SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 199595. February 4, 2015.]
PHILIPPINE WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, INC., petitioner, vs. TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRS FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Special First Division, issued a Resolution dated February 4, 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 199595 (Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc., et al.). — The petitioner's motion for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file a comment on the private respondent's motion for reconsideration (with motion to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc) of the Decision dated April 2, 2014 is GRANTED. The petitioner's comment/opposition to private respondent's motion for reconsideration, the private respondent's motion for leave to file the thereto attached reply to the petitioner's comment/opposition to the motion for reconsideration, as well as the aforesaid reply are all NOTED.
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc1 filed by private respondent Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc. (TRY Foundation).
TRY Foundation seeks that the Court Decision 2 dated April 2, 2014 be reconsidered and set aside on the following grounds: (a) the final and executory judgment in G.R. No. 190193 can no longer be disturbed pursuant to the doctrines of immutability of final judgment andres judicata; (b) a petition for prohibition and certiorari are not sanctioned remedies against a final judgment rendered by this Court; (c) the Property Registration Decree has already eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction and limited jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC); (d) whether a matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general or limited jurisdiction is a procedural question and not a jurisdictional one; and (e) any issue on jurisdiction was waived by Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. (PWCTUI) when it actively participated in the case. 3
The Court denies reconsideration. As exhaustively discussed in the Court Decision dated April 2, 2014, the doctrine of immutability of final judgment is not applicable in the present case because all proceedings and judgments, including those taken and rendered during the appeal stage in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04), were void for lack of jurisdiction. This nullity is the inevitable consequence of the trial court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over the fundamental subject matter of TRY Foundation's petition that is — the revocation of the donation made in favor of PWCTUI. AICTcE
Instead of proceeding to hear, try and resolve the underlying issue of revocation of donation, the RTC should have dismissed the petition, subject to the re-filing of the appropriate civil action, or re-docketed the same as an ordinary civil action which required stricter jurisdictional requirements than a land registration case. The lack of a valid service of summons and payment of docket fees imposed on ordinary civil actions prevented the RTC from validly acquiring jurisdiction over the claim for revocation of donation deceitfully passed off as a simple petition for amendment or alteration of a certificate of title.
The fact that PWCTUI participated in the proceedings before the RTC cannot be taken as a waiver of the absence of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties. 4
Contrary to the contention of TRY Foundation, the disquisition in the Decision dated April 2, 2014 did not disentangle the entwined general and limited jurisdiction of RTCs. The Court only emphasized the distinct and more stringent jurisdictional requirements for ordinary civil actions cognizable under the trial court's general jurisdiction.
Clearly, the issues tendered by TRY Foundation are matters of no extraordinary import that merit the attention of the Court en banc. They do not involve novel questions of law. Neither did the Decision dated April 2, 2014 modify or reverse any established jurisprudence. As settled in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (now P.D. Monfort North), Municipality of Dumangas5 and Paz v. Republic of the Philippines, 6 an action which seeks the reconveyance of a property on the ground of a revoked deed of donation cannot prosper until the donation shall have first been revoked in due course under Article 764 or Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
Likewise equally recognized is the principle that it is always in the power of the Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it. 7 "Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. . . . The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final." 8
The Court's duty to rectify a serious jurisdictional error committed by a trial court in order to avert the resultant deprivation of PWCTUI's property without due process of law are sufficiently compelling reasons for the Court to suspend the procedural rules on appeals and take a second hard look at the arguments espoused by PWCTUI.
Moreover, given that all proceedings taken in connection with and arising from LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) were of no force and effect, it cannot be correctly argued that the Court Decision dated April 2, 2014 was in conflict with the void pronouncement in G.R. No. 190193. There is no basis for the claim of TRY Foundation that the subject matter of the case h as a huge financial impact on businesses or affects the welfare of a community so as to justify its referral to the Court en banc. SHTcDE
Finally, it bears emphasizing that the Court sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis-à-vis its divisions and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits veritably as the Court en banc itself. 9
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court en banc are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 382-406.
2. Id. at 365-381.
3. Id. at 384-398.
4. Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation, G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 158, 164.
5. 512 Phil. 108, 123 (2005).
6. G.R. No. 157367, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 74, 81-82.
7. Ginete v. CA, 357 Phil. 36, 52 (1998).
8. Barnes v. Judge Padilla, 482 Phil. 903, 915 (2004).
9. Apo Fruits Corp., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 576 Phil. 234, 243-244 (2008).