Pilipino Cable Corp. v. Ojoy

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 220483. November 11, 2021.]

PILIPINO CABLE CORP., SKY CABLE AND/OR PAUL ABASTILLAS, petitioners, vs. LORENA AÑONUEVO OJOY, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 11, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 220483 — Pilipino Cable Corp., Sky Cable and/or Paul Abastillas v. Lorena Añonuevo Ojoy

The petition must fail.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that respondent did not file her own petition for certiorari against the rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) nor appeal from the dispositions of the Court of Appeals which invariably held that she was dismissed for just causes (i.e., violation of company rules and loss of trust and confidence). Needless to say, petitioners did not question such finding either, only the award of financial assistance to respondent. Consequently, the rulings below have already lapsed into finality insofar as the validity of respondent's dismissal is concerned. The only issue left to be resolved is whether the award of financial assistance to respondent is proper.

The basis of an award of financial assistance to a validly dismissed employee is no less than our Constitution. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission1 elucidates:

Strictly speaking, however, it is not correct to say that there is no express justification for the grant of separation pay to lawfully dismissed employees other than the abstract consideration of equity. The reason is that our Constitution is replete with positive commands for the promotion of social justice, and particularly the protection of the rights of the workers. The enhancement of their welfare is one of the primary concerns of the present charter. In fact, instead of confining itself to the general commitment to the cause of labor in Article II on the Declaration of Principles of State Policies, the new Constitution contains a separate article devoted to the promotion of social justice and human rights with a separate sub-topic for labor. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital role of labor, hand in hand with management, in the advancement of the national economy and the welfare of the people in general. The categorical mandates in the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the workers are more than sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in proper cases even if the dismissal be for cause.

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There should be no question that where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. For example, a subordinate who has irreconcilable policy or personal differences with his employer may be validly dismissed for demonstrated loss of confidence, which is an allowable ground. A working mother who has to be frequently absent because she has also to take care of her child may also be removed because of her poor attendance, this being another authorized ground. It is not the employee's fault if he does not have the necessary aptitude for his work but on the other hand the company cannot be required to maintain him just the same at the expense of the efficiency of its operations. He too may be validly replaced. Under these and similar circumstances, however, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause.

But where the cause of the separation is more serious than mere inefficiency, the generosity of the law must be more discerning. There is no doubt it is compassionate to give separation pay to a salesman if he is dismissed for his inability to fill his quota but surely he does not deserve such generosity if his offense is misappropriation of the receipts of his sales. This is no longer mere incompetence but clear dishonesty. A security guard found sleeping on the job is doubtless subject to dismissal but may be allowed separation pay since his conduct, while inept, is not depraved. But if he was in fact not really sleeping but sleeping with a prostitute during his tour of duty and in the company premises, the situation is changed completely. This is not only inefficiency but immorality and the grant of separation pay would be entirely unjustified.

We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.

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Verily, in exceptional cases, the Court has awarded separation pay in the form of financial assistance to a legally dismissed employee as an act of "social justice" or "on equitable grounds." In both instances, however, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee. 2 The employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay or financial assistance if the dismissal is an offense involving moral turpitude. 3

The twin requirements are satisfied here.

For one, respondent's act does not amount to serious misconduct. To be sure, misconduct or improper behavior is just cause for dismissal when the following elements concur: (a) the misconduct is serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent. 4

Here, respondent committed a wrongful act when she misappropriated P3,500.00 worth of employee funds meant to be deposited with Meralco Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (MESALA). This constituted a grave offense under their company's Code of Discipline. 5 Said act, too, relates to her responsibility as Human Resources (HR) Officer to handle MESALA accounts, funds, and contributions of employees within the Pilipino Cable Corp. group and its subsidiaries and affiliates. 6

But the element of wrongful intent is absent here. On the contrary, such intent was negated by respondent's immediate return of the borrowed amount. Though she wanted to restore the amount sooner, the circumstances of her mother prevented her from doing so. Yet she still managed to restore the borrowed amount within a week and before Pilipino Cable issued her a show cause memorandum. This only goes to show that were it not for her family emergencies, she would not have been constrained to resort to such measure. Strictly speaking, therefore, she cannot be deemed to have been dismissed for serious misconduct in the absence of wrongful intent, albeit she was rightly dismissed for grave violation of company rules and loss of trust and confidence.

In Salavarria v. Letran College, et al., 7 the Court sustained the validity of petitioner's dismissal, a teacher of Letran College, due to multiple instances of soliciting contributions from her students without the requisite school approval. Evidently, this was a blatant violation of the school's policy. The Court, nevertheless, ruled that this did not amount to serious misconduct. Hence, the Court was not precluded from awarding separation pay to petitioner to serve the ends of social and compassionate justice.

For another, respondent's violation did not adversely reflect on her moral character. She merely acted on instinct in the face of a family emergency when she misappropriated P3,500.00 of her co-employees' funds. Too, respondent was forthright with her wrongdoing and was sincerely remorseful. She even pleaded to serve a lesser punishment as she no longer questioned her guilt. Finally, her seventeen (17) years of service and unblemished record with the company speaks more, though not a conclusive proof, of her true moral character as an employee.

Similarly, in Aparente, Sr. v. Coca-Cola, 8 the Court sustained the termination of petitioner as advertising foreman of respondent due to violation of company rules and regulations but still awarded financial assistance in his favor in consideration of his eighteen (18) long years of service for the company without any prior violation.

With the concurrence of the twin requisites here, the award of financial assistance to respondent is warranted. To be clear though, the Court does not condone the act of respondent. Despite her good intentions, it is still wrong to misappropriate the funds of her co-employees for her personal use. Her act certainly gives justifiable reason for Pilipino Cable to lose its trust and confidence on respondent. These same good intentions, however, lay the basis for the award of separation pay, in the form of financial assistance, on equitable grounds. Besides, it is revolting to the principle of social justice not to grant the same despite the miniscule amount of P3,500.00 involved, in the absence of ill-intent against the company, and respondent's seventeen (17) long years of service with meritorious record.

In International School Manila v. International Alliance of Educators, 9 the Court sustained the dismissal of respondent language teacher due to gross inefficiency. It nevertheless ruled that the award of financial assistance was in order considering her service to petitioner school for more or less seventeen (17) years, and consistent with the principle of equity and social justice.

Even then, the financial assistance of P200,000.00 awarded below ought to be modified. In Paz v. Northern Tobacco, 10 the Court ruled that the formula for the equitable grant of financial assistance shall be as follows: half-month pay multiplied by number of years in service divided by two (2). Based on record, respondent had a monthly salary of P31,000.00 and almost seventeen (17) years of service. Hence, the amount of financial assistance should be reduced to P131,750.00. This monetary award shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum in accordance with Nacar v. Gallery Frames. 11

Only Pilipino Cable as respondent's employer shall be liable for the amount. It bears stress that a holding company like Sky Cable Corporation may be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary only when it is adequately proven that: a) there was control over the subsidiary; b) such control was used to protect a fraud (or gross negligence amounting to bad faith) or evade an obligation; and c) the fraud was the proximate cause of another's existing injury. 12 Absent evidence that the subsidiary's separate personality was being used by its parent or holding corporation to perpetrate fraud or evade an existing obligation, the subsidiary company's separate corporate personality may not be disregarded.

Here, there is utter lack of evidence proving that Sky Cable exercised its control over Pilipino Cable to cover up a fraud or evade an obligation with regard to respondent's employment. There was no mention of Sky Cable's participation at all in the events that transpired here. It is as though Sky Cable was merely included to ensure respondent's prospective collection of her monetary claim. The rulings below did not even bother to discuss the basis of Sky Cable's culpability. Hence, Sky Cable should be absolved from paying the monetary award. If the principal will be exonerated, much more its co-petitioner Paul Abastillas who is its mere employee.

All told, we sustain the grant of separation pay to respondent in the form of financial assistance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 28, 2015 and Resolution dated September 7, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 135383 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

The complaint of respondent Lorena Añonuevo Ojoy for illegal dismissal is DISMISSED. Petitioner Pilipino Cable Corporation is nevertheless ordered to pay P131,750.00 in favor of respondent as financial assistance. This monetary award shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. 648 Phil. 238, 258-259 (2010), citing PLDT v. NLRC, 247 Phil. 641 (1988).

2.Herma Shipping and Transport Corp., et al. v. Cordero, G.R. No. 244144, January 27, 2020.

3.Id.

4. See Sterling Paper v. KMM-Katipunan, 815 Phil. 425, 436 (2017).

5. IV. OFFENSES AGAINST COMPANY PROPERTY GRAVE

Theft, attempted theft, or appropriation for personal use of company property or of another employee and/or unauthorized removal from the company premises of any company property. x x x rollo, p. 663.

6.Id. at 662.

7. See 357 Phil. 189, 197 (1998).

8. See 387 Phil. 96, 102 (2000).

9. See 726 Phil. 147, 182 (2014).

10. See 754 Phil. 251, 258 (2015).

11. See 716 Phil. 267, 281 (2013).

12.Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Florentino, et al., 836 Phil. 655, 700 (2018).