THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 223777. March 14, 2018.]
MA. THERESA P. PRIETO, petitioner, vs. TOYOTA SHAW, INC. and ARTURO P. LOPEZ, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 14, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 223777 (Ma. Theresa P. Prieto v. Toyota Shaw, Inc. and Arturo P. Lopez) — This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 13, 2015 Decision 1 and March 17, 2016 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals, Manila (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132511, which affirmed the February 28, 2013 Decision 3 and August 30, 2013 Resolution 4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 10-002829-12, a case for illegal dismissal.
The Antecedents
Toyota Shaw, Inc. (TSI) is a company engaged in the sale and distribution of Toyota cars, parts, and accessories in the country, while Arturo P. Lopez (Lopez) is its President (collectively referred to as respondents).
On September 22, 2009, TSI rehired Ma. Theresa P. Prieto (petitioner) as Vehicle Sales Manager (VSM) for the Toyota-Shaw branch. As VSM, petitioner was tasked with, among others, monitoring the performance of the Vehicle Sales Department in achieving its sales target. During petitioner's stint with TSI, its Toyota-Shaw branch consistently exceeded sales target. Because of her performance, TSI increased her salary and extended to her some other incentives and benefits.
On August 31, 2011, Lopez instructed petitioner to see him at his office at TSI's Toyota-Pasig branch. During the meeting, he advised petitioner that she would be transferred to Toyota-Pasig branch as Showroom Sales Manager (SSM) effective September 1, 2011. Lopez gave her the following reasons for this transfer: (1) petitioner cannot work well with Jorge Tuazon, her immediate supervisor at Toyota-Shaw branch; and (2) she failed to match the sales performance of Toyota-Pasig branch. Petitioner immediately rejected the transfer as she considered it to be a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.
On the same day, shortly after the meeting, respondent Lopez issued an Intra-Company Communication, 5 dated August 31, 2011, which stated that petitioner has decided to look for other opportunities outside of TSI and that effective September 1, 2011, Mylene R. Ribleza (Ribleza) would become the VSM Officer-in-Charge (OIC). Upon learning of the communication, petitioner allegedly felt embarrassed prompting her to file a leave of absence on the same day from September 1 to 29, 2011.
On September 19, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA) alleging that she was constructively dismissed.
The LA Ruling
In its Decision, 6 dated August 23, 2012, the LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It reasoned that there was no transfer to speak of considering that the same was not accepted by petitioner and that Ribleza was appointed only as an OTC. Since no transfer was effected, the LA concluded that there was no constructive dismissal.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated an appeal to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In its decision, dated February 28, 2013, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the LA. It found respondents' version of facts and arguments to be marred with material inconsistencies and contradictions, and ruled that petitioner was constructively dismissed. The NLRC found it incredible for respondents to claim that they awaited petitioner's return from her leave of absence while, at the same time, making it appear that she had resigned. It ordered respondents to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges but without backwages.
Respondents and petitioner moved for reconsideration and partial reconsideration, respectively. In its resolution, dated August 30, 2013, the NLRC denied respondents' motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, it partially granted petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration by awarding her separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service in lieu of reinstatement because of strained relations. However, the NLRC refused to grant petitioner's prayer for backwages, damages, and 13th month pay.
The NLRC opined that petitioner is not entitled to backwages because she could not be considered completely blameless considering that after the lapse of her leave on September 29, 2011, she failed to report for work.
Not satisfied with the judgment awards, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its decision, dated August 13, 2015, the CA denied the petition. It ruled that the petition for certiorari is a remedy of last recourse designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. The CA opined that, rather than the issue of jurisdiction, what petitioner assailed was the wisdom of the NLRC in not awarding backwages. Therefore, the relief sought by petitioner could not be granted in the said petition. Further, it ruled that backwages may not be awarded due to the employer's good faith. It also denied petitioner's claims for 13th month pay for lack of factual basis, and for damages and attorney's fees absent any evidence that respondents were motivated by malice or bad faith.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated March 17, 2016.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that backwages should have been awarded because there was no showing that respondents acted in good faith when they terminated her employment; and that she is entitled to moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and her accrued benefits (including 13th month pay and the monetary equivalent of her sick leave incentive and vacation leaves for the year 2011).
In their Comment, 7 dated September 17, 2016, respondents aver that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decision and resolution. They argue that the assailed decision and resolution rests on jurisprudence, such that any error would be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
In her Reply, 8 dated January 23, 2017, petitioner argues that the CA committed an error of jurisdiction. She highlights that the CA failed to explain how and why the cited jurisprudence applies to her case. Likewise, petitioner emphasizes that the CA failed to explain how petitioner's termination was made in good faith. Petitioner insists that the CA's factual findings are inconsistent with its conclusion that her termination was in good faith.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DETERMINING THAT THE NLRC DID NOT COMMIT ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO AWARD BACKWAGES TO PETITIONER.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious. The CA erred in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to award backwages to petitioner.
Petitioner is entitled to backwages
At the outset, it must be emphasized that "[i]n a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision x x x. Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we hate to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it." 9
In this case, the CA ruled that petitioner raised an error of judgment in its petition for certiorari. In particular, the appellate court opined that what petitioner assailed was the wisdom of the NLRC in not awarding backwages. Thus, it concluded that the remedy sought by petitioner cannot be granted in the petition for certiorari.
The Court disagrees.
In Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. v. Villamater, et al., 10 the Court pronounced that:
x x x. Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari, which is merely confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is, thus, incumbent upon petitioners to satisfactorily establish that the NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically in order that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. 11
Grave abuse of discretion exists when the act is: (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. 12
In the instant case, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to award backwages to petitioner; such ruling is contrary to prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Article 294 [279] of Labor Code of the Philippines provides that "x x x [a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." 13 Thus, the general rule is that an employee unjustly dismissed from work is entitled to full backwages.
This Court, in a number of cases, has provided for exceptions to this rule. Thus, to support its position, the NLRC cited the case of Victory Liner, Inc. v. Race, 14 which in turn cited the cases of Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, 15 and San Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor. 16 In these cases, the Court opted not to award backwages despite the finding of illegal dismissal.
However, the aforementioned cases do not apply herein. A reading of these cases shows that the illegally dismissed employees were found guilty of breach of trust or found to have committed some irregularities. In short, there was just cause for their dismissal which was deemed too drastic a penalty by the Court for some equitable reason or the other.
In Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, 17 the employee was found guilty of breach of trust for stealing high-grade stones from his employer. Meanwhile, in San Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 18 the employee was dismissed from work after he was caught buying from his co-workers medicines given to them by the employer gratis and re-selling said medicines for profit. Lastly, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. Race, 19 the Court found the dismissal to be in good faith considering that (1) the employee was only able to render actual service to the employer as a bus driver for a short period of time before his injury prevented him from continuing, and (2) the employee's leg injury effectively prevented him from working as a bus driver for the employer. Due to the just cause in these cases, the Court deemed it proper not to award backwages despite a finding of illegal dismissal.
Here, the NLRC ratiocinated its refusal to award backwages on the ground that petitioner was not completely blameless as she failed to report to work after September 29, 2011 and her employer acted in good faith in dismissing her.
The Court does not agree with the NLRC and the CA. The failure of petitioner to report to work after September 29, 2011 cannot be taken against her. The NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was constructively dismissed by respondents TSI and Lopez on August 31, 2011, when respondent Lopez issued an Intra-Company Communication, which stated that petitioner had decided to look for other opportunities outside of TSI and that, effective on September 1, 2011, Ribleza would become the VSM OIC.
Under such circumstances, petitioner could not have been expected to report to work after September 29, 2011. She believed she had been constructively dismissed; thus, she filed the instant case for illegal dismissal on September 19, 2011. Had petitioner reported for work, it would have militated against her claim of constructive dismissal.
The Court also does not agree that TSI acted in good faith.
In Buhain v. Court of Appeals, et al., 20 this Court held that "[i]n Itogon-Suyoc Mines, there was express finding of just cause in the dismissal of the employee concerned. Reinstatement was ordered only because we deemed that dismissal would be too severe a penalty considering the long years and loyal service he has rendered to the company. The same factual milieu obtains in Manila Electric Co., insofar as the presence of just cause is concerned. In the sense, therefore, that there was a just cause in the dismissal of an employee and that the latter was afforded due process, we held that there was good faith on the part of the employers." 21 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, an employer is in good faith in dismissing his employee if there was just cause in his dismissal and he was afforded due process.
In this case, the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, found that TSI did not have just cause in dismissing petitioner. They also found that petitioner was not afforded due process by TSI. Thus, there is no basis in law and in fact for the finding that TSI was in good faith in dismissing petitioner.
It is clear that the NLRC decision denying petitioner backwages does not rest upon law and jurisprudence. Thus, the CA committed reversible error in holding that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner backwages.
Accordingly, the Court finds it proper to award petitioner backwages from August 31, 2011 (the date respondents illegally dismissed petitioner) up to the date of finality of the August 30, 2013 resolution of the NLRC granting petitioner separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
The Court notes that petitioner prayed for backwages "from the time of her dismissal or on 31 August 2011 up to the date of the finality of the decision awarding such backwages." However, consistent with the ruling of this Court in C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries v. Perez, 22 the award of backwages shall be counted from the time of her dismissal, August 31, 2011, until the finality of the decision awarding separation pay. "The reason for this was explained in Bani Rural Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman. When there is an order of separation pay (in lieu of reinstatement or when the reinstatement aspect is waived or subsequently ordered in light of a supervening event making the award of reinstatement no longer possible), the employment relationship is terminated only upon the finality of the decision ordering the separation pay. The finality of the decision cuts off the employment relationship and represents the final settlement of the rights and obligations of the parties against each other. Hence, backwages no longer accumulate upon the finality of the decision ordering the payment of separation pay because the employee is no longer entitled to any compensation from the employer by reason of the severance of his employment." 23 (citations omitted)
Thus, the award of backwages herein shall be counted from the time of petitioner's illegal dismissal on August 31, 2011 until the finality of the August 30, 2013 NLRC resolution granting petitioner separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The award of separation pay in the said August 30, 2013 NLRC resolution has long become final because petitioner only appealed the award of backwages, damages, and other benefits.
Petitioner is also entitled to moral
The NLRC and the CA also erred in refusing to award moral damages and attorney's fees to petitioner.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that moral damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. 24 Here, bad faith on the part of respondents may be inferred from the Intra-Company Communication regarding certain organizational changes, wherein they made it appear that petitioner severed her ties with, and decided to look for other opportunities outside, TSI. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
As to the award of attorney's fees, "[i]t is settled that where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally justifiable." 25 Respondents' act of illegally dismissing petitioner forced her to litigate and incur expenses. Thus, she is entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
The Court concurs with the NLRC and the CA that petitioner is not entitled to exemplary damages, 13th month pay, and the monetary equivalent of her sick leave incentive and vacation leaves for the year 2011.
Exemplary damages are granted by way of example or correction for the public good if the employer acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manners. 26 In the instant case, petitioner failed to prove that respondents acted in such manner by dismissing her. Hence, she is not entitled to exemplary damages.
Petitioner is also not entitled to the award of 13th month pay. It must be observed that in the proceedings before the NLRC and the CA, petitioner failed to present sufficient proof establishing her claim for 13th month pay. Similarly, this Court also finds that petitioner was unable to present sufficient proof establishing her claim for the monetary equivalent of her sick leave incentive and vacation leaves for the year 2011.
The legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards granted at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 13, 2015 Decision and March 17, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 132511 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Toyota Shaw, Inc. is ORDERED to PAY petitioner Ma. Theresa P. Prieto:
a. Backwages computed from August 31, 2011 up to the date of finality of the August 30, 2013 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission granting petitioner separation pay in lieu of reinstatement;
b. Moral damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
c. Attorney's fees in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); and
d. Legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum of the total monetary awards computed from the date of finality of this resolution until their full satisfaction.
The Labor Arbiter is ORDERED to compute the total monetary benefits awarded and due petitioner Ma. Theresa P. Prieto in accordance with this resolution.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 8-21; penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, concurring.
2.Id. at 23-25.
3.Id. at 231-238; penned by Commissioner Dolores M. Peralta-Beley with Presiding Commissioner Leonarda L. Leonida and Commissioner Mercedes R. Posada-Lacap, concurring.
4.Id. at 256-263.
5.Id. at 107-108.
6.Id. at 190-198; penned by Labor Arbiter Daniel J. Cajilig.
7.Id. at 337-356.
8.Id. at 371-381.
9.Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., et al. v. Serna, 700 Phil. 1, 9 (2012); citations omitted, emphasis supplied.
10. 628 Phil. 81 (2010).
11.Id. at 92.
12.Imperial, et al. v. Judge Armes, et al., G.R. Nos. 178842 & 195509, January 30, 2017; citing ATO v. Court of Appeals, et al., 737 Phil. 61 (2014); Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al., 464 Phil. 173 (2004).
13. LABOR CODE, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Amended & Renumbered), July 21, 2015.
14. 593 Phil. 606 (2008).
15. 202 Phil. 850 (1982).
16. 159-A Phil. 346 (1975).
17.Supra note 15.
18.Supra note 16.
19.Supra note 14.
20. 433 Phil. 94 (2002).
21.Id. at 105.
22. G.R. No. 220506, January 18, 2017.
23.Id.
24.Litonjua Group of Companies, et al. v. Vigan, 412 Phil. 627, 643 (2001).
25.Id. at 643-644.
26.Lu v. Enopia, et al., G.R. No. 197899, March 6, 2017.