THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 194464. October 11, 2017.]
PREMIUM WASH LAUNDRY and ELMER C. ESPIRITU, petitioners,vs. MA. TERESA P. ESGUERRA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 11, 2017, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 194464 (PREMIUM WASH LAUNDRY and ELMER C. ESPIRITU, Petitioners, v. MA. TERESA P. ESGUERRA, Respondent.) — The Court NOTES:
(1) the transmittal letter dated June 13, 2017 of Doerlyn D. Dural, Records Officer II, Archives Section, Judicial Records Office of the Court of Appeals (CA), Manila, elevating to this Court the CA rollo of this case; and
(2) the transmittal letter dated July 3, 2017 of Atty. Maria Ricasion B. Tugadi, Director II, Legal and Research Department of the National Labor Relations Commission, elevating to this Court the entire record of this case.
The petitioners seek the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 27, 2010, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring the respondent as having been illegally dismissed, and ordering the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and full backwages to her. 2 The NLRC thereby affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in her favor on November 21, 2006. 3
Antecedents
The CA summarized the factual and procedural antecedents, viz.:
Sometime in September 2005, private respondent Ma. Teresa P. Esguerra filed a complaint before the labor arbiter against petitioners, Premium Was (sic) Laundry (PWL), and Elmer C. Espiritu for illegal dismissal. She alleged that she was a stay-in employee of PWL, receiving a weekly salary of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos and rendered services twelve (12) hours a day six days a week. On September 24, 2005, petitioner Espiritu closed the laundry shop without prior notice to its employees and also the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Private respondent avers that the workers were given P2,000.00 each only. Private respondent, however, refused to receive the said amount and instead filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner Elmer C. Espiritu, on the other hand, contends that PWL was not a sole proprietorship but an unregistered partnership with him as partner financier and private respondent as industrial partner. Allegedly, private respondent had full control and management of the operations of PWL and that it was their mutual decision to close PWL. In fact, both of them informed the lessor of the premises, Antonia Dizon, that they would cease laundry operations upon expiration of the lease contract in July 2005. Private respondent left on October 9, 2005, and took with her PWL's records. Thereafter, she filed a complaint before the labor arbiter. 4
In his decision dated November 21, 2006, 5 the LA declared the respondent's termination as invalid upon finding that contrary to the petitioners' insistence, she had been an employee because there had been no evidence to prove her being an industrial partner. The LA disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that complainant had been illegally dismissed from her employment. Accordingly, respondents are directed to pay complainant her separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as well as full backwages, as follows:
a.) P72,000.00 — Separation Pay
b.) P127,053.33 — Full Backwages
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA, 7 and noted several circumstances to warrant the conclusion that the respondent had been an employee, such as: (a) the payment of salary; (b) the fact that she had been required to report for work from 7:00 am to 7:00 pm; and (c) the fact that she had been under the petitioners' control. The NLRC modified the grant of monetary rewards, however, and decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby vacated. And in lieu thereof, Premium Wash Laundry and/or Elmer C. Espiritu are ordered to pay jointly and severally Ma. Teresa P. Esguerra of separation pay and indemnity in the form of nominal damages as follows:
a. P72,000.00 — Separation pay aScITE
b. P50,000.00 — Nominal Damages
All other claims are dismissed for lack of legal and factual basis. 8
Assailing the decision of the NLRC by petition for certiorari, the petitioners averred that the NLRC thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, on August 27, 2010, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, and upheld the ruling of the NLRC on the employment status of the respondent. 9 It rejected the petitioners' contention that she had been an industrial partner considering that they had not presented any competent evidence to prove such allegation; and that she had not been shown to have received a share of the profits from the supposed partnership.
Issues
In their petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners challenge the factual and legal conclusions of the CA, and continue to insist that the respondent had not been their regular employee but rather an industrial partner who had been in charge of the over-all management of the business. They insist that the CA erred in ruling that no partnership had existed between petitioner Espiritu and the respondent simply because no certificate of registration was ever presented to prove the existence of such partnership; that the testimonies of employees of Premium attesting to the fact that they considered the respondent as a partner in the business were sufficient to establish their allegation; that under the four-fold test of employment, the evidence on record would support their contention that the respondent had not been an employee because she had possessed the necessary expertise in the management of the business; that the P2,000.00 given to her weekly was not a wage but an allowance; and that petitioner Espiritu never intervened in the work performance of the respondent.
The main issue is whether or not the respondent was an employee of the petitioners entitled to the reliefs granted by the NLRC and the LA.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit.
Prefatorily, we must remind that a petition for review on certiorari is limited only to a review of questions of law. Section 1, Rule 45 clearly provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. 10
The petitioners still assail the existence of an employer-employee relationship, and thereby seek the reversal of the rulings of the LA and the NLRC. The existence of employer-employee relationship is ultimately a question of fact. Considering that the petitioners thereby ostensibly raise factual issues, the Court has to dismiss the appeal because the Court cannot re-examine the factual bases for the conclusions of the CA. To do so will necessarily involve determining the probative value of evidence presented by the parties during the initial proceedings, and will require the ascertainment of the truth or falsity of the allegations of their respective claims. But it is already a well-settled rule that the factual findings of said administrative tribunals are to be accorded not only respect but even finality when supported by substantial evidence. 11 As such, the Court will not re-examine the facts as established and found by the lower courts. HEITAD
Moreover, the factual findings of the labor tribunals that are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions are generally binding on this Court. Consequently, the Court is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that the same were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis. 12 In other words, the Court now refrains from disturbing the factual basis of their rulings.
Nonetheless, even assuming that the Court indulges the petitioners and reviews the factual findings, every indication points to the ultimate result that the Court would likely reach the same conclusions arrived at by the CA. Verily, the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the LA on the status of employment of the respondent, instead of her being an industrial partner. The records cannot sustain the latter conclusion over the former.
Under a contract of partnership, two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. 13 Article 1769 of the Civil Code lays down different rules to determine whether a partnership exists, and even determines whether a person is a partner, thus:
Article 1769. In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to each other are not partners as to third persons;
(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such-co-owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived;
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise;
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord;
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the business;
(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other property by installments or otherwise.
Accordingly, that the respondent received P2,000.00 did not ipso facto prove the existence of the partnership between her and petitioner Espiritu. The petitioners did not substantiate their claim that the respondent was an industrial partner. Her having managed the business did not make her a partner because an employee enjoying managerial rank could take care of the day to day operations of her employer's business, but her doing so did not vest upon her the position of a partner. Also, in a partnership, the partners not only contribute to a common fund but also share in the profits. As the CA correctly observed, the P2,000.00 given to the respondent could not be considered as her share of the profits of the partnership but as wage for her performance of work.
In the absence of substantial evidence to support the petitioners' contention, we must presume the respondent to be the employee of the petitioners, and must conclude that she had been invalidly dismissed from employment. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is upon the employer to show that the employee's termination from service is for a just and valid cause. The employer succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence, not on the weakness of the employee's evidence. We must also abide by the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the latter in case of doubt in the evidence presented by them. 14
The respondent has further established her being the employee of the petitioners. Under jurisprudence, the factors by which to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, known as the four-fold test, are, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct, or the so-called control test, considered to be the most important element. 15 Conformably with the four-fold test, the respondent was hired by Espiritu, and was paid P2,000.00 per week plus free accommodation as compensation; she was removed from employment by Espiritu's closure of the business; and she was made to report to Espiritu with the obligation to seek the latter's approval particularly in financial matters. Under such circumstances, the CA correctly concluded that the respondent was an employee of the petitioners. ATICcS
Lastly, the CA held that the petitioners did not show that the removal from employment of the respondent came under either just or authorized causes. Specifically, the petitioners did not establish the serious business losses that could have justified her dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari for its lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 27, 2010; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 26-37; penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor (retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
2.Id. at 164-171.
3.Id. at 144-152.
4.Id. at 27-28.
5.Id. at 144-152.
6.Id. at 152.
7.Id. at 164.
8.Id. at 170-171.
9.Supra, note 1.
10.Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 38, 46-47.
11.Atok Big Wedge Company, Inc. v. Gison, G.R. No. 169510, August 8, 2011, 655 SCRA 193, 202.
12.Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140812, August 28, 2001, 363 SCRA 799, 807.
13.Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 148187, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 428, 438-439, citing Article 1767 of the Civil Code.
14.Functional, Inc. v. Granfil, G.R. No. 176377, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 279, 284-285.
15.Coca Cola Bottlers (Phil.), Inc. v. Climaco, G.R. No. 146881, February 5, 2007, 514 SCRA 164, 177.