SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 253366. September 13, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. YYY, 1accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 13 September 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 253366 (People of the Philippines v. YYY). — On appeal is the October 14, 2019 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 11021, which affirmed with modification the March 16, 2018 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of __________, Laguna, Branch 54, in Criminal Case No. SC-12366 which found accused-appellant YYY (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353.
The Information 4 dated August 10, 2006 reads:
That sometime in March, 2006, in _____________________ 5 and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design by means of force and intimidation and taking advantage of the mental condition of the complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], 6 a 15-year old girl against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
During arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty." 8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution:
Sometime in March 2006, then 15-year old 9 private complainant AAA saw accused-appellant along the street while she was buying junk food. 10 Upon passing by accused-appellant's house, the latter called her and asked her to come inside his house. Upon AAA setting foot to his house, accused-appellant immediately locked the door and undressed himself. He asked her about her age and height and started to undress her. Then, accused-appellant made AAA lie down on a bench and went on top of her. He kissed her and forced his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant told her not to tell anyone about what happened. AAA cried and saw blood coming out. Accused-appellant wiped off the blood and asked her to dress up. Thereafter, AAA went home. 11
Her mother, BBB, 12 also testified that she found out her daughter was raped because the latter got pregnant. When she asked AAA about it, the latter told her that it was accused-appellant who forced himself upon her. After narrating what happened, AAA and BBB went to the police station to report the incident. BBB also accompanied AAA during her medical examination. After being examined by the doctor, BBB found out that AAA was sexually abused more than once. She further stated that AAA was taken to the National Center for Mental Health for mental examination for exhibiting behavior suggestive of a mental condition. 13 The Psychological Report dated August 16, 2006 14 was submitted into evidence reflecting that AAA's intellectual functioning falls below the Borderline level, with inherent potential along the Dull Normal range. 15
Dr. Ma. Cheryl Obcemea (Dr. Obcemea) performed a physical and gynecological examination on AAA. She found an old-healed laceration at five (5) and nine (9) o'clock positions in AAA's hymen and her vagina admits two (2) fingers with ease. 16 Dr. Obcemea reduced her findings in the Medico Legal Report 17 dated May 15, 2006.
Evidence for the Defense:
The defense presented the lone testimony of accused-appellant. In his testimony, accused-appellant denied raping AAA and claimed that they were in a relationship. In fact, he alleged that it was AAA who courted him. 18 He insisted that they had sexual intercourse several times because AAA would go to his house to ask for pocket money 19 and payment for their electricity bill. 20 He further claimed that they had sexual intercourse around twenty (20) times. 21
When asked why he engaged in sexual intercourse with AAA, accused-appellant answered, "Parang ginusto po ng Dios; Pinagtagpo kami sa aming bahay. Pag namatay ay muling nabubuhay. Yan ang nabasa ko sa Bibliya. Parang ganun." 22
When asked about AAA's mental deficiency, accused-appellant answered, "Mukha ngang may kulang, ma'am." 23 However, he denied taking advantage of AAA and forcing her to have sexual intercourse. 24
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
In its March 16, 2018 Decision, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. The fallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds accused [YYY] GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amount of Seventy-five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy-five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and Seventy-five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary damages, or a total of Two Hundred Twenty-five Pesos (P225,000.00) with an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until satisfaction of the award.
SO ORDERED. 25
Accused-appellant appealed 26 his conviction to the CA. He argued that the trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite AAA's incredible testimony and her dubious medico-legal certificate. He explained that AAA's testimony should be taken with a grain of salt because she is a mental retardate. He further claimed that AAA's direct testimony and sworn affidavit contradict each other. 27
Accused-appellant also argued that the Medico-Legal Report does not indicate fresh lacerations in AAA's hymen, thereby negating the latter's claim of rape. He posited that there should have been a fresh laceration if the rape indeed took place. 28
Lastly, he contended that the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death penalty is improper considering that the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of AAA's mental disorder during the commission of the crime was not alleged in the Information. 29
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
In its October 14, 2019 Decision, 30 the appellate court affirmed the RTC's Decision with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED.
Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated 16 March 2018 rendered by the RTC of ________, Laguna, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. SC-12366 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
We find appellant YYY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, No. 1 (b) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 and hereby SENTENCES him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility of parole.
Appellant is ORDERED to pay private complainant AAA: (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 31
Hence, accused-appellant elevated the matter before Us. 32
Issue
Whether accused-appellant is guilty of Qualified Rape.
Our Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, states that:
Art. 226-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
To sustain a conviction for Rape under the foregoing provision, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, (2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. 33 Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes rape, viz.:
A mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes rape[,] without requiring proof that the accused used force and intimidation in committing the act." Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim and the latter's mental retardation need to be proved. 34 (Citations omitted)
In a catena of cases, We ruled that findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, are generally binding upon this Court. 35 Here, it is undisputed that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, a mental retardate. What accused-appellant impresses upon this Court is that AAA, being a mental retardate, is incapable of giving a credible testimony.
We are not convinced.
It is a well-settled rule that the trial court's evaluation and conclusion on the credibility of witnesses are generally accorded great weight and respect and are binding and conclusive or even accorded finality if affirmed by the appellate court 36 because of its unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses. 37 Thus, it is in the best position to assess their credibility. 38 Here, We sustain the findings of the courts a quo that AAA is a credible witness. In any case, AAA's mental deficiency does not diminish her credibility as a witness. If a mental retardate is able to perceive and make known her perception to others, her testimony deserves full faith and credit. 39
In the case at bar, AAA's straightforward and categorical testimony is sufficient to support a verdict of conviction. In affirming the contents of her sworn affidavit during trial that accused-appellant indeed raped her, she could not help but cry as she recalled her harrowing experience. As held in People v. Urmaza: 40
It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it was shown that they could communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant's accusations, it lends even greater credence to her testimony, as someone feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused. 41 (Citations omitted) (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, AAA's allegation of rape is supported by the Medico-Legal Report. Contrary to accused-appellant's argument, the absence of fresh lacerations does not negate the fact of commission of rape. We note that the Medico-Legal Report is dated May 15, 2006 or about two months from the commission of the crime. Hence, it is possible that there are no longer fresh lacerations due to the passing of time from the alleged incident and AAA's gynecological examination. In any case, hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. 42
However, We agree with accused-appellant's contention that the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of AAA's mental condition during the commission of the crime was not alleged in the Information. As held in People v. Magabo: 43
Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime of rape qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death under Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353. An allegation in the information of such knowledge of the offender is necessary as a crime can only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. A contrary ruling would result to a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and hence a denial of due process. 44 (Citations omitted) (Emphasis supplied)
Here, there was no allegation in the Information that accused-appellant had knowledge of AAA's mental condition. Thus, notwithstanding proof that accused-appellant had knowledge of AAA's mental condition, he can only be held liable for Simple Rape.
Lastly, pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, 45 the Court hereby deletes the phrase "without eligibility for parole" in the penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant.
In line with recent jurisprudence, the monetary damages shall likewise be modified as follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. 46
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed October 14, 2019 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 11021 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant YYY is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE RAPE under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to PAY the private complainant AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED." (J. Rosario designated as additional Member per Special Order No. 2835 dated July 15, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Initials were used for the name of accused-appellant per Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 or Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances issued on September 5, 2017.
2.Rollo, pp. 3-16; penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Gabriel T. Robeniol.
3. CA rollo, pp. 51-58; penned by Presiding Judge Maria Jean T. Cajandab-Pamittan.
4. Records, p. 12.
5. Geographical location is blotted out pursuant to Supreme Court Amended Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017 or the Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.
6. "The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence against Women and their Children, effective November 15, 2004." (People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 [2011]).
7. Records, p. 1.
8.Id. at 28.
9. See Certificate of Live Birth, records, p. 5.
10. TSN, February 9, 2011, p. 4; TSN, September 12, 2011, p. 5.
11. TSN, March 13, 2013, pp. 3-7; See Salaysay ni AAA, records, p. 2.
12.Supra note 6.
13. TSN, April 14, 2016; See Salaysay ni BBB, records, p. 3.
14. Records, pp. 44-45.
15.Id. at 45.
16. TSN, August 1, 2007, pp. 6-10.
17. Records, p. 4.
18. TSN, April 20, 2017, p. 4.
19.Id. at 2.
20. TSN, December 14, 2017, p. 4.
21.Id.
22. CA rollo, p. 6.
23. TSN, December 14, 2007, p. 4.
24.Id. at 4-5.
25. CA rollo, p. 58.
26.Id. at 12.
27.Id. at 43-46.
28.Id. at 46-47.
29.Id. at 47.
30.Rollo, pp. 3-16.
31.Id. at 14-15.
32.Id. at 17.
33.People v. Suansing, 717 Phil. 100, 109 (2013) citing People v. Tablang, 619 Phil. 757, 766 (2009).
34.Id., citing People v. Paler, 637 Phil. 458, 464-465 (2010).
35.People v. Urmaza, 829 Phil. 324, 335 (2018).
36.People v. Manzano, 827 Phil. 113, 126 (2018).
37.People v. Dayaday, 803 Phil. 363, 370-371 (2017) citing People v. Nelmida, 694 Phil. 529, 556 (2012).
38.Id.
39.People v. Suansing, supra note 34.
40. 829 Phil. 324 (2018).
41.Id. at 339.
42.People v. Suedad, 786 Phil. 803, 813 (2016).
43. 402 Phil. 977 (2001).
44.Id. at 988-989; See People v. Dela Paz, 569 Phil. 684, 705 (2008).
45. Entitled "Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase 'Without Eligibility for Parole' in Indivisible Penalties" dated August 4, 2015.
46.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 849 (2016).