EN BANC
[UDK 17606. June 21, 2021.]
PEPE AND PILAR, petitioners,vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedJUNE 21, 2021, which reads as follows:
"UDK 17606 (Pepe and Pilar vs. Executive Secretary and the Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases). — This resolves the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 1 and Motion for Leave to Proceed Pseudonymously, to File the Petition Electronically, and to Give Due Course to the Petition 2 (subject motion) both dated May 12, 2022 and filed by petitioners under the pseudonym 'Pepe and Pilar' (petitioners), assailing and seeking the nullification of the following:
i. Executive Order No. (EO) 168, series of 2014, 3 which created the Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases in the Philippines (IATF-MEID);
ii. Sections A, B, C, D, F, and G of IATF-MEID Resolution No. 148-B, 4 series of 2021, which state:
IATF-MEID Resolution No. 148-B, series of 2021
A. In areas where there are sufficient supplies of COVID-19 vaccines as determined by the National Vaccines Operation Center (NVOC), all establishments and employers in the public and private sector shall require their eligible employees who are tasked to do on-site work to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Eligible employees who remain to be unvaccinated may not be terminated solely by reason thereof. However, they shall be required to undergo RT-PCR tests regularly at their own expense for purposes of on-site work. Provided that, antigen tests may be resorted to when RT-PCR capacity is insufficient or not immediately available.
B. As a condition for continuing their operations, public transportation services in the road, rail, maritime, and aviation sector, shall require all their eligible workers to be fully vaccinated.
C. Public and private establishments, even if not required by the Guidelines on the Implementation of Alert Level Systems for COVID-19 Response in Pilot Areas to accommodate only fully vaccinated individuals, may nonetheless validly refuse entry and/or deny service to individuals who remain to be unvaccinated, or are merely partially vaccinated, despite being eligible for vaccination. Provided that frontline and emergency services shall continue to render assistance to all persons regardless of vaccination status.
D. Local Government Units (LGUs) are strongly enjoined to issue orders or ordinances to ramp up demand for vaccination by, among others, providing incentives for fully vaccinated individuals, and for business establishments which institute measures that promote vaccination among their employees and clients, and to the extent allowed by law, requiring proof of vaccination before individuals and/or entities may undertake or qualify for certain activities.
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F. In all of the foregoing, only the presentation of a medical clearance issued by a Municipal Health Office, City Health Office, and/or Provincial Health Office or birth certificate, as the case may be, shall serve as sufficient and valid proof of ineligibility for vaccination.
G. All Government Agencies are hereby enjoined to implement measures prioritizing fully vaccinated individuals availing of government programs and services.
iii. Sections B (5) and B (6) of IATF-MEID Resolution No. 149, 5 series of 2021, which read:
IATF-MEID Resolution No. 149
B. The recommendations of the Technical Working Group are ratified, the specifics of which are as follows:
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5. In furtherance of IATF Resolution No 148-B (s. 2021) providing for the implementation of measures to increase demand for COVID-19 vaccinations but except when all the onsite employees/workers of an establishment are required under the Alert Level System Guidelines to be fully vaccinated, all partially vaccinated employees in the public and private sector tasked to do onsite work need not undergo regular RT-PCR test at their own expense, as long as their second dose is not yet due pursuant to the interval prescribed for the brand of vaccine received as first dose.
6. To clarify the requirement of regular RT-PCR tests for purposes of onsite work, its frequency shall be construed as that determined by the employer but which should be at least once every two weeks.
Petitioners directly filed their petition and subject motion before the Court seeking redress to be free from unlawful government intrusion and illegal official action. At the outset, petitioners, through the subject motion, request the Court that they be allowed to litigate under the pseudonym 'Pepe and Pilar' and that all pleadings and service of notices be coursed through electronic mail, citing exceptional circumstances justifying their request, to wit: (i) reasonable fear of threats, harassment, reprisals or severe retaliatory harm, whether physical or mental, from either the supporters of the government or private interests, if petitioners' identities will be revealed; (ii) lack of any compelling interest from the public to know their identities; (iii) the issues presented in the petition are purely legal in nature, making petitioners' identities irrelevant and unimportant; (iv) there is a strong public interest in determining whether the challenged issuances are within the bounds of the law and the Constitution; (v) no harm, prejudice or disadvantage will be caused to respondents if petitioners will be allowed to litigate pseudonymously; and (vi) petitioners have no illegitimate or ulterior motive in filing the instant petition as their sole purpose is to prevent social injustice and abuse of basic human rights. 6
Petitioners further allege that the above-quoted EO and IATF Resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion and should be declared unconstitutional, null and void, and without legal effect for the following reasons:
First, the President has no power to create a public office, such as the IATF-MEID, as this power is exclusively lodged with the Congress. Petitioners argue that in any case, even EO 292, 7 series of 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, does not sanction the creation of the IATF-MEID, claiming that the President does not have the inherent power to reorganize the entire Executive branch nor can the task force's creation be justified under the President's power of control over the Executive Department. Thus, EO 168, series of 2014, which created the IATF-MEID should be declared null and void. 8
Second, the implementation of IATF-MEID Resolutions, issued since 2020, specifically the above-quoted portions of IATF-MEID Resolution No. 148-B, series of 2021, which curtail personal liberties of individuals and require mandatory compliance, is regulatory in nature and entails the exercise of police power, powers which were not validly delegated in favor of the IATF-MEID. Thus, Sections A, B, C, D, F, and G of IATF-MEID Resolution No. 148-B, series of 2021, should be declared null and void. 9
Third, anent the above-cited provisions of IATF-MEID Resolution Nos. 148-B and 149, series of 2021, petitioners contend that these provisions reveal a clear and unmistakable effort to discriminate against unvaccinated individuals. According to petitioners, these provisions also violate the equal protection clause under the Constitution. 10
Finally, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction, justifying that all the requirements for their issuance are present. Hence, the IATF-MEID must be restrained from exercising its duties and functions and from implementing the above-quoted provisions of its Resolutions 148-B and 149. 11
After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present petition, DENY the motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously, and DENY the application for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction.
At the outset, the following procedural defects and non-compliance with the Rules of Court warrant the outright dismissal of the instant petition:
(i) lack of names of all the petitioners in violation of Rule 46;
(ii) failure to pay docket and other fees in violation of Section 5, Rule 64 and Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56;
(iii) insufficiency of the petition in form as it lacks verification and certification against forum-shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 64 in relation to Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7; and
(iv) violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
In a plethora of cases, the Court has pronounced that the rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. 12 These rules must be complied with and shall not be relaxed just to cater to the pleas of the party litigants. In this petition, there appears to be no legal and factual basis to grant the motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously. In the subject motion and petition, petitioners primarily cite their reasonable fear of threats, harassment, reprisal, or severe retaliatory harm to justify the grant of the subject motion. While We do not intend to invalidate these fears, they appear to be theoretical, not grave, imminent, or real. In addition, there appears to be no legal basis, either under the law, jurisprudence or relevant rules to grant petitioners' plea to litigate pseudonymously.
It is rudimentary that courts acquire jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees. 13 The mere invocation that the petition is impressed with public interest, as in the instant case, is not sufficient to exempt petitioners from the mandatory payment of docket fees. In addition, petitioners' direct resort to this Court is in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which requires that recourse must first be obtained from lower courts sharing concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. 14 Based on the allegations in the petition, We are not convinced that there exists a special reason for the invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction in issuing the writs of certiorari and prohibition. This Court could not simply give due course to all petitions where original jurisdiction over the matter is shared with the lower courts as it will unnecessarily clog this Court's docket and exhaust resources that may be better utilized to resolve more pressing concerns. 15 Failing to provide any compelling reason to warrant the liberal application of all these rules, the instant petition must perfunctorily be dismissed.
Even if the procedural requirements are to be relaxed, the petition should likewise be dismissed for being substantially infirm. Petitioners' choice to file the instant petition pseudonymously and their failure to allege concrete facts preclude the Court from exercising its power to review this case on the merits.
Fundamentally, for this Court to exercise the immense power that enables it to undo the actions of the other government branches, it is required that there be an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination, among other requisites. 16 We find that there is no actual case or controversy presented which may warrant the exercise of Our power of judicial review. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 17 There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 18 The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination. 19 In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate how they were adversely affected by or how their legal rights had been violated by the subject IATF Resolutions such that it would warrant judicial review. 20 Petitioners' mere allegation of the unconstitutionality of EO 168 and the subject IATF Resolutions is not sufficient to warrant the Court's exercise of its judicial power of review. 21 In addition, a cursory review of the petition will show that petitioners failed to adduce sufficient and concrete facts to enable Us to intelligently adjudicate the issues presented. As such, their petition may be considered to be based on purely abstract or hypothetical grounds, warranting its outright dismissal. 22 Verily, for the same reasons, petitioners failed to show that they possess the legal standing 23 to file the instant petition.
In view of the foregoing, We deem it apt to no longer discuss the arguments raised in this petition. Furthermore, as a consequence of the dismissal of the instant petition, petitioners' prayer for the issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction must likewise fail for lack of legal and factual basis. 24 TROs and/or writs of preliminary injunction are ancillary remedies which cannot survive without the principal action. 25
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously and the application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction are DENIED." (59)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MARIFE M. LOMIBAO-CUEVASClerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 11-27.
2.Id. at 7-10.
3. CREATING THE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN THE PHILIPPINES, Approved on May 26, 2014.
4. Approved on November 11, 2021.
5. Approved on November 18, 2021.
6. Culled from the subject motion, rollo, pp. 7-9.
7. INSTITUTING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, APPROVED on July 25, 1987.
8.Rollo, pp. 17-18.
9.Id. at 19-21.
10.Id. at 21-24.
11.Id. at 25-26.
12.Abadilla v. Spouses Obrero, 775 Phil. 419, 426-427 (2015); Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 646 Phil. 617, 627 (2010); and Tible & Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association, 574 Phil. 20, 37-38 (2008).
13.Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Valdez, 566 Phil. 443, 450 (2008).
14. See Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019, 896 SCRA 213, 267-271; and The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 238 (2018).
15.Santos v. Gabaen, G.R. No. 195638, March 22, 2022.
16. In Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019, 917 SCRA 197, 227, the Court enumerated the following requisites for the exercise of the Court's power of judicial review: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination; (2) the parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; (3) the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, thus ripe for adjudication; and (4) the matter of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case, or that constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case.
17.Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 589 Phil. 387, 481 (2008).
18.Id.
19.Id.
20. See Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Medialdea, 842 Phil. 747 (2018); and Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019, 899 SCRA 492, 523 and 555.
21.Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III, id. at 523.
22. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 480-481 (2010), the Court held:
'Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events. Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application for a license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections, to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.' (Citations omitted)
23. See Garin v. City of Muntinlupa, G.R. No. 216492, January 20, 2021; and Francisco v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
24. See United Alloy Phils. Corp. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 773 Phil. 242, 257-259 (2015); and Manzala v. Commission on Elections, 551 Phil. 28, 36 (2007).
25. See Evy Construction and Development Corporation v. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation, 820 Phil. 123, 135 (2017); United Alloy Phils. Corp. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 773 Phil. 242, 257-259 (2015); and Manzala v. Commission on Elections, supra.