FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 247495. October 13, 2021.]
ANTONIO PIDO AND BEBOT HANGALAY, petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 13, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 247495 (Antonio Pido and Bebot Hangalay v. People of the Philippines). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and/or set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02831:
1) Decision 2 dated May 29, 2018, which affirmed the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of petitioners Antonio Pido (Antonio) and Bebot Hangalay (Bebot) for the crime of Frustrated Homicide but modified the penalty imposed and damages awarded in favor of the private complainant, Floro Suyom (Suyom); and
2) Resolution 3 dated April 10, 2019, which denied Antonio and Bebot's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Antecedents
In an Information dated October 7, 2005, Antonio and Bebot were indicted for the crime of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 28th day of May 28, 2005, in the Municipality of La Paz, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, and wound one FLORO SUYOM with the use of a sharp bladed weapon locally known as "sundang" which the accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the said FLORO SUYOM hack wounds on the different parts of his body, thus the accused performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence thereof, but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause independent of their will, that is, by the time[ly] and able medical attendance rendered to FLORO SUYOM which prevented his death. CAIHTE
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
When arraigned, Antonio and Bebot with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish the guilt of Antonio and Bebot, the prosecution presented the testimony of Suyom. His salient testimony established the following:
On May 28, 2005, at around 11:00 p.m., Suyom went out to buy cigarettes in a store in Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte where Antonio and Bebot, together with Inday Tarpin (Inday) and Leo Espina (Leo), were having a drinking spree. 5
While buying cigarettes, Suyom was suddenly attacked by Inday, Leo, Antonio and Bebot, who took turns in hacking him with a "sundang," hitting him on the head and at his back. 6 After he pleaded for his life, the perpetrators fled the scene. 7
As he was already unconscious, his children brought him to Burauen District Hospital for medical treatment, but he was subsequently, referred to Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC), where he received several major operations. He only regained his consciousness three days after the hacking incident. 8
Suyom explained that he was able to recognize his assailants because they live in the same barangay9 and the place where the incident happened was illuminated with a fluorescent lamp. 10
Antonio and Bebot confined their defenses to denial and alibi.
Bebot testified that Suyom was his neighbor in Barangay Mag-aso. At around 11:00 p.m. on May 28, 2005, he was with Arturo Notarte and Rodelio Suyom at Barangay Caabangan, La Paz, Leyte, attending the barangay fiesta. From Barangay Caabangan to Barangay Mag-aso, the distance is half an hour walk. 11
At around 8:30 p.m., they were at the house of councilor Andrea Lor. After dinner, they proceeded to the barangay hall for the dance until 12 midnight. Afterwards, they already went home. His house is 350 meters away from the house of Suyom. 12 He could not think of any reason why Suyom testified against him. Prior to the hacking incident, he did not have any personal grudge against Suyom. 13
On the other hand, Antonio testified that he knew Suyom because he lived and was born in Barangay Mag-aso. On May 28, 2005, at around 11:00 p.m., he was just asleep in his house in Barangay Mering, Tabon-Tabon, Leyte. He went to bed as early as 8:30 p.m., together with the members of his family, namely: Rosalinda Cinco, Anthony Pido, Rustom Pido, Adrian Pido, Russel Pido and Mayang Pido. He did not see or meet his co-accused Bebot, as well as the victim on the night in question. He was also not around the store where the crime was committed. 14 Prior to the hacking incident, there was no animosity between him and Suyom. Thus, he was surprised when he was arrested. 15
On July 15, 2016, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10 of Abuyog, Leyte rendered a judgment 16 finding Antonio and Bebot guilty for the crime of Frustrated Homicide. The dispositive portion of which reads: DETACa
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby rendered judgment finding the accused BEBOT HANGALAY and ANTONIO PIDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide. They are hereby sentenced each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Four (4) years, Two (2) months and Fifteen (15) days of prision correcional as minimum, to Seven (7) years prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the private complainant in solidum the amount of [P]30,000 as temperate damages and [P]30,000.00 as moral damages.
This case is ordered archived i[n] so far as accused Leo Espina subject of revival upon his arrest.
SO ORDERED. 17
In convicting Antonio and Bebot, the RTC gave due weight and credit to the positive testimony of Suyom that Antonio and Bebot were among the perpetrators of the crime. According to the RTC, Suyom could not mistake the identities of his attackers because they all lived in Barangay Mag-aso, La Paz, Leyte long before the incident. Suyom's credibility could not be doubted, as there was no showing that he was actuated by any ulterior motive or design to implicate Antonio and Bebot for the crime charged.
The RTC further opined that the testimony of Suyom jived with the Medical Certificate issued by the EVRMC, which showed that he suffered serious injuries on his head and stomach, which could have caused his death if not for the timely medical assistance given to him. Thus, there is no doubt that the crime committed was Frustrated Homicide.
In addition, the RTC held that conspiracy exists as shown by the fact that Suyom's assailants hacked and wounded him.
As to Antonio and Bebot's defense of denial and alibi, the RTC rejected the same for being uncorroborated. They likewise failed to convince the RTC that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime.
At odds with the ruling, Antonio and Bebot elevated the matter to the CA.
On May 29, 2018, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 15 July 2016 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants, BEBOT HANGALAY and ANTONIO PIDO are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide and sentenced to a prison term of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum. They are also ORDERED to PAY, jointly and severally, FLORO SUYOM, the amount of [P]30,000 [as civil indemnity] and moral damages in the amount of [P]30,000.00[,] plus interest of six percent (6%) per annum on each item reckoned from the date of the finality of this Decision until full payment.
Further, the individual bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused-appellants is cancelled, and their respective bondspersons are ordered to surrender them to the Regional Trial Court, within (20) days from receipt of a copy of this decision. Should the bondspersons fail to surrender them within the said period, the RTC shall confiscate the bonds and shall, thereafter, issue warrants for their arrest.
Furthermore, the RTC is DIRECTED to submit a report within twenty (20) days from notice of this judgment on the compliance by the bondspersons, surrender of the accused-appellants, and the action against the bonds, if any. aDSIHc
SO ORDERED. 18
In arriving at such disposition, the CA gave full faith and credence to the positive testimony of Suyom that he was hacked by Inday, Leo, Antonio and Bebot, and that Suyom was not actuated by any ill motive to falsely testified against them. The CA stressed that it would be unnatural for Suyom, being interested in vindicating the crime committed against him, to prosecute other persons other than the real culprits. The CA also emphasized that Suyom could not mistake the identities of Antonio and Bebot because they resided in the same barangay and they were familiar with each other. While there was no direct light from the place where Antonio and Bebot were drinking, the CA pointed out that there was a light inside the store, which illuminated them.
Moreover, the CA upheld the existence of conspiracy as Antonio and Bebot, with the use of "sundang," took turns in hacking Suyom. For the CA, said joint actions sufficiently point to a common design to end the life of the victim.
The CA rejected Antonio and Bebot's contention that the crime committed was not Frustrated Homicide since it was not proven that the wounds sustained by Suyom were fatal. The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that Suyom sustained serious injuries on his head and abdomen that could have caused his untimely death if not for the immediate medical intervention. Antonio and Bebot's intent to kill were presumed from their use of "sundang," a lethal weapon and the hacking blows, which they each delivered. The Medical Certificate of Suyom also showed that he had to undergo several major operations as a result of the incident.
Similar to the RTC, the CA rejected Antonio and Bebot's defenses of denial and alibi for being unsubstantiated. The CA likewise ratiocinated that Antonio and Bebot's alleged whereabouts were not too far from the crime scene as to preclude their presence therein.
Unperturbed, Antonio and Bebot moved for reconsideration, but to no avail, as the CA denied the same in its impugned Resolution 19 dated April 10, 2019.
Adamant, petitioners Antonio and Bebot resorted to this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds: ATICcS
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING PETITIONERS' CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT PETITIONERS ARE CRIMINALLY LIABLE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THEM FOR FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE DESPITE WANT OF PROOF THAT THE WOUNDS SUSTAINED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WERE FATAL. 20
Our Ruling
After a circumspect scrutiny of the case, the Court resolves to affirm the conviction of petitioners and dismiss the petition, there being no reversible error in the assailed Decision that would warrant the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
In their quest for acquittal, petitioners continue to assail the credibility of Suyom by putting into issue the latter's alleged inconsistency and uncertainty as to the number and identity of his assailants. 21 They further harp on the alleged poor lighting and visibility conditions in the crime scene. They claimed that, when the incident happened, it was almost midnight and the only illumination came from a fluorescent light inside the store. Suyom even testified that his assailants were having a drinking spree at the back of the store, where there was no light. Under such condition, they posit that it was highly improbable for Suyom to ascertain the identity of his assailants. 22
The Court does not agree.
Through the clear, positive and steadfast testimony of Suyom, it was sufficiently established that petitioners Bebot and Antonio were among the perpetrators of the crime. Suyom testified that, while he was buying cigarettes from a store in Barangay Mag-aso, he was suddenly attacked by Inday and Leo, together with petitioners, who took turns in hacking him with a "sundang," hitting him on the head and at his back:
A I was in Brgy. Mag-aso to buy a cigarette. 23
xxx xxx xxx
Q Where you able to buy cigarette?
A At that time I bought the cigarette, it happened. 24
xxx xxx xxx
Q What is that incident you were referring to?
A I do not have any fault as I have not committed any wrong and they hacked me.
Q You said, "they hacked me" who is this they that you were referring to?
A Bebot and Antonio.
Q This Antonio, are you referring to Antonio Pido, which you earlier identified?
A Yes[,] sir.
Q And this Bebot, are you referring to Bebot Hangalay?
A Yes[,] sir.
Q Who were the two other accused?
A Inday Tarpin and Leo Espina.
Q Can you tell us the reason why they hacked you?
A I do not know. TIADCc
Q Before the incident occurred, or before the hacking blow, do you know what where this four people doing at that time you bought a cigarette?
A As far as I know, they were all of them.
Q Yes the four of them hacked you. The question, what where they doing before they hacked you?
A They were drinking.
Q They did not invite you?
A They did not invite me, but they allowed me to drink.
Q Who delivered the first hacking blow if you still recall?
A Inday Tarpin.
Q Who followed Inday Tarpin?
A Bebot Hangalay and Antonio Pido.
Q Were you hit by the hacking blow?
A Yes sir, in my head and at my back.
Q What happened to you when you were hit by the hacking blow by the four people you were (sic) just mentioned?
A I was brought to the hospital. 25
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that Suyom was clear, direct and categorical that he saw four assailants and two of them were petitioners Bebot and Antonio, whom he positively identified.
In his direct testimony, Suyom further explained that he was able to recognize his attackers because there was a light coming from the store, which is adjacent to the place where petitioners and his group were having a drinking spree: cSEDTC
Q That place where you were able to buy cigarette which according to you, this four persons including Bebot Hangalay, Antonio Pido, and Leo Espina is a store. Can you still recall that place where they were having a drinking session, what was the illumination?
A There was a light.
Q What was the light?
A Fluorescent.
Q That fluorescent is situated in what particular part of the store?
A In the store.
Q Fluorescent is about how many meters to the place where the four persons were drinking?
A Just very near, the fluorescent is adjacent to them. 26
Thus, contrary to petitioners' submission, the crime scene was well-illuminated coming from the fluorescent light in the store, which is near the place where the victim's attackers were having a drinking spree. Such illumination gave Suyom a better view of the faces of his attackers for him to recognize their identities with certainty.
Furthermore, the RTC as affirmed by the CA aptly held that Suyom could have not mistaken the identities of his attackers since they all reside in the same barangay. Even Antonio and Bebot admitted that they know Suyom, and that they live in Barangay Mag-aso. 27 Due to their familiarity with one another, Suyom's identification of petitioners as his attackers became a relatively easy task. 28
In addition, the CA correctly pointed out that it would be unnatural for Suyom, being interested in the vindication of the crime committed against him to implicate somebody other than the real culprit. 29 Owing to the natural tendency of a victim to seek justice for himself, it is indeed highly illogical for Suyom to implicate someone else who is innocent of the crime. Human experience tells us that it is unnatural for a victim to accuse someone other than his actual attacker; in the normal course of things, the victim would have the earnest desire to bring the guilty person to justice, and no other. 30
Lending credence to Suyom's credibility is the absence of any ulterior or sinister motive on his part to falsely implicate petitioners for the crime charged. In fact, petitioners admitted that prior to the hacking incident, there was no misunderstanding or animosity between them. 31 Thus, no ill motive can be ascribed to Suyom for testifying against them. Pertinently, the absence of such improper motive on his part strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 32 Indeed, if an accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former. 33
Moreover, it is settled that, when it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, unless the same is tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. 34 The reason is basic. The trial court, having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence and in assessing who among the witnesses holds the truth. 35 Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him. 36 The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and would have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. 37 On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given due deference. 38 This rule finds an even more stringent application where the CA sustains the findings of the trial court. 39
Here, the RTC gave full faith and credence to the clear and positive testimony of Suyom pointing to petitioners as among the perpetrators of the crime. Since the RTC had the direct opportunity to examine the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand, the RTC was clearly in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.
Further, there is no showing that the RTC overlooked, misapprehended or misconstrued some fact or circumstance of weight or substance so as to materially affect the disposition of the case or doubt the credibility of Suyom. In fact, even the CA affirmed the RTC's appreciation of Suyom's testimony which makes the same invariably conclusive and binding on the Court. As a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the trial courts' calibration of testimonies and its assessment thereon when, as here, such assessment is undisturbed by the CA.
In sum, no compelling reason exists to doubt the credibility of Suyom and the veracity of his charges, as well as his positive identification of petitioners Bebot and Antonio as among the perpetrators of the crime. AaCTcI
In the alternative, petitioners propound that the prosecution failed to establish the frustrated stage of the crime charged for failure to present Dr. Deo A. Obero (Dr. Obero), the attending physician, to identify the contents of Suyom's Medical Certificate and to explain the extent of the injuries suffered by the latter. According to petitioners, absent clear and convincing proof that the injuries of Suyom were fatal or could have caused his death if not for the timely medical intervention, they cannot be held criminally liable for Frustrated Homicide.
The Court is not convinced.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, is present. 40 If the victim's wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted homicide. Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victim's wounds. 41
In this case, all the foregoing elements are present.
First, intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. 42 In Rivera v. People, 43 the Court considered the following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. 44 In this case, records disclose that petitioners, with a use of "sundang," a lethal weapon, took turns in stabbing the hapless victim, 45 causing serious injuries on vital parts of his body, i.e., head and abdomen. 46 Suyom would have died if not for the timely and effective medical attention given to him that ultimately saved his life. Plainly, the manner of the attack, the weapon used and location of the injuries sustained by the victim demonstrated petitioners' intent to kill.
As to the second element, the Medical Certificate 47 of Suyom showed that he suffered deep wounds on his head and abdomen, critical areas of the body containing major body organs, which could have caused his untimely demise, if not for the timely medical assistance. Due to the hacking in his abdomen, his spleen was lacerated, and his stomach and large intestines have prolapsed. As a result, he had to undergo an exploratory laparotomy (abdominal exploration through incision) and splenectomy (spleen removal). 48 Surely, the injuries sustained by Suyom cannot be brushed aside as mere grazing injuries, otherwise a simpler medical procedure or a lesser degree of medical attention would have sufficed.
As for the probative value of the Medical Certificate, it bears pointing out that the defense admitted the same contemporaneously with the disposal of the testimony of Dr. Obero, the attending physician, who issued the same. Thus, the contents of the Medical Certificate may competently and credibly be used to corroborate the testimony of the victim as to the location, extent and severity of his injuries.
Notably, the gravity of Suyom's medical condition was bolstered by the fact that he was referred from Burauen District Hospital to EVRMC, a more advanced hospital. Evidently, if Suyom merely sustained non-fatal wounds, the referral to a more advanced hospital would have been unnecessary. Equally telling is Suyom's testimony that he was not aware of such transfer, as he remained unconscious for three days since the hacking incident, thereby underscoring his life-threatening medical condition.
Q Do you recall if you were also brought to Burauen District Hospital?
A I did not remember. EcTCAD
Q Were you still conscious from the time this four persons you mentioned run up to the time you were brought to the EVRMC?
A I did not know when they brought me to the hospital.
Q In other words, while you were brought to the hospital, you have no conscious?
A I have no knowledge.
Q How many days when you gained consciousness after the incident?
A Three (3) days.
Q In other words, three days after the incident, it was only then that you discover that you were inside the hospital?
A Yes, sir. 49
The congruence of all these supports the conclusion that Suyom would have succumbed to death due to his injuries, but only survived due to the timely medical attention. Otherwise stated, all the acts of execution were performed on Suyom by inflicting mortal wounds, but death did not result by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators — the timely medical intervention given to him. On this score, We quote with imprimatur the CA's disquisition:
In the case at bar, the RTC correctly found that Suyom sustained serious injuries in his head and stomach that would have caused his death if not of the timely medical intervention. Accused-appellant's intention to kill Suyom can be presumed from the use of a lethal weapon, "sundang" and the lethal hacking blows they each delivered. It is clear that accused-appellants were able to perform all the acts that would necessarily result in Suyom's death. Further, the medical certificate showed that Suyom had to undergo major operations as a result of the incident. Thus, accused-appellants performed all the acts necessary to kill Suyom; but the latter survived due to the timely medical intervention. 50
Third, and lastly, none of the circumstances enumerated under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended was alleged in the Information, much less proven during trial to qualify the crime to Murder.
Irrefragably, n the frustrated stage of the crime charged was clearly and convincingly established to sustain the conviction of petitioners for Frustrated Homicide.
On the other hand, against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, petitioners could only rely on their defense of denial and alibi. It is well-settled that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Alibi, on the other hand, is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove and for which reason it is generally rejected. 51 For alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establish two elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission. 52
"Physical impossibility" refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. 53 Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail. 54
In this case, Bebot claimed that he was with Arturo Notarte and Rodelio Suyom at Barangay Caabangan, La Paz, Leyte attending a barangay fiesta at the time of the hacking incident. 55 However, he also admitted that the distance of Barangay Caabangan to Barangay Mag-aso could be negotiated by a half an hour walk. 56 Verily, the distance of the place where the victim was killed and the place where accused-appellant claims to be was not too far way to render it physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti at the time of the commission of the crime. His defense of alibi is also uncorroborated as none of his alleged companions were presented in court to substantiate the same. HSAcaE
As for Antonio, he claimed that he was just sleeping in his house in Barangay Mering, Tabon-Tabon, Leyte with his family members when the incident happened. 57 However, none of his family members were presented as witness to shore up his defense. Thus, his assertion that he was somewhere else at the time of stabbing incident is self-serving and cannot be given probative value. It would not prevail over the positive identification of the victim that he was one of the assailants.
It is an oft repeated doctrine that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. 58 As between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 59
All told, petitioners' mere reiteration of their defenses of denial and alibi, with no other substantial argument, much less proof, cannot reverse their conviction. Concomitantly, the CA did not err in affirming their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Frustrated Homicide.
Anent the propriety of the penalty to be imposed, Article 249 of the RPC provides that Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. Considering that the crime committed was Frustrated Homicide, the penalty to be imposed shall be one degree lower 60 than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed must have a maximum term which can be properly imposed under the rules considering the attending circumstances. Since there is no attending circumstance present, the maximum imposable penalty is within the range of prision mayor in its medium period or eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. 61 On the other hand, the minimum imposable penalty should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC, that is prision correccional in any of its periods 62 or from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence imposed by the CA ranging from Four (4) years and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum is correct for being in accordance with the law.
Similarly, the Court sustains the following monetary awards in favor of the victim, pursuant to the case of People v. Jugueta: 63 (1) P30,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (2) P30,000.00 as moral damages.
Finally, in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, 64 the Court upholds the imposition of legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from the finality of this decision until full payment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 29, 2018 and the Resolution dated April 10, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02831 are AFFIRMED.
Petitioners Antonio Pido and Bebot Hangalay are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide and are sentenced to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum. They are also ORDERED to pay jointly and severally, Floro Suyom the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as civil indemnity and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages, plus interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from the finality of this Resolution until full payment. HESIcT
SO ORDERED." Lopez, M., J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 10-24.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, with Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and Gabriel T. Robeniol, concurring; id. at 26-36.
3. CA Rollo, pp. 114-115.
4. Records, p. 1.
5. TSN, September 23, 2013, pp. 5-7.
6.Id. at 5-8.
7.Id. at 9.
8.Id. at 9-10.
9.Id. at 3-5.
10.Id. at 8-9.
11. TSN, November 19, 2015, pp. 3-4.
12.Id. at 4-5.
13.Id. at 6.
14. TSN, February 26, 2016, pp. 5-7.
15.Id. at 13.
16. Penned by Presiding Judge Carlos O. Arguelles; CA rollo, pp. 32-42.
17.Id. at 41-42.
18.Rollo, pp. 35-36.
19.Id. at 47-48.
20.Id. at 16-17.
21.Id. at 17-18.
22.Id. at 18.
23. TSN, September 23, 2013, p. 5.
24.Id. at 6.
25.Id. at 6-8.
26.Id. at 8-9.
27. TSN, November 19, 2015, p. 3; TSN, February 26, 2016, p. 4; p. 6.
28. See People v. Cortezano, 425 Phil. 696, 709 (2002).
29.Rollo, p. 30.
30.Serrano v. People, 637 Phil. 319, 332 (2010).
31. TSN, November 19, 2015, p. 6; TSN, February 2016, p. 13.
32.People v. Lucero, 651 Phil. 251, 259 (2010).
33.People v. Lara, 692 Phil. 469, 486 (2012).
34.People v. Regaspi, 768 Phil. 593, 598 (2015).
35.People v. Apattad, 671 Phil. 95, 113 (2011).
36.People v. Quinto, G.R. No. 246460, June 8, 2020.
37.People v. Court of Appeals, 755 Phil. 80, 111 (2015).
38.Supra note 36.
39.Supra note 34 at 598.
40.People v. Lanuza, 671 Phil. 811, 819 (2011).
41.People v. Aquino, 829 Phil. 477, 488 (2018).
42.De Guzman, Jr. v. People, 748 Phil. 452, 458-459 (2014).
43. 515 Phil. 824 (2006), citing People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003).
44.Rivera v. People, id. at 832.
45. TSN, September 23, 2013, pp. 6-8.
46. Records, p. 9.
47.Id.
48.Rollo, p. 141.
49. TSN, September 23, 2013, pp. 9-10.
50.Rollo, p. 35.
51.People v. Ronquillo, 818 Phil. 641, 652 (2017).
52.People v. Manalili, 716 Phil. 762, 774-775 (2013).
53.People v. Mosquerra, 414 Phil. 740, 749 (2001).
54.People v. Ohayas, 811 Phil. 141, 150 (2017).
55. TSN, November 19, 2015, pp. 3-4.
56.Id. at 3.
57. TSN, February 26, 2016, p. 5.
58.People v. Vidaña, 720 Phil. 531, 543 (2013).
59.People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 527 (2013).
60. Article 250. The courts, in view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated crime of parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the preceding articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that which should be imposed under the provision of Article 50.
61. See Cirera v. People, 739 Phil. 25, 47 (2014).
62. See People v. Marzan, G.R. No. 207397, September 24, 2018.
63. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
64.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 282 (2013).
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Irrefegrably" in the official document.