FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 194984. August 8, 2016.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. AMELIA Z. MAÑALAC, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 8, 2016, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 194984 — PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. AMELIA Z. MAÑALAC, Respondent.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) praying that: (1) the Decision 1 dated April 13, 2010 and Resolution 2 dated January 3, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72482, which affirmed with modification the Decision 3 dated May 7, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 53 in Civil Case No. G-3486, be set aside; and (2) the Complaint for Damages of respondent Amelia Mañalac (Mañalac) against Carmen L. Layug (Layug) and PNB in Civil Case No. G-3486 be dismissed. The Court of Appeals found Layug and PNB jointly and severally liable to Mañalac for $14,918.72.
The antecedents of the case are summarized as follows:
Sometime in 1992, [respondent] Amelia Z. Mañalac and her niece defendant Carmen Z. Layug (Layug, for brevity) opened an "AND" joint foreign currency deposit (FCD) account at PNB, Guagua, Pampanga Branch with an initial deposit of US$500.00.
[Mañalac] and Layug had an agreement that the money the former will be sending from the United States of America will be deposited by the latter in their joint FCD account with PNB.
Upon [Mañalac's] return to the country, however, she was surprised to find out that her joint account with Layug in the PNB amounting to $14,980.72 had been withdrawn without her knowledge and consent and only $247.13 was left.
[Mañalac] confronted Layug about the matter and the latter admitted having withdrawn the money in their joint deposit for her own personal use. According to Layug, the withdrawals were made possible with the help of some PNB officials.
On November 5, 1998, [Mañalac] went to PNB accompanied by her husband and daughter to clarify the matter and to complain about the unauthorized withdrawals made by Layug in their "AND" joint account. They were entertained by PNB's Senior Assistant Manager Carmen Singian who caused the retrieval of two (2) withdrawal slips and the ledger of [Mañalac's] account with the bank.
PNB's branch manager, Mr. Carcamo, talked with [Mañalac]. The latter reiterated her complaint and demanded that the withdrawn money be credited back to her dollar account. The branch manager asked her to return the following day and bring with her supporting documents.
The next day, [Mañalac] returned with the requested documents and the manager of PNB asked her to give them enough time to investigate her complaint but [Mañalac] kept on insisting that the withdrawn amount be credited outright in her account. This request was, however, denied by PNB.
Meanwhile, PNB conducted its investigation and found out that [Mañalac] and Layug are joint account holders of FCD Account No. 1458 for which they were issued a passbook. Their joint account is an "AND" account. They signed a ledger card upon opening the said account with PNB. When PNB adopted the computer system of banking, their passbook as well as their account number were changed and replaced by FCD No. 390-700909-1. With respect to this account PNB was only able to recover the ledger card signed by [Mañalac] and eleven (11) withdrawal slips. CAIHTE
On November 10, 1998, [Mañalac] filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga for damages against Layug and PNB alleging that Layug and PNB connived to defraud her of her dollar deposits by withdrawing money from her FCD account without her knowledge and consent.
On November 19 and 20, 1998, [Mañalac] gave her advance testimony in court because she was bound to return to the USA. On December 18, 1998, Layug filed her Answer with counterclaim alleging that she was authorized by [Mañalac] to withdraw from their joint account and the money she withdrew was sent to the latter in the United States.
PNB, on the other hand, filed its Answer with Counterclaim and cross-claim on December 22, 1998. It contends that the withdrawals done by Layug were with [Mañalac's] consent and authority because her signature appears on the withdrawal slips. It further prayed that in the event that the court decides in favor of [Mañalac], it should be reimbursed by Layug because it is the latter who actually benefited from the withdrawals. 4
After a full-blown trial, the RTC rendered its Decision on May 7, 2001.
The RTC started by tackling the issue of whether or not Mañalac authorized Layug to withdraw from their joint FCD account with PNB. The RTC, based on its own examination, found that Mañalac's signature on 11 withdrawal slips submitted by Layug and PNB in their defense, covering a total amount of $8,100.00, appeared to be authentic:
Since neither of the parties presented signature expert in support of their respective stand, the Court is now compelled to make its finding, after all "even the finding of the expert witness relative to the questioned documents is not conclusive."
A visual examination by comparing the signatures of [Mañalac] appearing in the disputed withdrawal slips (Exhs. "1-PNB" to "11-PNB") with her genuine and standard signatures appearing in the ledger (Exh. "12-PNB") and with that of the twelve (12) checks (Exhs. "C" to "O"), the Court, considering the writing style and stroke, sees that they are apparently similar in all aspects. Hence, the signatures appearing in Exhibits "1-PNB" to "11-PNB" are definitely [Mañalac's] signatures and therefore, all of them are valid withdrawal slips, with the knowledge and consent of [Mañalac]. . . . . 5
However, the RTC qualified that only the withdrawals amounting to $8,100.00 covered by the 11 withdrawal slips were proven to be authorized by Mañalac; all other withdrawals from the joint FCD account were unauthorized. The RTC reasoned:
[T]he signatures appearing in Exhibits "1-PNB" to "11-PNB" are definitely [Mañalac's] signatures and therefore, all of them are valid withdrawal slips, with the knowledge and consent of [Mañalac]. However, this does not apply to the other alleged withdrawals which [Layug and PNB] failed to establish as facts. The contention of the [petitioner]-PNB that the other withdrawal slips got lost due to recurring flood are too shallow to believe at as true and conceive merely as afterthought. The evidence is short as to when the alleged recurrence of flood occurred and as to what particular weather disturbance that caused the flooding. Besides, Carmen Layug denied any knowledge of these other withdrawal slips (tsn, November 22, 1999, pp. 22 & 23). DETACa
The record is replete with evidence that [Layug] was able to cause the withdrawal of all the money of [respondent] Amelia Mañalac contained in the Foreign Currency Deposit No. 1458 with ease, notwithstanding that its an "AND" joint account, wherein before any withdrawal could be made, the concurrence of both parties as depositors is a must, and their signatures must appear on the withdrawal slip itself. This is the standard practice, and outside of this, and if only one signature affixed on the withdrawal slip, it's the duty of the bank concerned to reject and not to honor the same as valid withdrawal.
There is no question that the deposited amount in the Foreign Currency Deposit Account is the exclusive money of [respondent] Amelia Mañalac (tsn, November 23, 1999, p. 63, Exh. "LL"). Before all the withdrawals caused by the defendant Carmen Layug, the subject passbook contained accumulated total deposit, which [petitioner]-PNB never disputed, in the amount of $14,918.72 (tsn, December 14, 1999, p. 25). The total amount covered by the eleven (11) withdrawal slips (Exhs. "1-PNB" to "11-PNB" is $8,100.00. Hence, mathematically after deducting the remaining balance of $247.13 (Exh. "B-13") there is still that missing amount of $6,571.59 which is covered by numerous unauthorized withdrawals. It is to be noted that defendant Carmen Layug made more than twenty (20) withdrawals as far as Foreign Currency Deposit is concerned (tsn, November 23, 1999, p. 52). And with these number of withdrawals, except for the eleven (11) withdrawals which are all authorized, the rest ought not to be recognized by the [petitioner] bank for the reason that [Mañalac] had no prior knowledge of it. 6
The RTC also held that Layug could only have made the unauthorized withdrawals in conspiracy with PNB:
The unauthorized withdrawals made by Carmen Layug in connection with Foreign Currency Deposit "AND" joint account would not have been consummated if only the PNB, Guagua Branch through its subordinate staff did not extend its clear cooperation and participation to the accomplishment of the subject disputed withdrawals. By its very nature, [petitioner] PNB violated its own Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in matters of withdrawal wherein forgetting that Foreign Currency Deposit No. 1458/390-700909-1 is "AND" joint account they allowed Carmen Layug to cause all the unauthorized withdrawals without the required knowledge and consent of [respondent] Amelia Mañalac as her co-depositor. With this unjustifiable actuation on the part of the bank personnel which they willingly extended to Carmen Layug, the Court rules and so holds that a plain connivance exists between [Layug and PNB] that deprived [Mañalac] of her money. It may be true that in this case, defendant Carmen Layug appropriated for herself alone the money deposit covered by numerous unauthorized withdrawals. But all these things made possible because the [petitioner] PNB as depository bank forget to honor their solemn obligation to safeguard the money of [Mañalac] herein as depositor (Art. 1972, Civil Code of the Phils., R.A. No. 386). 7
In the end, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Mañalac] and against [Layug and PNB], by:
1. Ordering [Layug and PNB], jointly and severally, to pay [Mañalac] the sum of SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE DOLLARS and FIFTY-NINE Cents ($6,571.59) or its equivalent in Philippine Currency, plus interest computed from the filing of this case until fully paid;
2. Ordering [Layug and PNB], jointly and severally, to pay [Mañalac] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) representing attorneys fees; and,
3. Cost of suit. 8 aDSIHc
Both PNB and Mañalac filed their respective appeals before the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision dated April 13, 2010, the Court of Appeals ruled that Mañalac did not authorize any withdrawal from the FCD joint account; that Mañalac's alleged signatures on the 11 withdrawal slips were evidently forged when compared to Mañalac's authentic signatures on the ledger and 12 personal checks; 9 that PNB failed to exercise the required diligence to detect Mañalac's forged signatures on the 11 withdrawal slips; that PNB is liable for the unauthorized withdrawals made by Layug from the FCD joint account in the total amount of $14,918.72; that there was no evidence of conspiracy and connivance between Layug and PNB; and that the RTC was correct in finding Mañalac entitled to attorney's fees as she was compelled to litigate to protect her interest, but not to moral and exemplary damages since no bad faith could be attributed to PNB.
The dispositive portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 53 in Civil Case No. G-3486 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as follows: [Layug and PNB] are held jointly and severally liable for $14,918.72, the total amount of deposit withdrawn from FCD 390-700909-1 plus interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the filing of the complaint until paid in full. 10
Unsatisfied, PNB filed this Petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO RESPONDENT'S INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND IN RULING THAT THE SIGNATURE OF RESPONDENT IS A FORGERY, CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT BASED ON INFERENCES WHICH ARE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN AND ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, TO WIT; A) IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE QUESTIONED WITHDRAWALS, AND B) IN FINDING PETITIONER PNB NEGLIGENT IN APPROVING THE WITHDRAWALS MADE FROM THE SUBJECT JOINT ACCOUNT. 11
The Petition is devoid of merit.
The initial issue for our determination is whether or not the prosecution was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that Mañalac's signatures on the withdrawal slips were forged.
Said issue is factual in nature because it requires a re-evaluation of the evidence at hand. Settled is the rule that where the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are at variance, we will review the evidence on record in order to arrive at the correct findings. 12
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. The one who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged. 13
It is well-settled that the presentation of handwriting experts is not mandatory or indispensable in establishing forgery. In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, 14 the Court pronounced that:
It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the NBI and the PC, are not binding upon courts. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.
Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. In an earlier case, this Court explained as follows:
". . . A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny. The judge cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert. In the case of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals (citing the case of Alcon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 833), the Court held that the authenticity of signatures
'. . . is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.'
"A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity . . ."
Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge."
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals each accordingly made its own examination and comparison of Mañalac's disputed signatures on the withdrawal slips vis-à-vis her genuine signatures on the ledger and 12 personal checks; but they arrived at divergent conclusions. While the RTC found that "the writing style and stroke, . . . are apparently similar in all aspects," the Court of Appeals held that there are marked or conspicuous differences between the two sets of signatures. TIADCc
After our own examination and comparison of the signatures, we are in full accord with the following observations of the Court of Appeals:
Anent [Mañalac's] claim that the signatures appearing in the withdrawal slips purportedly hers are false and fictitious, it is the observation of this Court upon a comparison of the signatures appearing in the withdrawal slips and the specimen signatures of [Mañalac] in the ledger that a marked difference exists between the said signatures contrary to the findings of the trial court . . .:
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, the strokes of [Mañalac's] signature in the ledger are different from the way the signatures in the withdrawal slips were made. If further compared with [Mañalac's] signatures appearing in the 12 checks she issued to Layug for deposit in their joint FCD account, the difference becomes more conspicuous.
While at a glance the signatures may appear similar, a closer and harder examination would show that the different strokes of the signatures in the withdrawal slips cannot be said as mere variations from how [Mañalac] customarily signs her name. Neither could they be considered as normal deviations found in one's writing. Even one who is not an expert could readily discern that the signatures were signed by different persons. The most telling differences between the questioned signatures in the withdrawal slips and the standard signatures in the ledger lie in the manner of execution and connecting links of the letters in the signatures.
The signatures in the ledger as well as those in the 12 checks are more slanted than those appearing in the withdrawal slips. The latter are more upright than slanted. The manner in which the letter "A" in Amelia was written is also patently different from those in the ledger and the checks. In [Mañalac's] authentic signature the letter A in Amelia is long and elongated rather than round and plump as in the withdrawal slips. Further the starting point of the stroke in writing the letter A touches the starting point of the stroke in letter M. This is not the case in the signatures in the withdrawal slips where the loop in the letter A is similar to letter C.
It could also be observed that the connecting links of the letters in the signatures in the ledger and checks are distinct from those of the letters in the questioned ones. Further, the tail of the letter "C" in Mañalac is longer and with an upward stroke in [Mañalac's] authentic signatures while the same letter consist only of a short stroke in the withdrawal slips. These differences were most strikingly demonstrated in Exhibits "6" to "11" of [Layug and PNB] where the signatures appear to be printed rather than cursive. 15 cSEDTC
In addition, the "Z" for the initial of Mañalac's middle name on the withdrawal slips appeared to be written tentatively or unsteadily, and with the lower loop more rounded than those on the ledger and personal checks; in at least three withdrawal slips, the "1" in "Mañalac" was written as a straight vertical line, without the loop that was present in all of Mañalac's authentic signatures; and there is an easily discernible difference in the size of the letters with Mañalac's signatures on the personal checks boldly rising above the signature line, whereas those on the withdrawal slips being relatively smaller and scribbled close to the signature line. It bears to point out that Mañalac issued and signed the personal checks at about the same period of time she purportedly signed the withdrawal slips, i.e., 1994-1996, so the differences in the signatures on the two sets of documents could not be attributed to changes in Mañalac's handwriting through the passage of time.
Thus, we arrive at the same conclusion as the Court of Appeals that Mañalac's signatures on the withdrawal slips were forgeries. Apart from Mañalac's forged signatures on the withdrawal slips, Layug and PNB were not able to present any other evidence of Mañalac's knowledge and consent to Layug's withdrawals from the joint FCD account. In comparison, there were several other circumstances supporting Mañalac's allegation that she was totally ignorant about the withdrawals, as pointed out by the appellate court:
There is no question that a withdrawal from their joint FCD account could not be effected solely by Layug considering that the same is an "and account" whereby both or all the joint account holders must sign the withdrawal slip in order to effect a withdrawal.
From the correspondence between [Mañalac] and Layug, it is apparent that [Mañalac] did not know the true status of their joint account nor was she aware of the withdrawals made by Layug. In the text of the letters [Mañalac] sent to Layug, she kept requesting the latter to send her photocopy of their passbook for her to know how much money was already deposited in their joint account. In all her replies, Layug kept promising to send [Mañalac] photocopy of their passbook but never had she mentioned of any transactions made involving their joint account.
. . . Further, in Layug's letter addressed to [Mañalac] dated June 19, 1998 . . . she explicitly assured [Mañalac] that her money already amounted to $14,980.72. Adding the deposits made by [Mañalac] through Layug plus the interest thereon from the time the joint account was opened in 1992 until the last deposit made without deducting all the withdrawals therefrom would roughly total to the amount stated by Layug in her letter to [Mañalac]. However, as per their joint saving account passbook, it appears that the remaining balance of their deposit as of June, 1998 was only $238.82.
Layug's contention, therefore, that she was able to effect all the withdrawals because [Mañalac] gave her the authority to withdraw by leaving and sending her pre-signed withdrawal slips, does not inspire belief. In the first place, why did Layug tell [Mañalac] that their deposit with PNB already amounts to $14,980.72 when she should have informed the latter of their outstanding balance as of her last writing which was barely $238.82, if the latter was aware that withdrawals were made against their account? Secondly, Layug never sent a photocopy of their passbook to [Mañalac]. It was only in 1998 when [Mañalac] came home to the Philippines that she saw the passbook and its contents.
What strikes US further is that there was a time that [Mañalac] sent Layug an authorization letter for the latter to make a withdrawal in June 1995 for she was then in dire need of the money. If [Mañalac] truly authorized the previous withdrawals and has customarily sent pre-signed withdrawals slips to Layug to facilitate their transactions with PNB, why would [Mañalac] sent Layug such authorization letter instead of simply sending her a pre-signed withdrawal slip to easily effect a withdrawal from their joint account.
A perusal of the record reveals that the only authorization given by [Mañalac] to Layug to withdraw from their joint FCD account was the one dated June 26, 1995 attached to [Mañalac's] letter to Layug of even date. A follow-up letter dated August 9, 1995 was also sent by [Mañalac] to Layug reiterating her request contained in her June 26, 1995 letter. Quoted hereunder is the pertinent portion of the letter which states, that; SDAaTC
". . . Chu, kanya sumulat ulit ako so iyo dahil hinihintay ko yong teller check na pinawi-widraw ko sa P.N.B. Dollar deposit lahat dahil kailangan na kailangan ko hinulog ko yung registered letter para sa iyo na may kalakip na $50 dollars para sa mga pinamimisa mo na kasali ako noong July 26, 1995 bakit hanggang ngayon hindi ko pa natatanggap, magbabayad ako ng matrikula ni Alice $3,000 dollars malapit na ang pasukan Sept at para sa kasal ni Arnold Sept din . . . .
In response thereto, Layug sent [Mañalac] a letter dated October 22, 1995 informing the latter that the authorization letter she sent her to withdraw from their joint account was not honored by the bank notwithstanding the fact that Layug was her co-depositor in the said joint "and account." Layug also informed [Mañalac] that she was not able to withdraw the money and purchase a teller's check for [Mañalac], thus —
". . . iyong nirerequest mong teller's check ay hindi puwede iyon kahit binigyan mo ako ng written authorization. Sa mga bangko ay hindi nila pinaniniwalaan ang mga sulat dahil madali lang daw gawin kagaya noong pinadala mo sa akin. Dapat ay ikaw mismo ang magwithdraw sa mga pera mo. Kahit joint tayo doon sa libreta ay hindi naman ako puwedeng magwithdraw." . . . .
However, this is not the true reason why Layug was not able to withdraw. In fact she never presented the authorization letter sent by [Mañalac] to PNB for the simple reason that the balance in their joint FCD account that time was far below the amount being requested by [Mañalac]. She concealed this truth from the latter. Quoted hereunder is Layug's testimony on this matter, viz. —
Q Madam Witness, by virtue of that alleged authorization were you able to withdraw from the PNB?
A No, I was not able to withdraw, sir, because in the letter she told me to withdraw all which means we will close the joint account, sir.
COURT:
Q In other words, Madam Witness, you did not make use of this?
A I did not, sir.
ATTY. TORNO:
Q Aside from these letters, did you receive any other letters from [Mañalac] regarding your account with the PNB?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you kindly show to us the said letter?
ATTY. TORNO:
- Witness is handling to this presentation a letter dated August 9, 1995, which we request to be marked as our Exhibit "17-Layug", Your Honor. And the envelope of the said letter as Exhibit "17-a-Layug."
COURT
- Mark them accordingly.
ATTY. TORNO:
Q What is this particular letter all about, Madam Witness?
A She asked me to withdraw from our joint account, sir.
Q For what purpose, Madam Witness?
A For the matriculation of her daughter Alice, sir.
Q Were you able to withdraw?
A At this time, I was not able to withdraw the three thousand, sir, because the balance in the joint account is (sic) not three thousand anymore. So I sent her a letter and told her that the balance was not three thousand so I was not able to withdraw the three thousand from our joint account.
COURT:
Q In other words, Madam Witness, you were not able to withdraw by virtue of this alleged letter of authorization?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you consult the bank about that authorization?
A Yes, sir, when we went in the bank last year November 23.
Q So it was only in 1998 that this letter of authorization was presented to the bank, is that right?
A Yes, sir, when we had problem with the bank. When she was complaining with the bank.
Q How did you know now that you were not allowed to withdraw three thousand dollars with that authorization alone?
A When she asked me to withdraw three thousand dollars in our joint account, sir, I was not able to withdraw three thousand dollars because the balance in the passbook is (sic) not anymore three thousand, sir.
Q Is it mentioned there that you should withdraw three thousand, Madam Witness? acEHCD
A No, in the other letter, sir.
Q What date was that?
A August 9, 1995, sir" (Underscoring Ours)
While Layug testified that she wrote [Mañalac] a letter telling her that she was not able to withdraw because the balance of their FCD account was not $3,000.00, in her response letter to [Mañalac] dated October 22, 1995, as quoted above, she stated otherwise. To stress, the authorization letter dated June 26, 1995 was never presented in 1995 but was only presented to the bank in November, 1998 when [Mañalac] complained about Layug's withdrawals because she was misled by Layug into believing that her money with PNB was still intact. 16
We must now determine the liability of PNB to Mañalac for the unauthorized withdrawals from the joint FCD account.
Although there is no evidence at all of conspiracy between Layug and PNB, the bank, in allowing the withdrawals from the joint FCD account based on the forged withdrawal slips, is still liable to Mañalac for breach of contract due to negligence or culpa contractual.
The contract between the bank and the depositor is governed by the provision of the Civil Code on simple loan, based on Article 1980 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.
There is a debtor-creditor relationship between a bank and its depositor, with the bank as the debtor and the depositor as the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings or current deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of the parties. 17
In Philippine National Bank v. Pike, 18 we discussed the degree of diligence required of banks, thus:
With banks, the degree of diligence required, contrary to the position of petitioner PNB, is more than that of a good father of a family considering that the business of banking is imbued with public interest due to the nature of their functions. The stability of banks largely depends on the confidence of the people in the honesty and efficiency of banks. Thus, the law imposes on banks a high degree of obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791, which took effect on 13 June 2000, makes a categorical declaration that the State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance.
We stressed further in The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals 19 that:
This fiduciary relationship means that the bank's obligation to observe "high standards of integrity and performance" is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Article 1172 of the New Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a family. . . . .
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. Article 2180, paragraph (5) of the same Code likewise provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Moreover, we had previously ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to prove the negligence of such employer. 20 Herein, the Court of Appeals aptly adjudged the negligence of PNB, as follows:
PNB's claim that the withdrawals made by Layug were duly authorized by [Mañalac] was based on the premise that [Mañalac's] signatures in the withdrawal slips are similar to those appearing on the ledger. This fact, however, is belied by the same evidence that PNB and Layug presented to support their claim. As earlier discussed, the signatures in the withdrawal slips are different from those in the ledger. Banks are encouraged to exercise care in the comparison of the signatures against those on the signature cards they have on file. "By the nature of its functions, a bank is required to take meticulous care of the deposits of its clients, who have the right to expect high standards of integrity and performance from it. Among its obligations in furtherance thereof is knowing the signatures of its clients." SDHTEC
PNB, therefore, can not find shelter in the fact that it observed the standard operating procedures of the bank in approving withdrawals to escape liability. The evidence plainly shows that its officers failed to properly verify the signatures of the depositors and to detect the differences between the signatures on the withdrawal slips and those in the ledger. The failure of its employee to exercise the required diligence makes the bank liable for any wrong payment made against the deposits of its clients.
For the negligence of its employees/officers in failing to detect the obvious forgery of Mañalac's signatures on the withdrawal slips, PNB should bear the loss and pay back, jointly and severally with Layug, $14,918.72 (the total amount of unauthorized withdrawals from the joint FCD account) to Mañalac.
However, we modify the interest rates imposed in accordance with our ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames. 21 Since the deposit with PNB is considered a loan or forbearance of money, and absent any contractual stipulation on interest, the interest rate of 12% is applicable from the date of judicial demand until June 30, 2013; and then the interest rate of 6% is applicable from July 1, 2013 until full payment of the $14,918.72.
The award of attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was not challenged by either of the parties. We also find no reason to reverse the same when undoubtedly, in this case, the bad faith of Layug in presenting the forged withdrawal slips and the negligence of PNB to allow the unauthorized withdrawals based on the forged withdrawal slips compelled Mañalac to seek redress from the courts and incur expenses. Attorney's fees may be awarded under the Civil Code where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered, 22 even if moral and exemplary damages are unavailing. 23
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 13, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72482 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Carmen Z. Layug and the Philippine National Bank are ORDERED to jointly and severally pay Amelia Z. Mañalac the following amounts: (a) US$14,918.72, the total amount of unauthorized withdrawals from FCD 390-700909-1, or its equivalent in Philippine Currency, subject to interest of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint with the Regional Trial Court until June 30, 2013 and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction of the same; and (b) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 9-25; penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Manuel M. Barrios concurring.
2. Id. at 27-28.
3. Id. at 123-133; penned by Judge Isagani N. Palad.
4. Id. at 10-11.
5. Id. at 130-131.
6. Id. at 131-132.
7. Id. at 132.
8. Id. at 133.
9. The checks were issued on various dates from 1992 to 1997 by Mañalac for different amounts (ranging from $200.00 to $3,000.00), drawn on her joint account with her husband with the Hudson City Savings Bank, and paid to the order of Layug. Stated in the "Memo" portion of the checks were the phrases "deposited to PNB," "deposit PNB," or "PNB deposit."
10. Rollo, p. 24.
11. Id. at 39-40.
12. Chiang Yia Min v. Court of Appeals, 407 Phil. 944, 958 (2001).
13. Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015, 746 SCRA 189, 198-199.
14. 432 Phil. 895, 907-908 (2002).
15. Id. at 20-21.
16. Id. at 15-19.
17. BPI Family Bank v. Buenaventura, 508 Phil. 423, 435 (2005).
18. 507 Phil. 322, 340-341 (2005).
19. 457 Phil. 688, 706 (2003).
20. Campo v. Camarote and Gemilga, 100 Phil. 459 (1956).
21. 716 Phil. 267, 282-283 (2013).
22. Art. 2208 of the Civil Code.
23. Carlos v. Sandoval, 508 Phil. 260, 294 (2005); Escobin v. National Labor Relations Commission, 351 Phil. 973, 100 (1998).