FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161878. March 12, 2014.]
PHILWORTH ASIA, INC., SPOUSES LUISITO AND ELIZABETH MACTAL, AND SPOUSES LUIS AND ELOISA REYES, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 12, 2014 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 161878 — PHILWORTH ASIA, INC., SPOUSES LUISITO AND ELIZABETH MACTAL, AND SPOUSES LUIS AND ELOISA REYES, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
We hereby address the issue of whether or not the petitioners and their counsel, Atty. Oscar L. Karaan, committed forum shopping; and, if so, whether or not they were thereby guilty of indirect contempt of court. EScIAa
On June 5, 2013, the Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) that had rejected the petitioners' insistence that they had been denied due process by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendering its judgment based on the ex parte evidence of the respondent. The relevant portion of our decision stated as follows: 1
Petitioners were not denied their right to be heard. As outlined above, the RTC set the case several times for the pre-trial and the trial. In so doing, the RTC undeniably relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure out of its desire to afford to petitioners the opportunity to fully ventilate their side on the merits of the case. The RTC thereby acted with liberality. This was in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all the parties the chance to argue and prove their respective sides. Here, however, they apparently stretched the limits of the RTC's liberality, to the point of abusing it. A review of the proceedings has given the Court the impression that they deliberately delayed the presentation of their evidence by asking postponements of the hearings. The pattern of delay that followed indicated that they did not intend to present any evidence in their favor, and that they were simply temporizing as a way of avoiding the inevitable adverse outcome of the case. Otherwise, they and their counsel would have easily completed the task of presenting their evidence and shunned the delays. They did present Ms. Garcia on direct examination, but they thereafter did not see to the completion of her testimony.
Petitioners' assertion that PCIB was equally to blame for the delay in the case was improbable. There was really no reason for PCIB to cause a delay. PCIB had already been allowed by the RTC to adduce its evidence ex parte as early as in June 1995. They and their counsel were fully aware that it then became their sole obligation to adduce their evidence in support of their defense. Indeed, they should blame no one else but themselves for losing their right to adduce their evidence.
We have set forth in detail the various instances in which they benefitted from the liberality of the RTC in its desire to enable them to prove their side. Contrary to their unworthy representations, therefore, petitioners were afforded more than ample opportunity to adduce their evidence. That the RTC ultimately declared them to have waived their right to present evidence was warranted. They should not be allowed to waste the trial court's time and attention through dilatory tactics that have no place in the fair administration of justice. Parties like them who do not seize the opportunity to participate in the proceedings have no grounds to complain of deprivation of due process. It is not amiss to note that the trial judge had actually warned them of the dire consequence to be surely visited upon them should they persist on not presenting their evidence. That they ignored the warnings demonstrated their low regard of the judicial proceedings. We reiterate that an opportunity not availed of is deemed forfeited without violating the Bill of Rights. 2 IATHaS
The Court further observed in the decision that the petitioners and their counsel had caused delay in the adjudication of the case, viz.:
We also state that the ruling of the trial judge to bar petitioners' right to present their evidence was not based on mere technicality. On the contrary, the ruling was the just treatment by the trial judge whose liberality they had unreasonably abused. The trial judge had the clear duty to ensure that the trial of the case would proceed despite the deliberate delays and refusal to proceed on their part. It is worth stressing, too, that the ruling of the trial judge did not rest on mere technicality, considering that PCIB as the adverse party was legally entitled to the trial of its case that was free of undue and unreasonable delays.
A party and its counsel who deliberately or neglectfully delay the prompt termination of their court case are further guilty of abuse of court processes and of impeding the smooth administration of justice, rendering them amenable to being cited for indirect contempt of court under Section 3, (c) and (d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners and their counsel should then show cause why they should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of court. The trial judge's tolerance of the delays or liberality did not exonerate them and their counsel from their impeding the smooth administration of justice.
On the part of petitioners' counsel, he was expectedly aware of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which required him as an attorney to exert every effort and to consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. He should not ever ignore such duty, even upon the pretext of giving his entire devotion to the interest of his clients. He ought not to forget that as an attorney, he was, first and foremost, an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort to comply with the requirement under Canon 12.
The Court upholds the liability of petitioners as laid down by the RTC and affirmed without modification by the CA, considering that petitioners did not present evidence in refutation. 3
Accordingly, the Court directed the petitioners and Atty. Karaan to show cause in writing within ten days from notice why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for impeding the smooth administration of justice. The Court specifically instructed Atty. Karaan to explain why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On July 19, 2013, Atty. Karaan submitted his explanation, 4 to wit:
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4. The supposed delay in Civil Case No. 91-1536 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 should not be entirely blamed on the shoulders of the undersigned counsel and his clients. Be it noted that the resettings and postponements in the hearing of Civil Case No. 91-1536 were attended either with justifiable reasons or were attributable to some unforeseen circumstances that occurred in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 as borne by the records. Noteworthy is the fact that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 granted these resettings and postponements showing that they were with sufficient basis. It is the respectful submission of the undersigned counsel that these resettings and postponements in Civil Case No. 91-1536 are not capricious and oppressive but were clearly warranted by the circumstances then obtaining. They neither are either deliberate or neglectful nor intended to defy the authority and dignity of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 or even this Honorable Court;
5. Be that as it may, the undersigned counsel offers his most genuine and sincerest apologies to this Honorable Court as it was never his intention to unduly delay the hearings of Civil Case No. 91-1536. More importantly, the undersigned counsel was never goaded or impelled to abuse the court processes of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 or even impede, degrade or obstruct the hearings and administration of justice in Civil Case No. 91-1536. In fact, the decision dated October 20, 1998 in Civil Case No. 91-1536 to a degree sided with his clients since the award given to the adverse party was decreased due to the presence of excessive and illegal interest and penalty rate thus showing that they possessed meritorious defenses. The undersigned counsel even exerted his utmost effort and put his best foot forward to assist the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 in resolving Civil Case No. 91-1536 as an officer of the court while at the same protecting and safeguarding the interest of his clients as required by Chapter IV of the Code of Professional Responsibility; 5 ADEaHT
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8. In fine, the undersigned counsel humbly submits to this Honorable Court that he did not commit any act constituting indirect contempt against the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 as he did not deliberately or neglectfully delayed the prompt termination of the case of his clients therein. The undersigned counsel likewise humbly submits to this Honorable Court that he has not violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On their part, Spouses Luisito and Elizabeth Mactal and Spouses Luis and Eloisa Reyes sent their compliance dated July 12, 2013 but which the Court received only on August 7, 2013, 6 representing that:
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1. The Petitioners express their sincerest apologies to this Honorable Court for any delay in the hearing of Civil Case No. 91-1536 by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61. The petitioners humbly submit that the resettings and postponements granted to them by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 were with justifiable reasons. If the Petitioners had no basis for the resettings and postponements they sought, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 would surely not have granted them during the course of Civil Case No. 91-1536;
2. The Petitioners also humbly submit to this Honorable Court that they, including their counsel, had no intention whatsoever to unduly delay the prompt termination of Civil Case No. 91-1536. The Petitioners were never motivated to abuse the court processes of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 or even obstruct, impede or degrade the administration of justice. During the entire proceedings of Civil Case No. 91-1536, there was never an instance that the Petitioners caused an affront or defiance on the authority or dignity of the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 which they even duly respected;
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6. The bottom line is that the Petitioners were never impelled by malice or deliberate intent to abuse the court processes or impede, degrade and obstruct the administration of justice by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 in Civil Case No. 91-1536. Be that as it may, the Petitioners reiterate their sincerest apologies to this Honorable Court for whatever delay that they may have caused in the trial of Civil Case No. 91-1536 by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 but which was never their or their counsel's intention.
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Ruling
The explanations of the petitioners and their counsel are undeserving of credence.
In the decision of June 5, 2013, the Court set forth its thoughts on why the moves of the petitioners and their counsel were contumacious. Thus, they were given the opportunity to justify themselves. But their proffered justifications do not convince the Court. They have expressed no remorse for causing the delay. To say merely, as Atty. Karaan does in his explanation, that counsel was offering "his most genuine and sincerest apologies" to the Court because it was "never his intention to unduly delay the hearings" was only doing lip service to the ideal ethical conduct but not at all serving the interest of the speedy disposition of justice, or ensuring the smooth administration of justice.
The filing of multiple dilatory motions for postponement by Atty. Karaan in behalf of his clients constituted grave abuse of court processes that tended to impede the administration of justice. Indeed, the norm is that every postponement or continuance in judicial proceedings should be responsibly and sparingly sought by a party and his counsel because it is not a tool designed to place an unnecessary burden on the court and the adverse party. Responsible advocacy on the part of counsel imposes on him to state a good reason for seeking the postponement or continuance to mitigate its effect as somehow delaying the proceedings. The frequency of seeking the postponement or continuance often determines whether abuse of court process exists or not; hence, if the frequency is excessive, the abuse of process is patent and ought to be sanctioned as indirect contempt of court.
The fact that the trial judge was tolerant of the moves of the petitioners and of their counsel to delay the hearings of the case was no justification for not holding them fully responsible. Being burdened as the litigants and their advocate with the obligation to avoid the delays, they could not hide behind the lapses of others to ward off an impending exaction of their responsibility.
Accordingly, the petitioners and their counsel are found and declared guilty of indirect contempt of court under Section 3 (c) and (d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)
Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines: 7
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation. ICcaST
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES Spouses Luisito and Elizabeth Mactal and Spouses Luis and Eloisa Reyes and their counsel, Atty. Oscar L. Karaan, GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT, and IMPOSES on them jointly and severally a FINE of P10,000.00, payable in full within five days from receipt of this resolution.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 96-104.
2. Id. at 102-103.
3. Id. at 103.
4. Id. at 117-122.
5. Id. at 118-120.
6. The pleading reflects that the Spouses Luisito and Elizabeth Mactal and the Spouses Luis and Eloisa Reyes as petitioners but the pleading was merely signed by the Spouses Mactal.
7. G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 331, 343-344.