Philippine Merchant Marine Academy v. Bulangit
This is a civil case regarding a petition for certiorari filed by the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) against Teresita F. Bulangit and the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The issue is whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in nullifying Bulangit's 90-day preventive suspension. The Supreme Court ruled that PMMA availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the CSC's ruling, as a preventive suspension order is interlocutory in nature and not appealable. PMMA should have filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals, not directly with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts to free itself from unnecessary cases and to deal with more essential tasks. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
ADVERTISEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 207103. June 17, 2019.]
PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY, petitioner, vs.TERESITA F. BULANGIT AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 17, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 207103 (Philippine Merchant Marine Academy vs. Teresita F. Bulangit and Civil Service Commission)
This is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated December 3, 2012 and Resolution 3 dated March 18, 2013 of the respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) nullifying the Resolution 4 dated July 19, 2012 of the CSC Regional Office No. III of San Fernando City, Pampanga (CSCRO III), placing respondent Teresita F. Bulangit (Bulangit) under a ninety (90)-day preventive suspension.
The Factual Antecedents
Bulangit a professor of the petitioner, Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) called a meeting sometime in March 2009 with some first class (4th year College Level) and third class (2nd year College Level) students/cadets from the Cordillera Region to inform them of the field trip of the PMMA faculty to Sagada, Mountain Province on April 18 to 21 of 2009. During the meeting, the first class cadets volunteered to contribute Seven Hundred Pesos (P700.00) for the cost of hiring mini buses from Banaue, Ifugao to Sagada, Mountain Province, as a sign of gratitude to their professors.
Later on, the Acting Dean of CMT, Larry V. Gonzales, denied having authorized any collection through voluntary or compulsory contribution from the students for the planned faculty field trip. Engineer Ronald D. Barro, the Acting Dean of College of Marine Engineering (CME), also denied that he gave Bulangit authorization to collect money from the students/cadets.
Thus, on September 26, 2011, an administrative case for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service was filed against Bulangit for the unauthorized collection of a sum of money from the PMMA students/cadets for the planned faculty field trip of the PMMA. 5
On February 22, 2012, the CSCRO III received an urgent motion for the issuance of a preventive suspension order against Bulangit during the pendency of the formal investigation of the administrative case against her in order to preclude the possibility of exerting undue influence on the possible witnesses. In order to prove moral ascendancy and undue influence of Bulangit to the cadet/student witnesses, PMMA presented letter of sympathy and support from Bulangit's previous cadets/students and sought Affidavits of Desistance from cadets/students witnesses who participated in the faculty field trip.
On July 19, 2012, the CSCRO III issued a Resolution 6 which placed Bulangit under a 90-day preventive suspension. The CSCRO III ruled that the requirements under Section 26 (A) and (B) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) in issuing a preventive suspension order were present, since Bulangit was charged with offenses of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and her presence in the workplace may hamper the normal course of the investigation against her or that she may unduly influence or pressure the witnesses or tamper with the pieces of evidence that may be presented against her.
On appeal, Bulangit claimed that the preventive suspension order was issued without substantial evidence. Bulangit averred that the unfounded fear that she might exert undue influence over the cadets was without basis since the field trip was held in April 2009 and the involved cadets have graduated and already left the PMMA.
On December 3, 2012, the CSC issued a Decision 7 which nullified Bulangit's 90-day preventive suspension contained in a Resolution 8 of the CSCRO III dated July 19, 2012.
The CSC also ordered the reinstatement of Bulangit with payment of back salaries and other benefits from the time she was unlawfully suspended. The CSC held that the preventive suspension was not premised on the conditions under Section 26 (A) and (B) of the RRACCS, particularly the requirement that Bulangit will exert undue influence or pressure on the witness against her; or that Bulangit will tamper the evidence that may be used against her since there was no evidence showing that Bulangit still exercises ascendancy over the first and third class students/cadets and that she will pressure or unduly influence the witnesses.
The CSC also held that even granting that Bulangit tried to convince her former students to execute an Affidavit of Desistance, such affidavit or withdrawal of the complaint does not result in the outright dismissal of her administrative case nor will it discharge her from any administrative liability.
Thus, the CSC held that there was no basis to place Bulangit under preventive suspension since her presence in the workplace will not hamper the normal course of the investigation of the case and neither will it pressure or unduly influence the possible witnesses who will be presented against her.
PMMA filed its Motion for Reconsideration 9 and asserted that the CSC committed error in interpreting Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the RRACCS, in that the two (2) conditions before an employee be placed under preventive suspension were the following: 1) if he or she is administratively charged with an offense involving Dishonesty; Oppression; Grave Misconduct; Neglect in the performance of Duty; Administrative offenses which are punishable by dismissal from service on its second or third offense; or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his/her removal from the service; and 2) that an order of preventive suspension may be issued to temporarily remove the respondent from the scene of his/her misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance to preclude the possibility of: a) exerting undue influence or pressure on the witness against him/her; or b) tampering with evidence that may be used against him/her.
PMMA likewise asserted that only two (2) requirements need be shown before an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation may validly issue namely: 1) that the proper disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected officer or employee; and 2) that the charge involves either Dishonesty; Oppression; Grave Misconduct; Neglect in the performance of Duty; or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his/her removal from the service, as ruled in the case of Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigillo10 (TIDCORP case). PMMA further asserted that there were six (6) remaining students/cadets, under the tutelage and control of Bulangit by virtue of her present position in the PMMA as certified by the Office of the Registrar. Thus, PMMA claimed that Bulangit can easily use her position to influence the students/cadets which justifies her preventive suspension.
The CSC in a Resolution 11 dated March 18, 2013 denied PMMA's motion for reconsideration. The CSC ruled that PMMA attached the certification of the registrar issued on December 21, 2012 for the first time in its motion for reconsideration and PMMA still failed to show proof or evidence on how Bulangit can tamper evidence and exert influence or pressure to the six (6) cadets/students who are only potential witnesses to the administrative case.
Hence, PMMA filed this instant petition.
Issues
PMMA raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE RESPONDENT.
2. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BLATANTLY COMMITTED ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF LAW, SPECIFICALLY SECTION[S] 25, 26 AND 29 OF THE RRACCS IN RELATION TO SECTIONS 51 AND 52, BOOK 5 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 29[2]) AND THE RECENT EN BANC DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. ROSARIO MANALANG-DEMIGIL[L]O, G.R. NO. 176343, SEPTEMBER 18, 2012.
3. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION COMMITTED A HIGHY (SIC) ERRONEOUS PRESUMPTION IN DECLARING THAT MORE OR LESS THE STUDENTS/CADETS HAVE ALREADY GRADUATED FROM THEIR CLASS. 12
Ruling of the Court
The petition is unmeritorious.
PMMA availed of the wrong remedy to question the rulings of the CSC in nullifying Bulangit's 90-day preventive suspension. A preventive suspension order does not finally dispose of the case, and in effect, allows the case to proceed until the final adjudication thereof by the court. As such, it is merely interlocutory in nature and not appealable, and the immediate remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, PMMA should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail such order or resolutions before the Court of Appeals, and not directly with this Court. PMMA's direct recourse to this Court is in disregard of the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extraordinary, or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous, and impertinent cases and, thus, afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. 13 In short, to warrant a direct recourse to this Court, PMMA must show exceptional and compelling reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. 14 This PMMA failed to do and warrants the dismissal of its petition.
In addition, the Court of Appeals takes cognizance of a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction as provided under Section 4 15 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In fact, the decision rendered by the CSC on the merits is appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, it is also worthy to note that this case is ancillary to the main case of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service filed against Bulangit docketed as CSC R3-D-10-0713 which was decided by the CSC CSCRO III with Decision No. 14-0003 dated January 13, 2014 and exonerated her of the charges. 16 The same was likewise affirmed by the CSC in a Decision No. 14-0464 dated June 20, 2014 17 and Resolution No. 1401397 dated October 1, 2014, 18 which found her not guilty of the charges. The CSC found that no evidence was presented by the PMMA to prove that Bulangit unduly prejudiced the public service when she called the cadets/students to a meeting relative to their field trip to Sagada and that the cadets/students voluntarily contributed P700.00 as an expression of their gratitude to the faculty members of PMMA for educating them, based on their joint affidavits and testimonies.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 8-27.
2.Id. at 79-86.
3.Id. at 113-118.
4.Id. at 33-36.
5.Id. at 37-38.
6.Id. at 33-36.
7.Id. at 79-86.
8.Id. at 33-36.
9.Id. at 87-96.
10. 695 Phil. 152 (2012).
11.Rollo, pp. 113-118.
12.Id. at 17-18.
13.Heirs of Jose M. Derecho v. Manuel Duro, G.R. No. 240295, March 27, 2019.
14.Rayos, et al. v. The City of Manila, 678 Phil. 952 (2011), citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, 495 Phil. 422, 432 (2005).
15.Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (As amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, took effect on September 1, 2000) (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
16. Rollo, pp. 227-236.
17. Id. at 237-245.
18. Id. at 246-254.
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