, 2018, the CA denied Cohen's motion for partial reconsideration.

Aggrieved, Cohen came to this Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. 41 In turn, the heirs of Magdayao filed their Comment, 42 with Cohen submitting a Reply 43 thereto.

Issues

I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING THAT THE RTC CASE IS IN THE NATURE OF AN ACTION QUASI IN REM;

II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE SAME IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY; AND

III.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER AND IN BRUSHING ASIDE THE SERIOUS JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES RAISED THEREIN.

Our Ruling

This Court denies the petition.

Petition for annulment of

Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure "govern[s] the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner." 44 The Court's ruling in Alaban v. Court of Appeals45 summarizes the nature, purpose, and availability of such remedy: ETHIDa

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby. 46

In Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank & Trust Company47(Pinausukan), the Court condensed the rules and jurisprudence on petitions for annulment of judgment into four indispensable requisites, so that the same may be granted, thus:

The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy, although seen as 'a last remedy,' is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief. The petition must aver, therefore, that the petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for relief without fault on his part. But this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud), simply because the judgment or final order, being void, may be assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred by laches.

The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does. Fraud is extrinsic, according to Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 'where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.'

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in court. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

In contrast, intrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful cross-examination, resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud. cSEDTC

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other process on the petitioner. A judgment or final order issued by the trial court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is always void, and, in the words of Justice Street in Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 'in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.' But the defect of lack of jurisdiction over the person, being a matter of procedural law, may be waived by the party concerned either expressly or impliedly. 48

This Court hastens to add that jurisprudence has also articulated denial of due process as another ground that may be invoked in a petition for annulment of judgment. The violation of one's due process rights is, after all, a defect in jurisdiction. 49 Non-mention thereof in Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules of Court does not preclude the setting aside of a decision that is patently void where mere inspection of the judgment is enough to demonstrate its nullity on ground of non-compliance with due process of law. 50 In which case, the court shall nullify the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereby. 51 Proceeding to Pinausukan's third and fourth requirements:

The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Its other name is stale demands, and it is based upon grounds of public policy that requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. The existence of four elements must be shown in order to validate laches as a defense, to wit: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom a claim is made, giving rise to a situation for which a complaint is filed and a remedy sought; (b) delay in asserting the rights of the complainant, who has knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and has been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which the latter has based the suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event that the complainant is granted a relief or the suit is not deemed barred.

Estoppel precludes a person who has admitted or made a representation about something as true from denying or disproving it against anyone else relying on his admission or representation. Thus, our law on evidence regards estoppel as conclusive by stating that '[w]henever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.'

The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of pleading. The petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together with sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents, and shall contain essential submissions, specifically: (a) the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, to be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner; (b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense; and (c) the sworn certification that the petitioner has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the CA or the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the said courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom.

The purpose of these requirements of the sworn verification and the particularization of the allegations of the extrinsic fraud in the petition, of the submission of the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, and of the attachment of the affidavits of witnesses and documents supporting the cause of action or defense is to forthwith bring all the relevant facts to the CA's cognizance in order to enable the CA to determine whether or not the petition has substantial merit. Should it find prima facie merit in the petition, the CA shall give the petition due course and direct the service of summons on the respondent; otherwise, the CA has the discretion to outrightly dismiss the petition for annulment. 52 AaCTcI

Tested against the foregoing framework, Cohen's petition must fail. Traversing Cohen's submissions before the Court of Appeals and this Court, she pleaded all four grounds that may be invoked in a petition for annulment of judgment. While this Court finds that three of these were indeed available to her, Cohen failed to abide by the strict procedure imposed by Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

Lack of subject matter

While Cohen pleaded extrinsic fraud in her Rule 47 petition with the CA, such invocation is negligible as she failed to substantiate the same. Further amplifying the Pinausukan requirements, Ramos v. Combong, Jr.53 explains extrinsic fraud as follows:

Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 54

Relative thereto, judicial proceedings are presumed to have been conducted fairly and regularly. It is necessary that full faith and credit should be given thereto in order that matters settled thereby may no longer be subject to doubt or question. 55 It then behooves the petitioner in a petition for annulment of judgment to establish extrinsic fraud by clear and convincing evidence, and not merely by a mere preponderance of evidence, 56 by sufficiently proving the specific acts constituting the deceit. 57

Cohen portrays as fraudulent heirs of Magdayao's indication of her address as No. 50-G Jose Abad Santos St., Ozamiz City, even if they supposedly knew that she resided in El Nido, Palawan. 58 Yet, such bare allegation, without so much of an attempt to mince details (e.g., if the heirs of Magdayao actually knew of her supposed Palawan residence, or whether they deliberately misdeclared her mailing address to exclude her from Civil Case No. 4923), fails the standard of clear and convincing evidence. In fact, the heirs of Magdayao amply demonstrated that they were justified in indicating her Ozamiz address, considering that the very same address appears on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 29, 2008 upon which Cohen hinges her claims.

On jurisdiction over the person of Cohen, the Court must first characterize the nature of the complaint, which will determine the required procedure for service of summons, in turn decisive of whether such procedure was complied with. Cohen contends that the Complaint presents an action in personam, for which personal notice is required, while the CA ruled that the action is one quasi in rem, for which jurisdiction over the res is sufficient. On this issue, the Court sustains Cohen.

In Muñoz v. Atty Yabut, Jr., 59 a case which similarly involved a complaint for annulment of deeds of absolute sale and cancellation of TCT due to spurious transactions, this Court had the occasion to characterize an action of such nature, thus: EcTCAD

The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. 60

When the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. 61 Nevertheless, then-prevailing Rule 14, Section 14 of the Rules of Court permitted service by publication upon persons whose whereabouts are unknown:

SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. — In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order. 62

In Pua v. Deyto, 63 this Court clarified that service by publication may be effected even in actions in personam, provided that personal and substituted service were first availed of but failed, and diligent inquiries were made as to defendant's whereabouts:

In Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corporation, the Court authorized resort to service of summons by publication even in actions in personam, considering that the provision itself allow this mode in any action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, orquasi in rem. The ruling, notwithstanding, there must be prior resort to service in person on the defendant and substituted service, and proof that service by these modes were ineffective before service by publication may be allowed for defendants whose whereabouts are unknown, considering that Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court requires a diligent inquiry of the defendant's whereabouts. 64

Accordingly, the complaint filed by the heirs of Magdayao, which sought to nullify the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 29, 2008 and Cohen's TCT No. T-21309, presented an action in personam, for which personal service was required, although service by publication could be, but was defectively, availed of. The Sheriff's Return of Summons dated August 5, 2013 showed how personal service was attempted, but failed. However, the heirs of Magdayao stopped right there, no longer attempted substituted service of summons, and immediately resorted to service by publication. Neither did they demonstrate, in their Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication, their diligent inquiries to ascertain Cohen's whereabouts. Thus, the RTC should not have ordered service by publication in its Order dated October 7, 2013. Accordingly, service of summons on Cohen was defectively carried out, and the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

Still, if this Court were to subscribe to the CA's ruling that the complaint presented an action quasi in rem, lack of notice to Cohen would still be a denial of due process, a ground she should properly invoke in her petition. As counseled in De Pedro v. Romasan, 65 "to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and quasi in rem actions is required" and that "regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative. A decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction."

On subject matter jurisdiction, this Court first clarifies that this ground may be invoked even belatedly into the proceedings for a petition for annulment of judgment. Cohen raised this ground only in her motion for partial reconsideration, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated July 19, 2018, for having been raised for the first time only upon reconsideration, and since the Resolution dated November 27, 2017 limited the proceedings to only two issues.

The CA is mistaken. According to Rule 47, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, if the petition for annulment of judgment is premised on lack of jurisdiction, the petition may be filed at any time before it is barred by laches or estoppel. True, upon closer scrutiny, this provision pertains to the timing of the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment and not when such ground may be raised, whether or not such a petition is already pending. But such should not bar the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, provided there is no estoppel or laches, since this ground goes into the very authority of the trial court to hear the proceedings and render judgment thereon. More importantly, such pronouncement coincides with the tenet that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. 66 The CA ruled that the limitation of issues in its Resolution dated November 27, 2017 precluded the litigation of the jurisdictional issue, but this contravenes Article 2035 of the Civil Code, that the jurisdiction of courts may not be compromised. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties. 67 AScHCD

That being said, the RTC did not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since this involved title to real property, for which the assessed value is jurisdictional. On this matter, Montero v. Montero, Jr.68 is on point:

In connection with the foregoing, it is a hornbook doctrine that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by the plaintiff's allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.

Hence, the Court has held that even if the action is supposedly one for annulment of a deed, the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.

Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the Complaint itself unequivocally states that petitioner Elmer, by filing the said Complaint, seeks to compel respondents Santiago and Charlie 'to respect the right of ownership and possession over the land in question by the heirs of [Dominga.]'

In fact, in the instant Petition, petitioner Elmer himself declares that 'the narration on the complaint would show that the petitioner was only establishing his rightful ownership over the subject property.'

Simply stated, at the heart of petitioner Elmer's Complaint is his assertion of the right of ownership and possession over the subject property as against respondents Santiago and Charlie. Primarily, petitioner Elmer seeks to establish and confirm his supposed 'rightful ownership' over the subject property.

xxx xxx xxx

Hence, more than asking for the nullification of documents, it is crystal clear that petitioner Elmer asserts his alleged right of possession over the subject property by seeking the reconveyance of the subject property. According to jurisprudence, '[i]n a number of cases, [the Court has] held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve [']title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.[']' Hence, the instant case is clearly one involving title to, possession of, and interest in real property. 69

Contrary to their claim that their action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation cognizable by the RTC, the heirs of Magdayao's complaint is really one involving title to real property, hence, subject to jurisdictional threshold values. They asserted therein that Cohen's schemes had deprived them of their rights over Lot A, and ultimately prayed that they "be declared the absolute owners" thereof.

Thus, Cohen correctly argued in her motion for partial reconsideration that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since, as shown by TD No. 13-011-0009 70 (derived from her previous TD No. 011-0381-A), the 2014 assessed value of Lot A was only P8,190.00. 71 Granted, TD No. 13-011-0009 indicates the 2014 assessed value, while the heirs of Magdayao's complaint was filed in 2012, but surely the assessed value then could not have been greater than in 2014 so as to fall within the RTC's jurisdiction. On this note, the RTC had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear Civil Case No. 4923, much less render the Decision dated April 30, 2015.

On denial of due process, Cohen was deprived thereof when the RTC sent a copy of the April 30, 2015 Decision by registered mail, even if she had earlier been summoned by publication, albeit defectively, and was unable to participate in Civil Case No. 4923. The then-applicable Rule 13, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provided:

Section 9. Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions. — Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party. 72

The service of judgment serves as the reckoning point to determine whether a decision was appealed within the reglementary period, because otherwise, i.e., in the absence of an appeal or if the appeal was made beyond the reglementary period, the decision would, as a consequence, become final. 73 Consequently, judgments improperly served provide no notice to the intended recipient, and prevent the reglementary period for succeeding remedies from even commencing. More importantly, defective service of court orders and processes leads to a denial of due process. 74

Here, it made no sense for the RTC to still serve the Decision dated April 30, 2015 by registered mail to Cohen's Ozamiz address, knowing that personal service of summons thereon had already failed, she had been declared in default, and her whereabouts could not be ascertained. The proper mode of service of judgment should have been by publication, pursuant to Rule 13, Section 9 (now Section 13) of the Rules of Court. Hence, at that stage of Civil Case No. 4923, Cohen was denied due process since she was incapacitated from immediately resorting to her available remedies. caITAC

Cohen could have resorted to

Nevertheless, while the Court finds that substantive grounds were available to support Cohen's Rule 47 petition, the same still merits dismissal as she failed to justify non-availment of the remedies available upon notice of the RTC Decision dated April 30, 2015. As held in Lazaro v. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc.: 75

Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would benefit, from his own inaction or negligence. In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to avail of the ordinary and appropriate remedies in assailing the questioned judgments of the trial courts, but he also failed to show to the satisfaction of this Court that he could not have availed of the ordinary and appropriate remedies under the Rules. 76

As earlier discussed, the RTC Decision dated April 30, 2015 was improperly served on Cohen by registered mail, so she acquired notice thereof only on October 3, 2016 when she and/or her representatives secured the records from the RTC. At this point, the RTC Decision had not yet, as to her, attained finality, and it was only then that the reglementary period for availing of other remedies began to run. Within such time, Cohen could have filed a motion for new trial, alleging extrinsic fraud, 77 or a motion for reconsideration, arguing lack of jurisdiction. 78 Even failing these two remedies, Cohen could have appealed and assigned as reversible errors the defective service of both summons and the RTC Decision dated April 30, 2015. However, Cohen did not resort to these available remedies, much less sufficiently explain why she could not have availed of them.

Owing to the exceptional character of the remedy of annulment of judgment, the limitations and guidelines set forth by Rule 47 of the Rules of Court should be strictly complied with. A petition for annulment of judgment which ignores or disregards any of these limitations and guidelines cannot prosper. 79

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 30, 2018 is DENIED. The Decision dated March 26, 2018 and the Resolution dated July 19, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149539 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Ann Procianos-Cohen's Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated December 8, 2016 was properly dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to avail of the appropriate remedies under the Rules. ICHDca

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-34.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with the concurrences of Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao (now a member of this Court) and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles; id. at 41-54.

3.Id. at 56-59.

4.Id. at 78-82.

5.Id. at 251-254.

6.Id. at 230-231.

7.Id. at 237-241.

8.Id. at 246.

9.Id. at 78.

10.Id. at 243-244.

11.Id. at 234.

12.Id. at 111.

13.Id. at 81.

14.Id. at 121-122.

15.Id. at 121.

16.Id. at 123-124.

17. Order dated October 7, 2013; id. at 125.

18.Id. at 128.

19.Id. at 126-127.

20.Id. at 112.

21. Penned by Presiding Judge Ambrosio B. De Luna; id. at 109-119.

22.Id. at 119.

23.Rollo, p. 75.

24.Id. at 76.

25.Id. at 89.

26.Id. at 129-132.

27.Id. at 139-140.

28.Id. at 85-104.

29.Id. at 145-146.

30.Id. at 150-156.

31.Id. at 168-172.

32.Id. at 173-175.

33.Id. at 177-179.

34.Id. at 209-210.

35.Id. at 51-54.

36.Rollo, pp. 123-124.

37.Supra note 18.

38.Id. at 60-74.

39.Id. at 318-326.

40.Id. at 56-59.

41.Id. at 3-34.

42.Id. at 329-348.

43.Id. at 375-395.

44.City of Taguig v. City of Makati, 787 Phil. 367, 389 (2016).

45. 507 Phil. 682 (2005).

46.Id. at 694.

47. 725 Phil. 19 (2014).

48.Id. at 33.

49.Arrieta v. Arrieta, G.R. No. 234808, November 19, 2018.

50.Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 264 (1997).

51.Nudo v. Caguioa, 612 Phil. 517, 522 (2009).

52.Supra note 50, at 36-38. Citations omitted.

53. 510 Phil. 277 (2005).

54.Id. at 285. (Citations omitted)

55.Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622, 636 (1955).

56.Republic v. Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296, 311 (2006).

57.People v. Verra, 432 Phil. 279, 285 (2002).

58.Rollo, pp. 97-100.

59. 665 Phil. 488 (2011).

60.Id. at 523. (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

61.Citizens' Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Melencio-Herrera, 148 Phil. 381, 385 (1971), citing Pantaleon v. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 765, 766 (1959).

62. Now Section 16 pursuant to A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which presently reads:

"Section 16. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. — In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his or her whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, within ninety (90) calendar days from the commencement of the action, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him or her by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order."

63. 699 Phil. 433 (2012).

64.Id. at 351. Citations omitted.

65. 748 Phil. 706, 725 (2014).

66.Figueroa y Cervantes v. People, 580 Phil. 58, 66 (2008).

67.Montero v. Montero, Jr., G.R. No. 217755, September 18, 2019.

68.Id.

69.Id. (Citations omitted; emphasis, italics, and underscoring in the original)

70.Rollo, p. 77.

71.See Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., 434 Phil. 28, 36 (2002); Hilario v. Salvador, 497 Phil. 327, 336 (2005).

72. Now Section 13 pursuant to A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which presently reads:

Section 13. Service of Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions. — Judgments, final orders, or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. Upon ex parte motion of any party in the case, a copy of the judgment, final order, or resolution may be delivered by accredited courier at the expense of such party. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him or her shall be served upon him or her also by means of publication at the expense of the prevailing party.

73.Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 693 Phil. 25, 37 (2012).

74.Aberca v. Ver, 684 Phil. 207, 225 (2012).

75. 456 Phil. 414 (2003).

76.Id. at 421-422.

77. RULES OF COURT, Rule 37, Section 1.

78.City of Taguig v. City of Makati, 787 Phil. 367, 394 (2016).

79.Spouses Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 192472, June 3, 2019.