Pike v. Concepcion

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 236805. April 16, 2018.]

PHILIP PIKE AND PAUL JONATHAN PIKE, petitioner,vs. JOSEPH EIMOR CONCEPCION, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 16, 2018, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 236805 (Philip Pike and Paul Jonathan Pike vs. Joseph Eimor Concepcion). — The Court EXCLUDES the Hon. Court of Appeals-Eight Division as respondent from the title of this case pursuant to Section 4 (a), Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the June 22, 2017 Decision 1 and January 16, 2018 Order of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 141709.

The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:

An ejectment case was filed by respondent Joseph Eimor Concepcion against petitioners Philip and Paul Jonathan Pike, docketed as Civil Case No. 19011 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 68, Pasig City.

On May 26, 2014, the MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Joseph Eimor Concepcion and against defendants Philip Pike, Paul Jonathan Pike and all other persons claiming right under them, as follows:

1. Ordering defendants Philip Pike, Paul Jonathan Pike and all other persons claiming right under them to vacate the property located at No. 10 East Capitol Drive, Kapitolyo, Pasig City and peacefully surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff;

2. Ordering defendants Philip Pike and Paul Jonathan Pike to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

3. Ordering defendants Philip Pike and Paul Jonathan Pike to pay plaintiff the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 2

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 155, Pasig City, the RTC rendered a Decision 3 dated November 17, 2014, affirming in toto the above ruling of the MeTC. The fallo of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed Decision dated May 26, 2014, rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 68, Pasig City, the same is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO and the instant appeals interposed by plaintiff and defendants are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the RTC's Decision.

Pending resolution of said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of Immediate Writ of Execution anchored on Sections 19 and 20, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

On May 21, 2015, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

Pending the expiration of the 15-day period to appeal, on May 22, 2015, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. The RTC explained that with the Pikes' failure to file the requisite supersedeas bond pursuant to Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and considering that the judgment affirming the MeTC's Decision is immediately executory per Section 21, Rule 70 of the same Rules, it is constrained to grant respondent's motion.

Thus, on May 28, 2015, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal directing the Sheriff to cause the execution of the MeTC Decision.

Petitioners initially moved for reconsideration of the May 22, 2015 Order but they later withdrew said Motion. They also did not file an appeal to contest the RTC's November 17, 2014 Decision.

Then, on June 19, 2015, petitioners filed a Motion to Remand arguing that the RTC's November 17, 2014 Decision was already final and executory because they did not file an appeal within the reglementary period. Thus, according to them, entry of judgment should be issued and the records immediately remanded to the MeTC for execution following Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Respondent opposed the Motion, maintaining that it is a mere dilatory tactic to frustrate the final implementation of the writ of execution pending appeal. Respondent then filed an urgent motion for issuance of break open order.

RTC Omnibus Order

The RTC issued on July 13, 2015 an Omnibus Order holding that petitioners' Motion to Remand, filed four (4) days after receipt of the Notice to Vacate, was premature and dilatory in nature. It explained that since respondent's motion for immediate execution was filed during the period to appeal and no appeal has yet been taken by petitioners, it had no means of determining whether petitioners will be filing an appeal or not. Moreover, petitioners' failure to comply with Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and to post a supersedeas bond justified the immediate execution of its Decision. The fallo of the Omnibus Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Remand is hereby DENIED for being dilatory in nature and for being premature.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners then directly sought relief from the CA via a Petition for Certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration of the RTC's Omnibus Order.

CA Ruling

In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's Omnibus Order. The CA first noted that it was improper for petitioners to directly file a Rule 65 petition before it, without moving for reconsideration of the said Order, violative of Section 1 of said Rule. Furthermore, the CA held that in a catena of cases, this Court held that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a certiorari petition and that while there are exceptions to said Rule, the instant case does not fall under any of the said exceptions. 4

The CA likewise ruled that even if it ignores said procedural misstep, the petition will still not prosper.

According to the CA, an RTC judgment against the defendant in an ejectment case is immediately executory and can accordingly be enforced forthwith without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by said losing party. Thus, the court's duty to issue a writ of execution is ministerial and may even be compelled by mandamus. 5

The CA noted that when the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution, its November 17, 2014 Decision has not yet attained finality and Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court could not be applied. Thus, said the CA, the RTC properly denied the Motion to Remand since at the time the writ was issued, it still has the authority to immediately enforce its Decision pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the same Rules. 6

The CA likewise noted that the settled rule is that the RTC need not remand the records of the case to the MeTC in instances of execution pending appeal following the Court's ruling in City of Manila v. Court of Appeals. 7

The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 8

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied in the questioned January 16, 2018 Resolution, petitioners filed the instant petition.

We resolve to deny the petition.

Applicable in the instant case is Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. — The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.

Applying Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules, this Court explained in Uy v. Santiago9 that once the RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in an ejectment case, has rendered a decision, said decision shall be immediately executory. Thus:

From the foregoing, it is clear that it is only execution of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts' judgment pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. On the other hand, once the Regional Trial Court has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, be immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a Petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court.

Erasing any doubt on the matter is the more recent case of Teresa T. Gonzales La'O & Co., Inc. vs. Sheriff Hatab, where it was categorically held that —

Unlike Rule 70 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court where the defendant, after perfecting his appeal, could prevent the immediate execution of the judgment by taking an appeal and making a periodic deposit of monthly rentals during the pendency of the appeal and thereby preventing the plaintiff from taking possession of the premises in the meantime, the present wording of Section 21, Rule 70 explicitly provides that the judgment of the regional trial court in ejectment cases appealed to it shall be immediately executory and can be enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher court. (emphasis ours; citation omitted)

Corollary thereto, We have held that in the execution of the judgment in ejectment cases, the issuance of a demolition order is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court which rendered the decision. The Regional Trial Court that affirms the decision of the Municipal Trial Court cannot order execution of its judgment. The exception is when the Regional Trial Court grants execution pending appeal. 10 The instant case falls under said exception.

As correctly pointed out by the CA, Section 21 does not require that an appeal be perfected before the RTC will have the authority to order the execution of its decision. The tenor of the provision is that the RTC's decision shall be immediately executory but the losing party may still file an appeal thereon even though said decision will be enforced already. On the basis thereof, it is clear that the RTC did not err when it ordered the issuance of a writ of execution as it was done before the expiration of petitioner's period to appeal.

Thus, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the RTC's Omnibus Order granting the immediate execution of its Decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.

2. Penned by Presiding Judge Eduardo Ramon R. Reyes.

3. Penned by Judge Maria Gracia A. Cadiz-Casaclang.

4. CA Decision, pp. 6-7.

5.Id. at 9.

6.Id. at 10-11.

7. G.R. No. 100626, November 29, 1991. Id. at 11.

8. CA Decision, pp. 11-12.

9. G.R. No. 131237, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 680, 685.

10.Mina v. Vianzon, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1682, March 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 56, 60.