Pineda v. Spouses Ligason

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 237338. October 13, 2021.]

RICARDO P. PINEDA, petitioner,vs. SPOUSES RICARDO LIGASON and ANGELINA LIGASON, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 13, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 237338 (Ricardo P. Pineda v. Spouses Ricardo Ligason and Angelina Ligason).

After a careful review of the pleadings and arguments of the parties, the Court resolves to DENY the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, for failure of petitioner to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its July 18, 2017 Decision 1 and January 18, 2018 Resolution. 2

Antecedents

Spouses Ricardo and Angelina Ligason (respondents) are the present registered owners of a farm lot located in Apalit, Pampanga, with an area of 64,443 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 479287. 3 The land was formerly owned by Anacleto Naguit under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-1765 (0-14976). 4 In 1962, it was sold to Fernando Nuque De Leon (Fernando) and Sixta Nuque De Leon (Sixta) who then instituted Marciano Pineda as tenant over the 6.4-hectare landholding. Subsequently, 2.521 hectares were segregated and tilled by Marciano's son-in-law, Rolando Rota; while 3.922 hectares remained in Marciano's cultivation with the assistance of his son, Ricardo Pineda (petitioner). In 1990, petitioner succeeded his father as tenant. 5

The subject landholding was later purchased by respondents but petitioner and Rota remained as tenants thereon. 6 Upon the demise of Fernando, the property was administered solely by Sixta. She continued to receive the rentals from petitioner and Rota consisting of 23 and 27 cavans of palay, respectively, through her authorized representatives, respondent Angelina Ligason and Piling Mundo. However, beginning in the year 1996, petitioner stopped paying rentals. 7

On May 15, 1996, respondents filed a Complaint 8 for Increase of Rental against petitioner and Rota. They prayed that the said tenants be directed to return the landholding if they would not pay 175 cavans of palay as rental (25% of 700 cavans per harvest), as mandated by law. In their amended complaint, respondents further prayed that petitioner and Rota be ejected from their tillage due to their refusal to pay the increased rental based on their claim that they had not harvested any product beginning in agricultural year 1996. 9

Petitioner and Rota filed their answer with counterclaim, claiming that they were ready to pay the rentals due but were not aware of the alleged transfer of the property to respondents. They insisted on the original agreement with the former landowner for the payment of 50 cavans of palay per harvest for the entire landholding. They pointed out that the aforesaid conveyance or transfer was done without their knowledge or consent and without notice to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), in violation of their right of redemption. They further averred that for the year 1997, the palay crop was seriously affected by the El Niño phenomenon and, in 1998, by El Niña, as evidenced by the certification issued by the DAR Agricultural Technologist. 10

Petitioner filed a motion for consignation before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, seeking to redeem the area of land being cultivated by him, 11 while Rota filed an urgent motion (Re: consignation of arrears). 12

RARAD Ruling

On November 13, 2008, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) rendered his Decision 13 in favor of respondents, thus, against petitioner and Rota who, admittedly, did not pay the rentals due beginning in 1996 upon learning that Sixta had passed away. Such withholding of rental payment for many years were found to be unjustifiable and deliberately committed; there was even no valid tender of payment made by the tenants.

The RARAD thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, viewed from the premises, and with such violations of the respondents, a decision is hereby rendered:

1. DECLARING [petitioner and Rota] to have violated PD 816 and Sec. 26(6) of RA 3844;

2. ORDERING the ejectment of [petitioner and Rota, and for them] to vacate and peacefully surrender the subject landholding; [and]

3. ORDERING [petitioner and Rota] to pay back rentals since 1996 up to the present, after the proper accounting of the harvest of 1996 to last harvest, based on their lease agreement.

SO ORDERED. 14

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied under the RARAD's March 17, 2009 Order. Petitioner then appealed the same. 15

DARAB Ruling

On September 13, 2012, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) rendered its Decision 16 denying the appeal of petitioner. It held that the alleged uncertainty regarding ownership which hindered the said tenants from complying with their obligation of remitting the lease rentals cannot be countenanced considering that pending final determination of ownership of the litigated land, the tenants should have made a prior consignation before the RARAD of whatever lease rentals were due on the subject landholding.

The DARAB said that the circumstance raised by petitioner and Rota that the deed of absolute sale was entered into by respondent's daughter Leonor while she was still a 12-year-old minor, while making such contract voidable, is of no moment because the sale remained valid and binding until annulled in an appropriate judicial proceeding. It clarified that any pronouncement on the issue of ownership in the ejectment suit is merely provisional and solely for the purpose of determining possession. Notably, the offers and motions to consign the rentals due filed by petitioner and Rota necessarily result in the recognition of respondents' title. Even Rota's act of depositing the 54 cavans of palay with the Apalit Central Rice Mill Bonded Warehouse as his share in the lease rental for 2002 and 2003, will not rectify the situation since the same was deposited in his name. Moreover, for failure of petitioner and Rota to make a valid tender of the redemption price within the prescribed period, such right of redemption may no longer be exercised in this case.

Petitioner and Rota filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied under the DARAB's October 15, 2013 Resolution. 17

The CA Ruling

Petitioner elevated the case to the CA in a petition for review under Rule 43, stressing that the DARAB ruling contravenes the policy of the State to protect the agricultural tenant's right to security of tenure.

The CA affirmed with modification the DARAB's decision by declaring that while the eviction of tenants for nonpayment of the rentals due was justified in this case, the right of legal redemption had not yet prescribed. Citing the case of Po v. Dampal, 18 the appellate court stressed that failure of the vendee to serve a written notice of the sale to the lessee and the DAR prevents the running of the 180-day redemption period. 19

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration, contending that the nonpayment of rentals was not willful and deliberate; in fact, he had acted in good faith when he heeded the advice of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) to suspend the payment of rentals until such time when the successors-in-interest of the former landowners could present a valid title. Petitioner also reiterated that agrarian laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. 20

In its January 18, 2018 Resolution, the CA denied petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration. 21

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE DARAB'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS AND THAT THERE WAS NO VALID CONSIGNATION BY PETITIONER.

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner assails the RARAD judgment evicting him from the landholding despite the fact that the original complaint prayed only for increase in rental. He contends that the amended complaint did not supersede the original complaint filed by respondents, after an answer was already filed. 22

Petitioner insists that he was not in arrears, his last payment having been made in 1995. However, payment of rentals was temporarily suspended in 1996 after petitioner learned of the death of the remaining landowner Sixta De Leon, who had no known compulsory heirs (both siblings Fernando and Sixta De Leon having died single and without issue). He claims that respondents' certificate of title was first presented to him only in 2001; and that respondents did not present any evidence, such as a demand letter and an affidavit of the persons present at that time, to prove that they demanded payment of the lease rentals. Thus, respondents should be deemed to have made their demand only at the time they filed the complaint on May 15, 1996. At that point, petitioner was not yet in delay and, hence, could not be deemed to have failed in the payment of their lease rentals. 23

Petitioner contends that his failure to pay such rentals was not deliberate and unjustified and did not last for more than two years. He had dutifully paid rentals for the years 1965 to 1995; hence, it cannot be said that the non-payment was absolute. He also insists that he resorted to consignation when he filed with the DARAB a Motion for Consignation dated June 6, 2002, which was left unresolved. 24

Finally, petitioner argues that the CA ruling that the agricultural tenant's right of redemption had not yet prescribed prevents the ejectment suit from proceeding until the expiration of the reglementary period under R.A. No. 3844. This necessarily implies that the tenant remains in actual possession for him to exercise and avail of the right of redemption. Otherwise, it unduly defeats and negates the purpose of legal redemption. 25

Respondents' Arguments

On the procedural matter raised by petitioner, respondents argue that the original complaint was already superseded by the amended complaint and petitioner's right to due process was not violated as, in fact, he was able to file his answer to dispute the allegations of the amended complaint. Moreover, under the DARAB rules of procedure, agrarian reform adjudicators are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence prescribed by the Rules of Court.

Respondents assert that the finding of the RARAD and the DARAB that petitioner was in arrears of lease rentals, and his failure to pay the rentals due being willful and deliberate are borne by the records. And while their right of redemption is recognized, petitioner failed to validly exercise the same within the reglementary period by making proper consignation of the amount or price of the subject landholding. Finally, contrary to petitioner's contention, the remedy of ejectment, a consequence of the tenant's failure to pay rentals as they fall due, does not negate the tenant's right of redemption; which was unfortunately thwarted in this case with petitioner's failure to consign the purchase price of the property.

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.

The question of whether petitioner is in arrears in the payment of rentals on his portion of the landholding is one of fact, which calls for the review of the parties' evidence. This, of course, is impermissible as this Court is not a trier of facts. 26 While there are established exceptions to this rule, petitioner has never alleged that his petition falls under any of the exceptions to the rule. 27

At any rate, petitioner and his co-tenant Rota clearly admitted in their pleadings before the RARAD and the DARAB that they refused to pay and withheld the payment of rentals because they wanted to first ascertain the legitimate heir or successor of Sixta. Petitioner deplored the fact that respondent Angelina Ligason received, on March 29, 1995, 23 cavans of palay without disclosing to him that Sixta had already died. However, the RARAD rejected this defense raised by petitioner and his co-tenant, stating that such uncertainty in ownership after the agricultural lessor's death would not affect the tenants' compliance with their obligation to pay the rentals due; they could have made proper consignation of the said rentals by depositing the same in the name of the agricultural lessor. 28

It must be stressed that in appeals of agrarian cases, the Court's function is limited to determining whether the factual findings of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board are supported by substantial evidence. 29 Settled is the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies, which have expertise in the performance of their duties and exercise of their primary jurisdiction, are generally accorded finality if supported by substantial evidence. 30 When affirmed by the Court of Appeals, their findings become even more conclusive and binding upon this Court. 31

As to the procedural matter raised by the petitioner, the DARAB and the CA correctly rejected the contention that the RARAD gravely erred in ordering his eviction from the landholding when such relief was not prayed for in the original complaint, to which petitioner had already filed an answer. Indeed, the Rules of Court require prior leave of court for substantial amendments to the complaint after a responsive pleading has been filed. However, petitioner must be reminded that the DARAB and its adjudicators are not bound by the technical rules. Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:

SECTION 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. — The Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.

a) If and when a case comes up for adjudication wherein there is no applicable provision under these rules, the procedural law and jurisprudence generally applicable to agrarian disputes shall be applied;

b) The Adjudication Board (Board), and its Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (RARADs) and Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (PARADs) hereinafter referred to as the Adjudicators, shall have the authority to adopt any appropriate measure or procedure in any given situation or matter not covered by these Rules. All such special measures or procedures and the situations to which they have been applied must be reported to the Board; and

c) The provisions of that Rules of Court shall not apply even in a suppletory character unless adopted herein or by resolution of the Board. However, due process of law shall be observed and followed in all instances.

There is no similar provision on amendment of pleadings in the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. The provisions of the Rules of Court do not automatically apply even in a suppletory character unless these are adopted by the DARAB. In this case, the admission of respondents' amended complaint, with petitioner and his co-tenant having likewise filed their answer with counterclaim to the said amended complaint, was consistent with the practice adopted by the DARAB and satisfied the requirement of due process. Considering that the DARAB is mandated by its own rules to resolve cases expeditiously, unhampered by the technical rules, petitioner's issue on the RARAD's judgment based on the amended complaint had become inconsequential. 32

Petitioner's eviction from

A tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to security of tenure. Petitioner can only be ejected from the agricultural land holding on grounds provided by law. 33 Nonpayment of lease rentals whenever they fall due is a ground for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee under paragraph 6, Sec. 36 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, which provides:

Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due:Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; x x x (emphasis supplied)

The landowner or agricultural lessor has the burden of proving the existence of a lawful cause for the eviction of a tenant or agricultural lessee. 34 In the case of nonpayment of lease, jurisprudence laid down the rule that mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder's share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay. 35 The agricultural tenant's failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to warrant his dispossession of the land that he tills. 36

The term "deliberate" is characterized by or results from slow, careful, thorough calculation and consideration of effects and consequences. The term "willful," on the other hand, is defined as one governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason. 37

In this case, the Court concurs with the finding of the RARAD and the DARAB that petitioner's failure to pay the rentals due on the subject landholding was willful and deliberate. Petitioner intentionally did not pay such rentals from 1996 to 2001 because he claimed uncertainty in the ownership of the land when Sixta died. He allegedly wanted to ascertain whether the property was indeed validly acquired by respondents considering that the latter did not yet have a certificate of title in their name at that time. He likewise questioned the transfer of the landholding with the execution of a deed of absolute sale in favor of a minor. It was clear that petitioner deliberately stopped paying rentals based on his own conviction that respondents' claim of ownership was doubtful.

As correctly held by the RARAD and the DARAB, petitioner was not justified in stopping the payment of the rentals due beginning in 1996 notwithstanding the death of Sixta and the latter's lack of legitimate heir. Even assuming that uncertainty in the transfer of ownership to respondents has resulted from their inability to present at that time a certificate of title in their name, petitioner should have consigned the amount of rentals with the RARAD or the DARAB. However, petitioner merely filed a motion for consignation with the RARAD in 2002 without tendering the full amount of rental payments. Worse, petitioner's argument that he had tendered payment appears to be an attempt to mislead the court, as the consignation was not made as settlement for the arrears, but was an attempt by petitioner to redeem the property.

Petitioner's argument regarding the lack of a required two-year period of nonpayment of rentals before a tenant may be lawfully ejected from the landholding, is misplaced.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 816, issued on October 21, 1975, mandated the agricultural lessees on rice and corn landholdings covered by P.D. No. 27, pending the issuance of the said law's implementing rules and regulations, to still pay the rentals due to the landowner whether or not the landholding is already covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT); while the landowner shall still pay the land taxes if the landholding is not yet covered by a CLT. 38 The payment of rental was to continue until valuation of the landholding shall have been determined or agreed upon between the DAR and the landowner, which shall be the basis of the amortization payment to be made by the agricultural lessee under P.D. No. 27. 39

P.D. No. 816 was issued in order to address the situation where some agricultural lessees have stopped or refused to pay rentals that fell due to the landowner on the assumption that once the CLT is issued in their favor, they were no longer obliged to pay the said rentals. To curb this practice which the government deemed detrimental to the expeditious implementation of the land reform goals and the policy of equalizing the rights and obligations of the landowners and agricultural lessees, Secs. 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 816 provide:

SECTION 2. That any agricultural lessee of a rice or corn land under Presidential Decree No. 27 who deliberately refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay the rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years shall, upon hearing and final judgment, forfeit the Certificate of Land Transfer issued in his favor, if his farmholding is already covered by such Certificate of Land Transfer, and his farmholding;

SECTION 3. That any agricultural lessee whose landholding is not yet covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer and who shall continue not to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner/agricultural lessor shall, upon proper hearing and judgment, lose his right to be issued a Certificate of Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and his farmholding[.]

The Court held in Natividad v. Mariano40(Natividad) that, without any deliberate and willful refusal to pay lease rentals for two years, therein respondents' ejectment from the subject property, based on this ground, is baseless and unjustified.

In the present petition, we do not find the respondents' alleged non-payment of the lease rentals sufficient to warrant their dispossession of the subject property. The respondents' alleged non-payment did not last for the required two-year period. To reiterate our discussion above, the respondents' rental payments were not yet due and the respondents were not in default at the time Ernesto filed the petition for ejectment as Ernesto failed to prove his alleged prior verbal demands. Additionally, assuming arguendo that the respondents failed to pay the lease rentals, we do not consider the failure to be deliberate or willful. The receipts on record show that the respondents had paid the lease rentals for the years 1988-1998. To be deliberate or willful, the non-payment of lease rentals must be absolute, i.e., marked by complete absence of any payment. This cannot be said of the respondents' case. Hence, without any deliberate and willful refusal to pay lease rentals for two years, the respondents' ejectment from the subject property, based on this ground, is baseless and unjustified.41 (additional emphasis supplied)

In Natividad, the provisions of P.D. No. 816 found relevance considering that even prior to the purchase of the landholding in a public auction by the petitioner, the father of two of the respondents as well as their co-respondent, had been issued CLTs as early as July 28, 1973. In addition, respondents therein pointed out that as of the year 2000, they had approved valuation reports issued by the Barangay Committee for Land Production (BCLP), which they belatedly discovered thru their counsel. Respondents filed a petition for relief from judgment after the PARAD's decision ordering their ejectment from the land for alleged nonpayment of rentals became final and executory due to their failure to appear despite notice. It cited their inexperience and lack of knowledge of agrarian reform laws and the DARAB's Rules of Procedure which prevented them from appearing before the PARAD in due course. Moreover, therein respondent tenants, unaware of the purchase of the land by Natividad who did not complain and demand rentals from them for ten years, had continued paying the rentals, as they fell due, to persons whom they believed were still authorized to receive the same.

The Court in Natividad faulted the petitioner for his prolonged inaction in demanding the rentals due from the respondent tenants. It further explained the import of issuance of CLTs, thus:

Ernesto purchased the subject property in 1988. However, he only demanded the payment of the lease rentals in 1998. All the while, the respondents had been paying the lease rentals to Corazon and Laureano. With no demand coming from Ernesto for the payment of the lease rentals for ten years, beginning from the time he purchased the subject property, the respondents thus cannot be faulted for continuously paying the lease rentals to Corazon and Laureano. Ernesto should have demanded from the respondents the payment of the lease rental soon after he purchased the subject property. His prolonged inaction, whether by intention or negligence, in demanding the payment of the lease rentals or asserting his right to receive such rentals, at the very least, led the respondents to consider Corazon and Laureano to still be the authorized payees of the lease rentals, given the absence of any objection on his part.

Import of the respondents' CLT

Diego and respondent Doroteo were undoubtedly awarded CLTs over the subject property pursuant to P.D. No. 27. Thus, we agree with their position that they have acquired rights over the subject property and are in fact deemed owners of it.

A CLT is a document that evidences an agricultural lessee's inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is the provisional title of ownership issued to facilitate the agricultural lessee's acquisition of ownership over the landholding. The transfer of the landholding to the agricultural lessee under P.D. No. 27 is accomplished in two stages: (1) issuance of a CLT to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding to the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is a "deemed owner"; and (2) issuance of an Emancipation Patent as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer-beneficiary.

The CLTs of Diego and of respondent Doroteo were issued in 1973. Thus, as of 1973, Diego and respondent Doroteo were deemed the owners of the subject property pursuant to P.D. No. 27, but subject to the compliance with certain conditions and requirements, one of which was the full payment of the monthly amortization or lease rentals to acquire absolute ownership.

xxx xxx xxx

In the event the tenant-farmer defaults in the payment of the amortization, P.D. No. 27 ordains that the amortization due shall be paid by the farmer's cooperative where the defaulting tenant-farmer is a member, with the cooperative having a right of recourse against the farmer. Thus, if the tenant-farmer defaults, the landowner is assured of payment since the farmers' cooperative will assume the obligation. In the present petition, the records show that the respondents were members of a Samahang Nayon. Pursuant to P.D. No. 27, Ernesto should have claimed the unpaid lease rentals or amortizations from the respondents' Samahang Nayon. 42 (citations omitted, additional emphases supplied)

In the present case, however, petitioner never alleged, nor was there any finding, that the subject landholding had been placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27, and that petitioner had qualified as an allottee or had been awarded a CLT, or that there was a pending or completed valuation of land for the purpose of land distribution pursuant to said law. At any rate, petitioner's deliberate nonpayment of rentals had exceeded the two-year period without him having made any valid consignation even after the RARAD had rendered judgment in 2008. Unlike in Natividad, petitioner intentionally stopped paying rentals because he wanted to ascertain who the heir or successor-in-interest of Sixta was since respondents at the time could not present a certificate of title in their name. But even when presented with such title in 2001, petitioner still failed to pay the rentals and to consign the amounts with the RARAD in the name of respondents. His act of filing of a motion for consignation without tendering the full amount of rentals with the RARAD in the name of the agricultural lessor did not comply with the requirements of a valid consignation. The CA, therefore, correctly affirmed the DARAB's ruling that petitioner's eviction from the landholding as ordered by the RARAD was proper and justified on the ground of willful and deliberate refusal to pay the past due rentals on the subject landholding.

It must be noted that the proceedings before the RARAD and the DARAB had dragged on for several years. From the time of the filing of their answer to the original complaint, petitioner and his co-tenant Rota were represented by their counsel. They never claimed any disadvantage or adverse situation that could have prevented them from presenting fully their case before the agrarian adjudicators. The extant facts simply preclude the conclusion that Natividad v. Mariano squarely applies to this case.

Right of redemption has not

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner's right to redemption subsists.

Sec. 12 43 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended by R.A. No. 6389, mandates that the 180-day period for redemption must be reckoned from the notice in writing upon registration of the sale, which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the DAR. The Court has ruled that the right of redemption will not prescribe unless there is such notice in writing of the sale. 44 Since it has been established that petitioner was never notified in writing of the sale of the disputed lots, then there is no prescription to speak of in the instant case. 45

The lack of written notice on petitioner and the DAR has tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Even if petitioner eventually gained constructive knowledge of the sale to respondents, still there is no compliance with the express requirement for notice to be in writing. 46

In these instances, the question arises as to when the 180-day period is to be reckoned?

In Spouses Franco v. Spouses Galera, Jr., 47 we held:

Under the law, the agricultural lessor must first inform the agricultural lessee of the sale in writing. From this point, a 180-day period commences, within which the agricultural lessee must file a petition or request to redeem the land. The written notice shall be served on the agricultural lessee as well as on the Department of Agrarian Reform upon registration of the sale.

The right of redemption granted to the agricultural lessee enjoys preference over any other legal redemption that may be exercised over the property. Upon filing of the petition or request, the 180-day period shall cease to run, and will commence again upon the resolution of the petition or request or within 60 days from its filing.48 (emphasis supplied)

Considering the circumstances, We hold that the 180-day period of redemption shall begin to run upon the finality of this resolution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 18, 2017 Decision and January 18, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133576 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." Lopez, M., J., on official leave.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 24-33; penned by Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao (now a Member of the Court) and Franchito N. Diamante, concurring.

2.Id. at 43-45.

3. CA rollo, pp. 211-212.

4.Id. at 205-208.

5.Id. at 40-41.

6.Id. at 296-300.

7.Id. at 147-148.

8.Id. at 115-117.

9.Id. at 148.

10.Id. at 81-82.

11.Id. at 276-277.

12.Id. at 82.

13.Id. at 81-85.

14.Id. at 84-85.

15.Rollo, p. 27.

16. CA rollo, pp. 19-32.

17.Id. at 46-47.

18. 623 Phil. 523, 530 (2009).

19. CA rollo, pp. 153-154.

20.Id. at 158-160.

21.Id. at 189-190.

22.Rollo, p. 9.

23.Id. at 11-14.

24.Id. at 14.

25.Id. at 14-16.

26.Springsun Management Systems Corporation v. Camerino, 489 Phil. 769, 788 (2005).

27.Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 184 (2016).

28. CA rollo, pp. 22-23, 81-82.

29.NGEI Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Filipinas Palmoil Plantation, Inc., 697 Phil. 433, 438 (2012).

30.Republic v. Lopez Agri-Business Corporation, 654 Phil. 44, 59 (2011).

31.Ligtas v. People, 766 Phil. 750, 763 (2015).

32. See Philcontrust Resources, Inc. (formerly known as Inter-Asia Land Corporation) v. Santiago, 814 Phil. 507 (2017).

33.Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo, 593 Phil. 108, 130 (2008), citing Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr. v. Pollescas, 511 Phil. 641, 649 (2005).

34. R.A. No. 3488, Sec. 37.

35.Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo, supra, citing Roxas v. Cabatuando, 111 Phil. 737, 740 (1961).

36.Id.

37.Id.

38. P.D. No. 816.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, while the implementing rules and regulations of [P]residential Decree No. 27 have not yet been issued completely, the status quo shall be maintained between the parties, that is, the landowner shall continue to pay the land taxes thereon if the said landholding is not yet covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer, while on the other hand the tenant-farmer who is now called agricultural lessee shall continue to pay the rental to the landowner whether or not his landholding planted to rice and corn is already covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer[.]

39. P.D. No. 816.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, such payment of rental shall continue until and after the valuation of the property shall have been determined or agreed upon between the landowner and the determined of Agrarian Reform which, in turn, will become the basis of computing the amortization payment to be made by the agricultural lessee in 15 years with 6% interest per annum under Presidential Decree No. 27[.]

40. 710 Phil. 57, 76 (2013).

41.Id. at 76.

42.Id. at 76-78.

43. Sec. 12. Lessee's right of Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale. (emphasis supplied)

44.Springsun Management Systems Corporation v. Camerino, supra note 26 at 790.

45.Id.

46.Po v. Dampal, supra note 18.

47. G.R. No. 205266, January 15, 2020.

48.Id.