THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 231030. January 17, 2018.]
PHILIPPINE PLASTICS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ALDRIN L. SAN PEDRO, Mayor of the City of Muntinlupa, Metropolitan Manila, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated January 17, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 231030 (Philippine Plastics Industry Association, Inc. vs. Hon. Aldrin L. San Pedro, Mayor of the City of Muntinlupa, Metropolitan Manila). — The Court NOTES respondent City Government of Muntinlupa's comment on the petition for review on certiorari.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and to set aside the Decision 2 dated June 28, 2016 and the Resolution 3 dated April 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 137584.
The undisputed facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Muntinlupa City enacted on January 18, 2010 Ordinance No. 10-10 4 entitled "AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE USE OF PLASTIC BAGS ON DRY GOODS, REGULATING ITS UTILIZATION ON WET GOODS AND PROHIBITING THE USE OF STYROFOAM/STYROPHOR IN THE CITY OF MUNTINLUPA AND PRESCRIBING THE PENALTIES THEREOF" (subject Ordinance). By the subject Ordinance, business establishments and/or individuals are prohibited from selling and providing (1) plastic bags to consumers as secondary packaging materials on wet goods; (2) plastic bags to consumers as primary packaging material on dry goods; and (3) Styrofoam/styrophor as containers. The herein respondent Hon. Aldrin L. San Pedro (San Pedro), then Mayor of Muntinlupa City, later approved the subject Ordinance. 5
The herein petitioner Philippine Plastics Industry Association, Inc. (PPIAI), a non-stock, non-profit corporation, established to protect the legitimate business interests of persons and entities in the country's plastics industry, however, challenged its constitutionality before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction (with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The case was then docketed as G.R. No. 206718. 6
After the submission of the required Comment and Reply, this Court found that most of the issues involved are factual. Thus, on October 7, 2014, this Court referred the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence and rendition of judgment. In compliance therewith, the CA heard the case on November 9, 2015 and the following facts were stipulated: (1) the genuineness and due execution of a copy of the subject Ordinance; and (2) Republic Act No. 9003 (RA 9003) was passed 10 years before the enactment of the subject Ordinance. The issues raised by the petitioner before the CA are: (1) whether Section 15 7 (a), (b) and (c) of the subject Ordinance violates RA 9003; (2) whether the subject Ordinance complies with the requirements for the valid enactment of police power ordinances; (3) whether the petitioner is entitled to the writs of certiorari and prohibition; (4) whether the petitioner is entitled to the injunctive reliefs sought in these proceedings; and (5) whether the petitioner has locus standi in the instant case. 8
On June 28, 2016, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the Petition. While it upheld the petitioner's locus standi for not being disputed by the City Government of Muntinlupa and for being able to show that it will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury allegedly due to the enactment of the subject ordinance, the CA, however, pronounced that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition availed of are improper remedies. For one, the respondent did not perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function in approving the subject Ordinance; there was also no showing that the approval was attended by grave abuse of discretion; and the petitioner failed to show that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy available. Instead of certiorari and prohibition, the proper remedy would be a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court as the petitioner seeks the nullification of the subject Ordinance, or at least a portion thereof, for being unconstitutional, an invalid exercise of police power and violative of RA 9003, which matters are beyond the scope of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. And, even if certiorari, prohibition and mandamus may be the appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, it is still incumbent upon the petitioner to show the (1) existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. These, the petitioner failed to do. The principle of hierarchy of courts was also disregarded in filing the Petition directly with this Court instead of with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The CA equally held that the petitioner failed to prove that the subject Ordinance violated the equal protection clause and that it is discriminatory. The petitioner simply made a general statement that there exists no substantial distinction between the primary packaging, the secondary packaging, and the plastic cutlery without adding anything else. But in truth, substantial distinction does exist between the primary and the secondary plastic packaging materials, or even between the plastic packaging materials and the plastic cutlery as certain goods require a primary receptacle or packaging. To note, primary packaging materials are wrappers or receptacles of wet goods, snack foods, frozen foods and hardware while secondary packaging materials are packaging materials for wet goods to provide support to any packaging and intended for the convenience of the handler as well. Obviously, frozen and wet goods require nonporous primary packaging to prevent the seepage or spillage of liquid or fluid. But, no such seepage or spillage can be had on dry goods, which do not require refrigeration like clothing and textile. Further, as explained by the City Government of Muntinlupa, what is prohibited in the subject Ordinance is the sale and provision of plastic bags as packaging materials for wet and dry goods, and not the plastic packaging or wrappers of these goods done by the producers or manufacturers thereof. As to the argument that the subject Ordinance is unfair and unreasonable as the plastic bag, plastic packaging, and styrophor containers are declared by the ordinance to be harmful to the environment when they are otherwise, the same cannot be given any credence for lack of proof that these plastic bags, among others, are indeed not harmful to the environment. 9
The petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied in the questioned Resolution dated April 11, 2017.
Hence, this Petition raising the issue of whether the enactment and the approval of the subject Ordinance, particularly Section 15 (a) and (b) thereof, were attended with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, inasmuch as it does not conform to the requirements of a valid police power ordinance.
There is no merit in the instant petition.
At the outset, this Court finds it no longer necessary to discuss once again the procedural issues raised by the petitioner for the CA had already made a well-versed discussion on the matter to which this Court conforms. Thus, this Court will now proceed to the main issue raised herein.
In Legaspi v. City of Cebu, et al.10 citing City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 11 this Court made these pronouncements regarding the tests of a valid ordinance, thus:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy). (Emphases and italics supplied.)
Here, it is beyond question that the City Government of Muntinlupa, pursuant to Section 11 (a) (6) and (e) (13), Rule V of RA 7926, 12 in relation to Section 458 (a) (1) (vi) and (a) (5) (xiii) of RA 7160, 13 has the power to approve ordinances and pass resolutions in order to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment x x x and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance;" and to "[p]rovide for an effective and efficient system of solid waste and garbage collection x x x." With these, it is clear that the issuance of the subject Ordinance, that is, the prohibition on the use of plastic bags to consumers as secondary packaging materials on wet goods and as primary packaging materials on dry goods, and on the use of styrofoam/styrophor as containers, is well within the power of the City Government of Muntinlupa for it merely acted based on its mandate to do all efforts to protect the environment. After all, such mandate originated from the Constitution itself. Also, its enactment is in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Now, as to the substantive requirements of a valid ordinance, this Court assents to the findings of the CA that, indeed, all such requirements have been met.
Here, the petitioner argued that the subject Ordinance runs counter to the Constitution for being violative of the equal protection clause as it prohibits the use of plastic bags as secondary packaging materials on wet goods without substantial distinction as opposed to primary packaging materials of the same wet goods. Also, while the subject Ordinance prohibits the selling of plastic bags, no such prohibition was made with regard to plastic spoons and forks used in restaurants and eateries, which are also harmful to the environment. To the mind of this Court, such arguments are preposterous.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. In short, for classification, to be valid, it must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. 14 As aptly observed by the CA, the subject Ordinance did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as there is substantial distinction between the primary and secondary plastic packaging materials, or even between plastic packaging materials and plastic cutlery. To note, the frozen and wet goods require nonporous primary packaging to prevent the seepage or spillage of liquid or fluid but no such seepage or spillage can be had on dry goods that do not require refrigeration. For this reason, plastic as primary packaging materials for wet goods is allowed while the same is disallowed as primary packaging materials for dry goods. Further, plastic is also disallowed as secondary packaging materials for wet goods since no more seepage or spillage of liquid or fluid can be had as their primary packaging already served the purpose of preventing the same. The use of plastic as secondary packaging materials for wet goods is merely to provide support to any packaging and it is intended for the convenience of the handler. Thus, a re-usable packaging material would be enough to serve that purpose. And as explained by the City Government of Muntinlupa, the prohibition covers only the sale and provision of plastic bags as packaging materials for wet and dry goods and not the plastic packaging or wrappers of these goods done by the producers or manufacturers thereof.
The subject Ordinance is not also unfair and unreasonable. Though the petitioner claimed that the plastic packaging materials concerned are not harmful to the environment, it, however, failed to provide any proof in support of such claim. To repeat, the issuance of the subject Ordinance is in accordance with the mandate of the City Government of Muntinlupa to protect the environment. Thus, it will not be brushed aside based on the simple allegation that is it unfair and unreasonable.
There is also no conflict between the subject Ordinance and RA 9003. Here we quote with approval the CA's disquisition on the matter:
x x x Petitioner now insists that the subject Ordinance prohibits the sale and offering of all plastic packaging or bags, without regard to whether the same are environmentally acceptable or not, and thus, violates x x x Section 30 [of RA 9003].
x x x There is, however, no such conflict.
Under Section 5, Rule XII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations [IRR] of [RA 9003], the prohibition on non-environmentally acceptable products and any decision to prohibit certain packaging types and products, must be supported by available scientific, environmental, technical and economic information and technical studies through, but not limited to life cycle assessment and economic analysis. However, this requirement pertains to the National Solid Waste Management Commission only. This does not impose any restriction on the powers of the local government units to adopt their own system of waste reduction or source reduction, i.e., reduction of solid waste before it enters the solid waste stream by methods such as product design, materials substitution, materials re-use and packaging restrictions. Moreover, as aptly observed by the City Government of Muntinlupa, there is nothing in [RA 9003], or even in its [IRR], which prohibits the regulation and/or banning of environmentally acceptable products. 15
The subject Ordinance is also general and consistent with public policy. The CA's observation in relation to this is worth telling:
Finally, We are cognizant with the emerging trend in the nation to prohibit and/or regulate the use of plastic bags and styrofoam and/or styrophor either as primary or secondary packaging or as food containers for waste or source reduction purposes. The foremost consideration of the subject Ordinance, as well as the similar ordinances enacted by other local government units in the country is to preserve the environment and the ecological balance. This is consistent with the mandate under the Constitution that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. 16
With all the foregoing, this Court finds no grave error on the part of the CA when it struck down the petitioner's petition. Truly, the enactment of the subject Ordinance was not attended by grave abuse of discretion for it complied both with the formal and substantive requirements of a valid ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed CA Decision and Resolution dated June 28, 2016 and April 11, 2017, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 10-57.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Pedro B. Corales, concurring, id. at 64-78.
3.Id. at 80-87.
4.Id. at 89-94.
5. CA Decision dated June 28, 2016, id. at 65.
6. CA Decision dated June 28, 2016, id.
7. It should be Section 15 (Prohibited Acts) and not Section 16 (Penalties).
8. CA Decision dated June 28, 2016, id. at 65-67.
9. CA Decision dated June 28, 2016, id. at 68-70, 73-74.
10. G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013.
11. G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308.
12. Known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Muntinlupa into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Muntinlupa."
13. Known as the "Local Government Code of 1991."
14. Tiu, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999.
15. CA Decision dated June 28, 2016, rollo, pp. 75-76.
16. Id. at 77.