THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 230023. December 13, 2017.]
PRESTIGE CARS, INC. AND MARIO GLORIA, petitioners,vs. MAMERTO D. CORDOVIZ, JR., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedDecember 13, 2017, which reads as follows: ITAaHc
"G.R. No. 230023 (Prestige Cars, Inc. and Mario Gloria vs. Mamerto D. Cordoviz, Jr.). — For Resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated February 29, 2016 and Resolution dated January 19, 2017 in CA-G.R. SP No. 136113, entitled "Mamerto Cordoviz vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and Prestige Cars, Inc./Mario Gloria." The assailed rulings reversed the National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC) Decision dated March 31, 2014 and Resolution dated April 30, 2014.
Antecedent Facts
The petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave (SIL), 13th month pay, separation pay and moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees filed by respondent Mamerto Cordoviz, Jr. (Cordoviz) against Prestige Cars, Inc. (Prestige) and/or its President Mario Gloria. 2
Petitioner Prestige is a domestic corporation engaged in car dealership services. Respondent was employed by Prestige on January 19, 1995, 3 initially as a Counter Salesman and later as Service Manager 4 until he stopped reporting for work on July 14, 2012.
In their position paper, Prestige avers that it received a report from Security Officer Leopoldo L. Buco, Jr. that Cordoviz authorized repairs within the premises of the company on weekends without having them recorded in the company books, in violation of its company policy. 5 Prestige later received a complaint from its client that two (2) BMW units which were inspected and cleared by Cordoviz had missing car parts and spare parts. 6
In a Letter Memorandum dated July 2, 2012, Prestige asked Cordoviz to explain, in writing, why he should not be held responsible for the incident involving the missing car parts, since it was part of his job as Service Manager.
Cordoviz submitted a letter-reply dated July 13, 2012 addressing the issue regarding the alleged missing parts. He explained that 1) the CID was not replaced but merely reinstalled; 2) the airbag components were mistakenly mixed up with the spare parts of another client; 3) the power switch window was not the same power switch window they installed; 4) some of the mechanics in charge of the car were aware that some bolts, clips, screws and nuts were missing but did not report the same; and 5) that the floor mats were missing. Cordoviz stopped reporting on July 14, 2012 and surrendered his company-issued vehicle and mobile phone on July 16, 2012. 7 He averred that he was verbally instructed not to report for work anymore without mentioning the officer of Prestige who instructed him not to report for work. 8 Thereafter, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners.
Prestige, for its part, denied terminating Cordoviz and argued that it was still in the process of conducting further investigation when Cordoviz stopped reporting for work.
In his reply, Cordoviz claimed that he had no hand in the repair and transfer of the subject vehicles because there were team leaders and supervisors handling the same. In fact, the actions prior to the release of the vehicles were evaluated and approved by the After Sales Supervisor. 9
The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision dated March 27, 2013, 10 dismissing the complaint. The LA ruled that there was no illegal dismissal because Cordoviz abandoned his job. He surrendered all company properties in his custody and stopped reporting for work after he submitted his explanation letter. To the LA, his overt acts manifested his unilateral severance of the employer-employee relationship with Prestige. 11 The LA held that since Cordoviz was not illegally dismissed, he is not entitled to separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of the LA's March 27, 2013 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, instant complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of merit for the foregoing reasons.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, Cordoviz posited that there was prima facie abuse of discretion on the part of the LA in declaring that he abandoned his duties and in not awarding his money claims. The NLRC held that Cordoviz's arguments were unavailing because it is incumbent upon the employees to first establish the fact of their dismissal before the burden is shifted to the employer to prove that the dismissal was legal. The NLRC likewise noted that with respect to the missing vehicle parts, Cordoviz was placing blame on his subordinates and superior at the same time, but attributed no fault on his part as a Service Manager in charge of monitoring and supervising all works carried out under the service department.
Citing MZR Industries v. Majen Colambot12 and Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC, 13 the NLRC rendered a Decision dated March 31, 2014, 14 affirming the Decision of the LA, and a Resolution denying Cordoviz's Motion for Reconsideration. The fallo of the NLRC's Decision dated March 31, 2014 provides: CHTAIc
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the Labor Arbiter's 27 March 2013 Decision is accordingly AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cordoviz filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
The CA, citing Tegimenta Chemical Phils. v. Oco15 and Hantex Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 16 rendered the assailed Decision dated February 29, 2016, which reversed the rulings of the LA and NLRC. 17 The CA held that there was no proof that Cordoviz abandoned his job. For abandonment to exist, the CA elucidated, it is necessary that: (1) the employee has failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by overt acts. 18
Meanwhile, the CA likewise found that there was no sufficient proof to support the claim of illegal dismissal. Cordoviz merely mentioned in his reply that a certain Mr. Tupaz verbally instructed him not to report for work anymore, without explaining the latter's position or designation.
As to the issue of the 13th month pay, the CA pointed out that managerial employees are generally not entitled to 13th month pay. However, in their position paper, Prestige admitted to Cordoviz's entitlement thereto. Thus, it could be inferred that the company policy provides for the payment of the 13th month pay, not only to the rank and file, but also to managerial employees. As for SIL, Article 82 of the Labor Code excludes managerial employees from the coverage of the law. Even if Cordoviz was entitled to the SIL, documents showed that Prestige already granted vacation leave benefits; therefore, he could no longer ask for SIL benefits.
The CA rendered a Decision dated February 29, 2016, 19 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby PARTLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated 31 March 2014 rendered by the NLRC is REVERSED. Private Respondents are directed to pay petitioner separation pay in lieu of reinstatement for seventeen (17) years of service in the amount of Six Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (Php680,000.00) and proportionate 13th Month pay computed in accordance with existing company policy of private respondent Prestige Cars, Inc.
The case is ordered REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for proper computation of the 13th Month Pay as discussed above.
SO ORDERED.
Prestige filed the present petition raising the following issues:
1. The CA erred in disregarding the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC that Cordoviz voluntarily terminated his employment with petitioner Prestige through abandonment; and
2. The CA erred in ruling that Cordoviz is entitled to separation pay despite its own finding that he was not illegally terminated.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritless.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. As a rule, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive, and this Court will not review them on appeal. 20 However, the rule admits some exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 21 EATCcI
The LA and the NLRC ruled that there was no illegal dismissal because Cordoviz abandoned his job as shown by his overt actions in surrendering his company-issued vehicle and mobile phone, and in not reporting for work starting July 14, 2012. The CA, in reversing the factual findings of the LA and NLRC, held that there was no evidence to substantiate abandonment. 22 Hence, the Court deems it proper to review the above factual findings.
In illegal dismissal cases, it is incumbent upon the employees to first establish the fact of their dismissal before the burden is shifted to the employer to prove that the dismissal was legal. 23 Put otherwise, before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof. 24
Both the LA and NLRC were correct in finding that Cordoviz was not able to substantiate his claim of illegal dismissal. His allegation that he was verbally ordered not to report for work anymore was not supported by any proof other than his self-serving statement. He belatedly mentioned the name of one Mr. Tupaz in his Reply as the person who issued the verbal order, but failed to present evidence that the latter indeed had the authority to issue his dismissal. He also failed to mention the circumstances for which he was dismissed. Thus, in the absence of any overt or positive act showing that Prestige dismissed Cordoviz, the latter's claim of illegal dismissal and recovery of benefits cannot be sustained.
On the other hand, Cordoviz, cannot also be considered to have abandoned his job as Manager. To constitute abandonment of work, two elements must concur, namely: 25
1. The employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and
2. There must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act.
The absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. 26 Note that it is the employer who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning. If an employee indeed abandoned his job, petitioners should have afforded him due process by serving him written notices, as well as a chance to explain his side, as required by law. 27 In this case, there is no showing that Prestige took steps in notifying Cordoviz of his absences and ordering him to report for work; or as certaining his true intentions. Since abandonment is a matter of intention, 28 it cannot be lightly inferred, much less legally presumed, from certain equivocal acts. 29
As a general rule, in cases where there is no sufficient proof, either to establish illegal dismissal or abandonment of work, the remedy is reinstatement without backwages. Reinstatement is a restoration to the state from which one has been removed or separated. 30 However, when the reinstatement of an employee would result in tension or strained relations due to irreconcilable differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position in the company, 31 the payment of separation pay would be a more viable solution. In the present case, Prestige's trust on Cordoviz as its service manager was affected because he violated the company policy disallowing service work on weekends and because of his failure to successfully explain the issue of the missing auto parts on the two (2) BMW vehicles repaired under his supervision. For his part, he felt that he was illegally dismissed when he was verbally instructed not to report for work anymore.
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement in cases where the latter option is no longer desirable or viable between the employer and employee due to breach of trust. 32 Such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. It also releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust. 33 However, it must be emphasized that separation pay is granted as a measure of social justice, 34 as in the case of Cordoviz, who served as an employee for Prestige for 17 years before his termination.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated February 29, 2016 and Resolution dated January 29, 2017 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. (Bersamin, J., on leave)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob with the concurrence of Justice Ricardo Rosario and Justice Edwin Sorongon.
2. Records, p. 54.
3.Rollo, p. 47. In the Petition for Certiorari dated July 7, 2014 filed before the CA, it is stated that Cordoviz was employed as Counter Salesman on January, 1996.
4. Cordoviz was promoted effective August 1, 2011, Annex "C," records, p. 71.
5.Rollo, p. 6.
6.Id. at 8.
7.Id. at 39.
8.Id. at 46. Mr. Cordoviz mentioned the name of Mr. Tupaz on the Reply slip without stating the latter's position or authority in Prestige.
9. Records, p. 127.
10.Id. at 143-153.
11.Id. at 40.
12. G.R. No. 179001, August 28, 2013.
13. G.R. No. 8147, April 26, 1989.
14. Records, pp. 27-37.
15. G.R. No. 175369, February 27, 2013.
16. G.R. No. 148241, September 27, 2002.
17. Records, pp. 318-338.
18.Rollo, p. 43.
19.Id. at 38-51.
20.Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) vs. Virgilio E. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010.
21.Id., citing Campos v. Pastrana, et al., G.R. No. 175994, December 8, 2009.
22. Rollo, p. 43.
23. Exodus International Construction Corporation and Antonio P. Javalera v. Guillermo Biscocho, et al., G.R. No. 166109, February 23, 2011.
24. MZR Industries v. Majen Colambot, G.R. No. 179001, August 28, 2013.
25. Northwest Tourism Corporation v. Former Special 3rd Division of the Court of Appeals, 500 Phil. 85, 95 (2005); Nueva Ecija Electric Cooperative, (NEECO) II v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 157603, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 169, 182.
26. Tan Brothers Corporation of Basilan City through its owner/manager Mauro Tan v. Edna Escudero, G.R. No. 188711, July 3, 2013, n citing MSMG-UWP v. Hon. Ramos, 383 Phil. 329, 372 (2000).
27. Id., citing Henlin Panay Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 180718, 23 October 2009, 604 SCRA 362, 369.
28. Baron Republic Theatrical, Major Cinema, Wilson Pascual and Rodrigo Salazar v. Normita P. Peralta and Edilberto Aguilar, G.R. No. 170525, October 2, 2009; Macahilig v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158095, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 375, 386.
29. Garden of Memories Park v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 160278, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 293, 309.
30. DUP Sound Phils. and/or Manuel Tan v. Court of Appeals and Cirilo A. Pial, G.R. No. 168317, November 21, 2011, citing Forever Security & General Services v. Flores, G.R. No. 147961, September 7, 2007, 532 SCRA 454, 468; Pfizer, Inc. v. Velasco, G.R. No. 177467, March 9, 2011.
31. See Bank of Lubao v. Rowel Manabat and the National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 188722, February 1, 2012, citing Quijano v. Mercury Drug Corp., 354 Phil. 112, 121-122 (1998).
32. Armando Aliling v. Jose Feliciano, Manuel F. San Mateo III, Joseph R. Lariosa and Wide Wide World Express Corporation, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012.
33. Bank of Lubao, Inc. v. Rommel J. Manabat and the National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 188722, February 1, 2012, citing Golden Ace Builders v. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010, 620 SCRA 283, 289-290.
34. Manila Water Company v. Carlito Del Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "G.R. No. 18871, July 8, 2013" in the original document.